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This dissertation explores U.S. actions in the military “Surge” in Iraq from 2007-2008.  
Focus is on the entwined utilization of coercive and attractive power or smart power as an 
enabler of success and change from prior U.S. strategies in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  The 
analysis is based upon an extensive set of interviews with operational participants in the Surge 
from across the Executive Branch. Results show that smart power was an important element of 
the Surge and its use facilitated success, but that doing smart power was not a simple matter of 
achieving some mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, but rather effectively marshalling and combining 
attractive and coercive power resources to meet the problems at hand.  The lessons learned 
during the Surge of developing the right “smart power” synergy of hard and soft power can be 
utilized in current or future counterinsurgency or “near war” environments the United States may 
find itself in around the world. 
 The key contributor to this work was the interviewees themselves, who patiently 
answered my questions regarding events that happened over a decade ago.  The most fun part of 
this project was the hour (or two+!) spent doing live interviews with the people who actually 
made the Surge happen.  Often and unsurprisingly these individuals have subsequently gone on 
to bigger things, so their graciousness in volunteering their time as well as providing names of 
other people who could contribute made “snowballing” possible.  Thank you for providing me 
the opportunity to tell your story. 
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“Thinkers” and “doers” live in worlds with different solution sets.  It has been both my 
great challenge and great fortune to live in both worlds (albeit as with most hybrids, this is likely 
an admission that I am not particularly good at either).  The point most forcefully struck home 
when I began working as an adjunct professor at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, 
shortly after retiring from a 26-year active-duty military career.  In my first semester, I was given 
the honor of instructing their undergraduate Introduction to International Relations (IR) Theory 
course, where I must sadly confess that I probably learned more about IR theory than many of 
my students.   
One of the textbooks was the excellent Controversies in International Relations Theory 
by Charles Kegley.  In Chapter One, Kegley describes the four tasks of an IR theorist: describe, 
explain, predict and prescribe (or DEPP, as in Johnny.  Thank you, Dr Yetiv, for teaching me the 
value of acronyms as mnemonic aids).  As I attempted to describe these tasks to my students, I 
was struck by the fact that, during my military service as a staff planner I had also focused 
efforts on these four tasks.  The interesting insight to me was that the relative ratios of effort 
expended in academia and operations in each task varied greatly, almost to the point of being 
opposites. 
In an academic work such as this one, roughly 25% will be devoted to describing the 




will be devoted to explaining the situation, or the fifth “W” (Why).  Then the last chapter of the 
book, typically the shortest one, is devoted to both predicting and prescribing.  And of that, 
almost all the pages are prediction.  At most a page or two of the chapter was the writer saying 
what needed to be done about the situation. 
When working as a staff officer in a military contingency, the following reflects my all-
too-frequent experiences “downrange.”  I would walk into my bosses’ office and describe the 
problem (hypothetical) to him: “Sir, there is unrest in Anbar Province.”  He responds, “Okay 
J.R., what do you want me to do about it?”  Next, I explain the problem to him: “Sir, I think it is 
due to the upcoming elections.”  He responds, “Okay J.R., what do you want me to do about it?”  
Then I give my prediction of what could happen: “Sir, if the situation continues, it could 
negatively impact our operations in the area.”  For the third time, he responds, “Okay J.R., what 
do you want me to do about it?”  Finally, I give him a prescription: “Sir, I would recommend we 
develop some newspaper ads and radio spots to be broadcast in Anbar to publicize election 
events and registration requirements to counter the rumor mill.”  Then he would say, “Okay, 
route a staff package to me with your funding/resourcing requirements and I’ll sign it” 
(particularly in Special Operations units.  One great thing about working with them: they never 
blink at spending money).   
After that, the rest of my rotation would be implementing the advertising campaign.  If 
my time in-country were the aforementioned academic book, the first 30-page chapter was all 
four of the tasks in the DEPP acronym and the last 270 pages was implementation, a task not 
even conducted by the IR theoretician.   
This dichotomy was a continual source of frustration for me as a military officer.  When I 




deal of excitement as I read the” describe” opening and felt that the author was spot on in 
capturing the situation.  I got more excited as their “explanation” crystallized the situation in my 
mind and helped me appreciate situational nuances that until then had escaped me.  I was eagerly 
awaiting the final DEPP elements even as my concern mounted over their ability to give me a 
blueprint for success in the decreasing number of pages remaining. 
Then I reached that last chapter.  I skimmed through the predictions, which made sense to 
me, to get to the part where the author would finally tell me how to do my job.  Then I got to the 
last page (maybe two), which typically said something like “the UN should form a commission 
to further study this issue.”  What a gyp!  I felt like Ralphie in A Christmas Story after he saved 
his box tops to finally get his secret decoder ring and cracks the message played at the end of the 
Little Orphan Annie radio show to find out that the message is “Be sure to drink your Ovaltine.” 
  Even the civilian cultural experts hired by the military demonstrated similar challenges 
from the viewpoint of an implementer.  They were all dedicated, intelligent, well-meaning 
people; the problem was that if you asked them a question, they would come back to you three 
months later with a 50-page answer.  As a staff officer who has to answer a question from the 
commander at the evening update briefing on my single slide, this time frame and depth of 
analysis is not going to help me keep my job for another day (thank you for that line Colonel 
Becker).  I need the 80% solution you can give me right now, not the 95% solution you can give 
me next quarter.   
 On the other hand, academicians reading the above description of military planning 
should see red flags jumping off the page.  Our efforts were always hampered in two important 




 The military typically does not get involved in a region until after the crisis begins.  On 
9/11, the Department of Defense had three people who spoke Pashtu and/or Dari, the primary 
Afghan languages.  Training a new linguist takes a year.  Sending an officer or NCO to earn a 
master’s degree in a region of interest is going to take a year or more.  Adversaries and the 
domestic political constituency are not going to wait while the U.S. gathers sufficient 
information and experts to make a high-confidence plan.  As a result, commanders have little 
choice but to make the best decision possible based on the information and advice available to 
them. 
 High turnover also afflicts U.S. efforts to garner and retain expertise.  One year’s service 
is a long time in a combat environment for uniformed U.S. military personnel (civilians deploy 
for even shorter periods, typically a few months).  Consequently, just about the time the staff is 
getting to understand the environment and work effectively together, they start rotating out and 
the process begins anew. 
 Expertise was usually another planning shortfall.  The U.S. military wants its forces to be 
modular, i.e., they can deploy a military unit anywhere in the world and it will be able to perform 
the job, even if it is not “from there.”  That concept works well enough for a tank battalion or 
fighter squadron: changing their appearance to match the color scheme of the local flora and 
fauna will mostly do.   
However, this does not work as well with cultural/linguistic organizations.  The 4th 
Psychological Operations Group at Ft Bragg, North Carolina has several battalions grouped by 
region.  Members go through months of linguistic and cultural training before being assigned to 
their specific units.  I was a member of their 8th Battalion, tasked to supporting Central 




unit was supporting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan at a time when the other battalions were not 
supporting major military contingencies.  Even if we were augmented by members of other 
battalions, their value would be limited to us.  Spanish and Korean linguists, or scriptwriters who 
had studied Europe or Asia, could not simply be recast as South-West Asian experts with a fresh 
coat of paint. 
Even within 8th Battalion knowledge was compartmentalized.  We required linguists 
covering half a dozen major languages.  Our Urdu speaker was not going to be any help 
translating Arabic and vice versa.  I personally performed rotations in Afghanistan serving as a 
planning officer to operational staffs.  I was frequently looked to as a SME (subject matter 
expert) during planning and implementation.  I would respond that I was happy to offer my 
opinion, but that my field of study was the Middle East.  I would explain that Afghanistan was 
different from the Gulf Arabs: that it is a different culture, different language, even a different 
language group.  When I finished, they would say “Okay, so what do you think?” 
 In fairness to the leadership, they did not have a lot of other choices.  In either Iraq or 
Afghanistan, there might not be an officer on the staff with post-graduate work related to the 
region.  If there was a local or expatriate advisor available, they often lacked the security 
clearance needed to participate in extensive planning.  So yes, someone with a Top-Secret 
clearance who had studied anything within a thousand miles of the area of operation was in fact 
“close enough.”   
 The Middle East also demonstrated the challenges of coordinating and cooperating 
activities with a different culture (challenges which are bound to occur in any foreign 
environment: only the nuances of the challenges will change).  Interviewees will talk about how 




construction projects or budgetary expenditure could take weeks or months, creating problems 
for U.S. workers who then had to explain the delays to a Washington D.C. that was already 
impatient for results.   
Thinking an agreement meant prompt action was also a cultural gap.  Agreeing to do 
something is also just as important as actually doing it in much of the Middle East, a stand at 
odds with Americans who tend to be more results driven.  Particularly if their initial response to 
your request had been “That would be difficult,” there was probably a low likelihood that your 
wish would be fulfilled even if agreed to.1 
 Saving face was another challenge.  The Arabs are particularly reluctant to disagree with 
a superior.  This trait made it particularly difficult to get advice on courses of action.  My boss in 
Psychological Operations called it “yes yes.”  You would ask your interpreter what he thought of 
a draft leaflet or poster and he would say “Oh yes yes it looks very good.”  As an American I am 
probably more willing to accept criticism from a subordinate than they are used to.  Particularly 
so if the alternative is having my boss tell me it is a piece of garbage at the staff meeting after we 
disseminate 100,000 of them in the city and get the opposite effect of what we wanted.  It is a 
cultural roadblock difficult to surmount.  
 Coercive and attractive power as most visibly represented by the military and civilian 
sides respectively each have strengths and weaknesses.  An organization or society lacking one 
will not advance.  “Brains and brawn” are a powerful combination when utilized together.  One 
of the themes that came out of the research for this work was the importance of cooperation and 
coordination between the various agencies working in Iraq during the Surge.  With some 
flexibility, each can help to cover the weaknesses of the other and bring their strengths into play 






This work is an opportunity to hear and learn about the U.S. Surge in Iraq in 2007-2008 
directly from participants in that conflict.  Both military and civilians who helped make it 
possible were interviewed from an array of jobs and perspectives on the counterinsurgency effort 
there.  Grounded theory is utilized to identify common threads among the qualitative viewpoints 
of the participants who were selected and interviewed with a common question set based on 
referral sampling with previous interviewees recommending others for follow-on interviews. 
Problems besetting the previous effort in Iraq are recounted.  Some were problems 
internal to the U.S. government structure.  Some were external factors on the ground in Iraq or 
the surrounding region.  Some were unique to the cultural and sectarian situation in Iraq.  Most 
were nested into broader principles of defeating insurgents.  Planning for the change in strategy 
are discussed, including the publication of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  
Interviewees then describe how they implemented the new strategy and the changes that they 
observed.  They also provided a detailed account of their lessons learned and how these could 
assist future counterinsurgents. 
The Surge was not a magic potion.  Everything in Iraq was not being done wrong prior to 
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker arriving.  Everything in Iraq was not being done right 
after they arrived.  Fortuitous circumstances such as the Anbar Awakening and increases in oil 
prices augmented the change in strategy.  The people participating in the Coalition had been 
learning and adapting prior to 2007.  The Surge fostered and encouraged these initiatives with 
increases in both coercive and attractive force that produced a smarter synergy of power and 






Smart power was an important element of the Iraq Surge, effectively marshalling and 
combining attractive and coercive power resources to achieve success. Surge lessons can be 
utilized in current or future counterinsurgency environments. 
Research for this work primarily consisted of interviews with American participants in 
the Surge effort, including General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.  A mix of people from 
across the Executive Branch provided invaluable insights into the inner workings of the U.S. 
effort.  They believed that the establishment of security was a necessary precursor to developing 
the stability to allow stalled economic and political process to proceed.  This security could not 
be established by Iraqi Security Forces operating alone.  Cooperation in the form of improved 
training and establishment of Joint Security Stations provided the synergy needed to tame the 
violence in Baghdad through coercive measures, while arming and paying Sunni militias helped 
drive the Al-Qaeda presence out of Anbar Province. 
Interviewees saw the stabilization of Iraq as providing the environment to allow attractive 
initiatives to be more successful.  Improved cooperation between the various Coalition elements 
translated into more effective interaction with Iraqi military and government leaders.  Better 
reconstruction projects were mutually selected and effective oversight was established.  
Interviewees saw the Provincial Reconstruction Teams as helping enable political and economic 
contact with local leadership and creating an environment of trust and cooperation throughout 





THE SURGE IN BRIEF 
 
The Surge refers to the increase in capability and change in strategy that the Coalition of 
the Willing applied in Iraq beginning in early 2007 and lasting through the end of 2008.  
Additional military and civilian capabilities were added to the existing in-country strengths to try 
and stabilize a deteriorating security situation marked by sectarian violence and foreign-
supported insurgency.  Greater efforts were made to increase Iraqi formal and informal security 
force strength and work directly with Iraqi partners at all levels of the government. 
Violence and Coalition casualties initially rose as the increased military capability 
clashed with insurgents in strongholds that had been uncontested for years.  After a peak period 
they steadily decreased until they reached levels not seen since the initial stages of the invasion.  
A more assertive U.S. presence helped restart the political process in Iraq and turned to the 
reconstruction efforts need to maintain stability.  The calm would continue beyond the time 




 The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 after a military and political buildup that began in 
the wake of the Trade Tower terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.  The 
U.S. publicly put forward several reasons for the necessity of the attack, primarily featuring 
claims of Iraq retaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) equipment and capabilities, direct 
ties between the Iraqi government and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and changing the Iraqi 




was a challenging list of objectives, but not one that was necessarily impossible.  Prioritization of 
these objectives would change over time, particularly in the aftermath of the invasion when it 
was discovered how little WMD equipment or capability remained in Iraq.   
 The 2003 “shock and awe” campaign proved able to defeat Iraqi military forces and 
remove Saddam Hussein’s government from power with relative ease.  However, the military 
“light footprint” strategy implemented at the behest of senior U.S. leadership proved to be far too 
small to successfully occupy Iraqi after the invasion. Some pre-war critics of the small force size 
such as Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had envisioned this problem and thought the 
occupying force should be at least twice the size of the actual force allocation.  U.S. planners 
may have expected that “cutting off the head of the snake” would facilitate a quick transition to a 
more favorable government, hence occupation would be brief and shallow.  Instead, the U.S. 
found itself forced to deal with an insurgency movement centered on Sunni-held areas in western 
Iraq and including large numbers of foreign fighters.  The lack of occupying presence also 
contributed to a rise in fighting between Sunnis and Shia, as well as both sects fighting with (to a 
lesser degree) the Kurdish minority situated primarily in the north.   
 The original U.S. stabilization strategy emphasized working “by, with and through” Iraqi 
partners, hoping that indigenous capacity could be rapidly and effectively built up to meet 
political, social and security needs in Iraq and permit withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces.  This 
strategy was in line with U.S. thinking at that time that foreigners are an ineffective counter-
insurgency force for several reasons, including illegitimacy in the eyes of the local populace, 
inferior ability to gather intelligence on insurgent activity and serving as a spur to insurgent 
recruiting.  Successfully executing such a strategy would also reduce costs and casualties thus 




 The “by, with and through” strategy envisions a transition from hard to soft power whose 
focus is enhancing indigenous governance capabilities.  Civil Affairs forces would work to build 
up infrastructure, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs would help inform the populace 
of Iraqi programs and initiatives, and combat elements would dispatch large insurgent elements 
and train Iraqi security forces. 
 One of the most important assumptions of this strategy is that the indigenous populace 
will be able to create and maintain an effective, credible government.  This did not happen in 
Iraq.  Occupation planning may have been fueled by optimistic assessments.  U.S. leadership 
such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and key political appointees leaned heavily on 
the advice of exiled Iraqi Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress.  Intellectuals 
such as author and political commentator Fouad Ajami and journalist Jim Hoagland advocated 
for the Bush administration to take action, with little discussion of the ability of Iraq to 
reconstitute itself after an invasion.   
 This ability to self-rule was largely missing in Iraq by the middle of 2006.  Iraqi 
governance was weak, corrupt and proving unable to cope with the Sunni insurgency augmented 
by foreign fighters entering Iraq from throughout the Middle East and beyond.  This weakness 
and perception of favoritism towards the Shia in Iraq was also fueling sectarian violence between 
the suddenly dominant Shia and the disenfranchised Sunni minority, as well as the traditionally 
ostracized Kurdish minority located primarily in the north of Iraq.  Sectarian violence was 
particularly exacerbated by the bombing of the Shia al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on 22 
February 2006 and continued to increase in intensity throughout the remainder of the year. 
 This was the situation when General David Petraeus took command of Multi-National 




forces around Mosul and had been commended by Americans and Iraqis for his ability to 
stabilize his area of control and work cooperatively with the local Iraqi leadership, both national 
and local.  He wrote the book on counter-insurgency – literally.  Between his Mosul and MNF-I 
tours, he led the planning group at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center that promulgated Field 
Manual (FM) 3-24, US Army Counterinsurgency Handbook.  This was the first time in 20 years 
that the Army had published a field manual dedicated to counterinsurgency.  It cited successful 
counterinsurgency practices from several past thinkers, including David Galula, T.E. Lawrence 
and Carl von Clausewitz.  Nothing in the manual was particularly groundbreaking: the important 
thing was that it was promulgated and thus became U.S. military doctrine.  Foreshadowing of 
Petraeus’ MNF-I initiatives can be gleaned from FM 3-24 chapters titled “Unity of Effort: 
Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” “Intelligence in Counter-Insurgency” and 
“Developing Host Nation Security Forces.”   
 
A NEW PLAN 
 
 General Petraeus wanted to change the way the U.S. military was interacting with the 
Iraqi population.  However, this could not be accomplished without first taming both the 
insurgency and sectarian violence.  To do this, the simple fact was that even as Iraqi security 
forces were increased, more U.S. troops were needed.  General Petraeus had already convinced 
the U.S. leadership of this need, and in fact in January 2007 President Bush had already publicly 
announced his intention to send more U.S. forces to Iraq.  By December 2006 the U.S. force 
level had dropped to 128,000 troops.  The plan was to introduce one additional Army brigade 




a mix of infantry, heavy and Stryker (armored car) brigades, although their selection may have 
been based more on availability than desired capability.  They included: 
January 2007: 2nd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 
February 2007: 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 
March 2007: 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division 
April 2007: 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division 
May 2007: 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division 
 Force levels were also maintained by extending tours of units already in-country, 
particularly the Marines operating in Anbar Province.  At the peak of the Surge, General 
Petraeus commanded 166,000 troops.  This was the largest U.S. force level of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM, including the initial invasion, and represented an increase of about 30,000 troops 
over the force level prior to the Surge.  Both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and US 
Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad opposed the strategy, fearing that reintroduction of US forces 
would slow the development of the Iraqi Security Forces. 
 In addition to the increase in raw numbers, a change in types of forces also 
occurred.  GEN Petraeus specifically asked for 2 additional Civil Affairs battalions as well as 
PSYOP and Public Affairs force augmentation.  General Petraeus himself had a dedicated Public 
Affairs officer in addition to the one assigned to MNF-I headquarters as a whole. 
 As the reinforcements arrived in Iraq, they would become part of an overall force 
movement back into the urban areas, reversing the policy of General Casey.  They would be 
responsible for clearing out insurgent concentrations, then holding the terrain while Iraqi security 




outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods and conducting joint patrols to gain the confidence of the local 
residents and increase their forces’ intelligence capability.   
 These Iraqi forces would be part of the new approach to attracting the Iraqis to the new 
American presence.  Previously, the Americans had been advised to maintain a low profile as 
part of the “by, with and through” strategy wherein the preference was to have Iraqi leaders 
conducting photo ops and interviews.  Gen Petraeus changed this and encouraged his 
commanders to utilize their Public Affairs capabilities to communicate with the local populations 
as much as possible.  They were also utilized to resolve local disputes and forge connections 




 The Surge was not a “silver bullet” that brought stability to Iraq overnight.  In fact, 
Coalition deaths increased during the initial months (Mar-May 2007) of the Surge, a logical 
outcome when military forces move into areas controlled by the enemy.  General Petraeus’ 
strategy was to concentrate his reinforcements initially in the greater metropolitan area of 
Baghdad.  Joint patrolling with Iraqi Security Forces was more aggressive.  Outposts were 
established throughout the city to improve intelligence-gathering and improve Iraqi confidence 
in the U.S. presence.  “Jersey barriers” were erected along neighborhood sectarian fault lines by 
U.S. Army engineers.  These activities inevitably resulted in more frequent contact between U.S. 
forces and the insurgents.  The plan was that reducing insurgent capabilities would increase 




 The other major activity occurred in Anbar Province, where the Marines were able to 
effectively partner with the Sons of Iraq to push al-Qaeda out of the province.   
 Finally, one Surge brigade (4th Bde, 2nd Inf Div) was sent into Diyala Province as part of 
the stabilization effort between Baghdad and its sources of insurgent support in Iran.   
 MNF-I also utilized its soft power capabilities more effectively.  Approval procedures for 
message products were streamlined and delegated to subordinate commands, reducing time for 
message dissemination.   Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) budgets were 
increased and delegated, allowing commanders to provide Civil Affairs projects better tailored to 
local needs.  Procedures were developed to increase promotion opportunities for Iraqi force 
trainers, improving the quality of U.S. soldiers willing to be assigned as trainers. 
 Figure 1 summarizes monthly deaths data from Iraq. Across a number of indicators, there 
were substantial declines in the death rates.   
 
 











Looking at the numbers for the four indices tabulated, we can see similar patterns for 
three of the four.  U.S. military fatalities saw their first spike in October 2006, three months 
before the Surge forces began flowing into Iraq.  The peak three months were April through June 
of 2007, averaging over 110 deaths per month.  By October of 2007 they had declined to levels 
below that seen in the first half of 2006, where they remained for the remainder of 2007 and 
2008.  U.S. deaths at the beginning of the study averaged about 2 per day: by the end of the 
study, they averaged about one every two days, or a 75% decrease. 
 U.S. fatalities follow an initial path expected from a force increasing in both size and 
aggressive posture, combined with an adversarial response to a perceived deteriorating 
situation.  Deaths had increased prior to the Surge but increased again as the US forces finished 
flowing into Iraq.  However, it took only four months of full Surge operation for U.S. fatalities to 
begin dropping, and they stayed down with no sustained spike for the remaining 15 months of 




 Iraqi civilian deaths followed a similar pattern.  They steadily increased beginning in 
March until hitting their three-year peak of 3298 in July 2006, six months before the Surge 
began.  Deaths remained at a high level through August of 2007 averaging over 2,779 per month, 
then saw a “step” decrease from September 2007 through May 2008 averaging 1,220 per 
month.  After that they dropped decisively below even early 2006-levels, to 667 per month from 
June 2008 until the end of the year.  Averaging over 1500 per month at the beginning of the 
study, they were in the mid-500s by the end, a decrease of over 60%. 
 The statistics for Iraqi civilian deaths demonstrate the destabilization of the situation in 
Iraq that led to President Bush’s decision to order the Surge.  It wasn’t until September of 2007, 
four months after the full complement of Surge forces were in place, that civilian casualties 
began to decline.  Then it took until June 2008 before the second “step” decrease in deaths 
occurred, after US troop strength had returned to its pre-Surge level.   
 The last similar category was significant acts (SIGACTS), or Coalition force reporting of 
anything militarily significant occurring in their sectors.  SIGACTS steadily increased beginning 
in January 2006 and first breached 10,000 in October.  After that they remained at well over 
10,000 per month through July 2007.  They steadily decreased again from August, declining to 
5484 in February 2008.  They spiked up by nearly 1000 in March 2008, then declined every 
month for the remainder of the year, hitting their study-period low of 3290 in 
December.  Overall, they dropped from a monthly average of about 5500 at the beginning of the 
study to about 3400 at the end, a decrease of almost 40%. 
 The SIGACTS and Iraqi civilian deaths had the strongest correlation.  Both increased 
throughout 2006.  SIGACTS continued to increase into the first half of 2007 after civilian deaths 




other words, the issue may not be that Iraq became steadily more violent into 2007: the 
Americans just became more aware of what was occurring in Iraq. 
 The least correlation with the other categories occurred in the data for Iraq Security Force 
deaths.  Their numbers also demonstrated the largest fluctuation.  In general, they can be 
characterized as running between 132 and 201 for the first six months of 2006, spiking to an 
average of 206 per month from July through October 2006.  They then actually declined to an 
average of 112 per month from November 2006 through January 2007.  As the Surge began, ISF 
deaths jumped to a monthly average of 215 from February through July 2007, with a study high 
of 300 in April 2007.  They declined to an average of 86 per month from August 2007 through 
January 2008.  They experienced a four-month spike, averaging over 123 per month during 
February through May 2008.  ISF deaths did not go above 100 again for the rest of the year, 
hitting their 3-year low of 24 in November 2008.  Averaging about 175 per month at the 
beginning of the study, they declined to about 50 per month at the end, a decrease of about 70%. 
 The ISF numbers may indicate that their role in the Surge has been 
underappreciated.  Their statistics were the only ones that demonstrated a decline during the last 
three months of 2006.  When the Surge began, ISF deaths jumped from 91 in January 2007 to 
300 in April, before the full U.S. Surge component was in place.  Whereas U.S. fatalities 
dropped fairly rapidly once the Surge forces were fully in place, ISF fatalities remained 
stubbornly high, bore the brunt of the SIGACTS spike in early 2008 and did not substantially 
decline until June of 2008, nearly eight months later than their U.S. counterparts. 
 Insurgent fatalities are more difficult to find data for.  Best estimates of annual fatalities 
as provided by Coalition forces were 3,902 in 2006, 6,747 in 2007 and 2,028 in 2008.  The Iraqi 




although both represent a substantial increase over 2006 reflecting greater contact between 
security forces and insurgents.  Based on the increase in U.S./ISF fatalities in 2007, the U.S. 
estimate seems more credible. 
 It is widely accepted that the Surge succeeded.  By success, we mean that it helped 
suppress the insurgency.  Peter Mansoor, a key staff officer in Iraq during the Surge, wrote that 
“The Surge has created the space and time for the competition for power and resources in Iraq to 
play out in the political realm, with words instead of bombs.”2   As will be seen, interviewees for 
this work almost all said it at least produced short-term benefits of stability.  Even opponents of 
the Surge strategy had to concede its success in retrospect.  Hillary Clinton was quoted as saying 
that “the Surge worked.”   Barack Obama acknowledged that the Surge “succeeded beyond our 
wildest dreams” and was emboldened to order a Surge in Afghanistan shortly after taking office 
in 2009.  These statements are supported by several counter-insurgency progress indicators 
including human movement, business and agricultural activity, participation in elections and 
employment as well as reductions in acts of violence (number of attacks, friendly/host-nation 




The U.S. effort in Iraq can be divided into four general phases: invasion, occupation, 
Surge, and withdrawal.  This dissertation will discuss the first two phases, which contain 
elements of many forms of warfare, such as invasion, interstate war, intrastate war, and 
counterinsurgency.  This work would not suffice to evaluate in-depth each of these elements, any 




proper evaluation of the third phase, or Surge.  The withdrawal effort was discussed by 
interviewees in detail in response to the survey question “Did the Surge produce results?”  In 
particular it explores the ways in which General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker changed the 
role and capability of the “soft power” resources during the Surge, and the ways in which this 
“smarter” power contributed to the success the Surge experienced. 
Chapter Two is a review of the key literature found by the author relating to this work.  
Power and its theoretical underpinnings are explored.  Counterinsurgency literature is also 
discussed.  Writings specific to Iraq play an important role in understanding the Surge: in some 
cases they include books or articles by this project’s interviewees. 
Chapter Three describes the theory and methodology for this work.  Some definitions 
relating to power are proposed based on the research for this project and utilized later in the 
work.  It also describes how the database was created utilizing grounded theory and a series of 
interviews via referral sampling of people who participated in the Surge with a list of the 
questions asked of interviewees.   
     Chapter Four will use this operationalization to lay out the problems present in Iraq 
prior to the Surge, primarily as seen by Surge participants.  Some of the problems lay with 
decision-making being done in Washington DC.  Some were related to structural challenges 
within the U.S. Executive Branch such as manning shortfalls, short tours of duty and unclear 
lines of authority.  Some were related to execution on the ground such as insufficient partnering 
with Iraqi Security Forces or government officials responsible for reconstruction.  All 
contributed to the early lack of success in Iraq prior to 2007. 
Chapter Five analyzes FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, looking at its relationship to 2007 




brought together the military and civilian efforts in Iraq during the Surge.   Surge participants 
describe the changes they saw and developed in Iraq that demonstrate a foundation for 
operationalization of smarter power.  Coercion and attraction were applied together in varying 
degrees by people on the ground in response to the local situation. 
Chapters Six through Eight analyze the interviews with Surge participants to demonstrate 
how the better strategy translated into results in Iraq.  It started with a more supportive domestic 
strategic structure in the U.S. that better supported General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in 
terms of both resources and domestic support.  In Iraq, improved partnership within the U.S. 
agencies and with the host nation governance and security apparatus dramatically reduced 
violence and set the stage for reconstruction and reconciliation. 
Chapter Nine provides interviewee perspective on the Surge.  Much of the information in 
this chapter came from three survey questions: 
1) Did the Surge produce benefits? 
2) What were your lessons learned from the Surge? 
3) Are the lessons of the Surge applicable to other/future conflicts? 
Chapter Ten concludes this work with some general observations and ideas for potential 





Lessons learned during the course of this project can be grouped into three general 




1) Lessons reinforcing the literature 
2) Lessons different than the literature 
3) New lessons 
The detailed explanation of each of the lessons is available in Chapter Eight. 
 
LESSONS REINFORCING THE LITERATURE 
 
Much of what happened during the Surge was not new, hence these are not new lessons.  
Prior counterinsurgents had understood and documented these.  It was largely during the Surge 
that they were “remembered” and reapplied in Iraq.   They included: 
1) Broad counterinsurgency lessons do not change, but have to be relearned 
2) Counterinsurgency environments are complex 
3) Cultural and religious differences are difficult to reconcileThe government is often the cause 
of the insurgency, otherwise there would be no insurgency 
Domestic issues complicate foreign counterinsurgency, particularly in democracies 
4) Isolating a counterinsurgency environment is difficultModern transportation/communications 
make counter insurgency difficult 
5) Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed 
6) Smart power is normative 
7) Coercive or attractive power are rarely effective singly 
8) Adaptability is critical 




LESSONS DIFFERENT THAN THE LITERATURE 
 
 Interviewees provided insight to a number of issues that can be found in 
counterinsurgency literature but may be interpreted in a different manner or treated as a less 
important item.  Their illumination provides an opportunity to reevaluate critical thinking on 
these topics.  These included the items listed below: 
1) Foreign counterinsurgency becomes less popular with the local population with time 
2) Counterinsurgency falls into a gray area neither DoD nor DoS are enthusiastic about entering 
3) There are many ways to incorrectly apply power 
4) The importance of FM 3-24 was in its existence as much as what was in it 
5) Coercive and attractive power can be differentiated 
6) Power elements are both more and less fungible than commonly understood 
7) Iraq has little concept of a national will 
8) Someone will be unhappy about any change made 
9) Adaptability can apply to higher level guidance 




Several interesting new lessons came out of the Surge participant interviews.  In some 
cases it is the mere fact of accumulation of data and responses to this work. The new ideas are 
listed below: 




2) The importance of personalities is often underestimated 
3) Surge participants thought their effort made a difference in Iraq 




 Historical works tend to focus on the decision-makers at the top.  Due credit should 
certainly be given to President Bush for his personal courage in ordering a change in mission that 
most opinion at the time thought was not going to work.  Secretaries Gates and Rice also should 
be credited for implementing change and cooperation to reflect the new strategy.  Ambassador 
Crocker and General Petraeus formed an excellent working relationship in Iraq that was key to 
success.  These people have all been justly recognized and mostly praised for creating the 
conditions for success during the Surge. 
This work is an opportunity to hear from the people who worked at an operational and 
tactical level to make the Surge in Iraq a success.  Commanders of Army brigades and Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams.  Career employees and people called into active service from the military 
Reserves or temporary hires.  Contractors and trainers who worked and lived with their Iraqi 
counterparts.  People who worked with detainees, developed plans that integrated Coalition 
efforts or were responsible for communicating with Iraqis, Americans and the world at large.   
They came from a wide variety of backgrounds and performed a wide variety of missions 
while serving in Iraq.  Most interacted with Iraqis on a regular basis both at their place of 




Coalition installation was mortared on a regular basis).  Some continued to serve their country in 
Iraq or Afghanistan after the Surge ended.   
Their success was made possible by the strategic change the U.S. leadership made prior 
to the Surge, but only possible.  In the end it was the people on the ground who improved their 
cooperation and coordination with each other, got smarter in using each other’s strengths to 
overcome weaknesses, and implemented a more effective version of counterinsurgency than had 
been seen in Iraq prior to that time.  It was their efforts that brought the “breathing space” the 
leadership hoped to achieve in order to give the Iraqis a fair opportunity to stabilize their country 
and renew the political process.   
Their stories provide an opportunity to learn, or often relearn, the techniques that work or 
do not work in a counterinsurgency environment.  A number of common themes emerged that 
will be explored in this work.  Some are interesting in and of themselves, some can be pieced 
together with other insights to provide a richer mosaic of successful counterinsurgency.  All are 




The Surge came at a key point in the Coalition effort in Iraq.  Many people felt the U.S. 
was doomed to fail in achieving its objectives in Iraq and needed to simply leave.  With 
improved support from decision-makers in Washington D.C., the interviewees for this work and 
their comrades were determined to prove the critics wrong.  Their part in the Surge is retold in 
this work.   
They worked to overcome a myriad of structural and operational problems to restore 




politically, economically, and socially.  Changes that had been taking place before the Surge 
were emphasized and expanded.  Veterans applied procedures often learned the hard way from 
previous tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.  First-timers brought enthusiasm and willingness to 
cooperate across the military-civilian line. 
Utilizing referral sampling a pool of interviewees was developed that included a wide 
variety of people and missions during the Surge.  Their words shed light on a number of common 
themes that they saw as being part of success in counterinsurgency.  This work will explore those 
common themes in detail and compare them with the extant literature on counterinsurgency in 
general and Iraq in particular.  Some of the themes should come as no surprise.  Some take a 
different perspective from that commonly found in the literature.  Almost all are telling their 















Counterinsurgency does not tend to capture the public eye to the extent that conventional 
warfare does.  There are a number of potential reasons for this which will be explored while 
reviewing the state of the existing literature.  This chapter will focus on literature related to 
counter-insurgency warfare in general, which includes works from antiquity to modern times.  
These works describe elements of insurgency that still must be dealt with today and presented 
challenges for the U.S. in Iraq.  Better understanding of these challenges was an important 
element of the Surge.  A review of U.S. military doctrine demonstrates the fact that the U.S. was 
in many cases relearning lessons it had learned during prior conflicts.   
Understanding the state of the current literature regarding power will demonstrate the 
opportunity to further refine what soft power means and its relation to hard power.  This work 
will move beyond the theoretical hard and soft power debates with operationalized definitions in 
Chapter Three.  These definitions can lay out a roadmap for evaluating a power strategy to see if 
it is “smart.” 
 
THEORIZING ABOUT AND APPLYING POWER 
 
In addition to providing important insights into the counterinsurgency struggle in Iraq 




power in international relations.  This more theoretical contribution comes through the 
application of the concepts of soft power and smart power to the activities engaged in by the U.S. 
government in Iraq.  
The very nature of power has long been a subject of debate, not only in political science, 
but throughout academia.  A reasonable modern era start point can be the initial works of Robert 
Dahl, who moved beyond a rigid power structure in a group and postulated that, particularly in a 
democracy, there are a number of competing power elites who must work with each other and 
compromise.3  Iraq demonstrates some of the qualities of Dahl’s ideas and the potential for 
conflict that lies therein.  At the top are the competing Sunni Arab, Shia Arab and Kurdish elites 
who sway the allegiance of their respective sectarian populations.  Each also has sub-group 
power brokers such as tribal chiefs, sheikhs and wealthy individuals and families.   
 
BACHRACH AND BARATZ 
 
In response to Dahl and others, an interesting modern treatment of power was conducted 
by Bachrach and Baratz in Two Faces of Power, written in 1962.   Their idea was that power 
actually has two faces, neither of which are understood by sociologists and only one by political 
scientists. 
Bachrach and Baratz agreed with the political scientists that one face of power is results-
based, the measure of participation in decision-making.  To them, this means observing who 
participates in decision-making, the nature of their participation, and the measurable results that 
accrue from the process.  Because the results and interactions are visible and measurable, they 




What they also saw as a second face of power was the ability to control the decision-
making agenda.  Just because an issue does not come up for discussion does not mean it isn’t 
important.  A group or individual with power to control the agenda will not want to raise issues 
that could be decided in their best interest, or ones not personally important to them.  To them, 
organization, rules and structure exist largely as a self-reinforcing agenda of what is important 
and what is not.  Because this face of power does not produce decisions and measurable results, 
Bachrach and Baratz hypothesize that it can be hidden to outside understanding and evaluation.   
They believe both faces must be understood to properly evaluate power and its control 
among a group.  Keeping an issue from being raised can be as important as how raised issues are 
decided.  A frequent complaint among minorities or women throughout the world is that their 
nation does not even discuss issues such as voting, education opportunity or fair participation in 
public life.  They and their issues are kept off of the agenda of decision-making by others.4 
The person or persons who can control the agenda may often be behind the scenes.  
Interviewees for this work often found this to be the case in Iraq.  Even though there may be an 
elected mayor or governor officially “in charge,” interviewees often found that person curiously 
reluctant to work on issues that seemed to be of importance.  In many cases there was a tribal 
chief, religious leader or businessman who controlled the actions of the elected official.   
As an interesting note to the influence of Bachrach and Baratz, When Dr. Dahl published 
Democracy and Its Critics in 1989, one of his five criteria for the ideal democracy was control of 
the agenda. This is a corroboration of the Bachrach and Baratz idea of the importance of hidden 
power. 
The Bachrach and Baratz model of two faces of power is interesting and important, but 




items forward for decisions is a decision as well, even though made by a smaller group.  In fact, 
it could be treated as a form of hard power, with the community being coerced into not 
discussing items of importance to them.  Soft power is about attraction and is unlikely to be seen 




A notable in-depth treatment of the topic of political power was actually conducted by an 
economist, Kenneth Boulding, when he wrote The Three Faces of Power in 1991.   Boulding 
stated in his book that he had never seen a treatise on power written by a political scientist, 
although this is not correct as has been seen.   
Boulding divided power into three types and assigned a component of that power to each. 
First was destructive power, which he commonly associated with threats as embodied in 
political-military activity.   To Boulding, these threats could be active or passive, such as the 
difference between sending a gunboat to a port and having it fire on the port.  This was a crucial 
distinction to Boulding, who emphasized that people often conflate power and force whereas he 
felt that force was a subcomponent of threat.  Boulding also postulated that destructive power is 
the easiest to employ. 
His second type of power was productive, with a power component of exchange as 
embodied in trade or simple reciprocity.  As an economist, he postulated that a bargaining 
situation can only take place when there is an overlap between two parties of what they are 
willing to buy and sell.  This would mean that productive power can only be utilized when the 




(integrative) situation.  Boulding spent less time discussing productive power than integrative, 
even though his academic background was as an economist. 
To Boulding the third type of power, integrative, along with its component of love as 
embodied socially, was the longest-lasting.  To work, he said that the phenomena of conversion, 
or identification with an existing structure or group, was necessary.  Although it is the most 
difficult to achieve, integrative power endures the longest and is a necessary component of 
legitimacy.  He felt that destructive and productive power that lack legitimacy will not persist, 
that destructive and integrative power have a non-linear relationship, and that the tendency for 
unbalanced threat destructive power was in the end to destroy itself.   
Boulding does not conceive the power categories as distinct sets.  He discusses the idea 
of the three components of power as having “fuzzy logic” boundaries, so that there are elements 
of all three in each component of power, although one will predominate in each.  For example, 
exchange is the dominant component of productive power.  The exchange normally plays out in 
the economic sphere of human activity.  However, threat can exist in economics in the form of 
price wars or boycotts.  He mentions that love can also exist, but discusses it as an internal 
phenomenon, such as the morale of organizational employees.  
When discussing his fuzzy logic, Boulding comes right to the edge of the idea that an 
institution composed for threat power, such as the military, can exercise his other forms of 
power.  He points out that the military has productive and integrative elements.  However, he 
then discusses these elements as more internal to the organization: for example, a military needs 
productive power in the form of money in order to buy what it needs to sustain itself.  One would 
presume from reading his work that he would also view integrative power as internal, such as 




He does mention that a ruler needs integrative power to legitimate his rule, but then he 
says the ruler must be loved, or at least respected.  By adding on the minimal requirement of 
respect, Boulding turns away from advocating a pure integration componence for the military 
and instead relegates it back to its traditional threat role.  Thus, his tendency is to revert to 
treating organizations as having a niche role within a specific component of power, and largely 
by default they operate within a specific type of power. 
Further, Boulding advocates for three types of power, but his work basically seems to 
come down to whether targets of power act because they are coerced to act or because they want 
to act.  His productive power type presumes a precise, equally-beneficial exchange which is 
probably almost never the case in reality.  How often do friends have precisely the same amount 
of love and respect for each other?  Won’t virtually every relationship be composed of one party 
that feels slighted and one that feels smothered, no matter how slightly?  Sometimes we cannot 
find a good deal when we shop: we must take the best of the bad deals available.  Most 
Europeans probably do not like having to rely on OPEC or Russia to meet their petroleum needs, 
but the alternatives are worse. 
With such a razor-edge middle ground, wouldn’t it make more sense to simply define 
power as binary rather than trying to develop an unwieldy three-categorization construct?  This 
could be where Boulding’s background hindered his work: an economist would only be human if 
he wants to elevate his academic niche to a position of co-equality in a power model.  The 
problem is not that economics are unimportant to power considerations: they are.  The issue is 
assuming that there is a significant element of mutually satisfactory economic exchanges that 





The more obvious is the threat element as has been discussed with the OPEC example 
above.  But inequality can be shifted towards love as well.  A young girl might buy a pricey 
ticket to a Justin Bieber concert where she also manages to get his autograph.  To Justin, it was 
primarily an economic transaction.  He got his percentage of her ticket price, and certainly 
derives a rush from her as an adoring fan, but she was only one of 10,000 people at the concert 
and 100 or so for whom he signed an autograph (as one of 50-100 performances he does 
annually), so the love element is severely diluted (i.e. he would not have noticed the difference if 
she were not there).  But for her, it may be the highlight of her social calendar for the year.  She 
will talk about it with her friends for weeks.  If she took a selfie near him, it may become a 
blowup Flat Head poster on her wall.  Decades later she will pull out her autograph book and 
fondly reminisce on the experience.  She may have paid for the ticket but for her, it was a love 
interaction. 
Although Boulding does not really go through the door of cross-utilization of traditional 
power component organizations, he does leave the key for us to do so.  One could postulate an 
integrative function of traditional productive organizations such as corporations if their products 
are singularly desired by consumers (status symbols vs generic brands).  Many children do not 
want to eat a cookie unless it came out of a package with a picture of an elf on it.  Culture and 
politics can play a role as well, such as the exhortation to “Buy American.”  One can also 
postulate a true integrative function for military organizations as well, for example peacekeepers.  








 Steven Lukes developed a better basis to expand the concept of two faces of power.  He 
also believed that the two faces described were inadequate to cover the full potential of power.  
For him, the third face of power is described as the power “to prevent people, to whatever 
degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such 
a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things.”5 
 Lukes is skeptical of Marxist or other theories that believe there is a greater will or role 
(proletariat or worker for example) that people will willingly subsume themselves in and strive to 
make their identity.  But if so many people appear to be complying with an oppressive or 
exploitative system, his question is why do people appear to willingly submit themselves to 
domination rather than continuously resist? 
 Lukes builds upon the checklist developed by Charles Tilly in 1991.  It includes things 
such as the idea that people are continuously rebelling, but in smaller, covert ways, or that 
resistance is costly, or that force and inertia hold them in place.  Lukes singles out one in 
particular, that “As a result of mystification, repression, or the sheer unavailability of alternative 
ideological frames, subordinates remain unaware of their true interests.”6  
 Lukes used this idea of Tilly’s as a launching point for evaluating power in terms of three 
faces.  He felt that Tilly was on the cusp of an important element that was capable of standing 
alone as a “face of power.”  To Lukes, this could take a variety of forms such as tradition, 
culture, or misinformation both deliberate and unintentional.  He thought that this psychological 
element would be able to bias decision-making against the interests of the individual.  In other 




secret conversations.  This can be occurring even while people are “officially: supportive of the 
domination regime.   
 Lukes saw concerns by other writers that defining power in too broad terms risked 
turning it into a meaningless concept.  However, he felt that it was such an important concept 
that it was better to see power in an all-embracing way than not to try and do so. 
 Interviewees for this work consistently felt that the Surge was successful in part because 
it made a greater effort to work with Iraqis below the national level.  The military conducted 
robust joint patrolling with Iraqi Security Forces and co-inhabited smaller outposts.  Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams were established by Department of State at provincial level.  This allowed 
the U.S. to establish trust and a belief in the Iraqis that they did not have to have centralized 
direction in order to be successful.  In some cases, the Iraqis were already aware of this, but U.S. 
support helped enable events such as the Anbar Awakening by Sunnis who wanted to rid 
themselves of al-Qaeda but did not trust the Shia-dominated Iraqi government to help them 
achieve their goal. 
 
NYE AND KEOHANE 
 
Theories about soft power provide a critical framework for this analysis. Much of the 
scholarship on soft power is put forth by liberal authors such as Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane and 
Robert Pape who have written extensively on the value of soft power.   
Nye first proposed the concept in his 1980 book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power.  Along with Keohane, he further refines the term in Power and 




because others want what you want; it is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through 
attraction rather than coercion.”7   Pape explored the idea that the current US hegemony in terms 
of coercive power forces states trying to balance against the US to employ soft power approaches 
such as diplomacy, international institutions and economic statecraft to counter US global 
policies.8   
Another good group study of hard versus soft power is found in Soft Power and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, edited and based off a collection of speakers from a May 2008 symposium 
conducted at the University of Manchester.9   The timing for the study is near the end of the 
Surge in Iraq, an extremely fortuitous circumstance for this work.   
In it, Dr Nye discussed his views of hard and soft power in more detail.  He emphasized 
that the effectiveness of soft power should be judged from the perspective of the target, not the 
instigator.  He believes that realists tend toward a materialist bias that causes them to downplay 
the importance of soft power.  He defines smart power as the “…ability to combine the hard 
power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction into a successful strategy.”  He 
listed five recommendations from a Smart Power bipartisan commission he co-chaired that 
included: 
1) Restoring alliances, partnerships, and multilateral institutions 
2) Prioritizing global development 
3) Emphasizing a more personal public diplomacy 
4) Economic integration 
5) Addressing climate change and global security 
In Chapter Two, Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos explored the fungibility of what 




rigor, making a strict definition difficult to obtain.  They discuss how states can use hard power 
as a foundation to develop soft power, such as the U.S. using WWII to develop the United 
Nations.  However, they posit a problem for states being that much of the power being utilized in 
a soft role lies outside the control of states, such as non-governmental organizations (NGO) or 
religious groups.  They also criticize the idea that a “universal culture” as a basis for soft-power 
activities exists: in other words, even institutions and concepts commonly associated with soft 
power can conflict.  They say that smart power is a state strategy characteristic, not power itself. 
Zahran and Ramos use the idea of hegemony to demonstrate their criticisms.  After 
World War II (WWII), most countries have tolerated U.S. hegemony not because they thought it 
was the best deal, but rather the best deal available.  Similarly, after the War of 1812 the U.S. did 
not contest Britain’s domination of the high seas for nearly a century, not because they preferred 
it, but because it was perceived as fair enough for the U.S.  After WWII, the U.S. followed a 
similar model, making some effort to acknowledge the interests of other states and not creating a 
system that totally favored U.S. interests.  As a result, global balancing against the U.S. among 
friendly and neutral nations did not occur.  One could contrast this with the less successful 
regional hegemony established by the U.S.S.R., which failed in part due to perceptions of 
domination by the Soviets, and particularly Russians, among the other members. 
In Chapter Three, Edward Lock posits that Nye’s unstrategic conception of soft power 
results from conflating relational and structural power.  He thinks that Nye confuses between an 
entity attempting to exercise power versus the social system under which power is viewed as 
attractive.  Lock believes this is because Nye wants to address soft power in the context of U.S. 
foreign policy making.  Similar to Zahran and Ramos, he thinks this can lead to a problematic 




unstrategic conception results from inadequate appraisal of the interdependence between the 
agent and subject of power.  He describes power employment as a clash of interdependent 
strategies. 
Personal experience and the interviews for this project corroborates the constructivist 
element of Lock’s concept.  The author’s experience with reconstruction programs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were instructive.  Americans in particular have a tendency to tell the local people 
what they need rather than let those people tell them what they want.  The author found that most 
of the planning sessions for local projects at headquarters did not have a single local leader 
present.  The return on expenditure in refurbishing a village school is going to be far less if the 
tribal chief really wanted a well dug.  It also causes the Americans to come across as aloof and 
not interested in the needs of the local population.  If outsiders do not operate in concert with 
local perceptions of themselves and their environment, the outsider’s efforts will inevitably end 
up less successful than envisioned by their leadership.  Interviewees for this work emphasized 
that successful projects started with close coordination with local leadership. 
In Chapter Four, Christopher Layne laid out a case for the limited abilities of soft power.  
He makes a strong point that states probably do not make foreign policy decisions because they 
“like” another state or its leaders.  This would be in line with the thinking of Washington and 
Jefferson that states have interests, not friends.  Layne also believes that foreign policy decision-
making by state leaders is little influenced by public opinion.  Layne specifically points to the 
Surge as a decision by the Bush Administration to increase commitment in Iraq even after the 
Democrats had scored huge gains in the 2006 national elections.  He also tends to be dismissive 




Other studies have disagreed with Layne’s assertion that the public has little influence on 
policy decisions.  Paul Burstein concluded that the impact of public opinion is substantial, 
although our ability to generalize conclusions is limited.   Wlenzein and Soroka said that there is 
a fundamental link between public opinion and public policy, although influence can vary across 
political domains.   Layne uses the Surge as an example of a politician (President Bush) not 
following public opinion, citing the 2006 electoral victories by the Democratic Party as proof 
that the American public wanted to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq.  However, Bush’s policy 
can be viewed as akin to that of Soviet Premier Gorbachev when he increased the Red Army 
presence in Afghanistan upon taking office: a short-term increase with the long-term goal of 
stabilizing the country and setting the stage for a military drawdown.  Many of the interviewees 
for this work described how the U.S. change in presidents in 2009 played a huge role in changing 
the U.S. policy in Iraq. 
Many analysts may miss the subtle impacts that soft power can have, not from a state 
exercising it, but the principles underlying it.  Americans opposing a sitting president will often 
turn to the court of world opinion to air their viewpoints.  Tyrants the US opposes may gleefully 
pass the criticisms along to their citizens through the state-run media.  The criticisms may 
astonish the foreign listener, but not in the way the critic or tyrant expects.  Many of the 
members of the foreign audience are not astonished that America has such a horrible president: 
they are astonished that an American can say horrible things about their president and not be 
“disappeared” by the authorities.  Information like that is difficult for a pollster to capture; they 
may not even realize they should be looking for it.  But it is there.  
The difficulty in measuring soft power is one of the reasons that bureaucratic 




insurgents are killed by Predator missiles.  What they cannot track is the number of previously 
neutral people who got so angry with the U.S. attacking their village that they decided to join the 
insurgency, or at least begin supporting it with money or resources.  This opaqueness cuts both 
ways.  Hard power advocates will tend to downplay the potential impact of soft-power efforts, 
asking for objective proof that is difficult to positively determine.    
Conversely, soft-power practitioners are also prone to exaggerate the impact of their 
tools.  If you drop leaflets on an enemy unit encouraging them to surrender and they surrender 
the next day, did they surrender because of the leaflets, or was it because they were surrounded, 
cut off from supplies, and under continual bombardment?   Absent concrete information, soft 
power practitioners who are struggling for actual or perceived relevancy (and funding) may be 
prone to take credit even where credit cannot be proven.  Interviews for this work shed light on 
the challenges involved in demonstrating soft power’s “bang for the buck.” 
A problem may lie in reading too much into Keohane and Nye’s definition of attraction, 
including by Keohane and Nye themselves.  Their definition does not go into detail over whether 
attraction can be ephemeral or permanent.  This may lead them and other academicians to lean 
toward the idea of permanent attraction: reshaping politics, economies, friendships and even 
societies.  Nothing in the definition says this must be the case. 
The specific power act this plays out most visibly in is bribes, which Keohane and Nye 
described above as the “hard power of payment.”  Why is a bribe coercive?  The recipient 
reaches out in a voluntary act to accept the payment.   They are attracted to the payment and 
desire it: they are not being forced to accept it. 
By example, the U.S. as an occupying power may be experiencing attacks on its supply 




payment in exchange for ceasing the attacks.  The tribe accepts the payment, and the attacks 
cease. 
Where is the coercion in this case?  The U.S. was able to create a shared desired outcome 
with the tribe of U.S. convoys not being attacked.  Just because it is temporary or not heartfelt 
does not mean it is not a shared desire, even though it probably will not last beyond the U.S. 
payments.   
Britain discovered the latter to their dismay during the 1st Anglo-Afghan War.  The 
supply line for the British occupation army in Kabul ran through the Northwest Frontier back to 
India.  For two years the British paid the local tribes not to attack their forces. There were no 
problems.  Then the India office eliminated the tributes as a cost-cutting measure.  The tribes 
promptly rebelled, forcing the Kabul garrison to evacuate and be slaughtered on the retreat to 
safety (one man made it back to Jalalabad). 
The British experience demonstrates the downside of the ephemeral nature of bribes, but 
nonetheless for two years they had created a situation where they and the tribes were mutually 
attracted to the goal of British forces not being attacked.  Sometimes that is the best an occupier 
can realistically hope to achieve.  It is usually unlikely that an occupied nation will become 
attracted to their occupiers.  In fact, any initial gratitude that may have accrued from the 
occupation, such as by being liberated from a ruthless dictator, will also prove ephemeral.   
Part of the problem may be the Western/liberal/colonial desire to “improve” the locals by 
bringing them more into line with “modern” ideals and systems.  Though admirable, the desire to 
help may It also carries a somewhat paternalistic assumption that “improving” the lot of the 
locals will decrease their desire to attack U.S. convoys.  One interviewee for this work was 




because they are frustrated because they are out of work.10  A case can even be made that forcing 
structural change on an occupied country will be to the detriment of the established elites, hence 
is itself coercive.  Decreeing that the new Iraqi Parliament had to have at least 25% women may 
be admirable, but it essentially meant that ¼ of the males who were formerly part of the 
leadership lost their place of privilege and are unlikely to be happy about it. 
A related problem may lie in the distasteful nature of bribes.  No one wants to admit that 
the only way they can elicit compliance in another short of coercion is through handing them a 
stack of cash.  A parent may wish their children would get good grades simply because they want 
to: most parents find that a financial sweetener helps.   
Finally, writers may be incorrectly linking bribes to noncompliance threats normally 
associated with them.  In this case, the U.S. may make clear to the tribes that failure to accept the 
bribe will result in U.S. military action to proactively protect their convoys, i.e. cleaning out 
insurgent strongholds such as villages providing them shelter.  This confuses the issue because 
any carrot can be proffered with a threatened stick as the alternative.  The tribe may not be given 




 For Handbook of International Relations, David Baldwin contributed a chapter titled 
“Power and International Relations.”  He believed that all politics involved power, although they 
were not always about power.  To him, the discussion of power shifted from power as a 
possession of actors to power as a relationship between actors.  As a result, the discussion shifts 




 What is important to Baldwin as a result of the shift is understanding that because power 
is a relationship, different types and degrees of power may be more effective in some situations 
than others.  For example, the U.S. was far more powerful militarily in Vietnam, but military 
power lacked the fungibility to address the non-military problems the U.S. faced.  The same 
problem occurred in Iraq.  Every U.S. Army division has an artillery brigade, a tremendous hard 
power asset.  After the invasion, most were repurposed as infantry or Civil Affairs because 
artillery was useless in a counter-insurgency environment.  Armor, ground-attack aircraft and 
naval gunfire were among other U.S. assets that were rarely employed, repurposed or removed 
from the battlefield entirely. 
 Considering relationships also allows for integrating unintended effects into analysis, 
effects that are nonetheless consequential to relationships.  A brigade commander stationed in 
Iraq prior to and during the Surge related a story that epitomized this problem. 
A senior commander arrived in (his sector) with a very large check to restart a bakery that 
had been defunct since about 2003 when the owner left.  The office issued the check to 
some guy who claimed he was the bakery owner.  I had not heard anything about this 
before this senior officer arrived: I thought he just wanted to see the bakery.  Little did I 
know that he would issue a check, along with all these people with cameras and people 
from these various organizations.  Afterward I advised this officer that what he had done 
was demonstrate favorability towards a business owner and just put at risk several other 
Mom-and-Pop shops that had grown up and were providing baked goods to the Iraqi 
citizens and security forces.  Now they had direct competition based on U.S.-government 
funding for an activity that had long since not been an issue.  The locals had figured out a 






All schools of international relations thought can advocate for soft power to some degree.  




from a prosperous world as his economic theory of communism took hold.13  Alexander Wendt 
talked about how attraction will bring about changes in a state as collective norms shift over 
time.14  Even the realist Samuel Huntington talks about culture, although Keohane and Nye 
disagree with his assertion that soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard 
power.15  Joseph Grieco highlighted the importance of relative versus absolute gains but also said 
that states will enter voluntarily into agreements if they feel it is in their best interests to do so.16  
Robert Gilpin and his obsolescing bargaining theory postulated that over time sunk costs allow 
states to get the upper hand in their relations with multinational corporations (MNC), but the 
initial agreements are based on mutual attraction.17 Marc Sageman writes about terrorist social 
networks and says that in many cases social bonds between members predate ideological 
commitment, and that these soft bonds are what induce young recruits to join these radical 
organizations.18   
International relations practitioners often categorize elements of national power as being 
either hard or soft.  For example, the comparative politics textbook The Good Society lists the 
three forms of state power as political (including military), economic and cultural.  It tells us that 
“cultural power exists when people can convince others to adopt their values, ideas and premises 
as their own,” clearly seeing cultural power as soft power.  Regarding economic power, they say 
that “people who control scarce resources…obtain compliance from those who need them,” thus 
categorizing economic power as hard.  Similarly, they say “political power is grounded in 
coercion.”19  Draper and Ramsey reflect a common tendency among political scientists to 
pigeonhole forms of power as being definitively hard or soft.   
Literature exploring soft power elements of the Surge include Krowley and Rutherford on 




History describes initiatives developed by US forces working in tandem with Iraqi Army and 
Police units to improve their capabilities, understanding that locals are the best 
counterinsurgents.21  Hammes and Bakir describe challenges the U.S. faced with insurgent 
intimidation and the explosive growth of media in Iraq.22 
This work will advocate for the concept that almost any form of power can be hard or 
soft depending on how it is employed.  In the case of the Surge, this will demonstrate that the 
tools of power available to decision-makers are more flexible than previously understood.  The 
success of the Surge lay in part with the ability of the U.S. to repurpose part of its military 




Smart power is both a relatively new political science term and a normative one.  The 
concept itself is of course not new: the “carrot-and-stick” approach has been understood for 
millennia.  FM 3-24 emphasizes that you cannot kill your way out of an insurgency.  However, 
one of this work’s interviewees pointed out in an article he wrote that you cannot buy your way 
out of one either.   
The challenge in developing a common definition is that smart power is normative.  
Confusion is worsened by the tendency to bin capabilities as either hard or soft.  Dr. Nye is one 
of the leading smart-power thinkers, but demonstrates an “either/or” train of thought.  He talks 
about hard and soft power resources with the implication that a specific tool is only useful as 
hard or soft.  For example, The Center for Strategic and International Studies says that smart 




in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one’s influence and establish 
legitimacy of one’s action.”    
Not only does this definition assume military capability is hard, but that things like 
alliances are soft.  Alliances are typically viewed as hard power by the nation or nations they are 
directed against.  The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement was clearly a precursor to the 
invasion and division of Poland.  The Warsaw Pact was formed in response to the perceived 
threat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Arab unification efforts in 1967 
resulted in the pre-emptive Israeli strike known as the Six-Day War.  The security dilemma first 
espoused by John Herz is exemplified by alliance/counter-alliance moves by multiple parties, 
even if they see these moves as a soft power effort of attracting like-minded nations.  
Likewise, Chester Crocker starts by listing the capabilities and recommending they be 
mixed wisely, but then describes the engagement of “both military force and all forms of 
diplomacy.”   Again, the “both” implies certain tools are limited to certain tasks, even that 
diplomacy is a soft power, although it includes options such as recalling the Ambassador or 
severing diplomatic relations entirely.  Such thinking can be potentially hazardous to decision-
makers who take such actions thinking “The other side won’t feel threatened because this is just 
soft power.” 
Specifically describing challenges in Iraq, West, Russell and Robinson talk about the 
importance of soft power, pre-Surge steps U.S. forces were beginning to make in employing 
smarter power and bringing in the right numbers and force mix to properly do the job.23   
Building on the idea that any tool of power can be hard or soft, this work will explore 
how this concept increases the options available to decision-makers in a counterinsurgency 




Surge participant interviewees provide a number of examples of military and civilians 
synergizing their capabilities to implement smart power solutions to the situations confronting 
them in Iraq. 
Personalities were critical.  West talks about coordination problems among senior U.S. 
officials.  Ricks discusses some of the initial problems General Petraeus had coordinating with 
Admiral Fallon, Central Command commander.24  See Sky for tensions between U.S. military 
and civilians in Iraq, as well as West  for scarcity of U.S. civilians dispersing reconstruction 
funds.25  Pre-Surge problems with reconstruction efforts such as little Iraqi input, inept rollout 
and rewarding of DoD contractors were described by Allawi.26   
Interviewees will discuss how important positive working relationships were to success 
in Iraq.  They also underscore the importance of spending money on the right economic projects.  
They also talk about the importance of military action to stabilizing Iraq so that soft power 
efforts would have the chance to take hold, confirmed by the nation-wide drop in violence by the 
end of 2008.  In Chapter Three a working operational definition of soft power, hard power, and 
smart power will be provided and defended, so that these concepts can be applied to U.S. 




Counterinsurgency study and literature may suffer because it lacks the “curbside appeal” 
of major combat operations.  Military history readers tend to be more interested in conventional 
war.  D-Day or Pearl Harbor are much tidier and compelling stories than intermittent small-scale 




Also, the public tends to be more interested in reading about or recreating the large-scale 
conflicts.   
Consequently, it can be anticipated that historians and other researchers would tend to 
gravitate toward large-scale combat.  Combined with a valid concern that lessened public interest 
would lead to smaller book sales or interest in publication by magazines and journals, it is 
understandable that counterinsurgency warfare often fails to attract the same level of interest as 
Operation Barbarossa or the Yom Kippur War.   
This paucity of literature does not reflect global U.S. interests.  Since WWII, the U.S. has 
fought perhaps five conventional conflicts when defined as state vs state conflict: Korea, 
Grenada, Panama, the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, and the initial occupation phase of Iraq in 
2003).  By contrast, even a partial list of US involvement in insurgency/counterinsurgency 
efforts would include Greece, Lebanon (multiple times), Cuba, Somalia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Libya, Bosnia, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.  Many attribute the U.S. failure in Vietnam to its 
insistence on attempting to treat the conflict as a conventional one.   
 Insurgency/counterinsurgency campaigns are a rich environment for employment of soft 
power.  An important part of the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) 
has been efforts to delegitimize the ISIS leadership, and publicize their excesses.  Similarly, the 
U.S. shaped the global perception of the Taliban to gain support for its effort to remove them 






WHY IS WRITING ON COUNTERINSURGENCY OFTEN SPARSE? 
 
Insurgencies are often internal to a single state.  Consequently, a single government has 
the opportunity to contain it. States in general and dictatorships particularly do not like publicly 
airing the “dirty laundry” of the mere fact that they are home to an insurgent environment, let 
alone getting into the details of its scale and the expenditure of lives and resources in their 
attempts to defeat it.  The Westphalian system also tends toward a default option of treating these 
situations as internal affairs that neutral countries prefer to avoid.   
Insurgencies are prone to foster violations of international laws pertaining to armed 
conflict as well as human rights, which governments in particular are reluctant to publicize. 
Opposition groups usually try to publicize government excesses whenever possible, a challenge 
to governments that has become more acute with telecommunications advances.  Even worse 
from the government’s point of view, some insurgents welcome publicity of their own excesses: 
to them, notoriety may be preferable to anonymity.   
Insurgent writing may be hampered by a combination of high fatalities and low literacy.  
Much insurgent leadership will perish during the course of the struggle.  The high-ranking 
leadership of an insurgency is often made up of educated people.  However, much of the mid-
level leadership are often people who advanced through the ranks by being able to survive, not 
necessarily due to academic prowess.  Even on the government side, war tends to winnow out 
poor leaders even if they went to all the right schools, in favor of selecting leaders based on 
combat skills.  During WWII, the U.S. Army saw promotion of “mavericks,” enlisted men who 
earned direct commissions, and pilots who had not completed high school.  Neither is even 




Obstacles to academic study of counterinsurgency persist even after the conflict.  Most 
insurgencies fail (see Plakoudas for rebuttal of the assertion by Van Creveld and others that most 
counterinsurgencies succeed27), and the victorious government typically does not wish to 
remember or write about it in detail.  Most states continue to downplay the scope of a rebellion 
even after they successfully subdue it for the reasons discussed above.  Sources and complete 
records are often hard to find and sketchy in detail, making empirical analysis difficult.  Release 
of classified records can take decades.   
If we classify the American Civil War as an insurgency, it will appear to be an exception.  
Yet it can be argued that Americans on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line commemorated the 
battles, yet never fully addressed the underlying causes of the war, particularly slavery, which 
persisted afterward in the form of the Ku Klux Klan and Jim Crow laws in the South.  Despite all 
the Southerners who were slave-owners, slave traders, or overseers, the only person tried and 
executed after the war was Henry Wirz, commandant of the Andersonville prisoner-of-war camp, 




There is nevertheless important literature dealing with insurgency.  The current debate 
begins over whether counterinsurgency (COIN) is even feasible anymore, specifically when a 
foreign power joins the government in attempting to suppress the insurgency.  Writers such as 
Gentile, Metz, Greene, Branch and Wood, Joseph, and Hammes all bring out various points in 
support of this idea.  Gentile feels counterinsurgency is morphing into Responsibility to Protect 




a counterinsurgency strategy insinuates that COIN is winnable.29  To Branch and Wood, if the 
ingredients necessary for counterinsurgency, such as reliable intelligence and host nation ability 
to deliver services to its citizens are present, then there will not be an insurgency.30  Hammes and 
Greene bluntly state that a foreign power cannot establish the legitimacy of a host-nation 
government, with Hammes saying that it is not a cost-effective solution.31  Chapter Seven will 
recount interviewee lessons learned and applicability to future conflicts with opinions regarding 
the viability of counterinsurgency. 
Others feel assistance still possible, though in an indirect role.  Metz and Hammes wrote 
about using temporary expeditions or providing assistance and training without direct 
engagement against insurgents, as was the case in the early stages of Vietnam.  Metz, 
Fitzsimmon and Chin feel that modernist, materialist COIN practices fail to take into account 
religious or cultural motivations that cannot be stymied through improving social services.  To 
Chin, these concepts are Maoist and Cold War ones that will not meet desired objectives in the 
post-modern environment.32  Metz and Byman also point out that host-nation elites are expected 
to act irrationally in order to meet Western concepts of modernization, and are pessimistic of 
desired results beyond the margins.33 Chapters Six and Seven will include interviewees’ accounts 
that a direct presence was an important stabilizer in Iraq. 
At a more practical level, the debate often touches on the soft vs hard power dilemma.  
Common themes can be seen from the earliest writings to modern times.  Many of these were 
being ignored or misapplied during the early stages of the U.S. operation in Iraq.  There is also 
discussion of the relatively new concept of “smart” power.  There is evolving discussion over the 
“right” mix of soft vs hard power and ensuring that the right capabilities are being properly 




two basic approaches.  The first is enemy-centric or focusing on combat operations against the 
insurgents, such as done by the Romans or Ottomans.34  An extreme version put forward by 
Downes even suggests that when civilian loyalty is not flexible, indiscriminate targeting may be 
required to stop support to insurgents.  The second is population-centric, focusing action on the 
population.  He then sub-divides this into either coercive action against the population or a 
combination of selective violence and reform.35 
As will be discussed later, evidence from the interviews suggests that the Surge was 
successful in part because it moved in the direction of recognizing that additional hard power 
was needed to bring stability to Iraq.  Plan success included the need for an increase in military 
troop strength and expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces.  Byman wrote before the Surge of the 
need to provide security and order before any lasting reconstruction could take place, an idea 
echoed by numerous interviewees for this work.  Chapters Five and Six demonstrate the belief of 
a majority of interviewees that smart power had to include hard power. 
Another important theme in the counterinsurgency literature involves sensing and 
effectively adapting to local conditions. Sun Tzu understood the importance of manipulating the 
local political situation to your advantage.  Julius Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul describes the 
various local alliances Caesar developed to assist his military campaigns.  The American 
Revolution has been written about extensively and well by authors such as David McCullough 
and Robert Harvey, describing the poor job Britain did of finding common ground with the 
colonists.36  Popkin and Kilcullen provide excellent theories of reasons people become 
insurgents beyond ideology or even religion, reinforcing the importance of proper evaluation of 




communities—offers the best chance to strengthen people’s ties with their own government. The 
interviews show just how vital this was in the successes experienced by the Surge.38  
Another important theme involves the contest for the support of the local population. By 
A.A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of 
Counterinsurgency demonstrates the US military beginning to absorb historical lessons on 
counterinsurgency, in particular the French campaign in Algeria in the 1950s in which Galula 
was a participant.  Galula went on to lecture at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and 
worked with U.S. Air Force General Edward Lansdale, one of the leading U.S. counterinsurgents 
of the 1950s and 1960s.39  Galula believed the population was the object of both sides in 
counterinsurgency, and that their support was conditional.  This was a lesson the U.S. slowly 
relearned in both Vietnam and Iraq as demonstrated in Chapter Five when discussing 
development and implementation of FM 3-24. 
 
COUNTERINSURGENCY CHALLENGES IN IRAQ 
 
No country ever has the luxury of entering a counterinsurgency with a perfect plan, 
resources or organization to participate in the conflict.  Even totalitarian states are beset with 
challenges.  Democracies have an additional layer of problems brought on by the requirement for 
transparency.  In The Post-modern State and the World Order, Robert Cooper pointed out that as 
a hegemon policing pre-modern states, the U.S. cannot be as good as the rules it tries to uphold.40  
In trying to develop democracy in Iraq, the Coalition to an extent found itself in the dilemma Ed 
Mansfield alluded to in Electing to Fight that developing democracies are the most violent 




challenging task for every government no matter its military power.42  Chapters Four and Five 
include interviewee belief that Surge success was in part due to the ability of General Petraeus 
and Ambassador Crocker to justify the Surge to the U.S. Congress and public. 
Being the sole remaining superpower is/was not easy.  We can see writing on the subject 
encouraging a stable international system but cautioning that maintaining one requires national 
will.  Robert Keohane saw the decline of the superpowers but felt that international institutions 
would help maintain system stability.43  Charles Kindleberger felt that a hegemon was required 
to create a stable international system but cautioned in that that hegemon needed the will to 
enforce the rules of the system.44  Writing in the Harvard Journal of International Affairs in 
1998, Lisa Martin hypothesized in a similar vein, saying that the international institutions built 
by the U.S. became self-binding.45   
U.S. efforts were initially slowed by the reluctance of the administration to admit that an 
insurgent problem existed in Iraq.  As late as 2005 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had 
difficulty acknowledging the insurgents in Iraq as anything greater than “dead-enders” from the 
Saddam regime.  Allawi described these mischaracterization problems which kept the U.S. from 
properly responding to the threat at hand.46  Schiff  advocates her concordance theory which 
posits a more interactive relationship between the military and senior civilian leadership.47  She 
may be overrating the pre-Surge civilian-military separation: the National Security Council and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as advisory bodies to the White House.  The issue was not that 
Bush/Rumsfeld could not listen to the military; they just did not.  In Chapter Five interviewees 
discuss the importance of General Petraeus’s ability to access the White House. 
The U.S. also needed to achieve greater internal cooperation.  Kilcullen, along with 




embraces all departments of the U.S. government and is on the same battle rhythm as troops in 
the field.48  To Kilcullen this may matter more than formal unity of effort.  Joseph asks if war is 
the continuation of politics, and politics at the ground level is never considered in strategic 
interaction, why should we be surprised when defeat occurs?49  Schifrin feels that the very 
decision to Surge gave Iraqis the impression—and U.S. troops the opportunity to foster the 
impression—that the United States had recommitted to Iraq.50  Chapter Five lays out in more 
detail than past authors how the U.S. bolstered its interagency planning process for the Surge. 
Authors who discussed the structural challenges the U.S. had to overcome in Iraq include 
Ricks,, Brinkley and Kaplan.  Confusion over authority inhibited reconstruction efforts.  
Insufficient military force was in place to tamp down both anti-government forces and the Shia 
militias.  Overoptimistic assessments of the Iraqi government was causing disillusionment 
among the Iraqi citizens.   Russell stipulates that bureaucracy exists precisely to slow change so 
it should not be a surprise that increasing Iraqi bureaucracy would slow the process of 
reconstruction.51  Interviewees go into great detail describing these problems and how they 
affected operations. 
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reports provide a number 
of insights regarding staffing and organizational shortcomings that hindered the U.S. efforts in 
Iraq.  There was a lack of overall regulatory guidance.  There was no template for a “typical” 
reconstruction team in an occupied country.  Manning was haphazard and rarely long-term.  This 
work will expand on the manning and structural problems encountered as the U.S. tried to 
implement a coherent reconstruction strategy in Iraq.  Interviewees provided details and deeper 
insight regarding the practical problems created by the U.S. Executive Branch’s structural 




within the Executive Branch as well as with the Iraqis and making sure that political and 
economic initiatives better meet the needs of the population.   
Building trust in a multi-ethnic war is difficult.  Problems included abandonment of the 
Kurds and Shia in 1991 during the First Gulf War.52  Russell and Sky talked about the initial 
unwillingness of Americans to meet with former regime leadership and other insurgent groups.53  
Allawi described the secretive nature of Ambassador Bremer’s decision-making.54  Ali discusses 
Iraqi distrust of U.S. motives, particularly feeling they were primarily oil related.55  West 
describes U.S. Army surveys indicating 40% of the soldiers did not like the Iraqis and 38% felt 
they did not need to be treated with respect.56  Also see Ali and Ahmed for endemic Iraqi 
corruption and sectarian issues that needed to be understood for an effective counter-insurgency 
campaign.57  In Chapter Six, interviewees show how getting off the large bases and back into 
Iraqi communities improved trust and respect issues between both sides. 
International players with differing goals than the U.S. sought to influence events in Iraq.  
In Soft Balancing Against the United States, Robert Pape showed that the U.S. was not going to 
be able to “seal off” Iraq from other international actors who would utilize economic and 
political soft power to disrupt U.S. activities and objectives in Iraq, particularly Iran and Syria.58  
The Bush administration refused to meet with the Syrians or Iranians while ignoring Saudi 
support to Sunni insurgents and was also reluctant to provide a larger role to the United Nations 
(UN).59  Allawi went into detail about Iranian goals and techniques that were at odds with the 
U.S. effort, although they also favored installation of a Shia government.60 See Kilcullen  for a 
description of al-Qaeda’s global base of support and for the idea that the security force “area of 
influence” needs to include neighboring countries.61  Buchanan emphasizes two key points of 




for Iran while also recognizing the sovereignty of Iraq.62  Interviews demonstrate that some 
effort was made in this area, but it proved difficult to stymie activities of international players 
with objectives different than those of the U.S. although the emergence of some common 
interests with key international intervenors may have played an important role in near-term 
Surge success. 
Domestic U.S. politics also played an important role.  Ricks shows loss of popular 
support for the war in the U.S., but also Democratic reluctance to take responsibility for the 
situation.63  Hammes explains that the factor of time must be a central consideration in any 
counterinsurgency campaign that requires major U.S. forces, but also believes that the U.S. 
public has demonstrated patience if they feel the cause is worthy: they are not time-averse, but 
incompetence-averse.64  Mansoor details how GEN Petraeus invested a great deal of time on his 
confirmation process with Senate leadership.65 
Other writers have also discussed the tactical approach to counterinsurgency.  Eastin and 
Gade think that too little hard power can actually help insurgents by allowing them to signal 
strength and resolve without threatening them with annihilation.66  Gentile is concerned that 
COIN expects fence-sitters to become loyalists if the right strategy is applied.67  Gompert wanted 
to see less Western propaganda and more influencing by Muslim scholars.68  Malkasian and 
Marston, Pirnie and O’Connell, and Greene describe concerns with empowering the Iraqi 
authorities.  Pirnie and O’Connell even advocated preparation for host nation support in the 
event of a government collapse (in Iraq).69  Chapter Six will detail interviewee accounts of the 






U.S. MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE 
 
The U.S. military interest in updating its counterinsurgency guidance is episodic: when it 
is involved in a counterinsurgency.  The following table demonstrates this tendency: 
 
Doctrine Date Published Conflict Select Headings 
USMC Small Wars 
Manual70 
1940 Central America 
Caribbean 
Relationship with the State Department, Military-Civil 
Relations, Armed native organizations, Military 
government, Supervision of elections and Withdrawal 
FM 31-15  
Operations Against 
Irregular Forces 






Operations of Army 










Vietnam Ideological Basis for Resistance, Political Factors, 
Cold War situations, Propaganda and Civic Action, 
Police Operations 
Unconventional Warfare, Military Operations Against 
Irregular Forces, Situations Short of War 
Internal Defense and Development forces, The Hostile 
Guerilla Force, Advisory Assistance Operations, Civil 
Affairs 






Unity of Effort: Integrating Military and Civilian 
Activities, Developing Host Nation Security Forces, 
Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency 
Table 1:  U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Guidance 1940-2006 
 
All of the works share common elements.  There is recognition that U.S. forces are 
operating in a foreign country.  There is discussion of the need for cooperation between the 




There is an understanding that the goal is not permanent occupation, but to reach a point where 
the U.S. forces can be withdrawn.   
One previous analysis of the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine was conducted 
by the RAND Corporation.  Published by Austin Long in 2008, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence 
focuses on U.S. military counterinsurgency during Vietnam and the period up to and 
immediately after publication of FM 3-24 in Iraq.  Long concludes that publication of 
counterinsurgency doctrine did not materially alter attitudes or operations by U.S. forces.  In 
fairness to Mr. Long, his work was published in 2008, before the full effectiveness of the Surge 
was evident. The interviews in this work suggest that FM 3-24 and General Petraeus’ command 
did have a substantial impact on conduct in Iraq during the Surge.  
This work will argue in Chapter Five that doctrine is not necessarily intended or expected 
to change attitudes.  What it did in this case was provide authorization for individuals who 
already espouse those ideas the latitude to carry them out in practice.  FM 3-24 did not open 
General Petraeus’ eyes to a potential new way to combat insurgents in Iraq: it codified an 
approach he already felt would be superior to the strategy of his predecessors.  It also reinforces 
the importance of individual leaders.  Most of the interviewees for this work emphasized the 
personality-dependent nature of success or failure in carrying out their duties in Iraq.  That the 
U.S. would try this new strategy started at the top with General Petraeus and Ambassador 
Crocker and filtered down to their subordinates. Thus, doctrinal innovation synergized with 
command commitment in Iraq during the Surge.   
The Long study may not have appreciated how mentioning issues such as building local 
trust or reintegrating insurgents into the body politic are mentioned only infrequently in prior 




nation population permeates the entire work.  Cooperation, communication, minimizing 
collateral damage and effective partnering are the building blocks of the manual, not merely 
mentioned. 
This work will analyze in Chapter Five how FM 3-24 moved beyond the ideas of its 
predecessors.  It demonstrated a superior ability to treat the local population and leadership with 
respect.  Consider this line from the Small Wars Manual: “The future opponent…will have the 
inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater 
extent than a white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern 
armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the marine forces.”  The 
earlier works have a paternalistic, condescending air that writers of FM 3-24 worked to 
minimize.  Keep in mind that none of the documents were classified, so the target populations 
can access them. 
One person who participated in the drafting of FM 3-24, Frank Hoffman, published an 
analysis of it in Parameters (2007).  He said that the authors tried to mesh traditional approaches 
with the realities of the modern world.  He classified this merger as “neo-classical 
counterinsurgency.”  Hoffman felt that the manual gives commanders an understanding of the 
complex environment in which counterinsurgency operates but did not give them an 
understanding that different organizations may require different approaches.  He also felt that it 
did not sufficiently treat religion or communication.  He summarizes the manual as being “a step 







As this review of the past literature has demonstrated, counterinsurgency has received 
limited scholarly and military attention, and some argue that the lessons of counterinsurgency are 
repeatedly relearned by a military that frequently fails to apply them. History demonstrates that 
effective counterinsurgency requires a mix of soft and hard power deployed smartly. Many 
contemporary authors even argue that counterinsurgency is no longer a feasible option, even for 
a superpower. 
Several challenges are suggested by the literature that make it particularly difficult to 
mount an effective counterinsurgency operation for the U.S. including endemic U.S. government 
structural problems, employment challenges, a complex environment that includes a role for 
other external powers, and the ceaseless search for the proper mix of hard and soft power.  The 
U.S. was even slow to develop doctrine to deal with the situation in Iraq, waiting until the 
situation had become seemingly irredeemable.   
The next chapter will lay out the methodology used by this work to explore through in-
depth qualitative interviews with key participants in the Surge in Iraq the ways in which 
improved counterinsurgency approaches were applied during the Surge, and the consequences 









 Terminology will be defined in this chapter.  One of the key elements of this study is a 
common understanding of power.  With a working definition, this study will be able to better 
distinguish between hard and soft conceptions of power as well as analyze states utilizing them 
in combination.  This will be important as this work will also argue that capabilities should not 
necessarily be treated as either hard or soft.  It will also offer a definition for smart power or 
attempting to put the right resources to use in the right combination.  This work will further 
distinguish between smart power and simply mixing hard and soft power, which of itself does 
not guarantee the correct combination.  Hard and soft power will be operationally defined in 
terms of coercive or attractive power. 
Methodology for this study will also be explained.  To explore soft power in Iraq during 
the Surge, this work employed grounded theory and its applicability to gathering primary-source 
data from interviews.  Interviewees included military and civilians who were stationed in Iraq 
during the 2007-2008 Surge.  The interviewee data was compiled via the method of gathering 
known as referral sampling or snowballing.  Most interviewees were recommended by prior 
interviewees whom they had worked with in Iraq or knew had knowledge germane to soft power 
in the Surge.  This research enabled the development of a rich database drawing previously 




insights opened up a number of interesting avenues of analysis, including ones not envisioned by 






The Oxford Online dictionary defines power as “The capacity or ability to direct or 
influence the behavior of others or the course of events.”71  The definition broadly encompasses 
what this work will discuss as hard (direct) and soft (influence) power.  
Parsing this broad definition allows breaking out the difference between hard power, 
which Joseph Nye defines as “The ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military 
might to make others follow your will” and soft power which he treats as “getting others to want 
the outcomes you want.”   In other words, it is the difference between coercion and attraction, 
both of which would fall under the above definition of power.   
Dr. Nye’s definitions suffice as a theoretical starting point for defining power.  There is 
broad agreement on the concepts he is describing as being either coercive or attractive in nature.  
This work will also explore the idea that almost any action can be coercive or attractive 
depending on the point of view of recipients and other interested parties. 
A working definition of smart power is also needed.  The difference is that smart power 
is a normative concept.  History does not demonstrate a precise admixture of hard and soft power 
that invariably creates smart power.  Furthermore, even if there was such a ratio, it assumes the 




billions on reconstruction in Iraq prior to the Surge: the problems stemmed from ill-chosen 
projects, poor implementation and little to no oversight.  Chapter Eight will detail how part of the 
success of the Surge can be attributed to not just more resources, but better use of those 
resources.  A central theme that emerged in research was the need for a greater effort on the part 
of the U.S. leadership to better employ the tools of national power in Iraq.  In many cases they 
were relearning lessons that had been successful in previous conflicts.   
This work will employ the following new definition: 
 
SMART POWER: Employment of the range of available tools of power in a combination 
of attraction and coercion to efficiently accomplish national objectives. 
 
This definition allows the tools of power to be utilized in either a hard or soft role 
depending upon circumstances.  Military power is not predetermined to be hard, cultural power 
is not predetermined to be soft.  This opens a wider range of options for policymakers and allows 
for creativity in the employment of available assets.  The size difference between DoD and DoS 
means that, like it or not, if the U.S. wants to expand soft power activities overseas, utilization of 
the military in an attractive mode is necessary.  Interviewees confirmed that DoS manning 
shortfalls made this necessary during the Surge, even assigning DoD members to DoS billets in 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.   
This definition does not predetermine the optimal mix of hard and soft power but allows 
that ratio to be tailored to the operation.  The World Wars were overwhelmingly hard power.  
The relief operations in Haiti and Indonesia were mostly soft power.  The ratio can even change 




Interviewees frequently described the first six months of the Surge as “a gunfight.”  As the U.S. 
military gained the upper hand in the fighting, it could devote more resources to soft power 
efforts in Iraq.   
This definition strives for an efficient balance between hard and soft power.  National 
resources are finite, thus being able to use them wisely reduces the strain on the national purse 
and gives the taxpayer more confidence in the likely success of the operation.  The Surge 
leadership demonstrated a marked improvement in the ability of the U.S. to synchronize its 




Social scientists tend to categorize power capabilities as being either soft or hard.  
Military capabilities and some economic actions are usually considered hard.  These are 
commonly thought of in terms of threats or use of military force, embargoes, or even bribes.  On 
the other hand, social and cultural capabilities are typically considered soft.  These can include 
things such as education, innovation in political structures, or religious proselytization.   
By these traditional measures, the U.S. military would be treated as an element of hard 
power.  College textbooks such as International Relations by Pevehouse and Goldstein talk 
about the military in terms of the ability to exercise short-term power to influence another state.   
However, The U.S. military does not consist solely of hard power elements.  It does have 
components that can engage in the “war of ideas” described by Pevehouse and Goldstein.  The 
military is usually by far the largest element of a U.S. government occupation effort (called 




soft power elements may be larger than the entire Department of State contribution.  Therefore, it 
is critical to consider these forces when evaluating U.S. use of soft power. 
The U.S. military approach to soft power can be best understood by looking at its 
doctrine as promulgated by the Department of Defense.  The two most important for influence 
activities are Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, and JP 3-13.2, Military 
Information Support Operations, also known as Psychological Operations.  For planning 
purposes, the U.S. military treats Psychological Operations as a subset of Information 
Operations, which also coordinates Military Deception, Operational Security, Electronic Warfare 
and Cyber Warfare.  Note this is not a perfect delineation.  For example, Electronic Warfare and 
Cyber have offensive components whose primary purpose is to support kinetic operations by 
military forces.   
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, is the US military force guidance for working directly 
with local officials and population.  It defines Civil-Military Operations (CMO) as “…the 
activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships 
between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI).  CMO support US 
objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability.”   
Because all three publications have a “3” prefix, they are considered part of Operations.  
This is an important categorization.  Operations is normally the focal point of U.S. military 
activities, and as such normally has first call on resources and manpower with all other elements 
of the force such as the J-1 (Administration) or J-4 (Logistics) in support.  The fact that PSYOP, 
Information Operations (IO) and CMO have 3-prefix designators gives them a “seat at the table.”  




The bad news is that there has to be a separate “3” prefix for soft power capabilities.  
Although there are publications covering land, air and maritime operations, there are none for 
armor, bombers or destroyers.  It is true that CMO in particular can be performed by units other 
than civil affairs, but such specialized coding is a subtle sequestering of soft power functions 
such as messaging and rebuilding.   
Like any bureaucratic organization, the military says the right things about many topics.  
Equal Opportunity is important, Operational Security is important, morale is important.  No one 
has the time to devote full attention to all the areas the military claims are important.  Leaders 
will consequently focus on several things they think are truly important while paying lip service 
to the remainder.  Members of the unit will take their cue from the leaders.  The same effect 
occurs based on doctrine.  It is the difference between just being “important” and actually being 
important.   
Because these assets and operations are at least included among joint and Army 
regulations, they do allow a leader such as General Petraeus to determine that they are important 
and stress them in his operations.  This was the true contribution of FM 3-24 when it was 
published.  It gave General Petraeus and other leaders the ability to decide that the soft power 




 How do we know hard or soft power when we see it?  The current literature goes into 
detail on theoretical aspects of hard and soft power.  These theoretical discussions will typically 




operationalizes hard and soft power in a way to allow case-by-case categorization in a 
satisfactory manner. 
 Boulding talked about destructive power and placed it in a primarily hard power context.  
He said it could be active or passive, delineating between the threat and employment of power.  
He also postulated that his three types of power (destructive, productive, integrative) can overlap 
in employment, making it hard to break them into distinct categorizations for analysis.  Both 
Lukes and Baldwin help move the debate toward the power recipient rather than the capability 
itself.  It is the effect on the recipient that will help determine whether the power is hard or soft.  
Keohane and Nye give us the theoretical distinctions of coercion and attraction, providing a 
starting point for potential operationalization of hard and soft power. 
To empirically evaluate the data collected for this study, working definitions that 
encompass theoretical hard and soft power concepts need to be defined based on these theoretical 
constructs provided in the literature.  Keohane and Nye’s coercion and attraction provided the 
best basis for operationalization of the hard and soft power concepts.  This work proposes the 
following new operational definitions of coercive and attractive power: 
 
COERCIVE POWER: Actions whose consequences the recipient would not want repeated. 
 
ATTRACTIVE POWER: Actions whose consequences the recipient would want repeated. 
 
 To parse the advantages and disadvantages of each, the following definitions are also 




Time: The amount of time required to go from decision to conduct an action to action 
completion. 
Permanence: A measure of the length of time the effect of a completed action will persist. 
Undesired Consequences: Results of an action that are not in the best interest of the actor but can 
be reasonably expected to correlate with the action. 
The following table demonstrates operationalization of these definitions:
 
 
ACTION DO NOT WANT 
MORE 
WANT MORE TIME DURATION UNDESIRED CONSEQUENCES 
Bombing a House Insurgents, innocents in 
the house 
Locals terrorized by 
the targets 
10 10 Collateral Damage, Martyrs, 3rd party 
response 
Severing Diplomatic Ties Government, local 
citizens 
Inimical states 10 2 Resentment 
Erecting Barriers Insurgents Citizens and business 
owners 
5 5 Inhibits reconciliation 
Economic Sanctions Local Citizens, 
government 
Smugglers 1 2 Reduce respect for rule of law 
Cordon-and-Search Insurgents, Local 
Citizens 
Citizens outside the 
search zone 
6 3 Roundup of innocents, spillover 
Internment Facilities Insurgents, family 
members 
Other citizens 4 6 Abu Ghraib 
Checkpoints Insurgents, local 
citizens 
Local citizens 7 5 Slows traffic, fosters corruption 
Influence Messaging Insurgents Local citizens 2 9 Message fatigue, cynicism 
Uncoordinated Civic Action Insurgents, government Contractors, looters 3 3 Mismanagement, looting, indifference 
of local citizens (true intended target) 
Information Messaging Insurgents Local citizens 9 4 Dependency on occupying forces 
Joint Presence Patrolling Insurgents Local citizens, 
security forces 
3 4 Dependency on occupying forces 




1 8 Perceptions of bias, ingratitude 
Coordinated Civic Action Insurgents Government, local 
businesses, citizens 
5 7 Mismanagement, looting 
Bribes non-recipients Recipients 10 1 Favoritism 
Education/Training/Support  Bureaucrats, govt, 
citizens 
5 9 Possible dependence 
Hard/Soft Spectrum: Red = Hard, Green = Soft.      
BOLDFACE = Intended Targets  Plain Font = Others    
Time: 1 = Slow, 10 – Fast      
Effect Duration: 1 = ephemeral, 10 = permanent     






 The first column outlines a series of typical actions in a counterinsurgency environment.  
They can be performed by either military or civilian elements acting alone, or a combination of 
the two.  It is not an exhaustive list: there are hundreds if not thousands of activities that can be 
performed in an insurgency environment.   
 The color coding of the first column attempts to roughly place actions along a spectrum 
from coercive (red) to attractive (green) power.  Employment of weapons can be considered the 
most coercive of measures, even firing warning shots.  Education or training programs are 
usually soft in nature.  It is important for this work to note that not all diplomatic actions are 
attractive and not all military actions are coercive.  This is a departure from much of the 
literature on power which often equates a capability with a type of power.  For example, the 
military is considered hard power, cultural programs are considered soft power.  Many of the 
activities shown in Table 3.1 can be carried out by either military or civilian personnel, even if 
one is not the best choice. 
 The second column gives a short list of people who would likely not want to see the 
action, or others like it, repeated.  It can consist of people intentionally or unintentionally 
recipient of the action.  Intentional recipients are bold-faced in the chart.  It can consist of people 
directly or indirectly affected by the action.  People indirectly affected may view hard power as 
beneficial, or soft power as detrimental.  Insurgents are almost always one of the members of this 
list.  As power gets more attractive, they are often the only ones on this list.  
The third column gives a short list of people who likely would want to see the action or 
similar actions repeated.  As with those who would not want the action repeated, they can be 
indirectly or directly affected, and can be intended or unintended targets.  Note that even 
coercive actions will have supporters among the local citizenry.  Repeating actions should be 
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treated as a general category.  A village that has had a well dug does not want another well dug 
but may want further civic actions such as refurbishing their school or being visited by a medical 
team. 
 The determination of whether an action is hard or soft is based on the direct recipients.  
Looking at a cordon-and-search operation, it is conducted in a specific geographic area with the 
intent of finding insurgents.  This makes it employment of coercive power, even though there 
may be people outside the cordon area who are happy to see insurgents being captured and 
would want to see other areas (probably not theirs!) cordoned and searched.  Note that it is also 
coercive power to the people inside the cordon area who are being sealed off and having their 
dwellings searched.  Although innocent people living in the cordon area are undeserving 
recipients of coercive power, a secondary effect can be convincing those locals to turn in 
insurgents they are currently hiding. 
The fourth column breaks out actions by assigning a time factor for the desired effect to 
be achieved.  Severing diplomatic ties can be done in the time it takes the Ambassador to be 
driven to the Foreign Minister’s residence.  Trying to install a new political system can take 
years or even decades.  Note the difference in time between informational messaging and 
influence messaging.  Things such as warnings of impending military operations or date/times of 
local elections pass immediately upon completion of the subject action.  Influencing Sunni Iraqis 
not to support al-Qaeda was maintained throughout the time of the U.S. commitment in Iraq and 
beyond. 
 The fifth column assigns a permanence score to the action.  Killing someone is 
permanent: they will not directly impact the insurgency environment again.  Bribes are 
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ephemeral: recipients cannot be counted upon to continue to perform the desired action or 
inaction once the bribe is removed.   
 The sixth column is a short list of potential undesirable effects of the action.  For 
example, this takes into account that even though killing one insurgent permanently solves that 
problem, if his death inspires three of his brothers to join the insurgency, then the net effect of 
the action is to turn the battlefield odds even more against the striker.  Undesired effects usually 
involve the local citizenry, but they can also include international players or even domestic 
audiences.   
 This chart helps picture why weapon employment is a favored action for decisionmakers.  
It is fast and it permanently solves the problem at hand.  Further, a country like the U.S. with 
advanced weaponry such as Predator drones and Tomahawk missiles can employ them with little 
risk of its military personnel getting hurt.  It is also readily available to the U.S. and its global 
military presence.  The disadvantages basically accrue to third party effects and responses.  
Collateral damage may occur to property and innocent people.  Killing a prominent insurgent can 
inspire others to join the cause.  The international community may condemn the weapon 
employment and its effects.  Domestic audiences may not be willing to underwrite death and 
destruction if they do not perceive a vital national security objective at stake. 
 On the other hand, the chart demonstrates the plusses and minuses of working to install a 
government system or overseeing the political process.  It is a softer approach to effecting 
change, and the change can carry a great degree of permanency, which are important.  But it is 
slow.  It can also not create the outcome desired by the instilling country.  When given an 
opportunity to express their views, the people will often not select the course of action preferred 
by the occupier.  For example, Western powers keep trying to develop democratic institutions in 
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Muslim countries in the hope of getting secular, moderate leadership, but Islamist groups keep 
getting elected, often overwhelmingly. 
 Two sets of closely related actions can help elucidate the complexity of actions in a 
counterinsurgency environment.   
 
Information Versus Influence Messaging 
 
The first is the difference between information and influence messaging.  Information 
messaging is typically a Public Affairs function, and comprises things like information about 
curfews, voting registration and details of past violent acts.  It typically supports immediate, 
definitive events and does not directly attempt to permanently change audience behavior.  As a 
result, the products can be developed and disseminated quickly, but their effect may not last 
beyond the event of interest.  The goal is that eventually the local government and media will 
take on this role. 
Influence messaging in the U.S. Army is handled by Psychological Operations, and 
comprises things like inducing insurgent desertion, turning the local population against the 
insurgents, or encouraging local population support for the government.  It usually is more 
subjective in nature and hence is more open-ended than information messaging.  Influence 
messaging can take longer to take effect, years or even decades.  If it is well-planned and 
conducted, it can result in permanent behavior changes from the target audience.  If inaccurate, 
poorly carried out or lacks deeds that back its message, it can create message fatigue or even 
cynicism among the target population. 
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Neither information nor influence messaging is desired by the insurgents, who are rarely 
the target of the first but often the target of the second.  Local citizens can be targeted by both.  
They are usually receptive to information messaging, but not as receptive to a foreigner trying to 




Another paired set worth examining is uncoordinated versus coordinated civic action.  
Civic works projects are most common here.  The difference is whether the occupier asked the 
local citizens what they wanted or decided what they needed.  Going it alone was a continual 
U.S. problem in Iraq.  Though ill-advised, these actions do not meet the definition of hard power.  
The issue is not that the local citizens do not want the consequences repeated: they just do not 
care.  They would probably prefer the occupier talk to them about what they want, but they are 
not trying to alter their behavior to make the occupier stop the action.  About the only categories 
that want to see uncoordinated civic action repeated are contractors content to keep taking U.S. 
dollars even to build useless projects, and looters happy to have something to steal that no one 
will try to recover.72 
A squadron commander in Baghdad prior to the Surge illustrated the problem.  In the 
middle of his district was a fountain ringed by several lions.  A general ordered his unit to repair 
it.  They spent over $200,000 with local leaders telling him he was the third American to fix it.   
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It worked for exactly one day: within weeks the grass was dead and anything useful had 
been stolen.  When he asked the Iraqi District Advisory Council Chairman if they could dedicate 
some money to maintain the fountain, he replied, “No one cares about the lions except you.”73 
Coordinated civic action takes longer to initiate because time is taken to work with the 
local leadership to select projects they see as useful (and not all the locals may agree on project 
prioritization).  However, getting local involvement in the decision process means they will be 
less tolerant of a contractor dragging out the project to increase the cost, or improper building.  
They will also be loath to see pilfering or other sabotage of the project during or after 
completion.  Coordination does not eliminate these problems but brings the locals in as an 
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interested party to a successful outcome.  With an uncoordinated project the locals will not care 
if it being built properly, on-time or under budget.  Coordination takes time but increases the 
likelihood that the effort will have a lasting effect. 
 
Measures of Effectiveness vs Measures of Performance 
 
 When available, direct measurements of U.S. efforts include things such as numbers of 
pamphlets/radio broadcasts/newspapers circulated in Iraq or clinics built. Direct measurements 
(known as measures of performance or MoPs by the military) do not necessarily indicate 
effectiveness.  However, they are easier for a staff officer to track.  They also “brief great” at 
staff meetings.  The PSYOP officer puts up a Power Point slide showing a map of the country 
depicting circles indicating radio coverage on the three largest population centers in the country 
and says “General, your message is reaching over 60% of the local population 18x a day via our 
radio broadcasting.”   
Savvy commanders know to look past these metrics.  They ask questions like “Does 
anyone listen to our broadcasts?  Are the dialects and themes familiar to the local audience?  Are 
our broadcasts interfering with local broadcasting?  Have we considered buying airtime on local 
stations instead of trying to run our own broadcasts?”  He or she will be more concerned with 
indirect benchmarks known as Measures of Effectiveness (MoE), which indicate whether the 
audience performed the actions recommended in the messages.  Are attacks on US forces 
decreasing?  Is there an increase in TIPS-line reporting?  Did more of the population participate 
in the last election?  Are people utilizing the court system to adjudicate disputes?    
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This work will utilize both MOPs and MOEs in its analysis.  When feasible, weight of 
importance will be given to MOEs.  MOPs are valuable information and should not be entirely 





 Getting data from a war zone proved difficult.  The original intent of this work was to 
obtain and analyze data related to manning, employment and observed effects as recorded by 
units operating in Iraq.  Most of this data, though known by the author to have been tabulated 
and reported, is still not releasable to the public.  As a result, the author determined to capture the 




This project has inductive and deductive elements and utilizes an approach similar to 
grounded theory in which each interview, and other data collection leads to revision of key 
theoretical claims, and the revised theoretical claims then help guide future interviews and lines 
of questioning.  Grounded theory was developed in the 1960s by Barney Glazer and Anselm 
Strauss.  They were sociologists seeking a means to objectify qualitative research data such as 
patient interviews.  They wished to restore a balance between it and quantitative research, which 
by the 1960s had taken primacy in the field of scientific research.  Many scholars at the time felt 
79 
 
that qualitative research was inductive and hence speculative, and wanted to see a focus on 
empirical, real-world data. 
There were four basic stages of grounded theory research elaborated by Glazer and 
Strauss: 
- Codes: anchors around which key data points gather.  This involves taking data 
from interviews and written works and identifying key phrases or ideas and 
marking them for further analysis.  Work focuses on a posteriori knowledge from 
first-hand participants, trying to identify and codify as much as possible actual 
events and experiences by the individuals on the spot. 
- Concepts: groups of similar codes.  In this step recurring codes are identified, 
tabulated and categorized.  Concepts often stretch across a spectrum of 
interviewees.   
- Categories: broad groups of similar concepts.  Now the work brings together 
similar or correlative concepts into more generalized batches.   
- Theory: product of subject categories.  Finally, theories are induced from the 
aggregated categories.  Ideally a range of categories will provide a range of 
specific ideas from which generalized theories may be developed. 
A similar approach was adopted for evaluation of the interviewee data for this work.  
Phrases or observations that appeared in multiple interviews are brought together and treated as 
common codes among interviewees.  For example, both military and civilian interviewees 
remarked on the problems created in Iraq by the issue of short tour lengths.  Treating short tour 
lengths as a code, it can be grouped with other issues such as difficulty in getting qualified 
personnel into billets in Iraq as a broad concept of manning issues.  The concept of manning 
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issues can then be grouped with other concepts such as force protection issues into a broad 
category of structural limitations.  Structural limitations can be placed alongside categories such 
as execution problems to develop encompassing theories of reasons for ineffectiveness when 
conducting counterinsurgency. 
Evaluation must keep in mind that interviewees responses were in most cases generated 
by interviewer questions.  For example, a large amount of data on messaging was gathered.  This 
should not be surprising given that there was a specific interview question on messaging.  To 
some extent the staging is being guided by the researcher. 
The grounded theory approach was employed to modify questions over the course of 
conducting interviews based on unanticipated avenues of interest that opened up based on prior 
interviews.  For example, two interviewees volunteered that they had participated in the 2009 
“Surge” in Afghanistan.  Most interviewees after that were asked if they had participated in the 




All research was conducted in accordance with Old Dominion University guidelines 
regarding human subject research.  Research proposal package 1574657-1 was approved March 
3rd, 2020 and is available at IRBNet for review. 
Data was gathered utilizing referral sampling.  This is a non-probability sampling 
technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances.  
It was developed to increase sampling among hidden populations such as drug addicts.  Also 
known as snowball sampling, the idea is for the subjects themselves to guide the interviewer 
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toward future research subjects.  New subjects can reinforce existing research or spur branch 
research ideas. 
Referral sampling was the best approach to develop the current database.  A random 
approach would have required far more interviews than one researcher would be capable of 
conducting and might not have adequately covered interviewee characteristics important for this 
work.  Timothy Johnson points out that this technique allows for selection of further 
interviewees based on these characteristics of interest.74  The intent was to gather snapshots from 
a spectrum of agencies, locations, and jobs.  Referral sampling was able to meet this goal with 
far fewer interviews.  A questionnaire would not have been as effective in soliciting opinions and 
recollections that were not anticipated by the researcher but provided valuable insight into the 
Surge effort.  The impact of attractive power can be hard to capture in a box-checking format.  
Conducting live interviews allowed the researcher to ask follow up questions as interviewees 
provided unanticipated paths to explore facts germane to the Surge. 
Referral sampling proved an effective technique for all categories of Surge participants.  
Only five of the interviewees were personally known to the author prior to the study.  
Interviewees were quick to recommend additional potential subjects, did so within and across the 
military-civilian divide, and normally facilitated introductions to the new person.  This study did 
not seek classified information.  It captured unclassified data, recollections and generalized 
observances and trends.   
Interviews were typically built around broad questions following upon “yes/no” 
questions.  For example, “Did you work with Coalition partners?” would, in the event of an 
affirmative answer, be followed up with “Were there any you thought were particularly effective 
at soft power and why?”  Interviewees might go into detail about effective techniques they 
82 
 
observed from Coalition partners.  Alternatively, they might on their own detail Coalition 
partners or strategies they felt were not effective, even though this was never an interview 
question.  This format allowed the interviewee leeway to move into areas that may not have been 
previously considered by the interviewer or categorized as inconsequential.  As a result, the 
research developed and often branched off into areas not anticipated by the researcher.   
Referral sampling carries inherent weaknesses as a non-random process.  Subjects will 
tend to refer people they knew and worked with.  This potentially reduces the geographic 
“spread” of interviews.  For instance, a majority of the interviewees worked in Baghdad during 
the Surge.  Interviewees will tend to recommend people they worked with, so it logically follows 
that once the snowball rolled to Baghdad, it tended to stay in Baghdad. 
On the other hand, this interview “bulge” can also be taken as a demonstration of a flaw 
in the U.S. counterinsurgency effort that General Petraeus sought to reverse, the “big base” 
mentality.  At its height, the Victory Base Complex (VBC) housed 46,000 people, over one-third 
of the total U.S. strength in Iraq.  Then include the U.S. Embassy complex with over 5,000 
Americans, and it is easy to understand how personnel strength in Iraq did not directly transcribe 
into the “in the grass” capability most effective in countering insurgency.   
Interviewees will tend to recommend like-minded participants and friends, complicating 
the process of gathering viewpoints across the spectrum of opinion on an issue.  They are more 
likely to remain in contact with people they were friends with during the deployment.  They are 
more likely to recall them as people they successfully worked with, making progress in the 
mission with them.  There was not a single instance of someone speaking negatively about the 
person who recommended them during interviewing.   
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Post event interviews do not represent raw data, which is both a strength and weakness of 
the methodology.  Interviewees have had time to crystallize their thoughts and beliefs regarding 
the Surge and reflect upon what they experienced and learned.  On the other hand, time allows 
for bias to enter their memory and possibly distort the true picture of what actually occurred 
during the Surge. 
Forty-three people were interviewed for this work.  Seven were specialized interviews or 
otherwise were not interviewed using one of the standardized interviews, the remaining thirty-six 
followed the standard interview format reproduced in Tables 3.2 or 3.3.  All interviewees save 
one agreed to be recorded, although that one did allow notetaking.  Two subjects who published 
works on the Surge declined interviews but did answer specific questions.  Most interviews were 
conducted by phone: some were done via the Skype, WebEx or Zoom meeting platforms.  Some 
interviewees provided documentation to support their answers or to further this project’s 
research.  No interviewee ever declined to answer a specific question.  Most interviewees seemed 
eager to participate in this study and were interactive during the interview process.  
Transcribed interview average length was 8.5 pages.  Military interview length averaged 
10.7 pages.  Civilian interview length averaged 6.2 pages.   
Results were broadly representative of a variety of roles and positions within the U.S. 
effort in Iraq on a variety of dimensions. Interviews were roughly divided between military and 
civilian roles, including individuals who worked in Baghdad and elsewhere. There were both soft 
power and hard power specialists, leaders and staff, and a majority of people who regularly left 
their base and interacted with Iraqis.  It also included people who had been in Iraq prior to the 
Surge and/or participated in the subsequent “Surge” in Afghanistan.  The following table 
summarizes interviewee data: 
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Category In Category Out of Category Not Categorized 
Military 21 (54%) 18 (46%) 0 
Career 24 (62%) 15 (38%) 0 
SPS 32 (82%) 6 (15%) 1(3%) 
PEII 28 (72%) 7 (18%) 4 (10%) 
Leader 16 (41%) 22 (56%) 1 (3%) 
BDE+ 37 (95%) 2 (5%) 0 
Conventional 36 (92%) 3 (8%) 0 
Baghdad 29 (74%) 10 (26%) 0 
TOTW 27 (69%) 2 (5%) 10 (26%) 
MWI 33 (85%) 1 (3%) 5 (13%) 
Detainees 11 (28%) 17 (44%) 11 (28%) 
AFG Surge 14 (36%) 18 (45%) 7 (18%) 
SPB 36 (92%) 0 3 (8%) 
SPA 32 (82%) 1 (3%) 6 (15%) 




Of the thirty-six standardized interviews nineteen were military, seventeen were civilian.  
This was consistent with the sample diversity goals. Intent was to generate a balanced database 
of interviewees based on their service as either military or civilian participants.  Sufficient 
samples of each were obtained to explore the soft versus hard power issues in detail across the 
spectrum of department perception. 
There was some diversity in both the civilian and military department assignments, 
although this mix was slanted heavily towards DoS and U.S. Army. Sixteen interviewees were 
U.S. Army, two were Marines, thirteen were Department of State, four were other U.S. 
government agencies, one was a British national.   
No Iraqi nationals were interviewed.  Snowballing to them was not effective.  By and 
large the interviewees had not maintained contact with Iraqi or Coalition partners they worked 
with during the Surge.  Some also stated that on subsequent returns to Iraq they found that all the 
Iraqis they had previously worked with had been murdered.  Fear of retribution may have also 
played a role in interviewee reluctance to snowball Iraqi friends.  When the author reached out to 
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a British Army friend who works in Psychological Operations, he told him that by 2007 they 
were mostly out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. 
Twenty-five interviewees were full-time careerists of their respective department.  Eleven 
were individuals such as military Guardsmen or Reservists, contractors or Department of 
Defense temporary hires known as 3161’s after the regulatory section authorizing their hiring.  
This category is intended to search for differentiation in opinions of full-time careerists versus 
others to discern if one or the other was more likely to appreciate and embrace soft power 
techniques.  Full-time careerist specifically excludes Guardsmen and Reservists, who may spend 
30 years in the military but not on a full-time basis.  This categorization does not imply 
superiority of careerists over others.76 
Thirty-one interviewees were specialists in a field commonly associated with soft power, 
Five were hard power specialists, usually Army brigade commanders.  Military soft power 
elements are normally dispersed to units across the battlefield.  Even though there are stateside 
brigades or groups of soft power Army elements, and sometimes these headquarters deploy as 
controlling/oversight elements to a higher (corps and higher) command, they rarely operate in 
combat as an autonomous, complete unit.  This categorization allows analysis to look for 
differences in opinions on the efficacy of soft power between practitioners and combat leaders.  
Soft power practitioners can be expected to advocate for their field of endeavor, although 
interviews demonstrated some who questioned if not the soft power concept, its application in 
Iraq.  Of interest is combat leaders who came to see soft power as a preferable alternative to hard 
power. 
Twenty-five interviewees had previously served in Iraq prior to the Surge.  This includes 
interviewees whose tour substantially overlapped both the Surge and the prior period.  The 
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dividing line was set as February 2008, when General Petraeus assumed command of Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), although Surge units had begun flowing into Iraq in January.  In 
this case, subjects were preferred who had spent at least two months both prior to and after 
February 2008.  This categorization allows exploring whether Iraq veterans saw a difference in 
soft power employment during the Surge versus prior experience.  All Surge participants did not 
serve tours congruent with General Petraeus’ time as MNF-I commander.  Interviewees were 
considered to have served in Iraq prior to the tour if their tour began at least two months prior to 
General Petraeus’ arrival. 
Thirteen interviewees were leaders such as unit commanders or Provincial 
Reconstruction Team chiefs.  Twenty-three were staff or other support personnel.  Deputy 
commanders were treated as commanders for this category.  This split will allow evaluation for 
differentiation in opinions between leadership and subordinates on how the U.S. in general and 
their organization specifically implemented soft power during the Surge.  Subordinates might be 
more inclined to be open about implementation shortfalls, while leaders might be expected not to 
stray from the “company line”.  Sufficient sample sizes of each were gathered.   
Thirty-five interviewees operated at Brigade level or higher: only one was at a lower unit 
level.  PRT’s are treated as brigade level for this study.  Referral samplers tended to snowball 
sideways or up, i.e., they would recommend people at an equal or higher level to them.  The 
interviews as obtained do not provide an expansive opportunity to explore the opinions of Surge 
participants working at battalion level or lower. 
Three interviewees worked in Special Operations: the remainder of the military 
interviewees were conventional forces.  U.S. Army Special Operations is primarily composed of 
the Special Forces Groups, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.  Special Forces elements 
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normally work in small groups among the population of an area of interest.  As a result, they 
often practice many of the precepts of soft power as a matter of course and can be quickest to 
embrace and support soft power activities.  Special Forces in Iraq had a separate reporting 
authority back to Special Operations Command in Tampa: they did not report directly to General 
Petraeus, although liaison was maintained from both sides. 
Twenty-six interviewees primarily worked in Baghdad or the band of nearby towns 
during the Surge, ten worked outside of Baghdad.  Another consequence of referral sampling 
trending sideways or up was that the interviews tended to be Baghdad-centric.  MNF-I and 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) were both located there.  Approximately one-third of all the 
U.S. troop strength in Iraq was housed on the Victory Base Complex near Baghdad International 
Airport.  Sufficient non-Baghdad samples were gathered to allow for comparison between 
Baghdad and the rest of the country.  These samples also allow for comparison between the two 
prime insurgent sources.  The focus in Baghdad was against the Shia militias, whereas most of 
the non-Baghdad interviewees were facing Sunni insurgents in a combination of al-Qaeda and 
former Saddam regime elements. 
 
“BOB on the FOB” was a recurring cartoon published by SSG 
A.J. Merrifield, a soldier deployed to Iraq.  FOB stands for “Forward 
Operating Base.”  Many of the military and civilian personnel deployed to 
Iraq rarely or never left their base, usually because their job did not require 
them to do so.  It does not mean their job was unimportant or that their 
opinions are irrelevant, but simply that they were not in position to directly 
observe the effects of attractive-power activities in Iraq, the focus of this 
work.  Any FOB over company size was very safe.  It was not going to be 
overrun and insurgent indirect fire was inaccurate.  SSG Merrifield 
humorously lampooned the few Iraq participants who seemed to equate 
their support role risk with that of combat soldiers. 




Twenty-four interviewees regularly conducted missions “outside the wire”, defined as 
departing their installation multiple times weekly.  These departures could be as part of larger 
elements and missions or smaller groups with more specific tasks.  Sufficient samples were 
generated of Surge participants who were regularly conducting ground-level missions in the field 
and getting first-hand information on what was happening in Iraq.  Some care must be taken 
because in many cases, particularly for senior leaders, as they often had sufficient security that 
they were close to “bringing the wire with them” when they left their compounds.   
Thirty interviewees regularly met with Iraqi locals and leadership, defined as multiple 
times weekly.  These could be formal, scheduled meetings or a consequence of regular travel 
outside the wire.  The bulk of the interviewees regularly worked with Iraqis, whether going to 
their offices, bringing them to their offices or via telecommunications.  This allows exploration 
of the importance of direct communication with the host nation leadership and citizens in soft 
power endeavors.  Interviewees will repeatedly demonstrate their opinion of the value of direct 
contact with Iraqis. 
Five interviewees regularly worked with detainees, not necessarily as a prison facility 
guard or overseer.  Recidivism among captured insurgents is a concern in any counterinsurgency 
environment.  Sufficient samples were obtained to allow exploration of U.S. efforts to prevent 
captured insurgents from rejoining the fight upon release.  It is an audience that allows for the 
type of long-term approach that tends to be most effective for soft power. 
Fourteen interviewees are known to have participated in the 2009 Surge in Afghanistan.  
An initial interview question was whether interviewees thought the lessons of Iraq were 
applicable to other/future conflicts.  After multiple interviewees volunteered that they had been 
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in Afghanistan in 2009, a question specific to the Afghanistan Surge was added.  This provided 
an opportunity to explore whether interviewees immediately applied lessons learned in Iraq to 
the Afghanistan Surge, and to what extent they were successful.  It also allowed the researcher to 
uncover an interesting opinion of “Two-Surge” interviewees that is explored in Chapter Seven. 
 
THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
The strength of the interview method is that it allowed for collection of primary source 
data of Surge participants, not secondary data.  Primary source data is collected first-hand from 
participants.77  This allows for direct interaction between the researcher and the interviewee, 
eliminating possible confusion from derived sourcing.  It is considered captured data, meaning it 
was purposefully collected for this work.78  It also allows the researcher to direct the interview 
into unanticipated but interesting areas.   
Post-event interviews represent raw data, which is both a strength and weakness of the 
interviews as a source of information.  They allow for reflection and hindsight on the part of the 
interviewee that can place events into a broader context.  Amanda Bolderston described 30-50 
interviews as being necessary for a grounded theory approach to ensure that the researcher can 
saturate categories and detail a theory.  She also pointed out that these interviews are ideal for 
looking at perceptions and experiences of interviewees.79 
Drawbacks include concerns of accuracy when utilizing source interviews.  Additionally, 
the interviews are being conducted over ten years after the events in question.  Several subjects 
joked about memory issues in trying to recall events that far in the past.  Official records and 
cross-checking with other interviewees reduces the potential magnitude of the problem and is 
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recommended by Bolderston.  The author personally transcribed all interviews, which 
Bolderston demonstrates best allows the researcher to become familiar with the data.   
The following initial statement was read to all interviewees: “My name is J.R. Reiling.  I 
am a retired US Army Psychological Operations officer.  I am currently a PhD candidate at Old 
Dominion University.  My dissertation focuses on the soft power component of the U.S. Surge in 
Iraq from 2007-2008.  I am interviewing people who participated in the Surge as decision-
makers, operators or both.  Based on your Surge experience, I would like to interview you to 
improve my understanding of the Surge.  Interview should take approximately one hour and is 
unclassified.  Your participation is voluntary.  You may stop the interview at any time.  Your 
information will be kept confidential and only released with your permission.  May I record the 
interview?  May we proceed?” 
There were two basic categories of interviews: military and civilian.  Interviewer would 
interject or alter questions as deemed applicable during the interview, particularly if points of 
interest were touched upon.  Elite-level interviews, particularly with General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Croker, were also conducted.  In those cases, a tailored set of interview questions 
was utilized.  Interview length was kept at approximately 20 questions.  This section will list 









Military Interview Questions 
 
QUESTION # QUESTION 
1 Can you tell me your unit and role related to the Surge? 
2 What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?  
Also called non-lethal or non-kinetic.  Did you deploy to Iraq prior to the Surge? 
3 As part of pre-deployment planning, how did you view the utility of soft power elements 
such as PSYOP, IO, PAO and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)?   
4 Can you describe your unit’s organic soft power capability?  Did you or your unit request 
additional soft power elements and/or integrate them into pre-deployment training?  For 
example, cultural awareness briefings for deploying soldiers or exercises including actors 
portraying civilians/tribal leaders?  To what extent were these requests filled by your unit and 
higher headquarters? 
5 Upon arrival, what was your initial assessment of soft power “gaps” in your unit operations? 
6 Can you describe interagency relations, particularly with the Department of State and PRTs?  
Did you feel DoD and DoS were proactively cooperating or competing? 
7 Were there Coalition partners you believed were particularly effective at soft power and 
how?  How were you able to integrate and cooperate with these partners? 
8 Was soft power worked by, with and through Iraqi partners (government, military)?  How did 
this impact pursuit of U.S. national security objectives?  How or why not? 
9 Did your unit interact with local tribal/religious figures?  Did this change your ability to 
conduct operations? 
10 Did your unit interact with local/regional media (local TV/radio, Al-Jazeera)?  How or why 
not? 
11 Did your unit interact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)?  How or why not? 
12 Were you involved in messaging?  How long was the staffing process?  Did this change 
during the Surge?  To what extent was accuracy sacrificed?  Did you feel your messages 
were getting out in time to be useful? 
13 Did your organization work with detainees?  If so, were soft power elements such as 
vocational training, counterindoctrination or educational opportunities provided? 
14 Can you describe the interaction between hard and soft power?  For example, did soft power 
supplant hard power (compliance through coercion)?  Did you see the “ratio” of hard to soft 
power change over time?  If so, how was this achieved? 
15 Was hard power used to support soft power such as providing security for reconstruction 
teams or Rewards for Justice programs?  What ways proved most effective? 
16 Did the insurgents practice soft power? If so, did the insurgents change/increase their soft 
power focus in response to Coalition efforts and how?  Were there insurgent soft power 
tactics you felt were particularly effective? 
17 Did you perceive the ratio of U.S. to ISF casualties shifting during the Surge?  How? 
18 Were there elements of soft power (written vs audio vs video messaging, Civil Affairs, face-
to-face interaction, leaflet drops) that were more effective than others?  Which and why? 
19 Did the Surge produce benefits in Iraq?  If so, were they long-term or transitory? 
20 What were your “lessons learned” for soft power efforts during the Surge? 
21 Are the soft power lessons of Iraq applicable to other/future conflicts?  Why or why not? 





The questions were formulated to gather information specific to the soft power 
component of the Surge in Iraq as seen through the eyes of the military people stationed there.  
The following section details the specific purpose of each question asked. 
1) Can you tell me your unit and role related to the Surge? 
This question established that the interviewee was present during the Surge, where they 
were stationed, and what type of work they were performing during the Surge.  Desire was to 
have interviewees who were stationed throughout Iraq and served in a variety of locations and 
differing levels of authority and responsibility.  Intent was to see if any of these factors 
influenced answers. 
2) What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?  
Also called non-lethal or non-kinetic.  Did you deploy to Iraq prior to the Surge? 
This question established whether the individual had previously worked in or with 
international soft power efforts.  Intent was to establish whether they were already familiar with 
soft power concepts or would have to learn “on-the-job.”  Not all participants arrived in Iraq with 
General Petraeus.  Asking whether they had deployed to Iraq prior to the Surge included full 
tours from a prior time or people who had been in Iraq for several months prior to GEN Petraeus’ 
arrival.   
3) As part of pre-deployment planning, how did you view the utility of soft power elements 
such as PSYOP, IO, PAO and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)?   
This question explored whether interviewees had any preconceived notions of the value 
of military elements associated with soft power that could have impacted how they employed or 
worked with these elements. 
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4) Can you describe your unit’s organic soft power capability?  Did you or your unit request 
additional soft power elements and/or integrate them into pre-deployment training?  For 
example, cultural awareness briefings for deploying soldiers or exercises including actors 
portraying civilians/tribal leaders?  To what extent were these requests filled by your unit and 
higher headquarters? 
This question established what soft power elements commanders in particular had at their 
disposal.  Follow-on questions provide insight into the commander’s appreciation of the 
importance of non-kinetic capabilities throughout his command, and whether he was supported 
in this by higher headquarters.   
5) Upon arrival, what was your initial assessment of soft power “gaps” in your unit operations? 
This question demonstrates shortfalls the interviewee had to overcome while working 
during the Surge.  It is also an indicator of the interviewee’s perception of the importance of soft 
power projection. 
6) Can you describe interagency relations, particularly with the Department of State and PRTs.  
Did you feel DoD and DoS were proactively cooperating or competing? 
This question is intended to reveal how the individual felt interaction with the other 
primary implementor of the Surge improved or inhibited their ability to carry out their assigned 
duties.  Follow-on question provides insight as to interviewee’s perception of whether the 
cooperation was forced. 
7) Were there Coalition partners you believed were particularly effective at soft power and 
how?  How were you able to integrate and cooperate with these partners? 
This question provides insight as to whether the interviewee felt there were other nations 
who demonstrated effective counterinsurgency procedures, assuming there were other Coalition 
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partners in their area of operations.  Follow-on question indicates whether good practices were 
shared and synergized across the Coalition.   
8) Was soft power worked by, with and through Iraqi partners (government, military)?  How did 
this impact pursuit of U.S. national security objectives?  How or why not? 
This question shows the ability of the interviewee and their unit to integrate their actions 
with the host nation.  Follow-on questions can shed light on whether this partnering remained in 
the overall U.S. interest. 
9) Did your unit interact with local tribal/religious figures?  Did this change your ability to 
conduct operations? 
This question provides insight on the willingness and necessity of working outside 
official Iraqi channels, which may not have always been the “key figures” in the area of 
operations.  Follow-on question allows the interviewee to discuss whether this interaction 
positively or negatively impacted U.S. efforts. 
10) Did your unit interact with local/regional media (local TV/radio, Al-Jazeera)?  How or why 
not? 
Question indicates whether the interviewee’s organization capitalized on the opportunity 
to bring local media into the messaging process.  Follow-on question can shed light on whether 
any shortfalls were due to lack of opportunity or willingness. 
11) Did your unit interact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)?  How or why not? 
Question indicates whether the interviewee’s organization capitalized on the opportunity 
to engage others in getting the work done.  Follow-on question can shed light on whether any 
shortfalls were due to lack of willingness or opportunity. 
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12) Were you involved in messaging?  How long was the staffing process?  Did this change 
during the Surge?  To what extent was accuracy sacrificed?  Did you feel your messages 
were getting out in time to be useful? 
Question indicates whether the interviewee was involved in framing the dialogue explain 
to the Iraqis the actions and intent of U.S. forces.  Follow-on questions for applicable 
interviewees indicate whether the Surge adapted messaging to make it more useful. 
13) Did your organization work with detainees?  If so, were soft power elements such as 
vocational training, counterindoctrination or educational opportunities provided? 
Question indicates whether the U.S. was capitalizing on the opportunity to influence Iraqi 
prisoners.  Follow-on question may not be applicable to most units, who were operating 
temporary detention facilities. 
14) Can you describe the interaction between hard and soft power?  For example, did soft power 
supplant hard power (compliance through coercion)?  Did you see the “ratio” of hard to soft 
power change over time?  If so, how was this achieved? 
Question allows the interviewee to describe smart power efforts in his area of operations.  
Follow-ons provided insight as to whether the goal of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker 
to increase soft power efforts was realized. 
15) Was hard power used to support soft power such as providing security for reconstruction 
teams or Rewards for Justice programs?  What ways proved most effective? 
This is a variant of the previous question as a concrete demonstration of whether the unit 




16) Did the insurgents practice soft power? If so, did the insurgents change/increase their soft 
power focus in response to Coalition efforts and how?  Were there insurgent soft power 
tactics you felt were particularly effective? 
This was the question most likely to have interviewees respond, “That is an interesting 
question.”  Primary intent is to discern whether the interviewee’s unit was factoring insurgent 
response into the campaign plan.   
17) Did you perceive the ratio of U.S. to ISF casualties shifting during the Surge?  How? 
This question is intended to indicate whether the burden of fighting shifted to the Iraqi 
Security Forces during the Surge. 
18) Were there elements of soft power (written vs audio vs video messaging, Civil Affairs, face-
to-face interaction, leaflet drops) that were more effective than others?  Which and why?  
This question was intended to discern if there were elements of soft power that the 
interviewee felt were more effective than others.  If so, follow-up question was to determine the 
ones the interviewee felt were effective. 
19) Did the Surge produce benefits in Iraq?  If so, were they long-term or transitory? 
This question is intended to reveal whether the interviewee felt that the Surge improved 
the overall situation in Iraq, regardless of their opinion of the whether the entire U.S. intervention 
itself was beneficial to Iraq.  Follow-on question allows the interviewee to opine on the 
permanence of the Surge benefits. 
20) What were your “lessons learned” for soft power efforts during the Surge? 
This question allowed the interviewee to summarize their overall experience with soft 
power during the Surge, both positive and negative. 
21) Are the soft power lessons of Iraq applicable to other/future conflicts?  Why or why not? 
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This question allowed the interviewee to speculate on whether they felt that the soft 
power tactics and techniques they employed in Iraq would work in other conflicts.  A related 
question was added asking interviewees if they had participated in the 2009 surge in Afghanistan 
after two volunteered that they had. 
 
Civilian Interview Questions 
 
QUESTION # QUESTION 
1 Can you briefly tell me your organization, role and timeframe related to the Surge? 
2 What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?  
Did you ever work previously with U.S. government employment of hard power (compliance 
through coercion)?  Had you been assigned to Iraq prior to the Surge? 
3 Had you previously worked with U.S. military Psychological Operations, Information 
Operations, Public Affairs or Civil Affairs? 
4 How often did U.S. military proactively come into contact with your organization?  Were 
military liaisons embedded with your organization or vice versa?   
5 Was joint planning and coordination conducted with U.S. military? What types of 
interactions and frequency?  How did these contribute to the success of the mission? 
6 Did you travel “outside the wire”?  If so, were non-security U.S. military elements also part 
of the mission?   
7 How often did you work with Iraqi partners (government, military)?  How did this impact 
pursuit of U.S. objectives? 
8 Did you interact with local tribal/religious figures?  Were any techniques or activities more 
effective than others? 
9 Did you interact with local/regional media (local TV/radio, al-Jazeera)? 
10 Did you see your efforts impacting violence in Iraq and if so, to what extent? 
11 Did you see the “ratio” of hard power to soft power change over the course of the Surge?  If 
so, which elements of each increased or decreased? 
12 Did the insurgents change/increase their soft power focus in response to Coalition efforts if at 
all? 
13 Did international players (Coalition partners, proxy states) employ soft power effectively?  
How? 
14 Were non-governmental agencies integrated into soft power planning and execution?  Which 
ones and how? 
15 Were there elements of soft power that were more effective than others?  Which and why? 
16 Did you see the Surge as providing long-term solutions and how? 
17 What were your “lessons learned” for soft power efforts during the Surge? 
18 Are the soft power lessons of Iraq applicable to other/future conflicts?  Why or why not? 
 
19 Do you have anything else you would like to add? 





Most of the questions asked of the civilians were the same as asked of the military.  
Variations are discussed below. 
2) What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?  
Did you ever work previously with U.S. government employment of hard power (compliance 
through coercion)?  Had you been assigned to Iraq prior to the Surge? 
As a reverse of a question asked of military members, intent of this question was to 
determine if any of the civilian interviewees had been involved in a prior international coercive 
operation by the U.S. 
3) Had you previously worked with U.S. military Psychological Operations, Information 
Operations, Public Affairs or Civil Affairs? 
Intent of this question was to determine if the civilian interviewee had prior familiarity 
with the military elements traditionally associated with soft power. 
4) How often did U.S. military proactively come into contact with your organization?  Were 
military liaisons embedded with your organization or vice versa?   
Intent of this question was to determine if the civilian interviewee felt the military made 
an effort to interact with his organization.  Follow-up question would demonstrate the strongest 
form of proactive contact, a permanent liaison. 
5) Was joint planning and coordination conducted with U.S. military? What types of 
interactions and frequency?  How did these contribute to the success of the mission? 
Intent of this question was to determine whether the U.S. military was able to tamp down 
its tendency to “go it alone” during the Surge.  Follow on questions determine depth of 
effectiveness and whether the interviewee saw this interaction as beneficial.   
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6) Did you travel “outside the wire”?  If so, were non-security U.S. military elements also part 
of the mission?   
Intent of this question was to determine whether the interviewee left their parent base on 
a regular basis.  Follow-on question provides insight as to whether or not joint soft-power 




 The following chart tabulates key data and questions regarding the interviewees for this 
work: 
 
Category In Category Out of Category Not Categorized 
Military 21 (54%) 18 (46%) 0 
Career 24 (62%) 15 (38%) 0 
SPS 32 (82%) 6 (15%) 1(3%) 
PEII 28 (72%) 7 (18%) 4 (10%) 
Leader 16 (41%) 22 (56%) 1 (3%) 
BDE+ 37 (95%) 2 (5%) 0 
Conventional 36 (92%) 3 (8%) 0 
Baghdad 29 (74%) 10 (26%) 0 
TOTW 27 (69%) 2 (5%) 10 (26%) 
MWI 33 (85%) 1 (3%) 5 (13%) 
Detainees 11 (28%) 17 (44%) 11 (28%) 
AFG Surge 14 (36%) 18 (45%) 7 (18%) 
SPB 36 (92%) 0 3 (8%) 
Applicable Elsewhere 32 (82%) 1 (3%) 6 (15%) 
 








Terminology discussion focused on the key definition of power and its delineation into 
hard and soft for this work.  A new definition was proposed for smart power.  New and 
operationalized definitions were proposed for coercive power and attractive power.  These 
definitions will help separate power capabilities from the power categorizations themselves.  
Smart power is a normative concept, but one which integrates contemporary theory regarding 
power projection and will also prove valuable in demonstrating how the Surge differed from the 
previous U.S. effort there.   
Grounded theory and referral sampling were described to lay the foundation for the data 
accumulation basis of this study.  Forty-three interviews were gathered for this study with a 
healthy mix of civilian and military participants who served in a variety of positions and 
locations in Iraq during the Surge.  Most of the interviewees were unknown to the author prior to 
introduction by previous interviewees.  Their willing cooperation resulted in an excellent 
database that will allow this study to empirically pursue points of interest regarding the U.S. 












 Counterinsurgency is not easy.  Smart power is a normative term: hence there is not a 
formula that tells planners the right mix of hard and soft power to create smart power.  Success 
normally requires a large investment of people and resources by the occupier over an extended 
period.  Problems both internal and external will beset a country attempting to apply power 
against an insurgency, particularly if they are operating on foreign soil.   
 This work has defined smart power as “employment of the range of available tools of 
power in a combination of attraction and coercion to efficiently accomplish national objectives.”  
Smart power is normative.  Consequently, there is no precise allocation of hard and soft power 
that will produce the desired result for every contingency, or every time or location in a 
contingency, or even a different day in the same location.  Metz and Byman wrote about the 
inherent problem that as a foreign power increases the capabilities of the host nation government, 
its ability to influence them declines.80  Branch and Wood talked about lack of intelligence, 
particularly in the early stages of the insurgency, hindering the ability of the intervening power to 
plan a proper strategy.81 
 Many of the problems begin before assets even begin to be deployed.  This chapter will 
detail these structural flaws in the U.S. starting with the limitations imposed by the unique U.S. 
form of government.  Interviews shed light on problems related to force composition, tour 
lengths and lines of authority, and some of the steps taken to correct these flaws before and 
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during the Surge.  Guidance from senior leadership at times hamstrung operations.  Financial 
considerations played a role in limiting effectiveness of U.S. efforts in Iraq.  The patience of the 
U.S. voter acted as a nebulous but ever-present “statute of limitations” often forcing the U.S. to 
favor short-term versus long-term approaches. 
 Further problems arose after arriving in Iraq.  Interviewees consistently emphasized the 
personality-dependent nature of their efforts and that getting along with peers, particularly from 
other agencies, was crucial to success.  International problems ran from Coalition partners with 
differing national objectives to regional states and non-state entities who also desired to shape 
the course of events in Iraq.  Reminiscent of Vietnam, local government corruption, bias and 




 Proper exercise of power in Iraq was made difficult by structural flaws in the U.S. and the 
international system.  The ideas of Dahl about exercise of power being a result of compromise by 
elites was evident when looking at the fractured Iraqi political mosaic.  Almost as important was 
the need for compromise by the elites involved.  Those in Iraq and Washington, military and 
civilian, and U.S. and Iraqi, needed to develop a more cooperative effort emphasizing the 
strengths and weakness of each.  This chapter will detail some of the institutional problems that 
had to be worked through or around. 
 The second “facet of power” can be understood by looking at Bachrach and Baratz and 
their treatment of the second face of power, which to them was the agenda-controlling ability of 
senior leadership during the early stages of the U.S. intervention in Iraq.  Even before the 
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invasion, recommendations by the military of needed force levels were ignored.  State 
Department concerns about post-liberation governance were also marginalized as that role was 
even initially handed to the military.  After liberation, military concerns about the growing 
insurgent threat and how to respond to it were downplayed by Donald Rumsfeld in particular.  
The U.S. military and civilian leadership in Iraq were intelligent people who had ideas for 
changing the Coalition approach in Iraq, but they were disregarded. 
 The third facet of power postulated by Lukes could be applied to any number of the 
misperceptions and misinformation extant in Iraq.  Sunni, Shia and Kurdish misperceptions of 
each other and Coalition intentions were paramount.  External actors such as Iran and al-Qaeda 
appeared to be beneficial to the Iraqis because they opposed the Coalition.  The leadership in 
Washington D.C. was forcing a flawed strategy on its subordinates in the belief that it was the 
correct strategy.  Military and civilians in Iraq were reluctant to work together because of 





 Any occupying power can expect difficulty adapting to an insurgency environment in a 
foreign country.  A senior DoD official who worked reconstruction in Iraq described the 
problem: 
One of the biggest gaps was sending 18 and 19-year-old kids to a place where they don’t 
speak the language and asking them to restore security and maintain local order as a kind 
of police action post-invasion…. Use the U.S. as an analogy.  We have trained, extremely 
well-prepared police officers working in communities where they not only speak the 
language, but they live and they work and they understand every aspect of the culture 
they are in.  Yet they fail in those daily jobs in ways that create tremendous unrest.  On 
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that scale, think of the burden we placed on young men and women when we sent them 
into Iraq with none of those backgrounds, asked them to do a role much more 
complicated and gave them no support.82   
 
The best solution in Iraq was to stand up Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and enable them to 
take on the task of restoring stability and order in the country, moving toward Hammes’ idea that 
indirect support of local contingencies is a better strategy than employing foreign forces83.  This 
proved difficult due to issues of time, funding and factional mistrust.  Unfortunately, prior to the 
Surge the U.S. continued to act as if these forces were effectively taking on the pacification role 
and proceeded with drawing down its presence when it was obvious that the ISF was not ready to 
take the lead in restoring order.  A consistent theme among interviewees for this work was that 
the ISF were manifestly unready to take on the security role in 2007. 
 The problem was even more difficult because the policymakers in Washington did not 
want to simply restore an old order in Iraq: they were trying to create a new one built around a 
democratic system.  An interviewee who worked influence operations in Iraq felt that the U.S. 
never really mapped out what it would mean to build a new social order and take to do so.  He 
felt there were sufficient resources in Iraq, the U.S. just did a poor job with them.84  Gentile 
correctly warns that no amount of military adaptation can rescue a flawed policy.85  Nonetheless, 







Division of Power 
 
The Founding Fathers wrote a ground-breaking document of governance, but it was 
deliberately designed not to be fast.  Diffuse lines of authority make it difficult for any one 
person to effectively control the whole.  This spirit of diffusion permeates throughout the 
Executive Branch in particular.  Various agencies jealousy guard their prerogatives of authority, 
funding and manning, and are loath to see other agencies interfere in “their” area.  Gompert saw 
that a related problem was the U.S. tendency to address “problems” by creating new layers of 
bureaucracy.86  Interviewees will demonstrate that success was usually predicated on the 
opposite tack, eliminating the “red tape.” 
These problems were occurring from the beginning in Iraq.  Ambassador Timothy 
Carney, who was one of the interviewees for this work, was initially in Iraq with ORHA, the 
Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.  When he returned, he wrote 
an editorial for the Washington Post titled “We’re Getting In Our Own Way.”  This piece was 
critical of the effort there.87  Ambassador Carney (who had previously served as Ambassador to 
Sudan and Haiti) mentioned some of the minor problems such as housing accommodations and 
water shortages he endured throughout his time there, which may be humorous but are 
symptomatic of the larger coordination and resourcing issues in Iraq prior to the Surge detailed 
below.   
ORHA was organized by and reported to the Pentagon, not State Department.  This is not 
unusual.  Direct military rule of a conquered area ends up being the only realistic option when 
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countries occupy other countries.  There is usually a high threat level, and diplomatic/civilian 
resources are typically not ready to assume control over the occupied area.  This did not in and of 
itself have to be a problem: William H. Taft was an exceptionally effective military transitional 
governor in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War.88   
The problems arose with planning and implementation.  Little time was allotted to ORHA 
to organize and develop their plan.  ORHA Director Jay Garner knew this would create 
difficulties.  He recounted that when he went in to see Secretary Rumsfeld in January 2003, he 
told him that George Marshall had started working on post-WWII planning in 1942, while they 
were just beginning to plan for a problem that would probably happen in March or April.89 A 
senior stability commander who was on the CENTCOM operations staff in 2003 said ORHA was 
mostly designed as a fly-in package to help the Iraqi ministries get back to business.  
Unfortunately, after the invasion all the Iraqi technocrats walked away.90  Bringing back the ones 
willing to come back took time. 
Some staffers at ARCENT had begun planning for a post-invasion occupation, but it was 
a haphazard effort not coordinated with the main planning effort or State Department.  
Furthermore, an officer who worked in planning during the Surge pointed out that the 
Administration decided to do something different before the ORHA personnel had even begun 
deploying.91  Schiff’s concordance theoryworks under an idea that lack of communications 
structure was preventing adequate input to the Administration from the White House, but 
interviewee evidence indicates that the input was there: the Administration simply chose not to 
listen. 
ORHA was not prioritized by the military leadership in Iraq.  Ambassador Carney 
described continual problems trying to get functional telephones (their satellite phones only 
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worked outside).  The military dictated multiple-vehicle force-protection requirements to leave 
their compound, then provided only a fraction of the transportation they needed to get out and 
perform their mission.  Because of the state of Iraq’s banking system, Iraqi government officials 
had to be paid in cash: vehicles carrying boxes of cash frequently had to move with no security.   
ORHA was subordinate to the land forces commander in Iraq, hence they did not have a 
direct line back to Washington D.C.  This meant that when problems cropped up, they had no 
ability to go around bureaucratic or personal obstructions to get those problems solved.  Director 
Garner and his staff lacked the stature to overcome these obstacles.  All they could do was get 
into arguments with military staff who had little understanding of or interest in their mission.  He 
also ran afoul of authorities in Washington who wanted a faster de-Ba’athification process. 
ORHA would soon be replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Paul 
Bremer, who also assumed the titles of U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq.  The 
organization still resided within the Department of Defense, meaning Bremer was technically not 
an ambassador.  However, everyone understood that he had the backing of the White House, 
along with United Nations Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 which recognized the United States 
and Great Britain as occupying powers in Iraq and transferred authority for expenditure of Iraq’s 
oil revenue from the United Nations to the CPA, as well as responsibility for developing 
institutions for representative governance.92   
Bremer secured his administration backing by promptly promulgating orders dissolving 
the Iraqi army and mandating extensive de-Ba’athification.  Most interviewees agreed with the 
State Department Chief of Staff who said that army dissolution and de-Ba-athification sowed the 
seeds of the insurgency.93  The problem was particularly acute in the Sunni-majority provinces 
such as Salah al-Din, Saddam’s home province, where the U.S. brigade commander there was 
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faced with large numbers of senior Iraqi officers, generals with no jobs who felt 
underappreciated.  It also resulted in inferior membership in the new Iraqi Security Forces.94  
Many of these disenfranchised officers had fought in the Iran-Iraq War. 
When sovereignty was transferred to Iraq on 28 June 2004, the Department of State was 
at last able to establish an Embassy in Iraq and resume a more traditional diplomatic role in the 
country.  However, the military retained outsized responsibility for governance and 
reconstruction in Iraq in addition to its security function. 
Interviewees have stated that the Embassy and military were actually integrating prior to 
the Surge.  Embedment and liaison between both agencies did occur.  However, military were 
often placed into civilian slots due to manning shortfalls.  There was also lack of coordination 
between the Embassy and the DoD-funded Task Force for Business and Stability Operations 
(TFBSO).95  Part of the problem was security restrictions that made it difficult for State 
Department people to travel outside their compounds.  A legacy of the 1998 Embassy bombings 
was mission travel authorization being moved to security officials in Washington who imposed 
much greater safety-based restrictions on movement of non-uniformed personnel. 
A senior member of the TFBSO said that this led to other coordination problems.  
Because the Embassy personnel were largely restricted to their compound, they were reliant on 
second-hand information.  He felt that they turned into a self-generating organization, simply 
passing the same information back and forth amongst themselves.  In 2006 there were 25 
separate weekly meetings at the Embassy devoted to economics.  The TFBSO found it difficult 
to even send representatives to all of these meetings.  When they did not attend, it created 
resentment among the State Department officials who felt that the TFBSO was doing whatever it 
wanted and would not talk to them.  The TFBSO sympathized with their frustration but the 
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senior member acknowledged that the TFBSO de emphasis on inter-agency coordination came 
back to haunt them later when the organization was eventually shut down with the enthusiastic 
support of the State Department.96 
 
Insurgency: War or Peace?   
 
Is insurgency a small war or a tenuous peace?  Metz described insurgency as not military, 
but military-centric.97  In practice, it falls into a gap in U.S. Executive Branch international 
affairs.  There is no one agency specifically designed to deal with all of the challenges inherent 
in an insurgent environment.  The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report Hard 
Lessons reflects the multitude of agencies that had to be assembled to deal with post-invasion 
Iraq.  Plakoudas recognized that some of the challenge to counterinsurgents come from the 
bureaucratic politics within their own government.98 
 A short-term hire with private sector experience described the problem.  A Foreign 
Service Officer suddenly thrust into the role of a project manager for a major economic 
construction or operational project simply does not have that sort of background.  It is not what 
they are trained for and capable of doing.  Asking them to do it would be as unfair as taking a 
private sector manager and asking them to walk in and negotiate a treaty.99   
The same is true of a career officer, although that person may have had more interaction 
with the defense industrial sector.  Military officers do have unit budgets: however, these are 
rarely intended for construction projects.  Civil Affairs and the Corps of Engineers are the only 
U.S. Army components who continually oversee construction projects beyond remodeling an 
office or repaving a parking lot.  Most officers are only going to take on projects that can be 
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completed in their tour of duty (cynically, so it reflects on their fitness report), so their bias tends 
to be toward short-term projects. 
The Executive Branch lacks a middle class of leaders capable of moving into the full 
spectrum of soft power requirements.  Worse, both DoD and DoS will claim that they do have 
the ability to perform the role because they want the resources that come with it.  The TFBSO 
official described this as an institutional gap driving problems on the ground.100  It should be 
noted that this is typically a play for funds that the gaining organization will subsequently 
attempt to divert to what it sees as its core missions.  It is not because either organization wants 




A huge problem within DoD was getting the different messaging organizations of 
Information Operations, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs to plan together.  Public 
Affairs is tasked to provide information to the public from the owning military unit.  An MNC-I 
planner talked about the distinction between PSYOP and PAO and the IOTF, which is 
understandable but continually frustrating because none of them could talk to each other and the 
commander had to try to integrate them at his level.  He felt that their different “silos” were 
appropriate in WWII but are irrelevant today.101 
The Embassy was not just Department of State workers.  It also contained people from a 
number of agencies such as Treasury, FBI, Commerce and the DEA.  In his interview for this 
work, Ambassador Crocker made it clear that as the President’s representative in Iraq, he had 
control over all of the non-DoD agency entities operating in Iraq.102   
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The challenge is with the transient nature of the assignment.  Someone seconded to Iraq 
understood that they would have to return to their parent organization at some point.  As a result, 
they had to keep in mind the goals and objectives of that organization or risk censure upon their 
return home.103 What the interviewees saw was similar to the problems described by De Tray 




Dixon  described the success of the British approach to counterinsurgency as partly 
attributable to their ability to recognize the importance of cooperative civil-military relations.  
His logic is that if only 20-25% of successful counterinsurgency is shooting, then the bulk of the 
responsibility lies with the civilian presence.  He believes that if this is the case, then the 
politicians should be in charge.104  This would not play out in Iraq: however, interviewees 
stressed the importance of the excellent working relationship between General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker in revitalizing the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq.  This is more in 
line with Kilcullen and his thinking that a common diagnosis of the problem may be more 
important than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies. 
Perhaps the most common flaw interviewees mentioned was the service and personality-
dependent nature of interagency cooperation in Iraq.  Interviewees agreed with a Civil Affairs 
officer who pinned much of the blame on individual stress, not an organizational plan.  If a 
person was being a jerk, it wasn’t because their controlling agency wanted them to be a jerk, it 
was usually just the stress of combat.105  A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leader 
described a meeting with the military camp commandant where he told her that her team was 
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lucky he was feeding and housing them and had not pushed them out onto MSR (Main Supply 
Route) Tampa (i.e. “the street”).  And this was after the interagency cooperation memo had been 
signed.106  Often the military leadership considered the civilian presence to be a nuisance that 
added no value to their operation. 
An Embassy planner prior to the Surge said that the military was attempting to flex its 
muscles and take over some aspects of soft power, but not in a coordinated way.  He said that 
this was a particular problem with CERP money, which was nearly $2 billion.107  A Special 
Operations commander said that he would run into State Department people who felt the military 
was doing their job.  Others might be happy as long as the spending was integrated with what the 
State Department was doing.108  An MNC-I planner said that the biggest soft-power gap was that 
DoD had all the resources and money, DoS had all the authority and much of the expertise.109 
 An Embassy analyst prior to the Surge described the difference in analysis.  The Embassy 
utilized Iraqi data as part of its metrics.  MNF-I did not do so relying instead on Coalition data 
only.  The joke at the Embassy was “If an Iraqi was shot by a civilian, was he still dead?”110  
Joseph wrote about similar problems with the Human Terrain Teams, whose effort he felt never 




In 2007 Congress had switched to Democratic control of both houses for the first time 
since 1995.  This naturally ramped up the partisan nature of the debate concerning the effort in 
Iraq, with funding a critical part of being able to maintain the U.S. rebuilding effort.  Every 
confirmation hearing for a general officer assuming a command throughout DoD, not just in Iraq, 
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became another opportunity for Congress to question the war effort in an open forum.  General 
Petraeus and his staff understood that his Congressional testimony would be as vital to the war 
effort as military success in Iraq and would spend a tremendous amount of time preparing him 
for his Congressional hearings. 
 Public support for military action in Iraq declined as the conflict dragged on with little 
measurable progress. Easton and Gade emphasized the importance of home nation support and 
how eroding that support is often a key insurgent goal.112   Impatience for results drove 
Washington to demand quick solutions in Iraq even though this was not realistic.  An 
Ambassador working in Iraq prior to the Surge said that they were on six-month clocks.  
Washington would say, “You have six months to fix this” even though no non-profit would ever 
say they could do that sort of work in so short a time.  He called it the “7,000-mile 
screwdriver.”113   
A senior USAID official also said that it was difficult to hash out agreement with the 
military, who tended to operate on a shorter timeline than the civilians.  By comparison, USAID 
was on the ground in South Korea and Turkey for decades before they were able to leave when 






Any ideas the U.S. and its selected “Coalition of the Willing” had of being able to “wall 
off” Iraq from outside influence were dashed by nations and non-governmental organizations 
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determined to pursue their own objectives in the country.  A senior CENTCOM planner said that 
by 2004-2005 there was a clear international effort to create influence inside of Iraqi society and 
prevent the influence of the U.S.  According to him this changed the dynamic so that it was no 
longer about stabilizing Iraq: it was about fighting against deliberate efforts to accrete or deprive 
power.115  These efforts came in particular from Iran, Sunni Arab states, and non-governmental 
organizations.  There was a greater understanding if not ability for the Coalition to inculcate the 




The Coalition of the Willing proved problematic.  It was important politically for the U.S. 
to avoid the appearance of engaging in a bilateral war with Iraq.  However, President Bush was 
unable to duplicate the success of his father in obtaining a UN resolution authorizing the 1991 
liberation of Kuwait.  He was also unable to invoke a formal international agreement to develop 
his coalition as had been the case in Afghanistan, where the 9-11 attacks had activated the 
NATO defense pact to protect the U.S. as the victim of aggression (This was ironic, as it is 
doubtful if any of the drafters of the NATO agreement had ever envisioned that the U.S. would 
be the country asking for assistance).  The alternative became an informal grouping of nations 
under the heading of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I).   
Many of the contributing nations provided only small contingencies, often with little soft power 
capability.  One brigade commander described the Eastern European brigade with him as lacking 
capabilities such as PSYOP or Civil Affairs in addition to the language barrier: it was mostly 
young infantry guys who wanted to “go out and shoot stuff.”  The commander’s troops led by 
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example, and the Europeans learned to do things like pass out flyers and shake hands, but they 
did not do it as a unit.  
Some smaller Coalition partners demonstrated positive results when placed in the right 
environment.  The South Korean Zaytun Brigade deployed to Erbil from 2004-2008.  There was 
little violence in the Kurdish region, allowing the Brigade to focus on reconstruction activities.  
Their lone fatality was a suicide.  One Civil Affairs officer described them as being very well 
received116, while a USAID official said they demonstrated good results in jobs and economic 
growth.117  The Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group was a smaller unit that operated 
primarily around Samarra in the Shia-populated south from 2004-2006.  It was the first Japanese 
foreign deployment of troops outside of UN mandates since World War II.  Along with the 
troops, Japan committed nearly $5 billion to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, nearly a third of the 
U.S. amount.  
Overall, both the Korean and Japanese contingents were described by multiple 
interviewees as having good success, although one pointed out that the U.S. usually took the 
most difficult sectors.   Both military contingents were eventually withdrawn due to domestic 
unpopularity. 
The British generally received high marks from those who saw them in action.  One 
planner felt that the civil-military link for economics was much stronger than in the U.S.  Their 
Department for International Development (DFID) was an independent agency and worked well 
with the Ministry of Defence.  It was as if USAID did not have to go through the Embassy to 
work with DoD.   The biggest drawback for the British was lack of funds: they continually had to 
ask the U.S. for money to fund their ideas.   The British often contributed excellent insights to 
the process as co-participants, planners and advisors.  A Psychological Operations officer said 
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that they helped the Americans focus on sources of violence such as sectarianism rather than 
where it was occurring.  
Unfortunately, by 2007 the British focus was on the insurgency in Afghanistan, not Iraq, 
because it was a NATO operation, and they were concerned about the opium flow into London.  
The author contacted several British friends for potential interviews for this work, but the 
consensus was that by that time Iraq was no longer a priority for the Ministry of Defence.  A pre-
Surge planner in Baghdad felt that by that point the British presence in Iraq, proactive and 
valuable in the initial phases, had degenerated into a defensive perimeter around Basra airport, 
the sort of big base mentality that was precisely what General Petraeus was trying to reverse 
during the Surge. 
 
The United Nations 
 
The United Nations was unenthusiastic about the idea of overthrowing Saddam by force 
in the first place.  Their attempt at direct post-invasion involvement was severely curtailed by the 
bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 that killed 22 people including 
Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello.  A contractor for the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in Baghdad pointed out that after the attack the UN pulled 
most of its people back to Amman, Jordan.  This meant that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank had no presence in Iraq: the USAID workers modernizing the Iraqi 
banking system had to leave the country to meet with the IMF.118  This hindered the U.S. ability 
to obtain international funds for the reconstruction effort and forced individual member states, 
particularly the U.S. and British with some help from the Japanese and Koreans, to directly 
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contribute most of the funds.119 An MNC-I planner said that they would either have to go to 
Jordan to conduct meetings with the UN or coordinate by phone or video.120 
On the other hand, the minimal UN role gave the U.S. more freedom of action.  When 
interviewed for this work, Ambassador Crocker was critical of several aspects of UN operations.  
His experience working with the relief effort during the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan led him to 
believe that a multinational effort without a strong U.S.-led presence is usually ineffective.  He 
felt that the UN and many of the NGOs are more interested in headlines than relief, and that they 




The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was an important piece of the 
puzzle in Iraq.  Their focus was on the detention facilities run by the Coalition, particularly after 
the abuses at Abu-Ghraib were publicized.  A stability operations Army commander in Baghdad 
prior to the Surge pointed out that the bad guys facilities never get inspected.  Only those 
thoughtful enough about the importance of the ICRC get inspected.122 
 USAID is a government organization, but most of their contract partners are non-
government organizations (NGO).  These entities usually preferred to downplay their 
relationship with the U.S. and distance themselves from the Coalition to avoid insurgent 
retribution.  Unfortunately, this means that the partners are operating with less U.S. oversight.  
The stability operations commander voiced the concern that this lack of oversight can turn the 




Iranian Smart Power 
 
Iran was understandably unhappy with the creation of an American military presence on 
their western and eastern borders.  Deep-seated antagonism against the U.S. dates to the CIA-
sponsored countercoup that removed Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 and restored the Shah 
to power.  U.S. support to Iraq during the 1980s war started by Saddam Hussein continued to 
exacerbate the hostility of the two countries.  An Embassy lead planner who worked during the 
Surge said it was unrealistic to think that the U.S. would not have to partner with Iran to 
implement change in Iraq, pointing out that Shia and even Kurds fleeing Saddam’s massacres 
frequently ended up in Iran.124 
 Iran proved to be a formidable adversary utilizing both hard and soft power in Iraq for 
their own brand of smart power.  Hard power support included funding of Shia militias and 
development of weapons including the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), a shaped charge 
specifically engineered to create molten copper “bolts” capable of penetrating the armor on U.S. 
military vehicles.125 
 The Iranian soft power effort was even more extensive.  Several interviewees for this 
work described how they employed effective propaganda directly and indirectly through their 
proxies in Iraq such as Badr Corps.  A U.S. Embassy economics coordinator also said that the 
Iranians would steal food basket deliveries and deliver them to the locals.  Several interviewees 
described how when a project such as a bridge was completed a placard saying “A gift to the 
people of Iraq from the people of the United States” would be attached.  They would come back 
a month later and the placard had been replaced with one saying, “A gift to the people of Iraq 
from the people of Iran.”126 
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 Numerous people interviewed for this work credited the Iranians with expertly filling soft 
power gaps in Iraq overlooked or under-resourced by the U.S. and its allies.  As one ambassador 
leading economic planning in Iraq put it, “The U.S. tried to build power plants: the Iranians built 
libraries.  We tried to do all the hard stuff in Iraq.  The Iranians came in, did the easy stuff, and 




Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf nations are ambivalent toward the idea of a powerful 
Iraq, as is Syria.  Iraq has a larger population that is overwhelmingly Shia.  The other Sunni Arab 
leaders had no love for Saddam Hussein but considered a potential confederation of Iran and Iraq 
to be a bigger threat.  They also knew that Saddam kept Iraq stable and feared that anarchy 
would allow terrorists and other groups to attempt to come in and alter the balance of power.  
Syria was frequently a refuge for Sunni leadership when threatened, either by the Coalition, Iraqi 
government or insurgents throughout the U.S. time in Iraq.  This was a problem Metz understood 
when he said that traditional counterinsurgency concepts assume that partner and neighbor 
nations support modernizing and reforming the target nation128 although this was not the case in 
Iraq. 
 There was also the problem of differing schools of Islam.  Saudi Arabia is dominated by 
the Wahabi branch of the Hanbali school if Islamic jurisprudence, the smallest but most austere 
of the four schools.  The Saudis have used the opportunity provided by their oil wealth to further 
the spread of Wahabi practices throughout the world and naturally took advantage of the 
opportunity provided in Iraq to increase their effort there. 
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 A former ambassador and senior member of the Baghdad Embassy described the problem 
the U.S. faced in underappreciating the importance of external powers such as Syria and the Gulf 
States, instead thinking in terms of one state, Iraq, that they believed was contained around the 
edges.  He felt that the extent to which these countries could make all of the U.S. planning 
irrelevant was an under looked factor.129  For example, U.S. efforts to limit violence in Iraq 
would be ineffective if Sunni nations were providing logistic support and recruits to anti-
government forces in Iraq utilizing the tribes in Anbar Province disaffected by the loss of 
lucrative smuggling opportunities created by the UN sanctions after the First Gulf War. 
An Army stability commander said that soft power occurred in the form of food 
deliveries to Sunni enclaves from Jordan and Saudi Arabia.  He described the international 
competition for power and influence in Iraq as one of the untold stories of the conflict.130  A 
State Department PRT member said the relationship between Syria and Iraq was complex 
because of the historical antagonism between the two Ba’athist strands, but support for the Iraqi 




Al-Qaeda relished the opportunity to challenge the U.S. directly in a Sunni Arab state.  It 
meshed with their strategy of trying to instigate conflict to turn the Muslim world against the 
Christian West.   
Jihad in Islam is complex.  The Arabic word literally means “struggle.”  Most Muslims 
take it to mean the inner struggle all people wage to try and do good and avoid evil.  Many 
Muslims consider this the “Greater Jihad.”  There is also the concept of the “Lesser Jihad,” 
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which is considered the defense of the faith, either by the sword or by persuasion.  Both versions 
are subject to dispute among Muslim scholars. 
Groups such as al-Qaeda seize upon the lesser Jihad with their vision of spreading Islam 
via military conquest followed by conversion of conquered populations.  Both are widely 
considered distortions of the commonly accepted concept of Lesser Jihad, which is generally 
agreed to be defending Muslim lands rather than conquering new ones, and logical persuasion 
rather than forced conversion.   
It is disappointing that the U.S. did not really foresee the possibility of Iraq becoming the 
new Jihad for ambitious young Muslims.  Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya should have 
demonstrated that conflict against Christian nations in particular was almost guaranteed to be a 
magnet for the next generation of would-be mujahedeen, with unofficial support from the 
veterans of those previous campaigns now living in Sunni Arab countries.  Their religious fervor 
would make them tenacious and uncompromising opponents.  AQI was even utilizing the 
Internet as part of its propaganda campaign.  As one Embassy analyst in Iraq said, “If you’re 
using PowerPoint, you’re good.”132 
It is also disappointing that once there, the U.S. did not mount an effective campaign to 
divide the al-Qaeda jihadists from the local population.  This was in part because the Shia-
dominated government was reluctant to cooperate with the Sunni population.  The Surge would 
be successful in part because the Americans finally began to provide direct assistance to the 
Sunnis trying to get rid of the jihadists, although this violated normal counterinsurgency 
emphasis on empowering the local government.  This was a long-overdue unity of effort between 
the Western tribes and the U.S. which Byman had described as the Iraqis understanding that the 
U.S. was the “least worst” side to be on.133 
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A Treasury Department official working in Baghdad prior to the Surge described the 
power of money in enabling the insurgency.  She described cash as the ultimate attractive 
nuisance.  It is a flexible tool for non-government entities such as al-Qaeda because there is no 
legal tangle or accountability trail comparable to what government financing dictates, which still 




 Authority limitations inhibited the ability of Executive Branch agencies to carry out 
actions required in Iraq.  An Army stability commander described the disconnect between 
institutional knowledge and policy.  The military might pass along the lessons of the past, but 
policy people come in with little knowledge of the circumstances or history of the area of 
interest.  He felt that they are driven by politics at the time and the operators end up repeating the 
mistakes of the past even when they push back against the policies, and according to him they 
pushed back quite a bit.135  This further demonstrates the limits of Schiff’s Concordance Theory 





 Posting shortfalls affected all agencies in Iraq.  During the days of the British Raj, 
English officers were posted to areas of interest as commissioners for five years or even longer 
with no vacations.  They had sufficient time to become familiar with the area and earn the trust 
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of the local population.  The U.S. has no comparable system for long-term emplacement of 
officials in foreign countries.  Pirnie and O’Connell talked about the difficulty of trying to 
develop a coherent and balanced counterinsurgency strategy in the type of partnering role that 
requires a long-term commitment, which was becoming problematic in light of the waning U.S. 
willingness to remain in Iraq.136 
 
Military Manning Limitations  
 
U.S. Army conventional force members might be posted to Iraq for 12-15 months, with a 
two-week leave during their tour.  There was some effort to rotate units to the same locations so 
that veterans would at least be able to pick up established relationships within the local 
community, but this would mainly be applicable to full-time active-duty Army forces.  Most of 
the Army’s soft-power practitioners such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations reside in 
the Reserves, which were not being rotated into Iraq as frequently.137  
Special Operations forces would also deploy to the same locations, although on shorter 
deployment cycles.  They were also more likely to have active-duty Civil Affairs (CA) and 
PSYOP elements attached to them during their rotations, providing a better soft power continuity 
than in the conventional force.  One CA officer who worked with Special Forces in Iraq said that 
it gave him the flexibility to focus on human-terrain mapping and incentivizing behavior of key 
individuals, in contrast to the regular force units conducting more traditional CA missions.138 
It is also important to note that all 160,000 Surge participants did not arrive in Iraq and 
depart the same days as General Petraeus.  It was not a D-Day situation where everyone started 
at the same time working off a developed and rehearsed plan.  Many of the assets were already 
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in-country and fighting before the Surge was even announced.  General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker faced the challenge of trying to reshape the mission in many cases of extant 
organizations already in contact with the local environment, citizens and insurgents alike, in 
order to align with the Surge grand strategy. 
Units were often assembled piecemeal.  One brigade commander said that of the five 
battalions he commanded in Iraq, two were not from his brigade.  They were units already in 
country when he arrived and were later replaced by two other battalions he had never 
commanded or trained with.139  Another had two of his maneuver battalions and his artillery 
battalion detached to other missions, not working for him.140 
 
Civilian Manning Limitations 
 
Inadequate as this was, State Department postings were even shorter.  Because service in 
Iraq was classified as a hardship location, tours were limited to one year.  Eleven months and one 
day counted as a year.  They were also entitled to two 30-day leaves during their tour.  In other 
words, State Department workers spent nine non-continuous months in Iraq.  A military 
Information Operations planner in Baghdad prior to the Surge described his State Department 
counterparts as great Americans hampered by the rules requiring them to depart every 90 days.  
As a result, he had to deal with blank spots where there was zero coordination.141  It was difficult 
to even get civilians to head the PRTs according to another planner, let alone provide their full 
staffing complement. 
The resulting manning issues were illustrated by a team leader in Baghdad who said that 
he had five State Department people working for him, and there was not a single day when all 
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five were present to work due to individuals being gone on leave.142  The same team leader gave 
another example of the problem.  He had negotiated a procedures agreement with some of the 
military, State and USAID managers in-country.  When he returned several months later, he 
found that not one of the managers he had negotiated the agreement with were still in-country, 
and none of their replacements had even heard of the agreement. 
Secretary of State Rice wanted to implement “Vietnam rules” regarding Iraq.  During the 
Vietnam conflict State Department people who refused assignments to Vietnam were also 
expected to resign their position.  She was not able to impose this strict measure: consequently, 
Foreign Service Officers would refuse Iraq assignments and State would just keep going down 
the list, with a predictable drop off in quality.  Interviewees saw that many of the ones who did 
deploy were straight out of school.  They were smart and conscientious but had no experience 
and were now running a section in arguably the most important U.S. embassy in the world.143   
A USAID contractor said the State Department people were nice, but they spent 3-4 
months trying to adjust, worked for a while, then started working on their next assignment.  
Going to Iraq was something they had to do to get ahead.144  A brigade commander with 
extensive experience in Iraq also said that many of the State Department personnel he worked 
with viewed Iraq as a failed policy.145  Some of the State Department personnel even agreed that 
they viewed the invasion of Iraq as a mistake and many policies as failed: however, many felt 







Soft Power Without Hard Power Is Not Smart 
 
Walk softly and carry a big stick. 
- Theodore Roosevelt 
 
 U.S. leadership was focused on soft power prior to the Surge, they just failed to marry it 
with hard power.  This fails to acknowledge that there simply are some people that will not 
change their behavior no matter how much attractive power is used on them.  Lessons learned 
from previous conflicts included the need to include coercive power to stabilize the environment.  
Iraqi Security Forces were not strong enough to coerce behavior out of adversarial entities in 
Iraq.  The consequence was a sharp uptick in violence in Iraq in 2006 and early 2007. 
In his interview for this work, A former ambassador who worked with the reconstruction 
effort in Baghdad during the Surge stated that soft power was being employed prior to the Surge.  
He singled out the MNC-I commander as being an officer who “got it,” meaning the importance 
of soft power.  The question was how do you win hearts and minds when you don’t control the 
land?  For example, he described a typical situation where the U.S. would build a health center, 
one faction would gain control of it, and the other side would blow it up.  He could not usefully 
build more health centers if they kept getting destroyed.147 Another Embassy planner described 
as faulty the notion that just getting the Iraqis jobs would stop the violence.  He said that the 
Iraqis were not fighting for jobs, they were fighting for political control.148 
 Interviewees continually stressed the importance of hard power as a necessary 
handmaiden to successful soft power efforts.  An Embassy Chief of Staff during the Surge 
likened the situation to the quote by Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of this section.  As he 
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said, “Who wants to do dumb power?”149  A colonel who was a senior planner in Baghdad talked 
about the mantra under General Casey of “As they stand up, we stand down” referring to the 
Iraqi Security Forces.  The U.S. forces would move from tactical overwatch to operational to 
strategic or relinquishing more and more of the close fight to the Iraqis.  A strategy assessment 
officer pinpointed General Casey’s refusal to make protecting the population part of the 
campaign plan as the key element lacking in the pre-Surge strategy.150 
 A commander in Baghdad prior to the Surge said that it did not make sense to spend 
money on large-scale projects that could not even be visited because security was so bad.  Water 
treatment plants with no pipes or sewage treatment facilities with no connection to homes 
became monuments to U.S. stupidity.  He said that Iraqi leaders who talked to him simply did 
not believe the Americans could be that incompetent by accident; that the U.S. was doing it 
deliberately to keep their (Sunni or Shia) side down. A popular Iraqi indictment was how the 
U.S. could put a man on the moon but could not manage to fix their water/electricity/clinics/etc.  
It just had to be a conspiracy.151 
 This should not imply that open season was declared against the Iraqis in the manner of 
Downes who went so far as to suggest indiscriminate targeting of civilians supporting 
insurgents.152  Chapter Five will demonstrate that the Coalition leadership made the decision to 
go in the opposite direction and work more directly with the Iraqis.  Easton and Gade concluded 
from their study that insurgent strength can actually increase if violence applied against them is 
too little, leaving them perplexed to explain the success of the Surge.153  However, they may not 
have understood that the initial stages of the Surge actually saw an increase in violence against 
the insurgents.  Many interviewees for this work describe the first half of their Surge experience 
as a “gunfight.” 
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Power That Does Not Leave the Compound is Not Smart 
 
 Prior to the Surge, all elements of U.S. power were too tied to their installations for 
different reasons that will be explored.  Inadequate support and oversight to the Iraqi Security 
Forces and government were the inevitable result, failing to stabilize the country or provide 
viable reconstruction.  This was a problem that does not seem to have received great attention in 
the literature. 
A deputy brigade commander working in Baghdad recognized that this was the strategy 
developed by Lieutenant General (LTG) Chiarelli and said his favorite mantra was “Killing 
insurgents just creates more insurgents.”  However, the commander felt while the Coalition was 
ramping up soft power activity, the insurgency, civil war and score-settling continued to 
increase.154  A stability commander in Baghdad pointed out that the U.S. was not doing nation-
building, which is simply helping a country trying to help itself.  The conditions of stability had 
to be present first before there could be nation-building.155 
 Interviewee after interviewee echoed the assessment of the PSYOP officer who worked 
in Baghdad before and during the Surge that face-to-face was the most effective means of 
communicating a soft power message to the local populace.  He talked about how it empowers 
them and makes them feel like part of the process.156  But how can you interact face-to-face if 
you never go outside the wire?  Baldwin laid out the importance of being able to measure 
military success,157 measures that would be reprioritized during the Surge, particularly securing 





MILITARY BIG BASE STRATEGY 
 
The U.S. wanted the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to take charge of security in the country.  
A sensible goal, but one that likely led to wishful thinking.  The pre-Surge strategy dictated by 
Washington was to pull U.S. forces back to a smaller number of larger bases.  An Embassy 
director with extensive private-sector background felt that this decision may also have been 
influenced by logisticians trying to make their job easier.  Surveys indicated that most Iraqis had 
never even seen an American,158 a problem exacerbated by pulling the U.S. forces back to a 
smaller number of larger compounds. 
 Interviewees with early experience in Iraq said that the initial invasion had spaced troops 
around the country which assisted in providing stability.  One said that including contractors 
there were probably 250,000 or more people in-country situated at local levels.  Big installations 
like Camp Victory did not exist.159  As the smaller outposts were shuttered, insurgents were able 
to filter back into those areas and operate against the Coalition.  General Casey and the 
leadership in Iraq understood the limitations of the big base strategy but were unable to convince 
their superiors of the need to disperse.   
 As a result, it became more difficult for the soft power elements to get outside the wire.  
A Civil Affairs officer said that he would tell his own teams about something going on which 
they knew nothing about because they never left.  He said that there were even a few who were 
afraid to leave the FOB.160  This needed to change in line with Gompert’s idea that flexibility and 
opportunism were needed, or Byman comparing Iraq to the classical principal-agent problem of 




Civilian Security Limitations 
 
The 1998 al-Qaeda bombing attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya killed 
over 200 people, including 12 Americans.  Among the ramifications of this attack was the Crowe 
Commission’s determination to give more force protection authority to the DoS security 
apparatus in Washington and take it away from the Ambassador, the President’s on-the-spot 
personal representative, and his Chief of Mission.162  The result was a reduction in the degree of 
freedom Embassy personnel had to go outside their compounds.  An Embassy analyst prior to the 
Surge said that General Casey would not allow the military to provide security for the PRTs prior 
to the Surge.163  A Civil Affairs officer said that the PRT he worked with had excellent USAID 
workers, but they wanted to dig in.164 
Consequently, the State Department workers were not getting out and seeing what was 
truly happening in Iraq.  Much of their contact with Iraqis ended up being with the elites, who a 
senior Army planner in Baghdad said led to them not getting a true picture of the situation in 
Iraq.165  A Marine training team leader also saw DoS as working with the wrong people, Iraqis 
trying to ingratiate themselves with the Coalition.166  A leading DoD economics official felt that 
the inability of the DoS personnel to leave the compound kept them from being able to develop 




 A PRT leader relayed the story of a meeting that the co-located brigade commander had 
with the local provincial council after they had sent him a letter detailing their requests for things 
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such as food and relief supplies.  He arrived at the meeting, had his soldiers close and bar the 
door with weapons drawn, and walked up to the dais where the council leader was standing.  The 
commander told him to go sit with the others, told the group they were corrupt, and tore up the 
letter they had sent him.168  The PRT leader did joke with him that he had set up a “good cop/bad 
cop” relationship with the locals, that the PRT relationship with the locals could not possibly be 
worse than his was. 
 Leadership can say the right things about soft power even as their actions demonstrate 
differently.  A Marine Military Training Team (MTT) member said that they were continually 
told that their mission of training the Iraqi Security Forces was the main effort.  Then when 
senior leaders came to visit the area, they never came to visit the MTTs they visited the “straight 
leg” (infantry) units in the area.169 
 
Who to Talk to? 
 
 The initial problem was not including Iraqis in planning.  A State Department team leader 
described a December 2005 meeting with General Casey and his senior staff briefing an 8-pillar 
strategic plan for Iraq.  Although they all agreed there should be an Iraqi lead for every element 
of the plan, he pointed out that there was not a single Iraqi in the room.170 A USAID official said 
meetings were always about U.S. objectives.171  The Surge would align much more with the 
subsequent advice of de Tray and Gompert previously discussed that partnering with local 
government would be more effective and strengthen the local ties with their own government. 
In line with its idea to change the governance of Iraq from being top-down driven to 
bottom-up driven, the U.S. tried to push responsibility down to regional and provincial levels.  
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The result was the creation of Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NAC) and Provincial Advisory 
Councils (PAC).  However, the organizations were outside the Ba’athist structure that was not 
overturned by the Transitional Administrative Law and the 2005 Constitution.172  Worse, they 
were not staffed by the natural local leadership.  A brigade commander described how one of the 
NACs was not meeting the needs of the local community.  Upon investigation he discovered that 
the man placed in charge of running the NAC by the Americans was not even in Iraq: he lived in 
London.173  
 The same commander described another situation where they had been trying to restore 
power in part of Baghdad.  He would go to the NAC leaders who said inshallah it will be done.  
It did not get done.  The commander finally asked them who the guy was who used to run the 
power.  They told him, the commander found him, and within 30 minutes power had been 
restored.  He said the councils were often amazed that the guy who used to do the job might be 
the best person for the job.  The situation is similar to that encountered after World War Two 
when aggressive Allied de-Nazification often resulted in removal of the only person qualified to 
perform a particular job. 
 An important initiative was the Provincial Reconstruction Finance Committee (PRFC) 
which gave small budgets ($15-18 million) to provincial leadership to spend as they decided.  An 
ambassador working economic issues in Baghdad before and during the Surge said this was a 
huge development: Saddam had never asked provinces for their input on spending.  He said that 
consequently the locals were really into it.  The initial problem with the program was that 
Washington felt it operated too slowly, whereas the ambassador felt that its strength was 




What to Talk About 
 
 Mismanagement of reconstruction funds was a problem from the beginning.  Part of the 
issue was higher headquarters emphasis on spending money, regardless of outcome.  A squadron 
commander prior to the Surge said that a commander’s competence was based not on how he 
was doing in all the other Lines of Operation, but whether he had spent all his Commander’s 
Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) funds.  Weekly reports on spending were sent up 
the chain of command, and woe be unto the commander who wasn’t spending as much as his 
peers.  He said that this was the surest way for a commander to get into trouble other than an 
accidental discharge (of a weapon, most commonly when a soldier forgot they had a loaded 
weapon and discharged it into the clearing barrel located outside the dining facilities).175   
As an example, he said he got in great trouble the week he had a zero for his spending 
update slide.  He felt that they were reducing violence and making progress economically in his 
sector, so if he could do that without spending money wasn’t that great?  Higher headquarters 
disagreed, saying that if he were spending the CERP money he could be doing even better.176 
 A Marine officer who did planning in Baghdad prior to the Surge saw a similar problem 
working with the Iraqi ministries.  Even when they did spend money, it was not spent wisely.  
Hospitals and clinics that should have been built in six months took two years: many were never 
completed.  Even for the ones that were, the Ministry of Health had no doctors or nurses to put 
there.177 
 Much of what the U.S. was trying to do was a learning process for the Iraqis.  A leader of 
the U.S. messaging effort before and during the Surge said that the problem with “by, with and 
through” (the common U.S. government catchphrase for putting the locals in charge and up 
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front) is that it forgets “on.”  He said that the core issue is you are working to try and change 
them as much as by, with and through them.178 
 
Whom to Empower? 
 
 Greene concluded that elections in Iraq often served to reinforce existing sectarian and 
ethnic differences rather than working to overcome them.179  De-Ba-athification had also 
eliminated many of the technocrats who had been running Iraq prior to the invasion, particularly 
in the Sunni-dominant areas.  There were many cases where the Americans were not working 
with the right Iraqis to demonstrate smart power even when trying to apply power in an attractive 
manner. 
Trying to empower Iraqis with no experience at real power, particularly at lower levels, 
was challenging.  A former ambassador working with economics prior to the Surge said that the 
sheer aspects of responsibility and authority that serious budget authority and managing money 
at the local levels would have given was clearly missing.  That does open the possibility of 
corruption and requires a strong effort at accountability.180  A senior stabilization commander in 
Baghdad prior to the Surge described the American approach as too blunt and insensitive.  The 
U.S. culture was to try and drive change, mostly through the military.181 
 The commander also felt that a monument to incompletion was more damaging in the 
long run than the combat losses.  It was important for the U.S. to start a project, protect the 
project, and finish the project.  Do not hand it over and the furniture never goes in, or the 
teachers never get hired, or the building blows up, all of which he said happened.182 
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 A surprising problem was getting the Iraqis to spend the money they did have.  A 
commander of a U.S. brigade operating in a provincial area said that decades of oppression under 
Saddam had taught the leadership to avoid decisions for fear of getting shot.  Consequently, 
many fundable projects languished simply awaiting someone to take responsibility and approve 
them.183    Other ambassadors working in reconstruction concurred that Iraqis were reluctant to 
spend the money they did have or lacked the proper infrastructure and oversight capability.184 
There were corruption and competency issues among the Iraqis as well.  Branch and 
Wood believe that if host-nation governments was simply better-informed about grievances in 
society, then they could implement reforms without the need for military action.185  This 
benevolent government concept is not corroborated by interviewees for this work.  Closer to 
Marston’s idea, they felt that from Prime Minister Maliki on down, the Shia-dominated Iraqi 
government knew the problems the Sunnis were experiencing, they simply did not care or were 
even deliberately accentuating them.186  Fitzsimmons criticized much of the academic literature 
of the time for downplaying the importance of sectarian and ethnic strife in a civil war and trying 
to recommend rationalist, materialist approaches.187 
 
Losing the Information War 
 
 The U.S. wanted to be accurate in disseminating information to the Iraqi people.  This 
was a noble ideal, but it meant that the insurgents and other unfriendly elements were continually 
given the opportunity to get their side of the story out first.  Message approval authority resided 
at higher headquarters: brigade commanders did not have the authority to approve messaging in 
their area of operations.188  As a result of mission authority residing at such a high level, a 
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PSYOP officer in Iraqi prior to the Surge said they sometimes ran into problems with higher 
headquarters saying “you really shouldn’t be doing that: that’s not in your lane: that should be at 
our level.”189   
The fact that it was a dangerous environment meant that the press was not always 
enthusiastic about direct embedment.  An IO planner in Baghdad said that even when the U.S. 
tried to invite the regional media like Al-Jazeera they weren’t sure if they wanted to go because 
they didn’t want to get shot at either.190  Journalists are human too.191  Additionally, international 
news media were reducing their staff in Iraq due to both insurance costs and declining viewer 
interest. 
 Another problem was making sure that the PSYOP products were actually being aired.  
The planner found that he would have the TV on and would see what he knew was a Coalition 
product come on and go right off again.  He would call the PSYOP chief and say “Al-Arabia just 
shortchanged you by about 45 seconds.”  He emphasized that they were not cheap and the price 
was going up, so he thought it would be very interesting to see how much of what the Coalition 
paid for was broadcast.   
 There were also embarrassing incidents such as the accusations that consultants such as 
the Lincoln Group were paying Iraqi media to publish stories favorable to the Coalition or 
submitting stories to them while posing as free-lance reporters.  The Coalition response was that 
the stories were necessary to counter insurgent misinformation.  The same planner found the 
situation absurd: he felt that it was silly to make him responsible for reporting being done off 







 Marston and Fitzsimmons were concerned that religion and ethnicity were 
underappreciated elements of counterinsurgency warfare, particularly in Iraq.  Fitzsimmons felt 
that the focus should be less on the governmental structure and more of who was being placed in 
charge.193  Chapter Six will demonstrate that the Surge saw a greater effort by the U.S. 
leadership to try to develop a more inclusive structure in Iraq to accommodate Sunnis, Shia and 
Kurds.   
The various factions were skilled at appealing to their respective co-religionists.  An 
Information Operations officer said that they kept to simple messages.  Al-Qaeda told Sunnis 
they were there to help them and told the Americans they were there to kill them. The threatened 
other action to Sunnis was a gun to the head.  The insurgents had videos, pamphlets and even 
television and Internet programming.194   
The Shia groups proved effective at messaging to their constituents.  They pressured the 
Shia-dominated government to marginalize the Sunnis and portrayed the U.S. as an occupying 
power.  A former ambassador at the Embassy before the Surge agreed said that Muqtada al-Sadr 
was good at communicating with the Iraqi Shia, partly because of his father’s reputation and 
partly due to his own skills as a speaker, and that the Americans did not seem to know how to 
counter it195.  An interviewee who developed U.S. messaging in Iraq said that Muqtada al-Sadr 
was the most effective civil-military integrator on the battlefield.  He believes that this is why 
Sadr is still an important player even today.196   
Another described how Sadr’s militias borrowed the Iranian trick of claiming credit for 
U.S. relief deliveries.  They would use their inside knowledge of Coalition activities to learn 
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when a delivery was scheduled.  They would then show up at that village the day prior and say 
“Relief supplies will be delivered tomorrow.  They will claim it is from the Americans, but it is 
not: it is from Sadr.” This worked because the U.S. did not directly deliver supplies: they were 
contracting the work out precisely to try and maintain a low presence.197  These micro-level 
examples of Iranian influence have not been detailed in reviewed literature. 
 The U.S. would meet with religious leaders, although it was often not about religious 
issues.  Usually, the religious leaders were acting as representatives of their community to make 
sure they were being included in economic development projects or being part of the political 
process.198   
 A Treasury Department official who worked in Baghdad prior to the Surge described a 
subtle way that the American presence resulted in sectarian oppression.  She worked with an 
Iraqi corporate CIO who was also a Christian.  Under Saddam Christian women did not have to 
wear a head scarf: only Muslim women were required to. With the Coalition in Iraq, it was easier 
to brief them that it is a Muslim country and make all the women wear headscarves.  An attempt 
to be accommodating thus ended up being used against them in a manner too subtle for the 




 The U.S. effort in Iraq was beset with problems that inhibited its ability to achieve 
national security objectives.  The very nature of insurgency itself was a challenge, particularly 
for a democratic nation. 
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 Structural problems flowed from the design of the U.S. government, particularly the 
Executive Branch.  Authority was often unclear, with multiple agencies fighting turf wars for 
control of what they felt came under their area of expertise.  At the same time, gaps appeared for 
missions that neither DoS nor DoD wanted to do.  The international community played a role, 
from the UN absence or Coalition partner shortfalls to adversary nations that were not willing to 
cede Iraqi nation-building to the U.S.  Trans-national organizations such as al-Qaeda rushed into 
the power vacuum created by the 2003 invasion. 
 Execution problems hindered even the sincere organizations and individuals in Iraq.  
Tour lengths and personnel quality were not conducive to a “long war.”  Pre-Surge doctrine 
shied away from hard power and was over-reliant on soft power to create stability.  The desire to 
maintain personnel security frustrated efforts to conduct effective soft power activities with the 
Iraqis.  Personalities could make the difference between success and failure in carrying out 
assigned missions.  Sectarianism frustrated U.S. efforts to combine the warring factions in Iraq 









In some cases, I was supporting counterinsurgency. 
In other cases, I was supporting insurgency. 




 A new approach was clearly needed in Iraq.  A new approach would require a new plan.  
General Petraeus would spend most of 2006 preparing that plan while he was assigned to Fort 
Leavenworth.  Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was a major departure from the U.S. 
Army doctrine in existence at that time, reflecting the reality of the situation in Iraq.  It gave “top 
cover” to General Petraeus as he was selected for and prepared to take command at Multi-
National Force – Iraq (MNF-I).  He would be fortunate to be joined in Baghdad by a like-minded 
ambassador, Ryan Crocker.  They set the stage by securing more effective backing from the 
leadership in Washington D.C.  Then they went to Iraq and set the example by their cooperative 
attitude that filtered down to both the military staff and workers from State and other agencies. 
 The new thinking encompassed a number of approaches.  More U.S. soldiers would be 
sent back into contested areas as the hard power element of the Surge.  More Iraqis would be 
recruited to help with security, both formal units and militia.   
On the soft power side, reconstruction and reconciliation would be increased to try and 
deflate the insurgency.  Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) would be staffed and expanded 
to cover every province in Iraq.  Better measures of effectiveness would be utilized, and better 
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means of communicating Coalition successes would be employed.  Reconciliation would be 
practiced to a greater degree in the Coalition internment compounds.  And good timing and 
fortune played a role as well. 
 
THE BATTLE PLAN 
 
The most important military doctrine related to the Surge is Field Manual (FM) 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency.  Why?  Because General Petraeus himself was head of the working group 
that developed the manual at Fort Leavenworth prior to his taking command in Iraq.  In essence, 
FM 3-24 gives us an unclassified version of the battle plan General Petraeus would bring to Iraq.   
Field Manuals are Army doctrine while Joint Publications pertain to all branches of the 
service.  Some topics are most applicable to a specific branch of the service.  Consequently, that 
branch may be considered the service expert in a particular discipline.  For example, the Navy’s 
use of E-2 Hawkeyes as an integral part of aircraft attack packages makes them the leading 
service in Electronic Warfare.  The Air Force tends to be the lead in Cyberwarfare.  Over 90% of 
all DoD Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capability resides in the Army, thus Joint 
Publications on PSYOP closely resemble the Army field manual.  
At the time there was no recently published doctrine at any level regarding 
counterinsurgency.  Doctrine is not just the way to do something, but authorization to do it.  
Commanders taking actions not covered by any doctrine open themselves up for questioning or 
condemnation by higher authorities.  Officers who act beyond doctrine better be right, or they 
will find themselves alone if things go wrong. Conversely, no one goes to jail for following the 
doctrine, even for a poor outcome.  The result is naturally a service that is slow to embrace new 
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ideas.  The fact that the Army was even willing to allow General Petraeus to promulgate a new 
field manual for counterinsurgency is a testimony to how desperate leaders perceived the 
situation in Iraq was by 2006, because by implication it represents the Army acknowledging that 
they were fighting a war beyond their institutional thinking. 
There was a void in the U.S. military approach to counterinsurgency.  Voids create 
opportunity.  Sensing that the other services would be inclined to view the Army as the 
counterinsurgency expert, General Petraeus likely saw this as a chance for the Army to “take the 
lead” in developing counterinsurgency doctrine for not only the Army, but all of DoD.  He 
smartly partnered with the other DoD “land force,” the Marines, solidifying the likelihood that 
the final product would become the basis of future joint doctrine.    
General Petraeus held a planning conference on Information Operations (IO) and invited 
a long list of people, including his critics, to attend.  He believed that IO would be particularly 
important as part of a counter-insurgency effort.  He ran into problems with senior Army 
leadership with his group’s assertions that all soldiers are information-gatherers, which did not 
sit well with the intelligence community.  General Petraeus also knew that he would probably be 
selected to be the next commander in Iraq, so he only had a year to publish the new field manual, 
a process which can ordinarily take several years.  Nonetheless he persisted and the manual was 
published by the Army (and concurrently by the Marine Corps) in December of 2006, two 
months before his assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq. 
The 2006 edition of FM 3-24 is a 284-page (on the computer) document consisting of a 
short introduction followed by eight chapters: 
 Chapter 1: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
 Chapter 2: Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities 
143 
 
 Chapter 3: Intelligence in Counterinsurgency 
 Chapter 4: Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations 
 Chapter 5: Executing Counterinsurgency Operations 
Chapter 6: Developing Host-Nation Security Forces 
Chapter 7: Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency 
Chapter 8: Sustainment 
FM 3-24 also has the following appendices: A Guide for Action, Social Network 
Analysis and Other Tools, Linguist Support, Legal Considerations and Airpower in 
Counterinsurgency.   
In some ways the format follows that of the established field manuals.  A scene-setting 
opening chapter, another with calls for unification and cooperation with other government 
agencies or nations, the nuts-and-bolts of planning operations in the middle and concluding with 
a chapter on logistics.  Following traditional field manual layout was a logical move by the 
developers.  It helps acclimate traditional thinkers to new concepts if the structure follows a 
format they are comfortable with and increases the likelihood of acceptance. 
Like any introduction, FM 3-24’s is the author’s best opportunity to insert opinion.  It 
states up front that the US possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority, which 
ironically forces our opponents to practice asymmetric warfare.  It tells us that militaries 
typically start poorly in counterinsuirgency operations, but the ones that prove most adaptable 
and overcome their inclination to wage conventional warfare against insurgents are most likely 
to prevail.  It lays the groundwork for the importance of bottom-up initiative and innovation 
focused at local levels of the battlefield.  It warns that insurgents are clever and often barbaric, 
but that a unified, adapting effort can enable counterinsurgents to prevail. 
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Chapter 1, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” is a typical field manual opening 
chapter.  The third-longest chapter in the manual, it introduces definitions and lays out the 
rationale for its unique contribution to Army doctrine.  On page 1 it clearly tells the reader that 
insurgency is about political power and that long-term success in counterinsurgency depends on 
people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to government rule.  It points out that 
the insurgents get to operate paying less heed to rules of warfare and truth in broadcasting, but 
that this asymmetry narrows as they expand their territory and seek to acquire legitimacy.  It then 
goes into some detail on the history and theory of insurgency, focusing from the beginning of the 
twentieth century and particularly on the writings of Mao Zedong.  It lays out elements of both 
insurgency and counterinsurgency such as means and ends.  It then highlights counterinsurgency 
paradoxes such as “Sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are,” “The 
best weapons for COIN don’t fire bullets,” and “Sometimes it’s better for the local people to do 
something poorly than for us to do it well.”   
Chapter 2, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” is one of three 
distinctly shorter chapters in FM 3-24.  In most field manuals, the second chapter discusses unity 
of effort.  However, other manuals typically focus on integration with the other branches of 
service or foreign militaries, with some discussion of interagency U.S. cooperation.  FM 3-24 is 
more concerned with cooperation with non-military organizations, with a title even putting 
civilian before military.  When it speaks of civilian agencies, it does not just mean U.S. 
government, but international organizations, non-governmental organizations and even 
corporations.  It sets the stage by saying that integration of civilian and military activities is 
crucial to waging successful counterinsurgency. 
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Chapter 3, “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” is the longest chapter in FM 3-24.  
Overall, the word “intelligence” appears 433 times in the entire manual.  By comparison it 
appears a total of only 358 times in FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, combined.  What made intelligence such an important topic to the authors?  The 
chapter opens with a quote about the importance of intelligence by General Creighton Abrams, 
who integrated many of the lessons learned in Vietnam into the US Army.  It then tells us that 
intelligence in counterinsurgency is about people both in the sense of who has it and its 
importance.  It follows the standard Army manual format of intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield (IPB), which again is a smart way to make the manual look familiar to conventional 
warriors, but continually stresses the importance of civil structure and functions.  Society, 
culture, economics and even language are items FM 3-24 tell us must be considered during 
mission planning.  About halfway through the chapter is when it starts talking about the 
insurgents.  It talks about their force capabilities, but goes into greater detail about personalities, 
media capabilities and politics internal to the insurgent group and ways to exploit them.   
Chapter 3 also devotes considerable space to discussing the importance to 
counterinsurgency of human intelligence, or HUMINT.  It is certainly a two-edged sword: 
HUMINT is simultaneously the most unreliable and most insightful intelligence source available.  
Conventional force leaders tend to dislike the unreliability aspect of HUMINT: they prefer 
satellite imagery or signal intercepts.   FM 3-24 embraces the positive aspects of HUMINT, 
points out that it often provides intelligence impossible to obtain by technical means, and offers 
ideas for protecting and maximizing the value of this resource.  In the spirit of Donald 
Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns,” HUMINT can provide answers to questions you did not even 
know you had. 
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Oddly, the increased importance provided the intelligence community in FM 3-24 did not 
stop them from balking at one element during the drafting process.  They objected to a sentence 
that said “All soldiers and marines are intelligence collectors” as an infringement upon 
Congressional authority.  The objection is not entirely parochial.  Most military funding is 
sourced through Title 10 of the United States Code: however, intelligence is funded through Title 
50.  The initial draft did not appear to supersede the analysis responsibility of the intelligence 
community and was merely striving to emphasize the importance of field-level intelligence 
sourcing.    
Chapter 4, “Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations,” is the shortest 
chapter in the manual.  It adheres closely to standard Army planning guidelines such as Lines of 
Operation which continues to establish it as a “legitimate” work in line with the Army way of 
doing things.  It does talk about the importance of local considerations, adaptability, and 
counterinsurgency goals.    
Chapter 5, “Executing Counterinsurgency Operations,” is the second-longest chapter in 
the book: we can infer that though designing a counterinsurgency campaign in many ways 
resembles conventional technique, executing it is a different matter.  It immediately lists five 
overarching requirements for successful counterinsurgency operations: all five highlight 
enhancing host nation government legitimacy and/or integrating operations with host nation 
security forces.   Chapter 5 also details training and employing host nation security forces and 
recommends a vibrant information operations component of the battle plan focused on the 
perceived legitimacy of the host nation government by the locals.   
Chapter 6, “Developing Host-Nation Security Forces,” is a noteworthy inclusion: an 
entire chapter devoted to developing internal defense, a job treated with a large measure of 
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disdain by conventional force commanders.  “Host nation” appears zero times in FM 3-0 and 5-
0.  “Local” only appears in them about 50 times but in reference to security forces or conditions.  
The term “host nation” attaches a greater degree of importance to the indigenous population and 
dynamics than “local” and subtly reinforces the idea that Americans are the outsiders who should 
be operating under authority and limitations developed by the indigenous population, not 
ourselves. 
Interestingly, the Coalition would subsequently disregard one piece of advice from this 
chapter during the Surge, the admonition that security force pay should be distributed through 
government channels.  One component of the success of the “Sons of Iraq” movement in Anbar 
Province was the U.S. “going direct” to pay the local militias instead of relying on the mistrusted 
Shia-dominated regime in Baghdad to pay Sunnis. 
Chapter 7, “Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency,” is a small but interesting 
component of FM 3-24 not found in contemporary field manuals (these will be discussed in 
greater detail below).  Ethics in leadership is discussed, particularly regarding warfighting versus 
policing, proportionality and discrimination, and prisoner detention (think Abu Ghraib).  It 
reinforces the concept that learning and adaptability will be key to succeeding in 
counterinsurgency. 
Chapter 8, “Sustainment,” closes the main reading with another familiar topic to 
conventional fighters, logistics.  It says that logistics in counterinsurgency is different because 
there is no traditional rear area.  In fact, logistic units may be directly interacting with local 
populations and shaping the environment for future military operations.  Potential support to 
maintaining host nation security forces must also be considered. 
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The word security appears 512 times in FM 3-24.  It is used in several different contexts, 
including securing your own forces and “operational security.”  Approximately 146 usages refer 
to the national or local security environment and population security.  Another 211 usages refer 
to host nation security forces, or local police and military units.  Local security as provided by 
local security forces is emphasized as a vital element of successful counterinsurgency operations, 
a departure from the areas of focus for U.S. Army planners prior to the Surge. 
We can gain greater understanding of what a change in institutional thinking this was by 
comparing FM 3-24 to FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production.  
In U.S. military planning, the next 24-96 hours are considered current operations and are planned 
and conducted by the J-3, or operations, staff.  Time frames beyond that are considered future 
operations and are planned by the J-5, or plans, staff.  Higher-level echelon units have an 
increasing percentage of J-5 staff: tactical units may not even have a J-5.  FM 3-0 and 5-0 cover 
the full range of contingencies and timeframes the Army expects to plan for.   
Between the two documents, the word “security” appears only 229 times, less than half 
the frequency of FM 3-24.  It almost always refers to the security of US forces.  At best 10 could 
be stretched to touch on some aspect of security of the local population.  And in most of these 
cases, it references things such as route and port security which are really a means toward the 
end of protecting the U.S. Army force, with only a secondary benefit of securing the local 
populace. 
Comparisons of other key words further differentiates FM 3-24 from FM 3-0 and 5-0 and 










FM 3-0/ FM 5-0 
COUNT 
FM 3-0/FM 5-0 
FREQUENCY 
PER PAGE 
Insurgency/insurgent/insurgents 1,254 4.45 0 0 
Social 160 0.57 0 0 
Population/populace 462 1.34 117 0.19 
Civil/civilian 304 1.08 276 0.49 
May 604 2.14 845 1.37 
Table 7:  Word Frequency Comparison FM 3-24 vs FM 3-0 and FM 5-0 
 
Concepts that are crucial to FM 3-24 are barely treated in FMs 3-0 and 5-0.  The 
frequency comparisons validate General Petraeus’ belief that there was a gap in US Army 
planning for counterinsurgency warfare.  Even the relatively close use of “may” is still 
enlightening.  Although “may” is a more frequent word in both FM 3-0 and FM 5-0, FM 3-24 
seems about 50% more likely to realize that events on the battlefield will not always occur the 
way you planned them beforehand. 
Conceptual differences can also be seen by comparing the respective word clusters of FM 













Operations is at the heart of what the Army does in both cases, and things such as support 
and forces are comparably high, but we can see major differences as well.  In FM 3-24, leaders, 
governments and organizations are training, designing and understanding people and insurgents 
to provide support and success.  By comparison, in FMs 3-0 and 5-0 commanders, headquarters 
and units are offensively maneuvering, conducting decisive actions, and using tactical power to 
complete tasks against the enemy. 
What explains the differences?  It is human nature to try to simplify our complex world 
whenever possible, and combat operations are no different.  It should not be a surprise that 
military leadership has a desire to “sanitize” the battlefield whenever possible.  Planning for 
combat is complicated enough already.  The commander’s preference is that things like weather, 
time and popular support are not constantly getting in the way of strictly military calculations.  
As a result, commanders can fall into the trap of trying to pretend these problems do not even 
exist and developing plans that fail to take them into account.   
This thinking is evident in the understated acknowledgement in the pre-Surge Field 
Manuals 3-0 and 5-0 of even the presence, let alone importance, of local civilian populations.  
Both manuals were published in 2001.  Reading through FMs 3-0 and 5-0, they talk about Lines 
of Operation, logistics and force security.  They delve into details of tactics such as ambushes 
and retreats, and even briefly mention factors such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 
weapon employment, but barely acknowledge the battlefield presence of civilians who could 
impact operations.   
The Army as an institution needed a positive injection of guidance regarding 
counterinsurgency warfare to enable it to carry out its mission in Iraq.  The last major insurgency 
the U.S. had been involved in was Vietnam.  The time in-between had been dominated by the 
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Cold War, ideal conditions for leadership that wanted to focus on strictly military planning.  
Large conventional forces were concentrated in Europe preparing to repel a conventional force 
invasion, but never actually being employed.  As a contemplated defensive action, planners did 
not have to worry about occupying potentially hostile territory.  Damage done to local 
infrastructure would be inflicted by the enemy.  Forces could conduct exercises in isolated areas 
free of civilians.  The largest U.S. military operation conducted between 1973 and 2001 was the 
first Gulf War, which further reinforced conventional force thinking.  Operation DESERT 
STORM was a Cold Warrior’s dream come true: force-on-force combat in the desert.  It was 
Central Germany without Germans. 
Others paid attention to Gulf War I as well, and often did a better job of assimilating its 
lessons.  Most saw that a conventional fight against the U.S. is a fools’ errand.  When asked what 
he had learned from Gulf War I, the Indian Chief of Staff reportedly said, “Never fight the U.S. 
without nuclear weapons.”201   The groups who lacked the luxury of nuclear weapons were 
driven towards the other end of the spectrum of conflict: asymmetric warfare.  Al-Qaeda was 
demonstrating the viability of unconventional attacks against the U.S. even prior to 9-11, 
conducting assassinations, bombing embassies, and attacking on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden.  Even 
Saddam adapted.  As a result of Gulf War I he retooled the Iraqi armed forces, placing greater 
emphasis on forming stay-behind units of fedayeen, roughly “those who would sacrifice 
themselves.”  These were to become the core of resistance groups loyal to the regime in the event 
Iraq was invaded.  Although they did little good to Saddam, they were tailor-made to became 
part of the insurgent movement that sprang up after the 2003 Coalition occupation of Iraq. 
General Petraeus and his working group knew that they had to produce guidance 
pertinent to the conflict in Iraq.  Getting U.S. Army approval for FM 3-24 was the first step in 
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giving him the flexibility he needed to bring a new way of looking at the problem to his new 
command in Iraq.  With it, he now had the document he and his subordinates could point to and 
say, “We’re doing this because that’s what our doctrine tells us to do.” 
 
SUPPORT FROM ABOVE 
 
“…gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical.”  
- FM 3-24 
 
This analysis of FM 3-24 helps better understand the need for writing it and how it would 
serve as the foundation for the Surge strategy of General Petraeus.  It provides insight to how he 
and the U.S. viewed the best response to the threats and problems in Iraq.  As with the discussion 
of challenges in the previous chapter, this discussion will begin with U.S. political institutions 
and the American people. Whatever success could happen in Iraq would require stateside support 
across the board.  Changes in attitude and leadership helped create an environment more 




“The NSC staff, guided by the deputies and principals, assists in integrating interagency 
processes to develop the plan for NSC approval.” 




The Surge would not work without clear support at the top.  The Concordance Theory of 
Schiff was demonstrated not through institutional change, but individuals.  Changes in the 
Administration’s personnel and the arrival of leadership in Iraq who had the “pull” to coordinate 
directly with the President and his top officials resulted in increased willingness to allow the 
people on the ground in Iraq input into strategy.  Ambassador Crocker said in his interview with 
the author, if it is not important to the President, it is not important to anyone.  If it is important 
to the President, he needs to demonstrate that by having someone empowered by him to make 
sure the effort succeeds.  This White House support was demonstrated in the form of General 
Douglas Lute, Deputy National Security Advisor.  Ambassador Crocker considered him a key 
player in getting other agencies to provide needed personnel in Iraq.   He was empowered by 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, but also by the President.202  
 For the military, the Surge above all meant a temporary increase in force by about 30,000 
soldiers.  Attention was paid to soft power.  General Petraeus said that he got at least 1-2 
additional Civil Affairs (CA) battalions one of which was put up in the Kurdish region and the 
other in Nineveh Province.  There was also Public Affairs (PA) augmentation and more PSYOP 
elements.203  A senior Information Operations developer said that the Surge by itself did not 
cause a major change in what his office did though they did adapt strategy and narrative.204  
Another said that he recalls thinking they had the (soft power) assets needed. What was needed 
more than messaging was successful actions with well-coordinated messaging.205  Metz is 
pessimistic that a comprehensive, effective counterinsurgency narrative can be maintained in the 
modern information environment,206 but interviewees in Chapter Six will describe improved 
effects related to timely, coordinated messaging. 
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 The successful actions would come from the combat units that made up the bulk of the 
Surge reinforcement.  Multiple interviewees talked about the overriding importance of 
establishing security as a prerequisite to successful soft power initiatives.  A brigade commander 
in Baghdad during the Surge said that in his area there were pockets (of resistance) they had to 
eliminate that they might not have been able to do without the Surge force increase. He believed 
that the higher concentration of soldiers during the Surge got things under control.  There were 
areas they just could not satisfy, either lethal or non-lethal, without the additional forces because 
the troop-to-task207 ratio was just too great.208  The situation in Iraq prior to the Surge supported 
the idea of Eastin and Glade that small amounts of counterinsurgency force can strengthen an 
insurgency by providing it the opportunity to demonstrate resolve.209 
State Department’s ability to get the right people to Iraq was strengthened by the arrival 
of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary, with John Negroponte as her Deputy.  Negroponte has served 
as the first U.S. ambassador to Iraq upon dissolution of the CPA under Paul Bremer.  Both were 
solidly behind the Surge.  Ambassador Crocker explained that it is traditional in the DoS system 
that someone hoping to be an ambassador or who already has her name in play goes to see the 
Deputy Secretary to see how the plan lies.  What Negroponte did after becoming Deputy was to 
say, “If you haven’t been to Iraq, don’t even bother walking through the door.”210  This was 
further effort by the State Department to mitigate the difficulties observed by de Tray of getting 
the right people in Iraq.211 
Ambassador Crocker also built a more practical security process for the Surge.  In Iraq he 
worked out arrangements with General Petraeus whereby the command with the appropriate 
assets, whether military or civilian, would manage movements.  In 98% of the cases that meant 
military assets would move embassy people.  He signed and the RSOs (Regional Security 
156 
 
Officers) did not object.  It got people where they needed to go, although at an increased risk: 
military movement standards are not as stringent as State movement standards.212 
Ambassador Crocker knew that personalities would be important and worked hard to get 
the best ones lined up on his side. He said that a lot of it was personal effort, calling everybody 
he could think of for the senior positions and that he got terrific responses.213  As proof of his 
effort, there were at least 5 ambassadors working in Iraq during the Surge, reversing trends of the 
inadequate State Department manning observed by de Tray. 
A military planner on the MNF-I staff felt that AMB Crocker was the hero in the Surge 
and that to the extent that the Surge was considered successful, much of the credit can be 
attributed to him.  He felt that Generals Odierno and Petraeus were great, but the most valuable 
player was Ryan Crocker.  He ascribed a lot of the Surge success to Ambassador Crocker’s 
leadership in overcoming the institutional biases that were present (and that have still not been 
reformed in his opinion).214  They would prove more successful at integrating military and 




“Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgents manage both.” 
- FM 3-24 
 
General Petraeus understood that Congressional support was crucial to maintaining 
budgeting and public support for the Surge.  Many representatives would have probably agreed 
with Gentile  and Metz that victory in direct counterinsurgency warfare was not a realistic 
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goal.215  General Petraeus and his staff spent tremendous time and effort preparing for his 
Congressional testimony.216  He did not want to create a false expectation, and was blunt in his 
initial forecast to them: 
I told Congress during my confirmation hearing in January 2007 that the violence, the 
situation would get worse before it got better.  That our casualties would go up, because we 
went into these areas where the violence was the highest, which is where we had to go and 
did indeed go and separate the warring factions.  They were going to fight back: that is 
exactly what they did do.  The casualties did go up, although fairly quickly the Iraqi civilian 
casualties started to go down, and then over time the sensational attack numbers started to go 
down.  Then sectarian incidents started to go down: all of that was very important.217 
 
General Petraeus also wanted to increase funds available for the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program (CERP).  This was discretionary money that military 
commanders at all levels had to spend on local civic projects.  According to General Petraeus, 
the history of CERP started after they achieved security in Mosul, where the interim provincial 
council and governor had a lot of activities ongoing.  It was clear that they needed money for a 
host of ongoing projects to help restore basic services, to repair damaged infrastructure, to help 
repair damage to ministry facilities, to rebuild Mosul University and a variety of other 
educational institutions, and to rebuild the police academy.  Ultimately the Coalition Provincial 
Authority got permission to use the more than a billion dollars found in regime official’s 
buildings and so forth.  After that was gone, they wanted to find a way to continue to fund these 
projects.   
 He had talked to then-Senate Majority Leader Frist (TN), who represented a state in 
which a big part of Ft Campbell is located and who had done thoracic surgery on Petraeus after a 
training accident he had as a battalion commander.  He said that Senator Frist took a keen 
interest in the issue and that’s when Congress passed legislation that authorized the appropriate 
funds for what came to be known as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.  It was a 
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major component of the military soft power effort in subsequent years.218  One of General 
Petraeus’ senior staff officers before and during the Surge agreed that this was a point of 
emphasis in the meetings with key Congressmen: General Petraeus asked for additional CERP 
money and authority for usage and got it.219  This demonstrates the high level of access General 
Petraeus had to leadership in Washington as observed by Schifrin.220 
 Willingness to challenge the rules became more frequent as well.  A State Department 
manager with private sector experience got frustrated whenever he was told that something was 
against the law or required by Congress.  When he would ask if anyone had ever called Congress 
to explain why the rule was not working in a war zone, they would say no.  He would get on the 
phone and call a couple of Congressional staffers and they would say, “We didn’t realize that: its 
fine.”221  A senior Embassy transition official said that during the Surge policy in Washington 
was actually being driven by the field.222  This is another instance of approximating Schiff’s 
Concordance Theory although via personal initiative versus structural change. 
According to Ambassador Crocker: 
I became concerned over Embassy staffing and structure early on. In a perpetual crisis 
atmosphere, staffing decisions were often made quickly and without reference to overall 
coherence. I asked Pat Kennedy, Undersecretary of State for Management, for help. 
Kennedy himself came out to Baghdad for an extended period and produced the Kennedy 
Report. It laid out recommendations to alleviate manning and employment issues in 
Iraq.223 
 
The Kennedy Report provided for improved training, equipping and staffing of 
contracted security, particularly for convoy movement.  It increased Regional Security Officer 
(RSO) direct involvement in convoy movement.  It brought State Department security 
procedures more in line with those of the military and increased cooperation between the two.  It 
also mandated more cultural sensitivity training for contracted security.  The result was an 
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Embassy that was able to lash up more effectively with its military counterparts and expand its 
ability to restore stability to Iraq. 
 
LEADERS IN COOPERATION 
 
Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. 
- FM 3-24 
 
Surge participants at all levels talked about the importance of personalities in fostering 
cooperation between the various elements of the Executive Branch.  It is an element of success 
that was stressed by participants who published works related to the Surge, such as Mansoor, 
Brinkley and Sky.  Journalists who covered the conflict also talked about how changing people 
could change the effectiveness of relationships.  For Kaplan, it began stateside as General 
Petraeus was overseeing the writing of FM 3-24.224  Kagan and Ricks both talk about 
relationship-building between the Americans and Iraqis.225  The journalists encompass part of the 
cooperation concept.  However, even they do not talk in as great detail about the improvement in 
cooperation within the U.S. elements in Iraq.  Academic writings regarding counterinsurgency 
understudies the difference having the right person in a position can make.   
Interviewees continually stressed the importance of the excellent working relationship 
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus maintained.  Ambassador Crocker said, “The 
campaign plan that Dave and I developed at the outset was something we regularly tweaked and 
tuned.”226  General Petraeus spoke in the same light, saying “we actually both signed the 
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comprehensive civil-military counter-insurgency campaign plan.  We oversaw together the 
review of the plan that we inherited … and then did everything together.227 
 This should not be read to mean that previous partnerships of Ambassador and General 
were not cooperative.  A military planner with experience in Baghdad prior to and during the 
Surge said that he was surprised at how well General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad got 
along.  They shared a waiting room.  If you were going in to see General Casey, you would go 
into the waiting room and turn left: if you were going in to see Ambassador Khalilzad you would 
go in and turn right.  What was important to him was that General Petraeus took it even further, 
because he was “really into the soft power element.228 
 Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus regularly attended and co-chaired meetings 
related to security and reconstruction.229  They rarely, if ever, publicly disagreed on an issue.  
Such a relationship is invaluable in preventing subordinates on both sides of the aisle from 
believing there is a “mommy/daddy” situation where they could concentrate on one and be more 
likely to get what they wanted.  An ambassador working at the Embassy during the Surge said 
that the linkup between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus was critical to making sure 
dramatic progress was made at every level.230  Their practice was in line with Kilcullen’s 
recommendation that a common diagnosis of the problem might matter more than formal unity 




 As has been seen, by 2007 the Coalition of the Willing had mostly become the United 
States, although other countries such as Great Britain were still there in limited roles.  The 
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United Nations maintained few operations or personnel in Iraq.  As a benefit, there was less need 
for Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to build consensus for their actions in Iraq, 
allowing them to develop a plan that best suited U.S. goals.   
 A U.S. military force commander has almost no authority to pursue operations outside of 
his designated theatre in the manner prescribed by Kilcullen  This meant that attempts to limit 
Iranian or external Sunni influence were in many ways outside of the control of Ambassador 
Crocker and General Petraeus.   “Rat lines” importing weapons, fighters and logistic support to 
insurgents or sectarian factions could only be shut down within Iraq.  This would make the Sons 
of Iraq and Anbar Awakening initiatives so important.  Turning the Sunnis in particular against 




The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their 
institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents. 
- FM 3-24 
 
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker understood that smart power had to include a mix 
of hard and soft power.  Multiple interviewees agreed with this assessment.  An Embassy planner 
with the Joint Strategic Assessment Team described it as a combination of US and British 
military and folks from the State Department both inside and outside the embassy, and some 
academic experts. He said they had about a six-week period of doing intense planning and 
research to put together the report, then after that report was received by Ambassador Crocker 
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and General Petraeus, MNF-I J-5 started turning it into the new campaign plan.232  A Treasury 
official at the Embassy agreed that during the Surge a lot of people with subject matter expertise 
were looking at making things work holistically, both from a political and administrative level.233 
A senior staff officer at MNF-I during the Surge said that Gen Petraeus was intent on a 
whole of government approach to counterinsurgency.  He made it quite clear that he needed 
more of everything that the country could provide.  Not just soft power: more enablers—more 
military police, more aviation, more engineers—but also more IO, more PSYOPs, and more 
diplomats.  He understood that the Coalition had to get the violence levels down and the only 
way to do that was through kinetic action, but any sort of permanent gains would have to include 
the nation-building aspects of counterinsurgency as well. This is where the soft power came in.  
The officer said that General Petraeus was very hands-on in terms of the IO aspects234 of the 
Surge.235  To one MNF-I planner, General Petraeus did not think of counterinsurgency as just 
hearts and minds or just hard power.  It was not just offense or defense.  It was all of that 
together.236   
An ambassador working at the Baghdad Embassy during the Surge said that it was not a 
solution in and of itself.  He described the Surge as a change in tactics, a change in resourcing.  It 
was a whole-of-government focus on making things work.  To him, it demonstrated that you 
could make that work: putting a whole-of-government approach together with resources and far-
sighted management of them.237  An Embassy Chief of Staff said that unity of effort does not 
mean “a Surge,” but a coordinated vs ad hoc effort.  For example, he said that there were 
numerous buckets of money in Iraq and Afghanistan: what was needed was a jointly agreed upon 
strategy with conditions.238 
163 
 
It started with security.  According to General Petraeus, unless you can achieve security, 
you do not have a foundation on which to build anything else.  You have got to get security.  
That could only be achieved in some cases by separating the Shia militia and Sunni insurgents.239  
This clearly required an active Coalition presence aware of the internal problems within Iraq 
recognized by Dixon.240   
Success would ultimately depend on better application of hard power.  A Civil Affairs 
officer working throughout the country during the Surge said that hard power never went away 
as the punch you needed to have per classic realist theory that you must project strength to 
enable the other things you want to do.  He said that the units that did it the best brought down 
the hammer when they needed to, but they did not overplay it.  They then let soft power move to 
the fore and work the problem with hard power as the “free safety.”241  One brigade’s motto put 
it bluntly: ““Positive, Polite, Professional; Prepared to Help, Prepared to Kill.”242  Another 
brigade commander said that his mantra going into Baghdad was “This is not my problem.  This 
is your problem Mr. Iraqi Citizen and Mr. Iraqi Governance.  I’m here to help, and I do have a 
mission, and this is what I will do.”  He saw his mission as eliminating violent threats and 
criminal activities to set the conditions for a legitimate government.243  A Special Operations 
commander during the Surge period felt that his operations were probably still much more on the 
kinetic side.244   This was a lesson General Petraeus had learned during his time in Mosul, going 
after the irreconcilables with even more relentless pressure.  The special mission forces were 
employed in cases of high value targets.245 
General Petraeus did not intend to use the force increase to make the existing installations 
bigger.  Another lesson he brought from Mosul was living with the people to secure them with 
small combat outposts and other bases.  He felt that the key for the Surge was to go from big, 
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consolidated bases as had been done throughout 2006 back into the neighborhoods because that 
is the only way that you can secure the people and combine that with a variety of different 
population control and security measures.  During the Surge, he actually reversed the handoff to 
Iraqis of a variety of security tasks and essentially took control back, which is similar to what he 
had done in Mosul.246  Eastin and Gade talked about the soft power element of the Surge but may 
not have understood that initially the U.S. assumed a greater security role in Iraq. 
A Baghdad brigade commander said that the Surge was about putting in the right number 
of soldiers to accomplish what General Petraeus intended.  It was not the same in all areas.  In 
some areas he needed more guys to shoot and be in the close fight.  That was what it was going 
to take to rule the area and hand it off to the locals.  In some it was having enough soldiers on the 
ground to interact and do projects.  The Surge brought money, projects and some of these 
additional multipliers such as the PRTs.  It brought in a higher concentration of soldiers and put 
them in the right places based on the analysis that was done for hard and soft power.247 
A stability operations commander in Baghdad spoke similarly about what hard power 
needed to accomplish.  He described the Surge as providing sufficient forces to engage in 
clearance operations in a given area and having enough presence to hold it while clearing in 
another operational area.  The Surge provided more combat units to fight for consolidating the 
gains made by clearance operations. He said that prior to that the Coalition would clear an area, 
move to another area to clear, and the virus would come back.  Clear and hold came from the 
combat forces.  Clear would be the primary emphasis, the weight would be there, with build 
being a sub-emphasis.  Hold would take root as clear would lose some of its primacy, becoming 
hold and build.  Build would then take it over as they reduced the amount of U.S. force presence 
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in a given area after it was relatively stabilized.  That was the shifting of the weight over time 
and an important part of the process of stability operations.248 
 It would also be important to increase the civilian side of the Surge.  Some of the military 
expectations for the civilian Surge may have been unrealistic.  A Special Operations commander 
during the Surge said that because the military was adding five brigades it was probably 
expecting several thousand civilian people, when the real number was about a thousand.249  As 
an example, a Civil Affairs officer described the situation wherein Mosul had a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) and Kirkuk had a military PRT.  General Petraeus had set it up as 
military because he could not get State Department personnel for Kirkuk.  His whole theory was 
to let the CA and military guys do it and as they get replaced by State, they will just roll out.250  
A stability operations commander in Baghdad felt that the Coalition had to close that gap 
between them and USAID, to help them understand that the military could accelerate, enhance, 
secure and protect the work they were doing.251 
 But what mattered as much was getting the right civilians into the right positions.  A 
senior MNF-I staff officer agreed that the PRTs were morphing into a combination of 
geographically based PRTs and unit-based, embedded PRTs.  General Petraeus wanted those 
fleshed out with increased CERP authority which he put a lot of stock in.252  However, the goal 
was to have the PRTs staffed and led by civilians.  An MNC-I economics planner said that when 
fighting an insurgency, if you put all your cards on hard power you are going to lose.  In 
Vietnam we talked about hearts and minds, and that became a cynical expression that was 
abandoned in our thinking and planning.  But it was absolutely correct.253  Another Embassy 
analyst said that there was more of a push to get more civilian officials out into the field and beef 
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up those PRTs so that by 2008 they were opening slots around the country for more civilian PRT 
positions.254   
 There were also participants who understood that provinces outside of Baghdad needed 
help too.  A PRT leader said that at the time, the modus operandi was that if they can tame 
Baghdad, then they would get the rest of the country on board.  They were trying to surge 
capacity on the civilian side in Baghdad including at the PRTs.  He successfully argued that he 
needed to be in Salah al-Din because the problem was with the Sunnis.  The Sunni problem was 
more acute: the Shia in Baghdad was something that he felt they had plenty of resources 
dedicated to.255 
A provincial Civil Affairs officer said that the PRT mission really evolved from the 
bottom up more than from the top down.  There was a general strategy unveiled in about 2005 
that guided PRT development, but they were given very little on PRT operations.    Based on the 
collective experiences of PRT throughout Iraq, they saw what was working and what was not 
and incorporated the successes into a solid PRT operations template.  The entire thing was 
informal and after action-driven from the field.256  An Embassy analyst did express a common 
concern among the civilians when the brigade PRTs started to pop up.  There was a reluctance to 
use military security for the civilian efforts.  General Petraeus shifted that somewhat as he 
implemented doctrinal COIN activities, but there was still much that State Department workers 
felt military personnel did not understand about US civilian capabilities.257  The ultimate solution 
was simply to increase civilian staffing at the PRTs in keeping with Plakoudas as well as Pirnie 
and O’Connell emphasizing the importance of the civilian component or even primacy as 




STAYING IN TOUCH 
 
The U.S. Ambassador and country team, along with senior HN representatives, must be key 
players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of 
command. 
- FM 3-24 
 
Regular joint meetings would be conducted throughout the Surge.  According to Ambassador 
Crocker, their two full teams would meet on a quarterly basis to review, assess and reprioritize.  
He said that at the command level they were tightly knit, and it worked pretty well particularly 
given all the turbulence, political as well as kinetic.259  Another ambassador there agreed that 
they had a military/civilian joint campaign plan with frequent review sessions.260  An 
ambassador leading economic development at the Embassy during the Surge emphasized that 
every six weeks or so they held meetings of the Conditions Assessment Synchronization Board 
(CASB) at Camp Victory.  General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and about 200 key staff 
would spend a day doing a review of where they were on the plan.  He described it as a complete 
civil-military matchup.261   
A senior MNF-I staffer said that soft power coordination was maintained on a weekly 
basis as well.  In the BUB (Battle Update Brief) there was one day a week that was a “soft 
power” day.  General Petraeus and his staff flew to the Embassy Annex to take the BUB from 
that location.  That was the day that all soft power and nation-building activities were briefed to 
General Petraeus.262   
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 There was also a greater effort to get the military and civilians planning and working 
together.  A senior USAID director said that planning closely together allowed them to work 
together even more closely during the Surge planning.  Discussion was also very important 
during the Surge.  USAID senior officers were embedded with the military in the hottest areas. 
263  An ambassador working economics during the Surge said that he probably traveled to more 
places than any other senior officer in the embassy.  The trips were almost always with the 
military engagements they had coordinated together.264 
 Gentile believes the shift in strategy was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.265  
Certainly, much of what was done was a refinement of existing techniques such as arming Sunni 
militias and creating more PRTs.  Even evolutionary change is not possible without command 
support: General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were successful because they were willing to 




Skillful counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. 
- FM 3-24 
 
Several external circumstances worked to favor the Surge as well.  Global oil prices were 
rising, meaning there was a substantial increase in revenue available to the Iraqi government.  In 
fact, by 2007 oil revenue was several times the total Coalition financial contribution toward 
rebuilding in Iraq. 
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A degree of exhaustion with fighting was also beginning to set in with the local population.  
One brigade commander in Baghdad felt that the Surge happened at the point that everyone just 
wanted the bad stuff to end.266  Another commander pointed out that the process of removing 
incompetent Iraqi commanders had been done mostly in 2006, so that by 2007 there were some 
“pretty good guys” leading Iraqi forces.267 
The biggest circumstance working in favor of the Coalition in 2007 was the Awakening 
movement in Anbar Province and other Sunni areas.  Much of the Sunni population had grown 
tired of the al-Qaeda presence in their areas.  They had appeared initially attractive with their 
financial resources and anti-U.S. and Shia stance.  However, by 2006 their conservative 
interpretation of the Koran had combined with their indifference to collateral damage from their 
operations to make them an unwanted presence (forced marriages to the daughters of tribal chiefs 
had also become odious to the locals).  Most importantly, their financial resources were 
beginning to run low.  A Marine Military Training Team (MTT) member based in Ramadi 
during the Surge said that in his town, al-Qaeda wasn’t really an effective paying customer 
anymore.  They were instead starting to do a murder and intimidation campaign.268  An 
ambassador working in Iraq at that time said that he remembered their political-military 
counselor really pounding hard on the need for population security, not general security.269   
 As a result, the Americans found that they were pushing on an open door.  A PSYOP 
officer in Iraq before and during the Surge thought that the Surge set the momentum where Iraqis 
realized that the U.S. really meant it when it said it wanted Iraqis to take the lead.270  The MTT 
member said that they were organizing their (local) guys, most of them were “pissed off” enough 
at al-Qaeda that they didn’t need to be paid, they just needed the wasta271 of the tribe and 
affirmation of the sheikhs.272  The PSYOP officer  said that it had nothing to do with the plan: it 
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was already taking place as early as September 2006.  The Surge was really capturing those 
events, what was working, put it in an umbrella plan, and then sprinkled in a few more actions.  
To him, if it had simply been more “Let’s take into consideration more of what the Iraqis want to 
do,” it would have been just as effective.273 
 According to Winston Churchill, “Success has a thousand fathers: failure is an orphan.”  
The first half is certainly true in the case of the effort to organize and integrate the Sunni militias. 
A provincial U.S. brigade commander recalled: 
Sons of Iraq was interesting.  In the peninsula where my mechanized unit was, there was 
a string of IEDs that were destroying Bradleys (vehicles).  In Anbar Province the Marines 
get credit for starting Sons of Iraq.  I give credit to my battalion commander sitting down 
on the peninsula who came up with the idea.  These folks who had no money to feed their 
families would take money from al-Qaeda to plant IEDs.  Instead, give them PT belts and 
allow them to carry their AK-47 and allow them to ring a bell if there were nefarious 
activities.  When they rang the bell, everybody came to engage that evil element.  We 
also paid them to provide protection along key stretches of the MSR.  When Sen John 
McCain visited, he asked a very pointed question, “How much are you paying these 
guys?  How much is it costing the government?”  I told him it was half a million dollars a 
year.  He said that that was a lot of money.  I responded that one destroyed Bradley 
would take care of that, and the U.S. soldier cargo inside was priceless.  He agreed.274 
 
  General Petraeus discussed this program as initiating a training and equipping program, 
multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian, and using those forces to augment our own forces.  They were 
under the brigade combat teams performing a variety of missions of fixed site security; for 
example, a major ammunition storage point and securing a whole host of valuable infrastructure 
assets and so forth.275 
Sons of Iraq was largely concentrated in and near Baghdad.  The Marines did not see it in 
Fallujah (and points west) much, because a lot of those groups were ad hoc militia.276  However, 
the Marines were employing the same core concept of directly funding Sunni militias, which 
undercut the counterinsurgency principle of legitimizing government institutions, in this case 
military (the Iraqi Security Forces) and political (the Shia-dominated central government in 
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Baghdad).  A stability operations commander in Baghdad summed up the challenge, saying that 
they did not want to displace the Iraqi Security Forces as the trusted entity that helped provide 
them the security that made it possible for them to rise.277  Legitimacy was provided by a 
promise from Prime Minister Maliki to integrate many of these militia elements into the regular 
army, although this promise went largely unfulfilled to the dismay of Sunnis who saw 
themselves being shunted aside in favor of the Shia. 
 The important result would be a dramatic decrease in violent activity.  A PRT team leader 
said that the Surge numbers are underestimated because what was happening at the same time as 
the Surge was convincing the Sunnis not to take up arms, which really doubled the size of the 
Surge by decreasing “enemy” numbers.278  A Special Forces commander in Iraq prior to and 
during the Surge considered that as part of a broad soft power effort to pull insurgents off the 
battlefield.279  The Embassy was in agreement.  A State Department PRT leader said that the new 
ethos that was coming online in 2008 was about partnering with tribes: helping them figure out 
their own security mechanisms and supporting that through the Coalition’s Brigade Combat 
Teams.280  Gentile gives primary Surge credit to Sunnis turning against al-Qaeda (along with 
standdown of the Shia militias).281  Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro are probably more accurate in 
stating that the Surge was a necessary precondition for evicting al-Qaeda, pointing out that 
previous attempts to do so that lacked U.S. support failed.282 
 
REBUILDING THE ISF 
 
 While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is 
better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. 
- FM 3-24 
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Enabling the Sunni militias would be an important part of defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq.  At the 
same time, the Coalition needed to continue to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) to move towards the goal of long-term stability.  Metz believes that long-term 
stability requires locals to be in the lead with foreign elements in a supporting role.283  A staff 
officer who worked with General Petraeus before and during the Surge said that what they 
applied in the Surge was born out of General Petraeus’ work at MNSTC-I (Multi-National 
Security Command – Iraq).  There was a lot of tension between what he wanted to do at 
MNSTC-I and what he was able to do with the constraints put upon him and the tension between 
MNSTC-I and MNF-I.284 
General Petraeus recognized that the ISF had been beaten up during 2006 by a level of 
violence they were not prepared to deal with.  He also saw that in a number of cases inadequate 
leaders needed to be replaced.  They put the Iraqi Police Brigade into 30 days of training which 
also included a replacement of almost everybody from brigade commander on up and some of 
the battalion commanders.285  In the interim, the U.S. force Surge increase and movement off the 
large compounds would relieve pressure on the hard-pressed Iraqi units while they reconstituted.  
A stability operations commander in Baghdad before and during the Surge said that it was about 
reversing the direction they were going in at the time.  It was not to take over more from the 




Offering amnesty or a seemingly generous compromise can also cause divisions within 
an insurgency and present opportunities to split or weaken it. 
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- FM 3-24 
 
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus also understood the importance of bringing as 
much of the reconcilable population as possible back into the discourse.  General Petraeus said 
that many of the approaches that were used during the Surge were employed in Mosul during his 
time in command there.  He said that they did reconciliation with Sunni Arabs.  In that case it 
was reconciliation with former members of the Ba’ath party, Level 4 and below, something done 
again during the Surge.287 
One of the requests that General Petraeus had for Prime Minister Tony Blair when he 
stopped in London on his way to Baghdad was that he extend General Lamb as MNF-I deputy 
for a number of months.  General Petraeus knew him well from his time in Bosnia while General 
Lamb was head of British Special Forces and they had “chased war criminals together.”  They 
were also division commanders together in the first year of the war and when General Petraeus 
was at Leavenworth General Lamb was at the equivalent job in the UK.  When the Surge began 
General Lamb was the MNF-I deputy and General Petraeus wanted to keep him there to help 
convince U.S. leaders that they had to reconcile with as many of the rank and file and lower-
level insurgent leaders as was possible, and ultimately to do to the same thing with the militia 
leaders, while then pursuing even more relentlessly the irreconcilables.   
As you might imagine, a number of our brigade and battalion commanders questioned 
why we would sit down across the table from people who had our blood on their hands.  
And that is a reasonable question, but at the end of the day you cannot kill and capture 
your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency.  You have to reconcile with as many as 
you can, those who can be truly reconciled.288 
 
 Other interviewees agreed that one of the most valuable pieces the British leadership 
brought to the table was their hard-earned experience in Ireland where they finally realized that a 
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peace that excluded the Irish Republican Army was unrealistic.  They helped the Americans 
understand that the peace process in Iraq had to be as inclusive as possible.  Olson Lounsbery 
and Pearson postulate that insurgents are less prone to violence if they perceive the government 





An essential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, these forces can and 
should use their capabilities to meet the local populace’s fundamental needs as well. 
- FM 3-24 
 
A viable long term U.S. strategy in Iraq needed to work to put the country back on a 
stable footing.  The literature is surprisingly sparse on the economic aspects of the Surge 
strategy.  De Tray talked about previous issues related to poor PRT manning and project 
oversight.290 Many authors talk about soft power, and may delve into its political, religious and 
cultural dimensions, but few seem to tackle the topic of actual reconstruction.  It is a curious 
lapse given that authors across the board continuously state that improving the lives of the locals, 
implying standard of living increases, is paramount to permanently stabilizing a country. 
Conversely, Surge participants felt that poor economic conditions were a core cause of 
the insurgency.  An economics planner on the MNC-I staff said that his section took the view 
that it was more greed than grievance, so if they could accelerate the growth of the Iraqi 
economy and increase the number of jobs available for young men, it would increase the 
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opportunity cost of joining the insurgency.291  Even employment as additional security is still an 
alternative to insurgency.   
 We have seen that General Petraeus liked CERP spending and encouraged its liberal use 
by commanders.  A stability operations commander in Baghdad said that they built some strong 
processes for rebuilding Baghdad’s infrastructure and had great success with it as part of the 
Surge effort.  It was his responsibility to organize CERP spending.  One planning concern was 
avoiding creating inflation.  His preference was not to hand out money but to purchase needed 
items.  For example, they could purchase 50 small generators, distribute them throughout a 




It is essential that commanders designate a group of analysts to perform comprehensive 
insurgency analysis. 
- FM 3-24 
 
One of the changes that occurred with the new Surge leadership was a change in focus on 
what constituted success.  A State Department analyst in Bagdad before and during the Surge 
said that the prior leadership had been very interested in special projects being conducted in Iraq.  
Ambassador Crocker showed a greater interest in population security metrics, which at that time 
looked very bad.  Ambassador Crocker focused on the security metrics and was always 
interested in knowing if things were getting better or worse.  The State Department analyst said 
this went hand-on-glove with General Petraeus’ “take/hold/build” approach in the military 
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sector.  Prior to that the second Baghdad Security Plan had not been going well.  Now the 
leadership was unified in viewing the population security metrics as the most important criteria 
of success in the Surge.293   
Another State Department analyst said that General Petraeus was great at getting everyone 
pulling in the same direction.  In his daily BUBs he would put people on the spot to answer 
questions and demonstrate progress on a whole host of things he was trying to do, and that his 
contribution was achieving the synergy between hard and soft power.294   
The unified leadership in common metrics meant the analysts started working closer 
together.  An ambassador leading economic planning during the Surge said that the Embassy had 
a section of about 20 foreign service officers and contractors who worked with the MNF-I 
Strategic Effects section every day, participated in the daily BUB with General Petraeus, and 
hosted meetings with the Iraqis that usually had military officers present.295  
A brigade commander in Baghdad observed that if you are improving things like 
electricity and sewer it has to be to their standards, not yours.  It needs to be good for them, not 
necessarily good for you.  It needs to be something they can sustain after you leave.  The U.S. 
needed to make sure what was provided to them by way of soft power was sustainable once the 
Coalition left.296 A TFBSO official said that they were under constant pressure by General 
Petraeus’ staff with their desire to “count stuff, turn it into a bar chart, and measure it.”297  
 An Information Operations officer in Baghdad before and during the Surge gave an 
example of the importance of metrics that focus on the final goal.  He said that the problem with 
having a TIPS hotline for Iraqis to call was:  
a) Would somebody answer? 
b) If someone answered, did they send anybody to help? 
177 
 
c) If the ISF did show up, would they help or would they shake you down?  
Three out of four are lousy outcomes.  That is the level of measurement that was really 
missing.298  Chapter Six demonstrates that the Coalition would continue to granulate what was 





By publicizing government policies, the actual situation, and counterinsurgent accomplishments, 
IO, synchronized with public affairs, can neutralize insurgent propaganda and false claims. 
- FM 3-24 
 
In his interview with the author, General Petraeus emphasized the need to be first with the 
truth: 
That means you provide the facts as you best understand them, there is no putting lipstick on 
pigs.  What you do is try to beat the bad guys to the headline.  If that is your goal, you have 
to do it a lot faster than we did it.  We did dramatically increase speed in a whole variety of 
messaging and communications efforts in general.299 
 
One of the senior staff officers at MNF-I during the Surge said that this is what General 
Petraeus was adamant would not happen: an event happened on the ground and the insurgents 
would make hay of it in their propaganda and the Western media would pick up on it.  
Meanwhile the Coalition would launch an investigation that would take days or weeks and would 
come out with a much more accurate version of the truth which often exonerated its soldiers, but 
by that time no one cared.  When he stuck his finger in the chest of the IO guys and said, “we are 
going to beat the insurgents to the ticker,” that meant the ticker that goes on the bottom of the 
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CNN screen, the breaking news.  He wanted the Coalition version of what happened to be there, 
even if it was incomplete.  It was not going to be a lie, it might be incomplete, and as more 
information came out the U.S. would fact-check and rewrite any statements that were incorrect.  
The Coalition would be first with its version of what had happened.  And that would force the 
enemy to react and force the media to use the Coalition narrative initially and then both sides 
would be competing for the media battlespace.  But he was determined that the Coalition would 
be better at that competition by being first with what it knew to be the truth at the time.300   
One of the senior Public Affairs officers (PAO) at MNF-I saw the same thing.  According to 
him, they went there with the idea that when the Coalition talked to others, it should be at the 
speed at which a political campaign moves.301  To a great degree this was accomplished due to 
the flattening of how General Petraeus did business.  He believed that in order to do that they had 
to have to have the trust from the commanding general, that he trusts the staff to be able to work 
within the guidance he provided or knowing what his intent was.  For example, if the PAO 
needed to get something out, and he knew this was in keeping with current guidance, the PAO 
didn’t really ask permission, although he would always give him a follow-up “Here’s what I 
did.”  The PAO felt that you had to have that trust.302 
 There was also more of an effort to try to get product release authority delegated to lower 
command levels, which decreases approval time and allows better tailoring of products to local 
situations.  An Embassy planner saw that what General Petraeus wanted to do was push down 
the level of authority to do things like flyers and IO activities.303  Joseph among others has 
criticized U.S. counterinsurgency efforts as consistently failing to link their effort to local levels 
of governance.304  Delegating message release authority to lower levels improves the ability of 
commanders to shape messaging to their area of operations. 
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General Petraeus also wanted the various influence strands to plan and coordinate 
together.  There is a tendency for PAOs to be reluctant to be aware of the activities of 
Psychological Operations in particular to give them “credible deniability.”  General Petraeus’ 
PAOs would sit in on IO meetings as he felt necessary.  According to the PAO, early on it was 
uncomfortable for them (“Why is the PAO in here?”).305  It allowed for better message 
synchronization between all the Coalition elements.  He also kept a close eye on Coalition 
messaging.  A senior member of the Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) described their 
first meeting with General Petraeus.   As General Petraeus was being briefed, he kept scratching 
out questions on his note pad.  At the end he half-jokingly said, “I don’t know what you are 
doing, but keep doing it.”   The IOTF considered that an absolute win.  They found him to be an 
“engaged, smart decent guy.”306   
 
THE CAMP WAR 
 
Effectively disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former insurgents and their groups must 
be part of the overall COIN plan. 
- FM 3-24 
 
One of the big ideas that General Petraeus brought to the Surge was that the Coalition 
needed to conduct counterinsurgency inside the wire as well as outside.  They had to identify the 
extremists, the irreconcilables, and detain them inside the compound where they were previously 
being disruptive and making it impossible to do anything such as rehabilitation job training or 
moderation in religion or any other initiatives.  They needed to get them out of the enclosures, 
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but if they went in with weapons they would fight back as well as the other 800 people in there in 
some cases.  Once they put them into maximum security facilities, they were able to commence 
rehabilitation, a review process, job training, basic skills, basic education, and a variety of other 
initiatives to dramatically reduce the recidivism rate of those that were released. The Coalition 
goal was to stop releasing such detainees until they had such measures established because the 
recidivism rate was very high.307 
 




Despite the international focus on U.S. detention facilities such as CIA secret sites and 
Guantanamo Bay, U.S. detention facilities in Iraq received little media attention post-Abu Ghraib 
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and less academic treatment.  Although academic works mention atrocities that garner 
international attention, day-to-day operation of detention facilities and their contribution to force 
objectives receives less attention.  General Petraeus was concerned about recidivism and 
considered detention facilities an important part of taming the insurgency. 
A detention facility commander in Iraq during the Surge described his contribution this way: 
My biggest opportunity to push COIN (counterinsurgency) was family day.  I think we 
would have it every Friday where family members could come and visit their loved ones who 
were incarcerated or detained in our facility.  I do not think each prisoner had a weekly visit: 
we staggered it every other week.  Family members would bring fruits and vegetables, maybe 
scarves and blankets, things that they might think their loved ones might need or for comfort.  
We vetted it to make sure there was nothing usable as weapons.  They would bring a lot of 
kids.  My guards enjoyed playing with the kids, kicking around a soccer ball a little bit.  I 
thought that we could take this to a higher level.  If family members see we are treating their 
loved ones well, they would go back to their villages and say that the Americans are good 
people and are treating our loved ones well, versus saying we did not treat them well 
depending on what they see.  I started have my soldier’s family members send us toys, 
coloring books and extra clothing that we gave to the children and families when they came 
over.  A lot of the family members were not doing very well because their main source of 
income was now sitting in an internment facility, so they were facing hardship.  The idea was 
treating them well, and they will go back to their villages and tell the others how they are 
treated with dignity and respect.  We also built a playground for the kids to play on when 
they came.  We tried to spruce up the area, we painted the walls and asked any detainees with 
the inclination to draw murals on the t-walls.  We went from a drab internment facility to a 
much better place to be.308   
 
The compound commander described some of other initiatives such as sewing (there were 
prisoners of both genders at the facility) and computer classes.  Instruction was also provided on 
a more moderate view and interpretation of the Koran.  There were also opportunities for 
education, as some of the detainees were as young as 14 years old, trying to bring them up to a 





LEVEL OF INFLUENCE 
 
Forces that learn COIN effectively have generally…coordinated closely with governmental and 
nongovernmental partners at all command levels. 
- FM 3-24 
 
 An important element of General Petraeus’ plan was increasing interaction with Iraqis 
below the national government level.  At the time, this went against U.S. strategic planning as 
normally practiced by the Department of State which was to try and work with Iraqis at a 
government-to-government level.  It also aligns with progressive interventionist ideas of trying 
to remake a national entity out of a collective of villages, tribes and even individuals.   
This idea of reshaping a country at a national level is encapsulated in the writings of 
Antonio Gramsci, one of the early Marxist thinkers who founded the Italian Communist Party.  
Gramsci believed in the unifying power of ideology, and that it could be employed to mold the 
citizens of a country.  One of his paragraph’s states: 
The main problematique of the State is to incorporate the will of each single individual 
into the collective will turning their necessary consent and collaboration from “coercion” 
to “freedom”.  This means that the State functions so as to create “conformist” citizens 
who internalize the most restrictive aspects of the “civil life” and accept them as their 
natural “duties” without having any resentment. 
 
This passage encapsulates many of the strategic flaws that bedevil interventionist 
planning by nation-states.   
In his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Isaiah Berlin wrote about “…the fallacy of 
regarding social groups as being literally persons or selves, whose control and discipline of their 
members is no more than self-discipline, voluntary self-control which leaves the individual agent 
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free.”   There are about 9 billion human wills on the planet: like snowflakes, no two are exactly 
alike.  Spouses do not even have a collective will, let alone their children and extended family.  
If there is no such thing as a collective nuclear family will, how much more unrealistic is it to 
speak of an Iraqi collective will?   
Turning…coercion to freedom. In “Two Concepts of Liberty” Isaiah Berlin attacked this 
fallacy as well.  “To coerce a man is to deprive him of his freedom.”  To him, manipulating men 
toward goals set by others is to degrade them, regardless of the rationality or loftiness of the 
goals.  Even universal consent to loss of liberty still results in oppression.  Forcing the Iraqis to 
make 25% of their parliament women, even if for a noble end, is still coercion and deprives the 
Iraqis to learn from making their own choices.  Former Congressman Ron Paul said, “Freedom 
to make bad choices is inherent in the freedom to make good ones.”  
Without…resentment.  One truism of human beings is that we do not like other human 
beings telling us what to do.  The U.S. needed to recognize that although most Iraqis were glad 
Saddam was gone, they still resented foreign occupation, and that this resentment would increase 
the longer the U.S. was there.   
U.S. planners for the first four years of the occupation of Iraq were being unrealistic in 
believing that there was a collective Iraqi will to be tapped into, collaborated with or expected to 
produce nation-wide control.  Iraq is a state with two major ethnic groups and two major Islamic 
sects, in addition to Turkmen, Assyrians, Christians, Yazidis and others that probably comprise 
roughly 20% of the population.  Historically, these groups have been antagonistic to one another, 
antagonism exacerbated by outside sponsorship.   
The problem played out most visibly in the attempts to hold national elections.  Iraqi 
Sunnis and Kurds may have been new to democracy, but they were not new to math, and they 
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understood that it would be extremely difficult to implement a majority-rule system that 
prevented the 60% Shia population from dominating the political landscape.  The Sunnis 
boycotted the 2005 national elections, which they soon realized was an even bigger disaster than 
participating.  Although they did participate in future elections, they never developed trust in the 
system they claimed with some veracity was dominated by the Iraqi Shia. 
A collective national will is probably impossible to find, but the lower one can interact 
with a population, the more likely one is to operate within the more successful local parameters 
described by Olson Lounsbery and Pearson.310  Accordingly, one element of General Petraeus’ 
strategy that was probably a step in the right direction was reaching out to Iraqi interest groups 
below the national level.  Sunnis in Anbar Province, Kurds in Mosul and Marsh Arabs in the 
south of the country have different needs and are more likely to work with outsiders if they feel 
they are not being treated as part of some abstract greater entity.  He would be helped by the 
increase in number and quality of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that tailored 
reconstruction and political needs to local and provincial levels. 
This showed in the various arenas the Coalition interacted with the Iraqis.  Even while 
supporting a national political structure, there is still room to work economically, culturally and 
even militarily at a sub-national level.  Oil may be the biggest economic concern at the national 
level in Iraq, but a city mayor may think getting the local marketplace reopened is a bigger 
priority.  A tribal chief may simply be looking for someone to inoculate his camel herd.  Civilian 
interviewees for this work in particular emphasized their mission of trying to diffuse governance 
power to provincial levels and below, a major challenge in a country whose intellect and 
initiative had been stymied by 30 years of centralized control under Saddam Hussein.   
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The same holds true in the military sphere.  The pre-Surge strategy had been continuing 
to move U.S. forces into large bases isolated from the population but still mortar attack magnets.  
How is that establishing a sense of security and partnership with the local population?  Better to 
utilize those forces as General Petraeus did: small outposts jointly manned with Iraqi security 
located right in the heart of contested cities.  With this change, American forces were able to 
reach a more meaningful “collective will” that resonated with the local population and made 
them feel like they were being treated as more unique. 
Level of influence was an important component of the Surge strategy, following the 
advice General Petraeus had laid down in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
Operations.  Specifically, he tied it into the military principle of decentralized execution laid out 
in FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.   FM 3-24 devoted a section of 
Chapter One to stressing that delegating to the lowest levels possible is particularly important for 
counterinsurgency operations, particularly for effective information and civil-military operations.  
Chapter Five went into further details highlighting the need to operate and interact with the local 
population as much as possible.   
Strategists should understand that seeking a collective will in a target audience greater 
than one person is unrealistic.  However, the lower influence and planning go, the closer they can 
come to approaching the concept of understanding and reaching common interests and mutually 
agreeable goals that permit a certain degree of functionality.  This functionality is more difficult 
to achieve at a national than regional level, more difficult to achieve at a regional than tribal 
level, more difficult to achieve at a tribal than village level, etc.  Modification of a collective will 
strategy in favor of going around the national Iraqi government, even at times to its displeasure, 
was a key component of the Surge strategy and amplified its effectiveness at reaching out to 
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lower-level leaders and reducing violence within the country, most notably with the Sons of Iraq 
and Anbar Awakening developments.  The U.S. did not initiative these movements but 




 The Surge would be built upon the insights found in Field Manual 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency, as developed under the guidance of General Petraeus prior to his taking 
command in Iraq in 2007.  It was a departure from current Army doctrine, although it contained 
insights gleaned not only from Iraq, but prior U.S. “small wars” as well.  FM 3-24 provided a 
blueprint and justification for the change in U.S. strategy that would be implemented during the 
Surge. 
 Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus proved to be an able team.  They secured 
improved domestic support through communication and knowing how to work the system.  They 
set the example for interagency cooperation by maintaining a visible, unified presence to 
civilians and the military alike.  They formulated a realistic strategy tailored to the strengths of 
the military and civilian workers in Iraq. 
 Hard and soft power would be mixed to try and stabilize the country and allow political 
progress.  Strengthening the Iraqis while weakening the insurgency, risks would be taken to take 
the fight to the enemy and calm the volatile situation in Iraq.  This smart strategy would prove to 
be more flexible and adaptable than that previously employed.  Better messaging, effective 
tracking and putting pressure on anti-government forces would all play a role in the Surge, as 











 This chapter and the succeeding two chapters examine the events and operational 
strategies applied during the surge, beginning here with the structure of government operations, 
and then continuing in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 with an examination of the use and combination 
of coercive and attractive power in smarter ways during the Surge.   
The shift in Surge strategy and operations was made possible to an extent by changes to 
the support structure of the U.S. government’s Executive Branch.  Dahl’s idea that there are 
competing power elites who must compromise had been evident prior to the Surge.  The 
proclivity of the Rumsfeld-led Department of Defense to minimize State Department (DoS) input 
and participation in particular delayed development of a robust civilian framework capable of 
taking on the role of reconstruction in Iraq.  The ascension of Defense Secretary Gates, a more 
inclusive leader, and Secretary of State Rice, a more influential person with the Bush White 
House, resulted in better cooperation at the national level.  Additionally, Secretary Rice in 
particular would work to correct systemic flaws within DoS that hindered the effort in 






SUPPORT FROM ABOVE 
 
 The Concordance Theory of Schiff talked about the importance of subordinates working 
in harmony with their superiors and having meaningful input to the senior level decision-making 
process.  Getting their ideas into the plan provides them greater flexibility to implement policy 
on the ground, and this increased flexibility granted to the Coalition was important in enabling 
them to achieve national security objectives. 
Both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker enjoyed better access to their superiors 
in Washington DC and ability to influence them than had previously been the case.  This was 
partly due to their track record of success, and partly due to the deteriorating situation in Iraq 
creating a greater willingness on the part of the Administration to listen to input from their 
subordinates.  To an Embassy stability coordinator in Baghdad, policy in Washington was 
actually being driven by the field.311   
 Working to overcome budgeting issues was an ongoing challenge, although increased 
coordination helped to alleviate that.  According to a senior Embassy planner, several months of 
getting the Surge started were wasted deciding who would pay for what, although ultimately the 
American taxpayer will pay so what difference does it make which agency pays?  He developed 
a two-page memorandum based on President Bush’s wishes, and got the White House, Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), and DoD to sign off on.  His office then spent two more weeks 
negotiating with DoD, who turned it into a ten-page memorandum.  The lead ambassador said 
the process was “tougher than negotiating with the North Koreans.”    He finally went to the 
Defense Department and his counterpart refused to sign it because it did not spell out who would 
pay for getting the State Department dead home from the PRTs.  He asked for a pen and wrote 
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on the agreement “The State Department will pay to get its own dead home from the PRTs” and 
she agreed to sign it.  After all that, he said they never got a single bill from Defense Department 
for the cost-sharing.312   
 As another example, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leader returned from Iraq 
and was working in the NSC Iraq office on economics and PRTs when a call came from the 
OMB saying that it appeared that the military had just zeroed out the Iraqi police training 
funding.  They had a very tense meeting with Pentagon comptroller personnel.  The PRT leader 
said that this was not an MWR (Morale, Welfare and Recreation) program, wholly controlled by 
the military and internally focused: it was a presidential directive, a vital national security 
interest and that the Pentagon needed to do it.  At the time there were about 2000 military 
personnel working on training.  For the equivalent amount of money the military was spending, 
contracting to replace that capability would have gotten 350 people at most.  In general, she felt 
that Washington never came to grips with the fact that they needed to increase the budget and 
redirect funds.313    
 Increasing State support at the provincial levels meant increasing the number of PRTs in 
country.  A senior State advisor for stabilization said that the 10 original PRTs were increased to 
36 at the provincial and sub-provincial level.  The PRTs served as mini-embassies to reach out to 
local leaders, be they tribal, business, civil society or local government and strengthen provincial 
government, help the moderates push back on the efforts of Al-Qaeda to take down the 
government.  They were headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer and the deputy head of each 
PRT was a colonel.  Recruiting was done by State, USAID and DoD.314  An ambassador at the 
Embassy said that required national-level presence was met in part by building smaller PRTs.315   
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 Another DoS initiative was development of a Quick Response Fund.  Two interviewees 
who worked at the Embassy co-authored the fund, which was a $150-250 million dollar program 
that allowed PRTs to spend quick money to fund local initiatives as a workaround for 
government contracting which tends to be slow.   One felt that the most effective way of doing 
soft power is through direct engagement with community leaders, getting outside the wire, and 
working through local organizations, not only through contractors but also by providing them 
resources directly.316  To him the Quick Response Fund was invaluable in this regard.   
 Experience also played a role in getting policymakers to take advice from the field.  A 
division stability operations commander had served on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as 
co-chair of the sub-committee on Strategic Communication along with the then-Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Larry De Rita.  They talked about integrating different 
activities and where to maintain appropriate firewalls. Those experiences and practices of 
integration would be brought to bear in Baghdad and helped accelerate the process and precision 
of their work.317  
 Some devised clever workarounds to maximize cooperation benefits.  A brigade 
commander recounted that getting key information into the Pentagon required him to go through 
many layers: a division, MNC-I, MNF-I, and CENTCOM before it could get to the higher levels 
of government.  He found that the State Department structure was much “flatter.”  When the co-
located PRT team leader sent cables to Washington they went directly to DoS and Secretary 
Rice.  He used that process to get information into the Joint Staff that may have been lost in the 
layers he had to pass through.318  His initiative is laudable, but what made it possible was the 
existence of the PRT and the cooperative relationship he had developed with its team leader. 
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 Interest from high could be good and bad.  A stabilization director at the Embassy 
recalled that the enemy began to go after weaker, softer targets, specifically against the religious 
minorities of Iraq.  That led the President in early 2008 to create a task force protecting religious 
minorities in Iraq.  That was another interagency effort, military and civilians working together 
to come up with a response and assistance programs to protect the minorities against Al-Qaeda 
because they were the weakest targets.319  An ambassador working economics recalled a major 
funding handover to the Iraqis in Ramadi attended by Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, 
and, as it happened, Senator Joe Biden, who was visiting at the time, came along.  There was a 
major tribal engagement with about 60 sheikhs.  Speeches were given and both sides exchanged 
good wishes on how much had been accomplished, but also on how much more needed to be 
done.  He recalled it as a “hyper” tribal engagement that was very successful.320 
 On the other hand, another ambassador working on economic development recalled that 
“Secretary Gates, the White House, everyone was pounding the table asking why they couldn’t 
get more than 6,000 watts” (of electricity on a national basis).  He said that no matter what they 
did it was always the Achilles heel, there were just so many ways insurgents could undermine 
success, especially because the Coalition was usually trying to do it quick.  As he observed, you 
do not build power plants in the U.S. in six months.321  A Treasury Department official in 
Baghdad during the Surge said the military had a difficult time understanding that the budget 
cycle was like a pregnancy: it takes two years to go through the cycle of funding, approving and 
observing the budget expenditures.  The military wanted to speed up the process by adding more 
people.  She said that trying to shorten or extend that time frame just creates problems like a 
pregnancy: “if you add two more women you are not going to get a baby in 3 months.”322   
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Structural problems in State Department that hindered employing the full potential of 
attractive power tools have been discussed previously.  The Surge time period saw improvements 
in this area, but problems still persisted.  In many cases the military was forced to step in and fill 
civilian side manning shortfalls. 
 A PRT leader in the same province later in the Surge said that even with the Surge it was 
still the military in the lead and more of the military taking on soft power activities by pushing 
themselves out to the grassroots rather than integrating soft power experts into what the military 
was doing at the lower levels.323  He said that the civilian side was centered on expanding the 
number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that had already been established earlier.  
These would serve as mini-embassies to reach out to local leaders, be they tribal, business, civil 
society or local government and be able to strengthen provincial government, help the moderates 
in the effort to push back on the efforts of Al-Qaeda and others to take down the government.  
Department of State expanded the original 10 PRTs to 36 PRTs and sub-provincial teams.  These 
were headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer and the deputy head of each PRT was a colonel.  
Staffing at each was meant to cover everything from agriculture to business development.  
Recruiting was done by State, USAID and DoD.  An Embassy transition director said that the 
entire operation from planning and staffing to execution was all jointly done.324 
 Civilian personnel shortages meant that Baghdad in particular housed a number of 
“brigade PRTs” or e-PRTs (embedded PRT).  A Civil Affairs (CA) officer recalled that the 
“Baghdad Belt” e-PRTs were much more like a classic CA team attached to a brigade combat 
team and told to make the people a little happy, give some PSYOP capability to show we are 
spending some money but that they were not intended to expand local capacity.325  A planner on 
the Embassy JSAT team said this came partially out of frustration with the size of the civilian 
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Surge and that the e-PRTs were not really provincial. They were commanded by military 
personnel and might have one or two civilians but that was about it, a mirror image of the PRT.  
They increased the “footprint” in Iraq and were similar to the US military-run PRTs in 
Afghanistan.  The problem to him was that the military did not really bring the proper set of soft 
power skills and they tended to be hard power-oriented, because that was what they knew.  To 
him, if you put an armor guy in charge of a brigade PRT, he is going to act like an armor guy.  If 
he had a civilian, he may or may not listen to him.326 
 A brigade commander in Baghdad during the Surge further explained the difference: 
I never felt we had enough diplomatic presence.  Even early on in the Surge we were 
trying to get the NACs and DACs (Neighborhood and District Advisory Councils) 
organized.  The last time I had tried to organize a governmental-type meeting was when I 
was in the fraternity in college.  We did OK because we were calling the meetings and we 
had the guys and money.  But we were not good at understanding the needs, because we 
came in with an agenda and stuck to it.  The PRTs and the experts that came in with 
political-military expertise knew how to run meetings and how to listen and play off the 
individuals in the room.  They had the skills to negotiate with the locals that we did not 
have.  Maybe I or my battalion commanders did, but many times it was majors or 
company commanders holding these neighborhood meetings and they did not have the 
experience to do it.  As we moved to higher council meetings, we needed the expertise 
because the Iraqis knew politics.  Many of them were selected, elected, and appointed 
because they had skills and knew how to represent their people.  You could screw around 
and make promises you couldn’t keep, and it would not help you when you went out 
amongst the people.327 
 
 A lesson he did learn was to combine Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 
missions whenever possible, what the Army calls a TTP (Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures).328 One of the Civil Affairs officers leading an e-PRT said the brigade provided 
security convoys (and on-site security) to get his personnel to their engagements, projects, and 
functions. He did see value in the effort, with the greatest effectiveness happening when BCT 
(Brigade Combat Team) and PRT personnel conducted joint engagements with local leaders – 
allowing the PRT to focus on “soft” issues and the BCT to focus on “hard” issues (security).329  
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Missions like this illustrate the potential of combining coercive and attractive power to create 
smart power, a goal both military and civilians continually tried to achieve despite numerous 
challenges. 
 
LEADERS IN COOPERATION 
 
Kilcullen and Pirnie and O’Connell have been mentioned as understanding  that unity of 
effort can be just as decisive as a unified command structure.  The U.S. military and civilian 
leadership in Iraq worked to integrate their structures and activities more closely in an effort to 
overcome Joseph’s idea that such strategic interaction is no longer possible.330 
General Petraeus summed up the importance of his relationship with Ambassador 
Crocker in setting the example of unity at the top: 
Every meeting we had with the Prime Minister was together. We attended the Iraqi 
National Security Council Meeting together. We did the video teleconference each week 
with the President of the United States together. We did the video teleconference that the 
President did with the Prime Minister of Iraq together, and we testified together on 
Capitol Hill at the six-month mark and at the 12-month mark. It was totally integrated 
into the civil-military counterinsurgency campaign plan.331 
 
 Multiple interviewees were impressed by the close interaction between the two men.  A 
senior TFSBO official said their interplay was so natural they seemed like Butch and 
Sundance.332  A Public Affairs officer at MNF-I said that they knew full well that the 
Ambassador was head of the country team but at the same time, it was a very collegial 
partnership, and that is the way they wanted it.  Typically, one did not say anything without the 
other.333    
An experienced ambassador working economic issues said that success of the mission 
depends on not having one side dominant.  If you say the military is in charge and have a few 
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political advisors, it helps but it is not going to get the job done because there are so many angles 
that a couple of political advisors will not be able to cover them all.  He felt that sending in 
diplomats to try and solve a complex issue with a large security component and a few military 
advisors was not sufficient.334  The Surge worked to get the division of labor more in line with 
Dixon (2009) and his idea that if only 20-25% of counterinsurgency is shooting insurgents, then 
the political component of the effort needs to be larger. 
 The major meeting point became the Effects Assessment Synchronization Board which 
was the large ¾ day briefing of the current ambassador and 4-star general.  An Embassy planner 
described the quarterly meeting as an opportunity for both sides to meet with access to the same 
data and information.  For him, one month per quarter would be devoted to putting together this 
series of briefings.335  An Embassy Chief of Staff who worked to bridge the gap between MNF-I 
and the Embassy in understanding the economic situation in Iraq felt that the strategic change 
was dramatic once MNF-I and USEMBASSY increased synergizing of their efforts in 




 Many nations and non-governmental organizations continued to attempt to influence 
events in Iraq.  The challenge for the U.S. was that the number of influencers whose goals 
roughly aligned with the U.S. was waning, while the number of malign actors or actors whose 
vison for Iraq was diverging from that of the U.S. was increasing.  The fragmented nature of 
Iraqi society meant that the non-aligned actors were generally able to reach out to Iraqis who felt 
an external patron gave them a chance for achieving their objectives. 
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Although the number of Coalition partners had decreased since 2003, they still had a 
valuable role to play.  There were about 15,000 forces from other nations according to an MNF-I 
planner,337 in addition to individuals in key roles throughout the country.  This was about 10% of 
the total Coalition commitment in Iraq.338  A senior member of the Joint Strategic Plans and 
Assessment (JSPA) team recalled that what really mattered was General Petraeus’ ability to 
focus all efforts toward achieving goals which included Coalition partners.339   
 An ambassador leading economic planning recalled his role in bringing together 
Coalition partners that had economic interests in the country, such as the Greeks and British.  He 
described a Norwegian who focused on agriculture as “right out of central casting.”  Because 
many tended to live out among the Iraqis, he benefited because they provided insights to him 
while he worked to help them understand and reinforce what the U.S. was doing.  He also spent a 
lot of time with the UN team.340  Another Embassy planner said that the idea was that the battle 
for Baghdad was going to open things up for the UN to be able to come in more broadly.  He felt 
that they also played an integral role with transnational justice programs, working directly with 
the Iraqi government but also behind the scenes in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy on topics 
such as Iraqi de-Ba’athification.341   
 A senior MNF-I staffer described the important role of United Kingdom Lieutenant 
General Graeme Lamb, Deputy MNF-I Commander as the one that originally got General 
Petraeus interested in reconciliation.  He did so by relating his experiences in Northern Ireland.  
He said, “You Americans are going about this all wrong.  You are trying to reconcile with people 
who are already your friends.  That’s not the people you reconcile with.”  In Northern Ireland, he 
would sit down to negotiations with the Irish Republican Army with people who in previous 
weeks had been swinging pipes at his “lads,” and he said that those are the people you have to 
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reconcile with.  Some of them you can reconcile with, and then there are the irreconcilables.  The 
staffer said that it changed the nature of how they approached the insurgency, moving from 
monolithic bad guys to cleaving off the reconcilables and bringing them back into the tent. Then 
they would have fewer to hunt down and kill or capture.  Consequently, they created the Force 
Strategic Engagement Cell to pursue that idea.  Lieutenant General Lamb was not in charge of 
that cell, but it was always a British major general that was in charge.342 
 Another important element of rebuilding Iraq would be attracting foreign investment.  Oil 
prices were relatively high in 2007-2008, and as a result an ambassador working economic 
affairs at the Embassy said that the Iraqis were shipping more oil.343  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, Iraqi oil exports had gone from a low of about 1.3 million 
barrels/day in 2003 and 1.8 million barrels/day as internal violence began to increase in 2005 to 
approximately 2.3 million barrels/day in 2007-2008.344  According to an Embassy stabilization 
director during the Surge the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFSBO) under 
Paul Brinkley played a role in bringing important business representatives of the US to Iraq.345   
An MNF-I planner who helped oversee the second oil bid round recounted that it brought in 15 
oil companies from 13 other countries pledging to spend over $100B of their own money, not 
government money.  He also pointed out that a positive element of the 2005 Iraqi constitution 
was that it provided for allocation of oil revenue to each province based on population.346 
 Banking services in Iraq needed to be modernized.  An official working with the TFBSO 
U.S. Treasury was pushing for an electronic payment system utilizing Montran, a company that 
they had previously worked with when assisting modernizing nations.  Montran would not come 
into Iraq, citing security risk.  The official ended up as the person intervening between them and 
the Iraqi central bank and facilitated bringing in their equipment.347  An MNF-I planner was 
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involved with creating the Public Financial Management Action Group (PFMAG), and bringing 
in Grant-Thornton, World Bank, and the UN to help them spend their money better.348 
 Another important non-governmental actor was the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC).  Abu Ghraib had focused their interest on treatment of detainees by Coalition 
forces.  Negative ICRC reporting could adversely impact domestic and global opinions of the 
Coalition effort in Iraq.  An interment facility commander described the process: 
One of its functions is to ensure detainees and prisoner are being held in civil conditions, 
so there was one inspection before I got there and one while I was on leave.  I had to get 
back to them and either refute or fix their reported deficiencies.  Anything from cells 
need to have windows (was not realistic) to detainees need to have more exercise, that 
kind of stuff.  We really did not have a major issue, it was mostly minor issues, nothing 
of significance.349   
 
 Anyone who ran a detention facility in Iraq was subject to ICRC inspection.350  Special 
Operations was even liable to have the ICRC inspecting their facility.  It was a holding facility, 
not a detention facility, which a Special Forces commander during the Surge said is different in 
the nuances of law and policy.  They generally could not hold anybody for longer than two 
weeks. According to him, most of the focus in that time was obtaining useful tactical 
information.351  Surprisingly little has been written about the interaction between U.S. detention 
facilities and these international inspection regimes. 
 The Iranian effect was still strong throughout the Surge.  The same Special Forces 
commander said that most of their casualties in 2007 were a result of Iranian-sponsored actions, 
Shia militias rather than al-Qaeda.  They took fewer casualties against the Sunni insurgent base 
in 2007 than in 2006, but it also coincided with fighting Shia militias.  EFPs from Iran were 
“really hitting us hard, and that’s where we took our casualties.”352 
A stability operations commander in Baghdad described the problem using a sports 
metaphor of two teams clashing on the field: 
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The referees are involved and engage in the fight, and may trip up a player, deliberately 
undermine someone, shoot someone, kill someone, and that could be law enforcement 
officials.  The stadium officials who gave you authority to come in in the first place are 
engaged in their own operations shooting each other in the stands.  It is more like that 
kind of chaos, with many players coming in and conducting pursuit of what they viewed 
as their own interests.353   
 
 International interference was never going to be a problem the U.S. elements in Iraq 
could solve.  Their best hope was to interdict the “rat lines” and reduce the violence between 
factions and hence the opportunity for outside parties to become involved, with the hope that 
Coalition diplomacy could work to reduce the problems from the outside.  An MNF-I planner 
described the process.  By 2009 al-Qaeda could pull off a high-profile attack about every six 
weeks.  On the rat lines toward Syria, they would collect fees from truckers carrying Beiji 
refinery products up to Mosul.  25th INF DIV had this “down pat,” they knew the places where 
al-Qaeda was running tolling stations to fund their attacks.  If the U.S. disrupted those tolling 
stations, where al-Qaeda would be paid in either money or fuel, then it could disrupt their 
attacks.  The occasional al-Qaeda operative who may have had two other incomes already would 




 Communication is part of smart power.  Without it, coercive and attractive power are 
being employed without effectively playing on the strong points and minimizing the drawbacks 
of each.  Nye expressed concern about overreliance on the military in foreign policy and lack of 
planning between the elements of U.S. diplomacy and power.355  In Iraqi during the Surge 




 Ambassador Crocker believed that similar to the Army, there may be a lot down on 
paper, but personalities and personal relationships were crucial.356  He and General Petraeus set 
the tone for cooperation and coordination.  An MNF-I planner explained that when they met with 
Prime Minister Maliki weekly, they would talk about hard and soft power activities with the 
Prime Minister.357  A Joint Strategic Plans Assessment (JSAT) team leader attended the meeting 
specifically focused on the Surge. This fell under one of the benchmarks set up to gauge progress 
in Iraq.  He recalled that he or another participant wrote the cable and sent it back via the military 
side of the Embassy because they could not post cables from their SIPR (Secret Internet Protocol 
Router), the classified U.S. government information network) computers.358  An Embassy Chief 
of Staff also emphasized the success of this whole of government approach,359 with another 
specifying that the Surge was about General Petraeus and his ability to get everything moving in 
a coordinated direction, which is different from adding “X#” of additional brigades.360 
Problems still existed.  State Department manning was still low.  A Marine Corps MNC-I 
planner recalled that even in 2008 he would assign coordination meetings to the 12 members of 
his staff.  Sometimes in the morning he went to the Commander’s brief and USAID was 
represented by Mr. X.  Two hours later his major went to the camp brief and USAID was 
represented by Mr. X.  Later a lieutenant colonel went to the PRT coordination brief and USAID 
was represented by Mr. X.  There was one person trying to plug in at 4-5 different levels and he 
basically got no work done going from meeting to meeting.361  The planner provided his opinion 
of other problems regarding coordination: 
I can finally get this off my chest.  (synchronization with) Department of State (DoS) and 
USAID generally went very poorly.  I think there were culture differences.  In peacetime 
we have to practice with the military middle-majors on up training with USAID and DoS 
because the cultures are very different.  It will not work in reverse.  It is almost 
impossible to get DoS or USAID people to participate in peacetime training with the 
military because there are so few of them.  You can always break free a lieutenant 
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colonel to participate in a six-week DoS exercise.  You cannot break free a mid-level 
DoS or USAID guy to work with a military exercise.362  That was a problem: the culture 
was very different.  For example, when we were talking about things we should push 
economically to the Iraqis, it took me a while to realize we were talking about different 
things.  The military wanted change on the ground, wanted to do something economically 
that would reduce the unemployment rate of young men in Iraq to reduce the temptation 
for them to join the insurgency.  The State Department had the same general goal. But 
their purpose was to consult, to advise, to talk to the Iraqi government.  There would be 
an all-day discussion with certain Iraqi government ministers, and the State Department 
would consider it a success because we spent all day talking about these important issues 
with the right people in the room.  Messages would be sent back to Washington 
discussing what was discussed.  The military side would see it as a failure because there 
was no commitment to act, and in fact 3-6 months later they did not act.363 
 
 A Psychological Operations officer had a similar viewpoint, saying the relationship was 
more State providing the military visibility as to the things they were doing, more information-
sharing than coordination.  It was neither coordination nor competition.  He said he never saw 
meetings or collaboration that led to actions.364  The problem was not always physical: a Civil 
Affairs officer recalled that there were a variety of MNF-I offices located in the old Republican 
Guard Palace in the Green Zone, it was just a question of walking down the hall to talk to his 
counterparts.365  Writers such as Jospeh have talked about these types of challenges when linking 
political and operational concepts. 
Despite obstacles, better coordination filtered down in the Coalition.  An Information 
Operations Task Force (IOTF) leader said that their primary coordination was Saturday morning 
reviews.  Their OPTEMPO (Operations Tempo) was developed on a monthly cycle and their 
polling was monthly, so they would review their Lines of Operations (LOO) at these meetings: 
they had an anti-Al-Qaeda LOO, an anti-militia LOO, a security story LOO, and then 
democratization.  They did a periodic review in which anyone who wanted to show up could.366  
An MNC-I economics planner was one of the regular attendees at the Saturday review, although 
he was more focused on messaging to the U.S.367 
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 A senior USAID manager agreed that the Embassy PAO had a strong relationship with 
the military PAO.  Multiple people on her staff worked specifically with the Embassy PAO 
because Public Affairs had become so focused with getting out the right message, particularly as 
violence and civilian casualties increased, that it was important that there be a coordinated 
message. She recalled that every morning there was attention given to public affairs.  After the 
BUA (Battle Update Assessment) was an Ambassador’s meeting and there was time dedicated to 
public affairs issues.  There was no question in her mind that interagency coordination 
improved.368  To an economics planner at the Embassy and his colleagues, the success of the 
PRTs had nothing to do with electricity or the standard of living or crime.  It was based on the 
colonel running the PRT.369 
 Improved cooperation meant improved ability to work around structural limitations.  A 
senior Public Affairs officer at MNF-I said that the military has a lot more leeway in saying 
things that the State Department and its Embassy cannot.  As soon as an embassy or the State 
Department says it, its policy, whereas if the four-star is saying it, it could be considered policy, 
but it is not necessarily viewed that way.  Oftentimes they said things that the Embassy may not 
have been able to, because they operated differently.  For example, when they would do a joint 
press conference, the Councilor for Public Affairs and the MNF-I PAO would co-host it.  Many 
times, the PAO took the lead because he had more assets and did not have to deal with as much 
bureaucracy as the State Department did.370  It is ironic that the military found State Department 
was often a better medium to get information back to senior leadership in Washington, but at the 
same time the military could do a better job of messaging in Iraq. 
A leader on the Joint Strategic Plans Assessment (JSPA) team recalled that the original 
idea was that the MNF-I strategic planners and his organization would be brought together to 
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unify Embassy and military planning.  That did not happen, but 3-4 times a week he would meet 
with his military counterparts,371 approximating Kilcullen’s idea previously discussed that 
collaboration may substitute for formal unity of effort.  Another JSPA team leader working 
economics said that having the right players at the Iraqi Steering Committee meeting allowed 
him to get his items of issues on the agenda.  He could grab General Petraeus before the meeting 
and ask him to say this or that.  He recalled that some of his finer memories were having General 
Petraeus looking across at him back-benching and signaling, “Should I say it now?”372 
Some DoS manning and liaison was provided by DoD.  An ambassador directing the Iraq 
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) said that his military aide went everywhere he went, 
in addition to the General who was his Director of Operations.  During his visits to all of the 10 
PRTs he also interacted with the brigade commander paired with each PRT.  He also met 
regularly with the division commanders, both in Baghdad and at their locations.  He believed this 
face-to-face contact was essential for pursuing US objectives in Iraq.373  A senior USAID 
manager had a similar experience.  They had three military liaisons: marine, navy and army.  
They worked at the mission and were involved with advising.  When she went to Anbar it was 
always in the company of the Embassy’s Marine attaché.374  A lot of the travel she undertook 
was to meet with the military at different locations, usually going with another senior leader or a 
military member of USAID.375   
 Improved cooperation percolated to the provincial level.  Two Civil Affairs officers 
recalled early problems in their province.   One said that the brigade who rotated out early in the 
Surge would never say anything positive about the State Department people.  The other clarified 
that in fairness to that unit he was given the latitude to operate, but it was on his own and 
unsynchronized.  The example he gave was that if he was starting a big “by, with and through” 
204 
 
initiative the same day the brigade kicked off a major counterterrorism operation and killed 30 
people, it was not synchronized and negated what he was doing.  The challenge to him was not 
that they were opposing his unit, but that they operated independently of him.376  
 They further recalled how this changed with a change of brigade and new PRT 
leadership.  One said that the new commander wanted to know what his grand strategy was and 
what he wanted to do and worked with him and his unit.377  The other agreed that the new 
commander asked me what he could do for him.  The Civil Affairs officer said that they needed 
to show the Iraqis that the State Department workers had some influence with the all-powerful 
US military so they could get Iraqi support. The commander set up a meeting with the governor, 
brought the Civil Affairs officer with him and “treated me like his long-lost kid brother.”  He 
told the Governor that “the State Department folks have his ear” and that really set them up for 
success.  The power that a brigade commander holds was pretty awesome in Iraqi eyes.  
According to the Civil Affairs officer, being seen as an adjunct of his gives you wasta that is 
very beneficial.  He did not say “I’m going to kill you if you don’t listen to him.”  It was that 
“arm-around-you, this guy I am supporting is not acting in opposition to me” sort of 
cooperation.378 
 Both also agreed that the change in PRT leadership was also critical to success.  One 
described her as being very professional, not trying to belittle her counterparts or tell them how 
things were going to go, but simply being outstanding in partnering with DoD.379  An example 
provided by the PRT leader herself was that her Governance Officer (a Reserve Civil Affairs 
officer detailed to the PRT) told her one day that the young guys on the security team did not 
understand why they were going outside the wire risking harm to themselves and the civilians.  
The PRT started adding to the daily pre-mission security briefing conducted by the military 
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transport team by giving their own briefing of why they needed to go out, what they intended to 
accomplish, and what they hoped to achieve from the engagement.  To her the result was 
fantastic: then the young military guys wanted to come with because they felt that their action 
was accomplishing something and enriched the PRT’s understanding of atmospherics and 
context by sharing their own observations and insights.380   
 The new brigade commander described some of the changes he implemented: 
I developed some battle-rhythm events that allowed us to integrate the PRT into the 
operations.  The team leader, the CA, governance, econ and oil would huddle on Tuesday 
evenings to conduct strategic planning.  I had dinner every Tuesday evening with the 
PRT leader, mainly because she had a real grasp of what was necessary and what a PRT 
could do, but she would struggle with leadership issues within the PRT and how to 
maximize task organization that I take for granted from being a young platoon leader on 
up.  It was a good symbiotic relationship.  I could help her with leadership challenges, 
and she could help me with the gaps I had in the soft power like oil and econ.  She did 
that very well.  I had an LNO (liaison officer) linked up with her team, and she had an 
LNO that I placed into our Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC).  At the beginning 
she was dealing with infrastructure issues that detracted from her mission.  My Command 
Sergeant Major would help them out with the infrastructure issues, which allowed the 
team to focus on the mission, and it helped us build a great relationship with the PRT.  
They would invite us over to social events and recognition ceremonies, and we invited 
them to all our BCT events as well.  I also took members of the PRT with me on many 
occasions to events such as governor’s meetings and other key leader events outside the 
wire.  That way she had security, could hear firsthand my interactions, and have her own 
interaction with the key leaders in the province as well.  We were cross-talking right there 
in real time with the governor/other key leaders and that was valuable.381 
 
One of the Civil Affairs officers said that this cooperation paid off in terms of issues like 
project oversight.  According to him the prior brigade thought the Iraqis were stealing money, 
but from his perspective they gave out money and did not follow up on it.  He illustrated that if 
you just give somebody a million dollars and do not check on his work, he can do whatever he 
wants with it.  Then you may blame him, but it is actually your fault for not following up.  He 
said that following up was the hard job.  If they did not enforce it from the brigade, that is their 
fault.  They blamed the Iraqis for stealing, but from his perspective it was their fault for “handing 
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out all the money like its candy.”382  Greater participation from the brigades in overseeing 
attractive activities increased their effectives which was necessary as Greene analyzed Iraq and 
found it to be one of the most corrupt states in the world.383 
Prior to the Surge, there was confusion about what to measure and how to interpret it.  A 
deputy brigade commander in Iraq both before and during the Surge recalled that despite the 
miserable statistics they were seeing, MNC-I continued on the same course of action: they never 
changed until Lieutenant General Odierno came in.384  An Embassy statistician even felt that the 
military side wanted to discount some of their own intelligence reporting structures that they had 
set up for some time.  To him, the Embassy side was more data-driven and cared about getting 
the best data possible.385  Another Embassy planner stated that once General Petraeus came in 
and saw that the planners were doing it right, the methodology changed.386 
General Petraeus immediately began taking steps to change what metrics they were 
looking at upon taking command.  One of his senior staff officers said that previously the 
leadership in Iraq had been looking at everything.  There were dozens and dozens of metrics.  He 
believed that the key metric of ethno-sectarian violence got lost in the “noise.”  By focusing on 
that as the key determinant of whether the Surge was succeeding, he thought that it helped them 
focus their thinking.  Although they kept many of the other metrics, they did not look at them 
every day.  They were instead briefed in the Thursday BUB (Battle Update Brief).  Under 
General Petraeus, the level of ethno-sectarian violence became the key measure of the Surge 
succeeding, because the assumption was that if the level of ethno-sectarian violence decreased, 
they could restart the political process, but until the level of ethno-sectarian violence decreased 
the political process was going to be frozen.387 
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Getting out of the big bases meant improved security for the civilians, which also resulted 
in an increase in available data.  An Embassy stabilization director saw that they were getting 
metrics constantly, collecting a massive amount of information indicating that after a few months 
the (violence) numbers starting to go down and after a year it was clear that the Surge had 
succeeded.  The combination of the military and civilian Surge empowering the new government 
of Iraq and moderates at the local level worked as shown in the data on attacks and violence.388 
 A Joint Strategic Plans Assessment team leader remembered the metric aspect that was 
interesting was measuring causal issues.  General Petraeus wanted to measure markets opening, 
once he even wanted to measure swimming pools because flying overhead you can get that data.  
The biggest lesson to him was seeing it through the eyes of capacity development for the locals 
because the goal was to get them far enough along that the Coalition could go home.389  Better 
information-gathering and evaluation are critical elements of counterinsurgency according to 




 Interviewees felt that reducing the magnitude of the Executive Branch structural 
problems helped set the stage for a smarter counterinsurgency effort in Iraq.  Increased manning 
and financial resources provided an expanded capability to apply both coercive and attractive 
power in Iraq.  Working to maximize the value of remaining Coalition partners while attempting 
to blunt malign external influences steadied the course of the Surge.  Better relationships 
between the Departments of Defense and State resulted in better planning and synergy at the 
highest levels and set the example for subordinates.   
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 Smarter structure resulted in smarter execution in Iraq.  Chapters Seven and Eight detail 
the smarter execution that resulted from a smarter structure.  Soldiers and civilians alike found 
that they were able to apply more initiative, reach out more to their Executive Branch 













 There is a common misperception that the Surge was primarily an attractive or soft power 
effort.  In fact, the reason for bringing in 30,000 additional U.S. troops was to employ them in a 
coercive and hence largely hard power role.  Some of the additional forces were attraction (soft 
power) specialists, but the bulk of it was the six combat brigades brought in to enable the 
Coalition to fight and stabilize Iraq along with strengthening attractive efforts.  See Plakoudas 
for the need for a balanced counterinsurgency approach that includes military power.390  Marston 
observed that every U.S. unit in Iraq from battalion level on up had a high-value target list of 
insurgents to get off the battlefield.391  
According to General Petraeus: 
Unless you can achieve security, you do not have a foundation on which to build 
anything else. You have got to get security. That could only be achieved in some cases by 
separating the Shia militia and Sunni insurgents. Shia areas had Sunni populations and 
vice versa, although mostly the former. In many cases there were still mixed 
neighborhoods. If you can’t reduce the violence between Sunni and Shia, you are 
certainly not going to have a unified Iraq. Ultimately one of the big achievements of the 
Surge was the reduction of violence by some 80-85%. That was enabled because we 
brought the Sunni Arabs back into the fabric of society and gave them a sense that they 
would be better off by supporting the new Iraq rather than by actively or tacitly opposing 
it.392 
 
 It was this security that enabled the remainder of the U.S. Surge plan.  Reconstruction, 
reconciliation, and empowerment of the Iraqis were all made possible by the reduction in 
insurgent as well as sectarian violence.  Interviewees continually stressed the importance of 
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taming the violence as a prelude and accompaniment to moving Iraq forward on a path of 
national integration and growth. 
 
COERCIVE POWER  
 
Interviewees continually stressed the bedrock importance of security and that it had to be 
earned.  A Marine Military Training Team (MTT) leader who was there at the cusp of the Anbar 
Awakening said that the first six months was a “flat-out gunfight.”393 A squadron commander in 
Baghdad gave much of the credit to Lieutenant General Odierno, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 
commander as well as the additional force strength.  He said that kinetic ops were back in vogue, 
with a loosening of ROE (Rules of Engagement) and ending of onerous requirements like a 15-6 
(investigation for a U.S. Army incident) for every weapons discharge.  To him, the change was 
achieved through a change of command from (Lieutenant General) Chiarelli to Odierno.394   
 The force increase was important, but an MNF-I planner recalled that they had about as 
many troops as had been in Iraq at the peak under General Casey, but that they used them 
differently.  They operated shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqi Security Forces for the bulk of the 
Surge.395  This would prove more successful and reflected the ideas of Pirnie and O’Connell for 
combined operations with the host nation security forces. 
A brigade commander in Baghdad during the Surge said that the force increase meant 
smaller areas of responsibility, or in essence having a large enough brigade to concentrate their 
efforts and fight smaller battles.396   Echoing this ability to concentrate, a squadron commander 
said that the squadron they took over for had (the Baghdad districts of) Rustimiyah, Karada, and 
half of Rusafa.  That is an impossibly large area of a few million people and dozens of ISF (Iraq 
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Security Force) units for a squadron of 12 platoons to control.  They suffered casualties “just 
driving around waiting to get blown up” and could never get to understand the human terrain of 
the area.  When his unit arrived, for the better part of a year they just had Rusafa.  His unit could 
live there in the Joint Security Stations, with several SOI (Sons of Iraq) and ISF units that they 
could actually train with, mentor, and understand, and became intimately familiar with the 
terrain.397   
 Special Operations forces still focused on high value targeting operations.  A Special 
Forces commander during the Surge period emphasized that they were not just doing kinetic 
operations: the main focus of their day-to-day activity was developing Iraqi military and police 
force capabilities to do operations themselves.  Training, educating, teaching.  Then at night, 
they would take some of those forces that were capable out to do operations.  He said that 
looking at time spent on Civil Affairs and Information activities vice developing Iraqi forces, 
developing active intel, targeting and kinetics, during the Surge they were maybe 80/20%, or 
70/30%, while acknowledging that it is hard to quantify.398   
 Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) organized one Stryker brigade that was not 
assigned a specific geography.  A commander for stability operations said that it was called an 
above-ground force.  It was not fixed to the ground at all.  They would order it to concentrate in a 
particular area where they wanted to create favorable conditions.  As that area was cleared to the 
point that the unit fixed to that area was able to keep it stable, the above-ground unit would move 
to another area and partner with a different brigade.  To him, consolidation of gains had to be 
done by continued presence of the coercive military forces.399   
 A senior member of the Embassy said that the biggest difference he saw with the Surge 
was the ability of the military to support the police in the cities and localities “24/7.”  Until then 
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they would own the streets during the day but retreat to their bases at night and the police 
stations would get overrun and the troublemakers owned the cities at night.  He believed they 
could not get security in that sort of context.400   An Embassy Chief of Staff agreed that the 
strategic change was dramatic, particularly once the Joint Security Stations were established and 
MNF-I and USEMBASSY increased synergizing of their efforts.401 
 U.S. forces also worked to implement General Petraeus’ understanding of the need to 
separate the warring militias.  An MNC-I planner said that Lieutenant General Odierno ordered, 
appropriately, to clear areas out, put up giant T-walls and utilize biometrics to secure a market 
that had been recently targeted with IEDs so the economic activities could be carried out going 
forward.  The enemy gets a vote as he said, so they needed coercive and attractive power 
adjusted on a broad spectrum on a daily basis.402  A commander working in Baghdad during the 
Surge said that in each area they were investing a force to live in a joint security station or 
combat outpost with Iraqi police, or along city fault lines where they put up walls to separate 
different parts of the city.  Inside those walls were electricity and a microeconomy.  According to 
him, inside of those places with a microeconomy they had stability.403  These assets had to come 
from somewhere.  According to a Civil Affairs officer working in the north of Iraq: 
 I remember being in Salah al-Din and waking up one morning and all our T-walls 
(protective barriers) were gone.  They came in with forklifts and an endless parade of 
tractor-trailers, picked up every piece of concrete and hauled it all down to Baghdad.  We 
went from endless T-walls to having nothing left.404 
 
 This would ironically boomerang on the provinces outside Baghdad later.  As the battle 
for Baghdad shifted in favor of the Coalition over 2007, insurgents driven out of Baghdad moved 
to other areas.  Salah al-Din was a Sunni stronghold (Saddam’s former home province) and 
natural gathering place for Sunni insurgents.  Another Civil Affairs officer there said that a lot of 
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insurgents started coming north from Baghdad into the province during the Surge.  His brigade 
started doing a lot of kinetic operations and lost more soldiers than the previous brigade.405 
 There is no clear-cut academic consensus of the “right” ratio of troops to population to 
perform effective counterinsurgency.406  FM 3-24 cited previous studies that estimated that 
effective pacification required 20 troops for every 1000 inhabitants of a country, or about half a 
million security forces for Iraq.  An MNF-I planner recalled that they had surpassed that point in 
Iraq during the Surge if the Iraqi Security Forces were included.  There were 175,000 U.S. 
troops, 15,000 from other nations, about 190,000 total.  By late 2008 he said they had built Iraqi 
security forces to 750,000 of all kinds, reaching and improving upon that theoretical required 
troop density.  His criticism was of people who took the theoretical requirement and said, “U.S. 
troops.”  It did not have to be U.S. troops to him.407   
 An MNF-I planner explaining how ISF forces helped get to that number said that during 
the Surge said there were about 11 Iraqi divisions under some level of manning, although many 
were immobile because they were recruited locally.  From 2007-2008 the ISF grew in numbers 
and quality and as the Coalition saturated areas with the 20 brigades working alongside the Iraqi 
forces, the violence began to subside.408  See Hammes for discussion of the necessity of an 
adequate conventional military force capability for a counterinsurgency campaign to be 
successful.409 
 For the formal Iraqi security forces, there was an increase not just in numbers, but 
capability as well.  A stabilization commander in Baghdad said that they had been pushing to get 
the Iraqis out of the checkpoint mentality throughout 2006, and finally turned that corner with a 
deliberate offensive operation or campaign beginning around February 2007, Fard al-Qanoon 
(“Enforcing the Law,” an operation designed to protect the Iraqi population).410   
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Some of the increase was obtained through the Sons of Iraq program, an initiative in and 
around Baghdad to turn Sunnis, many of whom had been previously fighting against the 
Coalition, into militias aligned with the U.S.  As mentioned, Gentile felt co-opting the Sunni 
militias was in fact the primary factor that made the Surge a success.  An MNC-I planner 
recalled that it meant that 107,000 Iraqis were paid to protect their areas, which was a good way 
to get them off the battlefield as an adversary.411  An Embassy Chief of Staff also stated that 
Sons of Iraq was important to providing the force ratio needed to stabilize the country and “keep 
a lid” on the Sunnis.412  An Information Operations officer in Baghdad during the Surge recalled 
the beginning of the Sons of Iraq program: 
The Awakening was happening out west: the Sunni tribes were realizing that Al-Qaeda 
was just no good.  They’re terrible guests: they’re killing us and it’s their way or the 
highway.  The enemy of my enemy is my enemy, right?  We wanted to get that ink blot 
to move east.  Lieutenant Colonel P…. meets with the sheikh and asks him why I should 
trust you: you have been shooting at my guys for so long.  He said, ‘let me take you out 
back.’  They go out back, he swings open the door, and there are about 1000 Sunni men 
standing there.  He says, ‘We just need some weapons.’  Lieutenant Colonel P…. says 
‘Let me go talk to my boss.’   That was the start of it.413 
 
A Marine Corps planner stationed in Baghdad observed the same phenomenon.  He said 
that the Sunni tribal leaders eventually began to turn against al-Qaeda.  When al-Qaeda arrived 
they were welcomed, but they overplayed their hand.  They took Iraqi women to be wives, they 
took young men to be soldiers, they stole.  Eventually the tribes turned against them and reached 
out not to the Iraqis, but to the Coalition forces.  He saw this as a sign of trust that the Americans 
could say “Send your leaders to this point and we will meet them there.”  The tribal leaders knew 
they would not be betrayed: if they made the same offer to the Iraqi officials, they (suspected 
they) would be arrested or shot when they showed up for the meeting.  There was definitely an 
outreach.  He said it created hard feelings between the ISF and MNF-I because MNF-I did not 
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share with them.  They told them about the meetings after, and the ISF were very upset that they 
did not know about the meetings before.414  
Part of increasing local security capability was in the form of increased protection for 
electric plants, oil refineries and other key economic elements.  These were things the locals 
wanted to keep operating, or at least easy for them to disrupt if they did not.  A former 
ambassador directing economic development at the Embassy before and during the Surge said 
that one initiative they did that stuck out in his mind was building Iraqi infrastructure security, 
which he thought was a key element of how to do hard and soft power together.  It shows it is not 
one of these things or the other, but how interconnected they are.  If you get a refinery back up 
and running, and you know how important the refineries were in Iraqi, but cannot protect it then 
you have no gasoline at the gas stations.  If you get a power generation plant going again and 
cannot protect it, you are in trouble.  There are plenty of ways to criticize all that effort, but at the 
same time you cannot do without it.  You are just wasting money in an unsecure environment 
like that.  To him, development without security is not going to get you there.415   
The inevitable result of more contact with the insurgents would be more casualties among 
the Coalition and ISF.  General Petraeus recalls that: 
The casualties did go up, although fairly quickly the Iraqi civilian casualties started to go 
down, and then over time the sensational attack numbers started to go down. Then 
sectarian incidents started to go down: all of that was very important.   And we did think 
that as we handed off more and more tasks to ISF and as they shouldered more of the 
burdens on the front lines that their casualties likely would remain high even as U.S. and 
coalition casualties began to go down.416 
 
His premonition was accurate.  According to a Special Forces Commander with 
experience before and during the Surge, “From our perspective it was a hard fight in 2006 and it 
was a hard fight in 2007.  Our Iraqi counterparts that we were with were suffering more 
casualties than we were, as a SOF force.”417  An MNF-I planner said that when you look at the 
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2007-2008 statistics you see that the violence peaks as they were moving out into the areas they 
had conceded, then the violence goes way down.418  A stability operations commander in 
Baghdad remembered fall of 2007 as what it means to be in the midst of war that is really hot.  
He said that it was hard to tell whether you are winning or losing.  There were indications the 
Coalition was winning.  They were getting greater control of areas and could see weakness, and 
they had intelligence telling them they were wearing down all their adversaries.  But in his mind, 
“it sure doesn’t feel very good.  Winning in combat does not feel very good.”  To him, that was 
the pivot point, late summer 2007.419   
 The ISF suffered heavy casualties during this time.  There were several reasons for this.  
A staff officer at MNF-I pointed out that they had higher casualties simply because they were 
taking on a greater share of the fighting and had greater numbers; thus they had a much larger 
increase.  He felt that a lot of the casualties could have been because they were less trained.420  In 
a similar vein, A Marine Corps MTT leader believed that part of the reason the Iraqis were 
disproportionately hit was “their armor was for shit and their protection was for garbage.  A 
thing that would for us would have gotten a couple of guys with their bell rung and probably 
walked away was much more effective against them.”421  A particularly insightful squadron 
commander in Baghdad also opined that the increasing ISF casualties had more to do with the 
fact that the ISF was interfering with the criminal activity in Iraq and not just because they were 
getting better at doing their jobs or thwarting attacks on the Coalition forces or Shia gathering 
places by AQI.422 
 From the coercive/attractive power perspective, an interesting element was several 
interviewees pointing out the use of money to facilitate hard power actions.  There were several 
variants of this.  An economics planner at the Embassy talked about how the Provincial 
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Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were using the “money as a weapon system” paradigm.423  This 
was particularly evident with what were known as the “Brigade PRTs.”  Due to the continued 
DoS manning shortfalls, DoD was either manning or creating their own “PRTs” to provide 
themselves that capability.  In this case, the PRTs would utilize CERP money to fund 
reconstruction initiatives in a local area in exchange for better information about insurgent 
activity in that area.   
A Special Operations commander described another technique of using money as a 
weapon system that changed during the Surge.  He said that that was in fact what they called the 
manual, “Money as a weapon system.”  He said that they did get more authority on how to use 
money to achieve “soft effects” such as hiring Sons of Iraq as “security guards.” Doing this, they 
figured out how to use CERP money to achieve the effect they wanted which was to mobilize the 
tribal populations and civilians to come to the Coalition side versus al-Qaeda.424  This indicates 
use of money in an attractive mode, going against much academic thinking that money is hard 
power. 
This was the most reliable technique for mobilizing Sunni militias: the Shia-dominated 
Iraqi government under Prime Minister Maliki was reluctant to provide funding to Sunni armed 
groups.   Maliki did not want the Sons of Iraq legitimized.  A leader of the Information 
Operations Task Force (IOTF) in Baghdad recalled that some of their early products talked about 
the Sons of Adamiya or “Colonel so-and-so.”  Sons of Iraq branding came out of Maliki’s desire 
to limit them politically and tie them to the Americans.  He wanted to deny them the legitimacy 
to say, “We are Sunni Iraqis and we are fighting AQ because we are Iraqis and we have a place 
in Iraq.”  Consequently, the IOTF got guidance to do Sons of Iraq branding.  That was not a 
problem with the insurgents: to him it was a problem with the Iraqi government and internal Iraqi 
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politics.  The IOTF leader felt that that problem was far more significant in terms of the fight for 
Iraq than anything the insurgents on either the Sunni or Shia sides did.425 
 A brigade commander in Baghdad said: 
Depending on the timing and JAM (Jayesh Al-Mahdi or Army of the 12th Imam) 
organization you were talking about, it was or was not an insurgency.  It was a formal 
infiltration of the Iraqi government structure, and it wielded a host of influence inside the 
government structure, and inside the Iraqi military.  In some cases, this Iraqi private who 
was actually a senior leader of this Jayesh al-Mahdi who sits at the head of this branch of 
the Martyr Sadr.  Unless you peeled all this back and understood this, you were 
vulnerable to making bad decisions that would lead you down the wrong avenue.  We 
were not organized going in to understand that culture.  It wasn’t until we got into it and 
started living out there and listening and evaluating every personality and their activities 
that we would see that this guy was actually that guy who works for this guy who works 
for Maliki.  How does that work?  This guy who just blew up my soldiers is working for a 
guy that reports to the Prime Minister.  We laid all this out for Lieutenant General 
Odierno and General Petraeus on the hood of a HUMVEE before they came in and said 
that this was what we understood to be true.  And we were cautioned about how high we 
could go because I knew that as long as we didn’t address these realities through formal 
penalty or capture and incarceration, we would long suffer the consequences.  General 
Petraeus gave me a formal ceiling of how high we could go and we removed a couple of 
general officers and field grade officers off the battlefield and put them in Camp Cropper.  
It’s such a complex stew of activity it is sometimes hard to understand.426 
 
 The same commander described a situation where they were doing reconstruction efforts 
and got into a running gun battle with JAM who had come up from Sadr City wearing uniforms 
of the Iraqi Army.  What had been a civil reconstruction effort, make work and get streetlights 
put in turned into a bloody affair.  He was actually in direct conversation with a parliamentarian 
asking him to remove JAM from the battlefield who acquiesced.  One day he was driving 
through Baghdad during heavy fighting and it was relatively quiet, even though there was 
fighting where he had come from or fighting at the far end.  His interpreter was listening in on 
the Iraqi radios and phone calls and said “Saidi, they are keeping you alive.”  He asked who was.  
The interpreter responded “Both sides.  Trust me, they know exactly where you are.”  The 
militias would report to each other where this commander was on the battlefield.427 
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On another occasion he went to meet with a former assassin who had joined the Baghdad 
Patriots, taking a senior officer with him.  They could meet him but only after nightfall, and they 
had to walk.   The general asked if they were safe.  He said, “Boss, they know who I am.  If they 
want me dead, I will die right here.  But they respect me enough that they are going to let me 
travel to meet this guy.  If they like what they hear, they’ll let us travel back.  If they don’t, we 
won’t.”428  The Americans could serve as a trusted intermediary between the Shia and Sunni 
fighting forces in Iraq. 
 Over time the Coalition was able to quell the violence in Iraq at differing paces in 
differing parts of Iraq.  A squadron commander in Baghdad said that all deployed units including 
his decimated AQI, bled the Shia militias white, and took away their “cash cow,” the Jamilla 
market, until they agreed to a ceasefire.  He pointed out that there was a major power struggle 
going on among the Shia, so it was not necessary to kill or capture them all, just enough to get 
their leaders worried that their power relative to the other Shia factions could collapse if the 
fighting went on much longer.429  The phenomenon of insurgent subgroups battling each other 
for internal positioning in the midst of civil conflict was observed by Olson Lounsbery and 
Pearson.430 
 An Information Operations planner in Baghdad said that after April 2007 the security 
situation improved because they had al-Qaeda on their heels, and they were getting “run out of 
Dodge.”  The Sunni insurgents were going away because they became part of getting rid of al-
Qaeda.  According to him, even the Shia militias had backed off some.431  A stability operations 
commander also in Baghdad said that by January 2008 they saw the number of sectarian deaths 
going down.  The number of areas not under central and provincial government control were also 
going down.  He saw an exponential increase in the restoration of services because the process 
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was working, and many things being handed over.  There were still contests in certain areas, 
especially in areas where insurgents were losing influence, particularly Shia insurgents.432 
An ambassador leading economic planning at the Embassy said that between September 
2007 to March 2008 there was a significant decrease in violence and SIGACTS (Significant 
Actions) around the country.  He noted that the big city-wide conflicts like Fallujah, Ramadi and 
Baqubah-type struggles were over and things were really quite peaceful.  In the north Sunni 
insurgents launched actions against the Coalition and against the oil pipelines and power grid.  
By April or May things were quiet and stayed that way through the following summer.  He said 
that there was unhappiness about electricity but there was not much violence.  Travel was safer 
and there were fewer cases of roadside bombings.433   An Embassy Chief of Staff recalled that by 
late 2008 car bombs had been practically eliminated and TIPS line reporting had increased 
dramatically.434 
 Outside of Baghdad, a PRT leader observed that her counterpart brigade commander 
“totally got it.”  They were pushing people out to the smaller outposts.  She said that they had a 
phenomenal leadership team and were 100% supportive of the PRT.435  A USAID representative 
also saw that the level of violence was pretty extreme upon arriving but would hear that things 
were improving on the ground when traveling to Mosul or Erbil.  She said that the British 
starting to see some light at the end of the tunnel in Basra, especially economically, and that 
Anbar had the Anbar Awakening movement.436  A Marine MTT leader in the west of Iraq said 
that the last six months were a lot of vacating the al-Qaeda influence out of Ramadi and starting 
to work with reconstruction and civil order.437   
 Similarly, a brigade commander in Baghdad said that he had patrols whose sole purpose 
was security for the PRTs or the attractive components like PSYOP or CA.  He understood that 
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often you do not want those guys to go out “kitted up” with helmets and hardware.  In many 
cases they would not have guns.  They were working on a project, not defending themselves.  He 
had to give them a safe environment where they could do their job without being harmed: he did 
not have any problem with doing that.438  Another brigade commander’s stability efforts 
improved the Iraqi “circuit court” procedure.  He recalled that local judges were afraid they 
would be killed if they made “the right call” since they had their family right there in the town.  
His unit provided security for a traveling judge to arrive and conduct court.  He found that they 
were bold in their justice.  Once they completed their work, he got them out of the area safely.  
They “put an Iraqi face on it” by using ISF police and military, but he always had a Quick 
Reaction Force close by and prepared to assist if needed.439  This was an effective partnering of 
U.S. and Iraqi forces along the lines laid out by Pirnie and O’Connell.440 
 A JSPA planner saw that the data showed the death rates and sectarian killings declining, 
which he felt was part of the overall Surge strategy.441  The MNC-I  planner who developed the 
metrics chart (he referred to it as the “Virginia Chart” due to its shape) said that when you are 
there doing it, you do not see that over time you are doing more soft power and less soft power.  
Over time he saw less casualties, although on a day-to-day basis they were always fluctuating up 
and down.442  An MNF-I planner said that by 2008 he saw a shifting from a focus on kinetics to a 
focus on government.  He recalled that in March 2007 when he participated in the first Joint 
Strategic Assessment, they flew from Victory Base because it was not safe to drive on Route 
Irish to the Palace.  By the next year he could drive along Route Irish and there were ISF troops 
spaced all along the route.443   
 A Marine MTT leader recalled his departure from Iraq: 
During the last convoy I ran across town in Ramadi, I had approval to depart and was told 
by the commander “You have 5 minutes to depart lines because the Ramadan 5K is about 
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to start.”  Literally from dark and destroyed land to walls painted with murals and 
pictures.  It was funny to see how transforming public art was to the change in feeling 
there.  I’ll never think about art the same way after that.  We departed, and there were 
Marines at the water stations.  It had been custom in Ramadi that the day before Ramadi 
they would do a 5K race.  The Marines set up checkpoints with water.  I had to depart 
before the starter’s gun, or I would have had to wait until after the race.  That was 
literally my last view of Ramadi before we redeployed.  A 5K run with wall mural art and 




REBUILDING THE ISF 
 
 The reconstitution of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was a monumental task.  The army 
had to be rebuilt from scratch after the Coalition Provisional Authority dismantled the entire 
armed force of Saddam Hussein.  Police forces were not eliminated but needed to be expanded 
and trained up to a standard reflecting the need for security throughout the country.445  Politics 
continued to negatively impact the development of an ISF capable of stabilizing Iraq.  Writers 
such as Olson Lounsbery and Pearson analyzed the security dilemma in terms of an insurgency 
and said that increasing armed forces itself is perceived as a threat.446  However, by 2007 the 
Sunnis in particular were viewing al-Qaeda as the greatest threat to them, hence they were more 
amenable to an increase in government security forces as a driver of overall stabilization in Iraq. 
General Petraeus recalled: 
I knew General Babaker Zebari very well because he was my counterpart from the 
Kurdish region when I was in Mosul in the first year. He took over as essentially the chief 
of staff of the Iraqi military when I was a three-star doing the mission of the Multi-
National Security Transition Command – Iraq. We had a very close relationship so there 
was no challenge in building one. The problem was that he did not truly control Iraqi 
military actions. He was bypassed a fair amount by the Prime Minister, by other senior 
Iraqi leaders and so forth. Keep in mind that he was a Kurd and those who were most 




An advisor at MNC-I said that an advantage the Americans had was that the 
professionalism of US soldiers made the ISF want to emulate them and look like them.448  A 
Civil Affairs officer said that he still has the patches from a number of the units that he worked 
with and law enforcement such as Hillah SWAT because they did a lot with them.449   A 
provincial brigade commander tied this into weaving the fabric of trust between the people and 
their security forces, especially the police forces, and trying to get them to feel they were 
protected by the police force as opposed to being exploited.450  These stories demonstrate that 
military assets can play an attractive role not commonly captured in counterinsurgency literature. 
 Sometimes the professionalization could take a humorous form.  A brigade commander 
in Baghdad told an Iraqi general that every time they tried to talk, the general tended to get on 
the phone.  Why?  The general said, “I must talk to my commanders.”  The commander asked 
why he should believe he was being taken seriously if the general was constantly getting on the 
phone.  The commander also asked him how many of his subordinates were on the phone at his 
meetings, and said that it was a sign of disrespect.  The general promptly put out a policy that no 
one could have their phones out at his meetings.  He would make a big deal out of it when the 
commander would come to see him.  He would put his phone on a tray, his sergeant major would 
retrieve the tray, and he would say “You see, I am removing the distraction.”451 
Another Civil Affairs officer felt that ultimately the untold story of Iraq and biggest 
success was taking 150,000 of America’s finest and putting them in every town in Iraq.  They all 
interacted with American soldiers and civilians and they liked them.  They realized the 
Americans were “pretty nice people.”  He recalled being in the desert and pulling into an Iraqi 
FOB (Forward Operating Base).  An American soldier jumped off the front of the truck and an 
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Iraq soldier came up and they are hugging and swapping cigarettes, two big tough looking guys.  
Watching, he believed that there is undoubtedly a payoff for that.452   
 As the ISF size and capability increased, they were able to assume a larger role.  A 
stability operations commander in Baghdad credited the Coalition strategy of building the 
capability of Iraqi security forces and using their greater amount of force availability and using 
that greater force availability to conduct their own operations, not operations in the shadow of 
American units which had been the case for a few years before that.  He said that they were 
becoming sufficiently trained, resourced, armed and equipped with personal protection 
equipment such as HUMVEEs, the same sorts of things the Americans had.  As a result of 
increased contact, the ISF casualties began to rise despite gradual improvement in equipment.  
American casualties were also rising, but they were generally being done in adjacent areas.  He 
recalled that the ISF might be operating down one main highway going into a particular province 
and the adjacent community to that main highway might be where the Americans were 
operating, so there would be adjacent operations frequently.  There were American advisors with 
each of those Iraqi units as well.453   
 A USMC Military Training Team leader recalled that they were doing a lot of transition 
security activities while the police were being built up inside of Ramadi.  He specified 1/1 
Brigade specifically as being popular locally because they had a Sunni commander with a 
heterogeneous brigade.  The team leader said that this commander was an old Saddam guy, very 
secular, in command of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds: it was the American vision for Iraq.  Counter to 
that was the 1/7 Brigade who were all Shias out of southern Baghdad.  According to him that 
unit came in effectively waving banners saying, “Hey Sunnis, you’re about to get yours.  Your 
friends, the Shias.”454   
225 
 
 Better coordination with these assets increased their role as well.  A brigade commander 
in Baghdad recalled going to the commander of the Multi-National Security Training Command 
– Iraq (MNSTC-I) and telling him that the MTTs and PTTs (Police Training Teams) were in his 
battlespace and that he had to get the missions aligned, so they needed to report to him.  
MNSTC-I concurred experimentally in his sector.  Thanks to that, he then had every JSS, MTT 
and PTT team comprising both ISF and Coalition forces all under the same roof looking at the 
same map, listening to each other’s radio calls, and moving the effort forward.  To him it was a 
balancing act, identifying pathways toward a common end that everyone could subscribe to.455   
 In western Iraq, a USMC MTT leader anticipated change and opportunity as a result of 
improved Sunni cooperation: 
I briefed our Iraqi brigade that if the Awakening went well, we were going to go into 
reconstruction, and how to remodel the brigade to do that.  By April or May we had 
formed a joint Army-USMC-Iraqi-CA council to go out, do surveys and figure out what 
the locals wanted for reconstruction or access improvements so we could begin to 
develop the catalog of products and materials that were needed.  I would attend with my 
team to coordinate and synchronize with the Iraqis properly.  Messaging product was 
discussed.  It was such an onerous process trying to get official message products out was 
eventually we discarded participation in that process for alignment with national 
messaging and went with the commander’s local messages.  We did that for 
circumvention because the commander in his AO could communicate with the population 
there.  We would talk about things like “Support Your Local Gunfighter” and other 
simple things at a local production level.  We would also advertise recruiting drives for 
the police and army.456 
 
Another provincial brigade commander recalled that there were several times where his 
Iraqi counterpart brigade and division commanders were a bit light on security.  They would 
provide security in a fashion he called “smoke and mirrors.”  The local citizens would not see it, 
but it was there and the Iraqi commander knew it was there and could feel emboldened in his 
engagements and not feel threatened that an attack would sneak up on him in some fashion.  Al-
Qaeda was very good at showing up in a certain amount of time.457  His unit would watch the 
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time and knew the routes in so they could protect the key leader engagement.  The Iraqis did not 
have to look over their shoulder and could do the engagements themselves.  Instead of the U.S. 
doing it, it would be the governor and deputy governor talking to key military leaders.458   
ISF capabilities improved so dramatically that an MTT leader recalled that when Basra 
had problems during Fall 2007, the British could not contain it and the Iraqi units there 
collapsed, so the replacements for his Iraqi units went to Basra.  The bottom line is things got so 
smooth in his location in Ramadi that they could redeploy the Iraqi army assets out of town.  He 
was happy to observe this migration to soft power and regular order.459  We have previously 
discussed Hammes and his view that this sort of indirect support to the local security forces as 
being more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency. 
A proving ground for increased ISF capability came in the form of the March 2008 Easter 
offensive or Charge of the Knights.  To the surprise of the Americans, Prime Minister Maliki 
took a large contingent of his refurbished ISF and led it to Basra to take on the Shia militias that 
had taken control there.  An ambassador working economic development at the Embassy recalled 
that although they got into some trouble, US airpower was employed to help him out.460  It was 
probably motivated more by Maliki’s fear that the Shia militias were becoming too powerful 
than trying to create a secular Iraq, but it dovetailed with Coalition objectives in Iraq of a 
government that was less blatantly sectarian. 
None of this change came without cost.  A planner at MNC-I said that in general, Iraqi 
casualties tended to be about three times the proportion to the U.S. and that that ratio remained 
broadly consistent.461  A brigade commander in Baghdad also saw a lot more of the ISF 
casualties near the end of the Surge, mainly because he was trying to turn operations over to 
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them and allow them to take on their own fight.  The Surge was a difficult time for his unit as 
well: they lost over 50 people in their area of operations during a 15-month period.462   
 Some of the rebuilding effort may have even been solely the result of the improvement in 
security.  A squadron commander in Baghdad recalled that when he arrived in Rusafa and things 
were just starting to turn around, whole blocks of Baghdad’s business district were “completely 
vacant, bullet-ridden Orwellian wastelands.”  Within eight months they were filled with new 
businesses, and the main complaint was the price of rent, which went up four times because of 
demand.  Not one business owner – and he said he spoke to dozens – had received a microloan or 
grant, and all credited the improvement in security for the business development.463 Although the 
reconstruction effort played a role, a consistent theme of interviewees both military and civilian 
was the need for stability as a prerequisite for anything else. 
 
THE CAMP WAR 
 
 Failure to adequately address detention facilities can create problems with international 
ramifications for the facilities owner.  Fehrenbach and Foley described the major uprisings that 
occurred in the Prisoner of War (POW) camps during the Korean Conflict.464  Although the 
media will focus on shortcomings in detention facilities, the process of holding and rehabilitating 
captured insurgents receives less attention in media and academic writing. 
The Iraq War had already produced the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.  To change the 
dynamic according to General Petraeus: 
We created large rule of law centers which had within them detention facilities, judicial 
facilities to use, and even billeting for the judicial personnel, so that they didn’t have to 




 An internment facility commander recalled that “dignity and respect” was the mantra he 
repeated and emphasized oftentimes to his organization and the Iraqis.  For example,  
There were only female guards for female detainees.  And that was a whole other thing in 
itself.  The reason that was so important was in previous years female detainees were 
released and when they returned to their villages, the impression was “Oh, you were in an 
American prison.  The guards probably gang-raped you.”  They would be dishonored and 
executed.  What we had to do was make sure that we had a point of contact to give them 
over to.  We would find a local sheikh or village leader to sponsor the female detainee 
who was released.  I was the only male who was present at the pledging ceremony.  They 
would pledge to do good, not do anything bad, and we would have a ceremony releasing 
this person as reformed and no longer a threat and we’re releasing them into your custody 
‘Mr Village or Tribal Leader.’  We made a big show of only having female guards there, 
only female representatives from the Department of State.  By having the overwhelming 
female presence, we developed the idea that this young lady was not gang raped.  I had to 
work with the Iraqi Minister for Women’s Affairs quite a bit, who would check in on the 
female detainees and make sure everything was good there.  We had a couple of 
parliamentarians visit to check on the conditions also.  Having the parliamentarians and 
others inspecting the facilities and verifying that it wasn’t Abu Ghraib enhances 
legitimacy.466 
 
 Combat units had their own brigade detainment internment facilities (BDIF) as well.  A 
brigade commander in the north recalled that they would process the detainees, but we could not 
hold them more than 72 hours.  Because they had limited time with them, they did not have 
opportunities to do educational, vocational or any of the counter-indoctrination mission.  Their 
task was to complete the paperwork, take care of the detainees, and pass them forward within 72 
hours.467   
 For the more permanent holding facilities an MNC-I planner said that they did build 
vocational training for detainees into the plan.  Detainee operations in Iraq (and AFG) were part 
of the intelligence operation and security function.  He recalled that they slightly helped with 
“hearts and minds” and vocational training types of things. Detainee operations served to extract 
as much intelligence as they could from detainees while housing them in a humane way and not 
to have a repeat of “the black eye” of Abu Ghraib.468  International law regarding treatment of 
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detainees such as the Geneva Conventions brought limitations. A senior Public Affairs officer at 
MNF-I remembered that they could not show prisoners, particularly their faces.  They were not 
allowed to be interviewed.  Once in a while when the senior leadership would visit those 
facilities, they would bring reporters as part of “battlefield circulation,” with the understanding 
that they could take some distant footage, because they also didn’t want to give away the layout 
of the facility.469 
 By and large the camps did not detract from the Coalition effort during the Surge.  The 
detention facility commander had at worst an occasional hunger strike: he did not have riots.  
The hunger strikes were not usually coordinated.  It was usually an individual or two who 
thought their case was stagnating and being forgotten about.  He coordinated with the brigade 
Judge Advocate General who was liaison to the Iraqi courts, and they would provide the status of 
the cases.  He would then pass that to the detainees, and a lot of it was explaining that it was a 
lengthy process: be patient.  It was one-on-one interpersonal skills.  He did not think that any of 
the detainee tactics were effective at getting them what they wanted.470   
 As ISF force capabilities increased, their treatment of detainees also had to be addressed.  
A Marine Corps MTT leader recalled that occasionally they had to supervise the Iraqis with 
some of the detentions they had, although that mostly fell under the task of his intelligence cell, 
which had a major and NCOs.  There was one experience where there was a person the Iraqis 
had captured, and his team was supervising.  The Iraqis thought he had something, so they were 
asking, “How about if we bring him up to the roof and douse him with cold water in the middle 
of winter?”  ‘No, you can’t do that.’  “How about if we do this?”  ‘No, you can’t do that.’  To 
him it was adding a moral component to their training effort.  He said that as the Awakening 
progressed there were fewer of those instances.471 
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Better coordination prevented accidental detentions from boiling over into major 
incidents.  A commander in northern Iraq recalled that there was an occasion in Tikrit where 
Special Operations made a raid on a very influential imam and captured his son without the 
unit’s knowledge.472  Both he and the PRT leader received multiple frantic calls from virtually 
every Iraqi of importance in Salah al-Din province to release his son.  Protests started in 
downtown Tikrit.  Special Operations ended up releasing the detainee to his unit and they 
released him to the imam.  The commander said that although from then on he had to be careful 
of any action against this character, at least they now had knowledge of one particularly 
influential person in their area of operations.473 
 Detention facilities provided another opportunity to practice reconciliation.  Most people 
would probably consider detention facilities as strictly hard power.  A senior MNF-I staff officer 
talked about General Petraeus’ intent for the long-term detainees.  Some of them had been 
captured in 2003, and there were about 25,000 of them in Camp Bucca.  The biggest thing that 
General Petraeus did was create a system where military tribunals would hear their cases every 
six months.  This was key because a lot of the prisoners had no idea when and if they were ever 
going to be released.  He took the 5,000 worst offenders and had maximum security facilities 
built for them to get them out of the general population of prisoners, because they were turning 
them all into hardened insurgents through violence and intimidation.   
Then he would take the other 20,000 and try to rehabilitate them.  They would sing the 
Iraqi national anthem every morning.  They would make bricks and on each brick was stamped, 
“Rebuilding the Nation Brick by Brick.”  The artists among them could paint.  There were a 
variety of things, but the most important thing was to separate the worst offenders into maximum 
security facilities and then allow military tribunals to hear the cases of the others.  Often the 
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tribunals would release the people, saying, “There is no evidence that this guy did anything.  He 
got swept up in a cordon-and-search operation that was gathering in all the military age males: 
that is not a reason to detain anyone.”  When they were released, they were released in 
ceremonies.  They would have the local governor, mayor or other political leader.  They would 
have the imam there or the tribal chief, and they would all speak.  These released detainees 
would go through these rehabilitation ceremonies and they were quite effective.  Most of them 
did not return to the insurgency after that.  Of the insurgents captured and released after that, 
fewer than 1% were detained again.474   
A camp commander added that they did some reeducation from among a population of 
about 12,000 detainees.  They were assisted by imams there who were of the more moderate 
view that were trying to reeducate the detainees on Islam.  He had computer training classes for 
the females and sewing, and reading classes that some detainees participated in. The idea was 
that if they could read the Koran for themselves, they would realize that they had been misled by 
extremist imams, that the Koran did not advocate violence against non-Muslims that the 
extremist imams had previously led them to believe.475  An Information Operations officer in 
Baghdad remembered a Coalition program to work in particular with the youth.  One of his 
translators went there and would try to get the kids to see that this “was not a healthy choice for 
their futures.476” 
 Systemic analysis of individual detainee cases became a priority.  A brigade commander 
in Baghdad recalled: 
My objective was that every detainee be treated in a decent and humane fashion: that 
wasn’t the case when we got there.  Privacy needs to be afforded for the humanity of the 
individual as we sort out what they had done.  We realized that some of them did not 
need to go to (Camp) Cropper.  Some of them may have been well-intentioned people 
that didn’t have another course of action.  That is very liberal minded of me, which I am 
not.  We had a program where we would reintroduce them back by using the links we had 
232 
 
established between essential services and security.  If I had some dudes that I was going 
to reintroduce back into Qadra (Baghdad district), I would link them up with the local 
sheikh or NAC and tell them that you need to put these guys to work on the local 
community service project.  Keep them there for a couple of weeks and report back when 
you decide to release them.  Put the onus back on the locals.  On one occasion, I had a 
CODEL (Congressional Delegation) with me and we were in Yarmuk and we were 
walking the streets.  There was a guy in his orange jumpsuit cleaning the streets.  That 
was what they wore, not because he had been a prisoner.  He came up to me and said, 
“Thank you Akeeb ____  for letting me go, I am now working for my neighborhood.”  
He was so proud.  I ran into that more than once.  These guys had been captured and 
questioned and it had been determined that they had probably done something dumb.  As 
long as they had not committed a capital offense or been involved in a bombing, we 
normally let them go.  We told them that we had our eyes on them, and we were going to 
put them back to work earning a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work.  That was called 
Operation OUR TOWN, where we linked the security apparatus with the essential 
services with the reintroduction of people back to society from everywhere.  It dealt as 
well with confirming who’s actually supposed to be in this house, etc.  Operation OUR 
TOWN was led by the Civil Affairs team that had the city planner, and former 





 Coercive power had to be applied to stabilize Iraq.  This power had to come from 
Coalition forces.  This was a correction to the prior strategy of drawing down the Coalition 
presence while trying to turn coercive power over to an Iraqi Security Force that was clearly 
incapable of assuming it.  The military forces had a hard initial fight, but once they started to 
gain control of the situation it enabled them to gradually bring in Iraqi coercive power and 
stabilize the country.  They did this with more joint patrolling, bringing the ISF and U.S. military 
together which produced attractive benefits while applying coercive power against insurgents. 
 A detention facility is by its nature coercive.  However, the opportunity to practice 
attractive power even there exists.  The Coalition expanded learning and rehabilitation programs 
in its detention facilities to reduce recidivism of detainees upon release and generate goodwill by 
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the respectful manner in which the detainees had been treated.  This was a prime example of 













 Smarter coercive power was half of the Surge.  Smarter attractive power was employed 
hand in hand with it to increase the gains from each.  The Coalition improved its ability to 
influence the Iraqi population through better messaging by being faster and bringing 
communications down from national to more local sourcing and dissemination.  A key part of the 
messaging was reconciliation, a willingness to bring more sectarian and ethnic groups into the 
conversation and have a voice in determining Iraq’s political and economic course. 
 Interviewees talked about how reconstruction efforts improved as the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were created and funded to work with local level leadership to 
build and maintain projects the Iraqis actually wanted.  The PRTs worked to not only bring more 
resources to bear at the provincial level, but worked with the leadership to oversee expenditures 




 Olson Lounsbery and Pearson discussed the “comfort zone” of shared needs and 
expectations that people experience that can result in a sense of common fate.478  Messaging 
during the Surge thus faced the challenge of trying to promulgate messages that would resonate 
at the local level without further dividing the country along sectarian and ethnic lines.  Metz said 
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it was unrealistic to expect counterinsurgents to agree on a common messaging strategy.479  
However, since the Coalition at that point had waning international support, the U.S. was in a 
good position to develop and implement its own messaging campaign.  During the Surge U.S. 
messaging efforts became more effective and nimble, although significant challenges remained. 
In addition, progress was made on efforts to restrict and limit enemy messaging. 
The senior Surge leadership understood and emphasized the importance of messaging as 
part of their campaign execution.  According to General Petraeus:  
We had at least a monthly one-hour session with all those who were engaged in the 
information operations. We had daily updates on a variety of topics that would come 
under that particular heading during the daily battlefield update and analysis or BUA.480 
 
Ambassador Crocker agreed: 
The communications role was tightly controlled by the force commander and myself.  
Our tightly knitted view was that this needs to be about Iraqis, not about us.  Whatever 
you are doing that is going to have a public affairs dimension, we need to have host 
country buy-in and host country faces doing the public relations stuff.  Not us.481 
 
 A senior Public Affairs officer at Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) during the Surge 
described General Petraeus as a “voracious gatherer, consumer of information.”  He said that if 
he needed something new, as long as General Petraeus was somewhere where he was getting 
email, turnaround time was usually less than five minutes.  If he didn’t have a response within 10 
minutes that was unusual, and General Petraeus was probably doing some heavy thinking about 
it or typing out something more specific.482  An MNF-I planner agreed that General Petraeus 
“used the media very well.”  The Media Operations Center (MOC) was 24 hour and multilingual, 
run by a two-star general.  They tracked everything in the news and social media.  This allowed 
the MNF-I commander to respond quickly and there was a media update every morning in the 
Battle Update Assessment (BUA).  General Petraeus would understand the media was reporting 
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a rumor or car bombing and get ahead of the message by calling the media or Iraqi leadership.  
The planner felt that messaging proactivity was very good under General Petraeus.483 
 This proactive approach was emulated by their subordinates.  Major General Richard 
Lynch was in charge of Strategic Effects and according to a Marine Corps planner at MNC-I was 
“very much into that.”  He personally gave a daily press conference trying to influence the 
perception of what was happening.  At the time there was a great deal of cynicism, not just 
among the Iraqis who had reason to be cynical, but among the American media as well.  The 
planner recalled that General Lynch went through a lot of difficulty to ensure that the message 
they were coming out with at the press conferences was consistent with the message provided by 
Psychological Operations and Information Operations, because if there was a contradiction or 
even seeming contradiction, credibility would be lost.484  Similarly, the TFBSO conducted 
weekly press operations out of the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) in Baghdad.  They 
would insist on having an official Iraqi counterpart there, ministry of Finance or Agriculture for 
example.  They wanted to do everything with an Iraqi and “spin” as many questions as they 
could to the Iraqi representative to give it an Iraqi face.  A senior official said local media always 
showed up for their press conferences.485   
 There was a considerable amount of media working in Iraq.  An MNF-I Public Affairs 
officer believed that there were times when the number of interview requests were burdensome 
to the command.  He recalled his media management system: 
I kept a roster of every news organization in Baghdad.  The day I arrived I started the 
process and listed every news organization alphabetically.  30 days after we arrived, we 
arranged and conducted his (General Petraeus) first press conference to baseline all the 
media and then we started the battlefield circulations.  I would send out invites based on 
seats available, and I always had seats available, that was one of the battle drills that we 
worked out.  I would invite an organization, and if they could not send a reporter, I went 
to the next organization.  I kept it posted behind my desk on a large butcher board, so 
when the journalists from the various news organizations came to my desk, they could 
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see that I was trying to keep it as fair and equitable as possible and could see if they had 
missed a trip because they were not available. Transparency was the key for this, no 
favorites.   We really only did two press conferences in Baghdad, one at the beginning 
and one at the end.  The final tally of interviews both in Iraq and back in the States was 
319 according to my tracking sheet.486 
 
 An ambassador leading economic planning at the Embassy said that there was a lot of 
media in Baghdad and in the Palace.  Most if it was international media, whom he was engaging 
with the most.  He felt that the local media was better handled by the Iraqis.487  A stability 
operations commander agreed that by 2007 the number of media outlets had “exploded.”  Some 
were insurgent controlled which he considered very advanced media networks.  Some were 
spinoffs of BBC, SkyNews or al-Jazeera.  Fox also had a presence at that point in time.  The 
major networks were still there, particularly during the Surge, so the Coalition worked very 
closely with them.  They moved with U.S forces, and the Coalition embedded them inside of 
units again (the networks did the despite some insurance underwriting problems due to the 
risks).488  A Special Operations commander felt that messaging in local media often got good 
regional “play.”  He learned that when they got something into the local Iraqi media company, it 
was an opportunity for messaging people in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, etc.  
Consequently, he played heavily with the media as best he could within his sphere of control.489   
 Television was the most visible media in Iraq, and great Coalition attention was focused 
on it.  The same Special Operations commander said that his sense was that Iraqi society was 
even more susceptible to be swayed by media messages (than U.S. society), and electronic media 
seemed to move people’s opinions.  He thought the key element was the speed: it was easy to 
turn on the TV and something was on TV immediately.490  Conversely, social media such as 
Facebook were not engaged during the Surge, partly because of restrictions from Washington 
and partly because of the problems of maintaining one.491492 
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 Radio was a popular media source in Iraq as well.  A brigade commander in northern Iraq 
had his PSYOP teams distributing battery-operated throwaway radios to the populace so they 
had a means of listening to broadcasts.  His unit would broadcast music and messages on those 
stations.  The feedback he got in his Battle Update Brief was that it seemed to be effective in 
getting information out to the populace.493   
 Printed media was utilized as well.  An Information Operations planner in Baghdad said 
that his division provided the resources for the monthly PRT newspaper. There was some 
guidance to move it and other print products on-line but there was not trust in their ability to 
measure the performance of distribution: for example, who is viewing it?  He had seen similar 
issues when the Coalition was distributing Baghdad Now.  People would criticize it and say the 
Iraqis knew it was put out by the Americans.494  However, when he went out on missions and 
handed out Baghdad Now or the PRT newspaper the Iraqis would start reading it.  They might 
think it “sucked,” but they were reading it.  To him, that was a benefit of print, it provided the 
ability to facilitate an information patrol and see what people thought of the products.495   
A brigade Civil Affairs officer recalled that the PSYOP team did a leaflet drop about 
every month, although he felt face-to-face communication was better as will be discussed 
below.496  A squadron commander in Baghdad agreed, describing leaflet drops as “less than 
worthless, a complete waste of time.”  He said they would periodically get thousands of leaflets 
from division with “stupid” messages and be directed to distribute them.  They would ask the 
ISF to do that at their static checkpoints, but even they refused.  He recalled one particularly 
“asinine but popular” leaflet as having menacing eyes that said something like, “AQI is bad.  
Turn them in” in Arabic.  “Jundi” (ISF soldiers) would laugh and tell them, “You think people 
here in East Baghdad don’t know that?”  Iraqis would take them without looking and 
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immediately drop them on the ground.  He realized early on that distributing those would cause 
them to lose credibility, and he did not want to explain to a parent that their son was killed while 
distributing a worthless leaflet on a corner in Baghdad, so he did not do it.  After he redeployed, 
he met a PSYOP captain who worked in an adjacent unit that had Sadr City in her operational 
area.  She said that she got those leaflets all the time and told him, “Yeah I distributed 
them…into the burn barrel!”  Meanwhile at the weekly division update the PSYOP lead would 
report on the number of leaflets dropped, including the ones “distributed” into the trash, without 
any mention of their effectiveness which this commander felt was not measurable.497 
Improvement in production input improved product quality as well.  A PSYOP officer in 
Iraq before and during the Surge said that it was about 2007 before they realized that they needed 
to hire from within Iraq.  They brought in local Iraqis to be their cultural advisors even though 
they had lower security clearance levels.  Nonetheless, they were still more effective because 
they had better knowledge of the area.498499 
 Timely, relevant message distribution was a continual roadblock.  Preapproved 
Psychological Operations products and messages were available,500 and for a brigade commander 
in the north his preference was to “go with the good enough.”  His first course of action was 
always to dig through the preapproved themes and messages and products to see if those fit the 
bill before they tried to push something forward to get it approved.501  The drawback of 
preapproved products was that were typically generic, reducing their impact on the target 
audience.  A divisional Information Operations officer in Baghdad recalled meeting with brigade 
leadership who would say to him, “Don’t take this personal, but some of these things suck.”  In 
some cases, he agreed with them.502   
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 Getting new products approved resulted in improved relevance, but at the expense of 
timeliness.  According to the same IO officer: 
Brigadier General ___ had great ideas on how to flatten and accelerate the process but the 
subordinates couldn’t adjust. I understood it but could not convey to others on how to 
work collaboratively on it. He wanted the staff sections not reviewing the product drafts 
sequentially.  It would go to the first person, then the next guy with a college education 
would bleed all over it, then the next guy would have a Shia dialect.  Some ego problems 
and lack of intellectual maturity. This was the one time I kind of disagreed with the 
PSYOP team.  They seemed put off about altering the approval process.  I tried to 
emphasize that it was the same people looking at it, just in a different way. But with some 
of the issues with the translators, you just could not get past it.  I had a lot of shouting 
matches with the XOs (Executive Officer) from the brigades.  From my perspective, I’ve 
got 30 things in the que.  You want this approved and you have five things in the que 
right now.  Do you want me to bump this over the other 5 things you have?503   
 
 Another solution was delegating PSYOP product approval authority to lower-level 
commanders.  A brigade commander in Northern Iraq recalled that when he first arrived at the 
beginning of the Surge, he did not have PSYOP product approval authority, but that it started to 
get pushed down to the units in 2007.  Products out of the ordinary still had to be approved at 
division level or higher.504 As the approval process was moved down to the brigade commanders 
an IO planner in Baghdad remembered being glad for them, but he also told them that they were 
“going to get what they deserved.”  They got their approval process, but now they needed money 
for printers.505  Another brigade commander acknowledged that once they could go out and get 
PSYOP products, he never felt he had enough, although his patrols were always able to go out 
with something.  He noted that this was a big change from 2004-2005.  His unit had good 
interpreters so the message could be understandable in Arabic.  Getting good vendors who could 
do things fast and inexpensively was important to him.506   
 Timeliness was important for Public Affairs releases as well.  A Special Operations 
officer emphasized that every operation had the potential for positives and negatives in the 
information domain: they wanted to accentuate the positives and mitigate the negatives.  As part 
241 
 
of their CONOP (Concept of Operations), they had an information plan for the operation before 
they launched it.  Products as best they could be were already made.  The PAO already had a 
press release, ready to fill in the blanks.  The IO officer already had a framework of how he 
could exploit those operations, successful or not, and accentuate or mitigate.  They inculcated 
that in the force by talking about it all the time, emphasizing that they really had to expand the 
impact of that tactical, kinetic action in the information domain, because in the end it was really 
a battle for hearts and minds and will.  The vast majority of times, the initial quick look from a 
team regarding an operation, which was generally within an hour of getting back to base, what 
was monitored on the net, and what the ground force reported after the event, was already over 
90% accuracy most of the time.  But if there was anything contentious, they could not get that 
message out quickly because they just couldn’t get it through the wickets of approval.  In the 
balance between speed and accuracy, he felt that they always seem to default to accuracy.507   
 A senior member of the Information Operations Task Force thought that by the time of 
the Surge they had a robust routine for approval.  Periodically there were “hiccups” because of 
what he saw as a lack of understanding messaging strategy.  Depending on the LOO (Line of 
Operation), they worked on a weekly to monthly cycle.  Television commercials were normally 
produced in about 2 months.  Most other products were done on two-week cycles, and 
sometimes 24 hours.  One example of what he felt they did not get right was when the t-walls 
were put up to control movement in Baghdad.  Because no one told them about it, they were 
“caught flat-footed.”  Both AQ and Sadr put out messages saying, “they are trying to divide us.”  
He explained that if someone had told them a few weeks ahead, they could have prepared the 
ground by putting out commercials with a metaphor like “how do you catch a rat?  You trap him 
242 
 
in a corner.”  The first requirement is to get the operational conceptualization right of how 
messaging and action work together: that to him is co-creation.508   
 By and large coordination improved.  A brigade commander in Baghdad said that before 
they even lifted a finger to start their Haifa Street and Visible Signs of Change projects 
(reconstruction efforts), they briefed their intent to local Iraqi leadership and handed out flyers 
about what they wanted to do.  People understood that the Coalition was there to help them and 
saw this deliberate shift from hard to soft power.509  To a Civil Affairs officer who worked with 
Special Operations, there was no single breakthrough: it was a cumulative effort.  Rather than 
something timed well, he thought what was important was what trended well.  His unit did things 
over time that reinforced messages over time that had impacts over time.  It was a sustained 
campaign over time that he felt was more impactful.  He provided actions that reinforced the 
message that PSYOP was scripting.  The unit had a non-lethal targeting board to collectively 
cross-level their efforts.510 
 General Petraeus continued to play a direct role in ensuring unity of message throughout 
his command. A senior Public Affairs Officer (PAO) described the process: 
There were a few cases where subordinate GOs (general officers) didn’t necessarily agree 
with the direction that was being given.  They might go off and do their own thing, but it 
did not happen often.  After I brought it to his attention, a correction by the four-star 
usually stopped it.  One glaring incident was made by General _____.  When we started 
the Sons of Iraq initiative, he did not necessarily agree with the concept.  He periodically 
did media roundtables, and in one not long after we said we would pay these folks, he 
mentioned in the roundtable that the only way he was going to work with them was when 
they were flex cuffed, etc.  That went to “above the fold” New York Times: direct 
counter to what we had been putting out.  I let General Petraeus know what he had said.  
And this was his TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures): I would send him the 
information, he would reply to me and he would copy several others, such as the 
offending individual(s), the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Commanding General, the Staff 
Judge Advocate, whomever else he felt needed to know.  He would say something to the 
effect of “Steve, in this case, don’t think General _____ got it quite right.  Get a hold of 
him and his folks and let them know what the talking points are and get this corrected.  
Thanks.  DP.”  That is kind of how it went: to me, it is a four-star “eyes right.”  
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Typically, once that occurred, I could count minutes before I would start getting the first 
phone call from the subordinate PAO.  And that happened in this case, and life gets 
interesting.  For them, not necessarily for me.511 
 
 An IO planner even described situations where they put hard power on adversarial soft 
power.  The insurgents were assassinating Iraqi reporters on the steps of the town hall and 
sniping at the PSYOP teams complete with messaging from their propagandists.  He went to the 
lawyers and they said that what the propagandists were doing was illegal.  It was against Iraqi 
law because they were fomenting violence against security forces.  The Coalition could lock 
them up.  He was even able to get AQI propagandists onto the high-value target list.  The 
Coalition could go after them, and they knew operational details to assist the intelligence picture 
of the battlefield as well.512  A senior MNF-I staff officer agreed, saying that they captured most 
of the “media emirs” through a combination of good intelligence and raids.  It reduced the 
amount of propaganda the insurgents were able to put out, so they focused a lot of intelligence on 
finding them and putting them out of business.  Then they could put out their own messages to 
compete with the narrative that the remaining enemy media put out.513   
 A brigade commander in Baghdad described the insurgents as being as good at telling 
their story and sticking to it as the Coalition.  But he felt that they were lying.  They would say 
they U.S. was not good guys, were there to make their lives miserable and would not do what it 
promised.  Because they were living among the people, he felt it was hard to counter.  They had 
to counter it with mass: believable, achievable, deliverable stories.  The U.S. could not say one 
thing and do another.514  A squadron commander similarly said that particularly in Sadr City, the 
Shia militias took credit for every project, regardless of funding source, even being so brazen as 
to cover American projects with posters claiming they were funded by Moqtada al Sadr. Their 
biggest and most effective claim was that the Americans were the outsiders causing the problems 
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and needed to leave. They would claim they were the good guys and the Americans were the bad 
guys but to him, Iraqis knew better.  He felt the Coalition did not do a good enough job of 
advertising their “extortion racket” and making them own it.  Every Iraqi he met complained 
about it.  Many of the leaders he worked with corrected him when he called them “insurgents,” 
as they thought the U.S. was giving too much credit to the thieves and criminals it was facing.515 
 Part of the lesson the U.S. learned was to make its messaging Iraqi-focused, not U.S.-
focused.  A PSYOP officer said that by the end of the Surge They worked with the elders to tell 
them that the Americans felt threatened and then they were the ones telling the parents, “Hey, 
don’t do that.  We don’t want any problems.”516  An MNC-I economics advisor emphasized that 
this was not always a rapid process.  He said that if you wanted your Iraqi colleagues to do 
something, you had to meet them regularly, drink a lot of tea, and say the same thing every time.  
Eventually after many times they would get it through.517  An economics planner on the JSPA 
team remembered Taseen al-Sheikhly being appointed spokesman for the Baghdad Security 
Plan.  He was a Sunni living in a Shia neighborhood who actually got kidnapped by JAM.  He 
was afraid Taseen might get killed but said that Ahmed Chalabi got him released a few days 
later.  Every week Taseen would be at the table and he would be putting out the messages the 
Iraqis wanted, and the American PAO officers would coordinate with Taseen.518 
 Many interviewees found that in the end the most effective means of communication was 
face-to-face.  An MNC-I planner said that face-to-face meant yes, you actually meant what you 
were saying as opposed to written products where they ask who put it up and what is it all about.  
To him these interactions with local mukhtars and civic leaders, providing them honest and 
reliable information they could get out to their people, seemed to be the most effective way of 
doing things.519 A Baghdad Civil Affairs Team Chief concurred that the bulk of what they did 
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were face-to-face engagements – both at the local’s location (government building, market, etc.) 
and on the US military location (JSS, FOB).520 
Civil Affairs was a valuable inroad to opening these communications.  An IO planner in 
Baghdad said that they were valuable as they had the opportunity and time to form personal 
relationships with civilian power brokers.521  A Civil Affairs officer working with Special 
Operations said 99% of what he did was in person and benefitted from a visual set of outcomes, 
whether it was a facility or other project.  If anything, he felt that the U.S. was not always 
effective in conveying that it was a U.S.-enabled effort if that was the intent.  He felt that they 
wanted the U.S. seen as an ally there to help, but they did not always do that well.522  Some 
initial challenge was logical since introducing a more aggressive Coalition force posture would 
lead to greater violence in the short term.  One of the messages they had to employ was, “It is 
going to get worse before it gets better.”523 
 A senior staff officer at MNF-I said that a big part of the IO campaign was painting AQI 
as an enemy of the people of Iraq, the enemy of everyone.  If they could create a common 
enemy, then they would all be working in the same direction at defeating that common enemy, 
which did happen.  They emphasized publicizing a lot of the stuff that AQI did, the atrocities and 
so forth, and made sure that it got in Western media as well, so that AQI had to react to the 
Coalition’s IO campaign, not vice versa.  He said that General Petraeus made an important point 
of it and part of it was being first with the truth.  They had their own YouTube channel which at 
one point in time was one of the most subscribed of any YouTube channel.524 
 A brigade commander in the north further explained his three local themes.  First was 
getting dialogue between the provincial leaders and the central government.  It was important 
because they were disenfranchised Sunnis who needed to link in with the Baghdad Shia 
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population and leadership and feel like there was some trust building there.  The second was to 
drive a wedge between the people and al-Qaeda.  The good news story to him was that the Iraqis 
were a little more secular than 600 AD Sharia law so they would embrace being a little more 
Westernized.  They wanted to be a bit more Westernized, although not Western.  He could use 
that to drive a wedge between the people and al-Qaeda.  Third was weaving the fabric of trust 
between the people and their security forces, especially the police forces, and try to get them to 
feel they were protected by the police force as opposed to being exploited.525 
 An interesting opportunity to demonstrate the Coalition’s desire to bring the Sunnis back 
into the national dialogue occurred after the execution of Saddam Hussein.  His hometown of 
Tikrit is located in Salah al Din Province.  The PRT leader there assisted with the repatriation of 
Saddam Hussein’s remains to Tikrit.  That was a big deal.  The Sunnis were concerned that his 
body would be desecrated if buried elsewhere.  He said that the willingness of the Coalition to 
talk to the Sunnis signaled to the Sunni population that the U.S. was willing to make a partner of 
them, figure out what was important to them and integrate that into what they were doing.  He 
believed it helped sell them on the Coalition’s long-term democracy objectives.526   
 Some subordinates were creative in getting what they felt were the right messages out to 
the populace.  A Marine Corps MTT leader felt that most of the national-level leaflets were out 
of touch with what they needed: regarding inform and influence products, they were largely on 
their own. Consequently, they stuck to the Coalition message of the advancement of the ISF as 
Iraq’s next protectors.527  An Information Operations planner said that if he knew the person 
well, he might say “Look, you have loudspeaker teams.  You do not need anyone’s approval to 
use them.  If something comes up when you are getting ready to go out the door, you can go 
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running back to try and get a new handbill, or you can go use your loudspeaker teams and say 
whatever you want within 30 minutes of it happening.”528   
A squadron commander in Baghdad remembered: 
For a time, my squadron handed out small numbers of leaflets with simple messages that 
just noted recent attacks on Iraqis and how the Shia militias didn’t care (like a storyboard 
in leaflet form).  The intent was to embarrass the Shia militias about their wanton killing 
of other Shia, such as rocket attacks on the Green Zone that fell short, or an IED that 
exploded on a bus instead of a CF convoy, and perhaps embarrass them enough to stop.  
These were local events that were frequently not covered by Iraqi media, so they might 
have local interest.  I did this 3 or 4 times but it was risky, as in order to be timely I 
couldn’t wait for approval from division, which would take days or weeks and who 
would inevitably ask me to distribute thousands of their stupid vanilla pre-approved 
messages.  We stopped because it was just too time-consuming (we didn’t have a high-
speed printer) and I had no way of knowing if the effort worked.529  
 
 The last problem he mentions does illustrate the perils of going outside of the established 
system.  Psychological Operations has the training and experience to develop Measures of 
Effectiveness to find out if products are working and can also conduct pre- and post-testing of 




 Maintaining stability required restarting the political process.  This meant reengagement 
with the tribes and regions that had been marginalized in the aftermath of the invasion.  The 
military could not handle this alone: the State Department and its PRTs would be the main driver 
of this process.  Even Iraqis who had participated in the insurgency needed to be given an 
opportunity to rejoin the mainstream political process to continue to isolate them from al-Qaeda 




 Much of the effort for reconciliation was focused on the Sunnis.  The Kurds were largely 
autonomous and mostly wanted to be left alone outside of regaining control of Kirkuk and 
Mosul, which Saddam had spent years populating with Sunni Arabs to attempt to drive out the 
Kurdish population.  Stability in Iraq was dependent on tamping down the violence largely 
initiated by former Saddam loyalists and/or foreign fighters.  Some of the challenge would come 
from starting or restarting contact with the Sunni tribal leaders.  An IO officer working in 
Baghdad recalled that in 2004 1st Cavalry Division had a Civil Affairs officer who had been 
heavily involved with tribal engagements.  When he came back, he wanted to reestablish contact 
with his tribal contacts.  The IO officer told him that when he left, they all stopped talking to the 
Americans.531 
 The Coalition was fortunate that in the case of al-Qaeda, they were proving most 
effective at enraging the Iraqi Sunnis.  A Civil Affairs officer working with Special Operations 
felt that in Diyala Province the foreign fighter’s overviolent approach did not help over time and 
ultimately hurt the insurgents by alienating themselves.532  An advisor to MNC-I said that the 
Coalition got much better at messaging that it was in Iraq to bring down the violence so that the 
Government of Iraq could move forward with public service delivery and national 
reconciliation.533  Schifrin talked about the importance of giving the national government 
credibility,534 while Branch and Wood believe that if states are sufficiently informed or 
concerned about the needs of the nation, the need for military action decreases.535  
 Holding these areas required cooperation from the Iraqi Shia population.  A stability 
operations commander in Baghdad said that as they were doing those clearing operations they 
had to build and hold at the same time.  They began to share a lot more of the techniques for that 
with the ISF which had been Sunni-driven for many years: their practice was to come in with 
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only coercive power, not attractive power.  Some of their commanders were Shia and understood 
the model, but the U.S. had to be careful.  The stability commander remembered that if they saw 
some really effective Shia commanders engaged in attractive power, chances were the militia 
was attached to them.  The U.S, had to conduct deliberate analysis of the environment about who 
they were fighting, why, and how to move in a direction to fulfill the long-term objectives of the 
Coalition presence in the first place, which he said was a stable, democratic society not at war 
with itself.536   
 In many cases the initial approach came from the Iraqis.  A Marine MTT leader 
remembered the day he was walking across his compound and one of the “wannabe” sheikhs 
who had been out there walked up to the gate and said, “I’m here to tell you where they all are 
and I am ready to organize my guys so we can get rid of al-Qaeda.”  It was al-Qaeda who had 
turned the locals against them.  After a while they had stopped paying for food and being “sort 
of” a contributor to the economy, they started threatening and murdering people who were not 
backing them, and to him it went south from there.537 
 A Special Operations commander described the complexity involved in reconciliation: 
The other significant thing we spent a lot of time in 2007 on that I would classify as soft 
power was influence operations trying to pull insurgents off the battlefield, probably 
started about February or May 2007.  I remember sitting at our headquarters when the 
three three-star generals were there: Graham Lamb, Odierno, and McCrystal.  One of the 
keys was a Power Point slide my guys had made, I think out of the IO (Information 
Operations) cell, that listed all the insurgent groups in Iraq, and where they fell on the 
spectrum of immovable/reconcilable/friends (already changed sides).  And it also 
discussed what we could do to move the reconcilables (sp) further towards us and 
separate them from the irreconcilables.  A lot of the granularity of that insight was 
CJSOTF-AP reporting via our unit contacts and networks, because it was not as clean as, 
‘The 1920 Revolutionary Brigade is reconcilable, and we can move it to the government 
side.’  It was, ‘The 1920s Revolutionary Brigade is reconcilable in Diyala Province.  It is 
not reconcilable in Abu Ghraib.  In this area we can move a group, but in this area, we 
just need to target them kinetically.’   Al-Qaeda in Iraq, obviously irreconcilable.  For the 
most part it was how do you get all these splinter organizations and either defeat them on 
the battlefield or take them off the battlefield using soft power, which was a lot about 
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promises of money, economic support to those groups that were literally fighting because 
they wanted to maintain a way of life, or just put food on the table?  If you take that into 
account, maybe the ratio between soft and hard power was more balanced looking at time 
spent on those kinds of activities.538 
 
 A brigade commander in Baghdad during the Surge said that the tribal network and 
ability to disseminate information and change the attitude of the people was phenomenal.  He 
worked very closely with them.  He invited them to the neighborhood and district council 
meetings.  That was a bit of a struggle at first, because now they were mixing political with tribal 
leadership, and they did not always “jive.”  In a couple of cases, his unit went out in Humvees, 
picked up the tribal leaders, and brought them to the meetings.  He went to their homes, which 
could be scary because they did not know how safe it was.  They met some guys who claimed 
there were tribal leaders but were not, or were the wrong tribal leader, but he knew that they had 
to take some risks.  He recalled that that was where the Civil Affairs guys helped because they 
knew how to get information about people that the average commander or soldier does not have.  
He described them as very skilled guys who had multiple deployments to “screw it up, get it 
right, and now knew how to do it.”  His unit happily leaned on them for information on the 
populace and tribal leaders.539 
Another brigade commander said that they worked with the Baghdad Patriots and the 
Ghazaliya Guardsmen, who were really an offshoot of the Anbar tribesmen, heavily Sunni.  They 
did not bring their tribalism with them: just the religion.  He said that the Amiriyah (Baghdad 
district) leaders came to him after al-Qaeda entered Amiriyah and kidnapped a prominent 
citizen’s son for extortion purposes.  The leader was a former intelligence officer and likely 
assassin for Saddam.  Most likely he had been shooting at American soldiers.  He went to the 
sheikh in Amiriyah and said “I turn my back on al-Qaeda, they have violated Islam and I am here 
to support you and kill al-Qaeda.  Because the commander had developed relationships with all 
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the imams, the sheikh’s imam called us and asked if we would help.  His battalion commander 
called him and said “Boss, they’re looking for support, ammunition and medical supplies and 
activity coordination.”  The imam of the mosque opened the door to the blue dome and said, 
“You can put your command post right here.”  And he did.  That came later in the tour after they 
had developed these relationships with the imams.  
The commander emphasized that they were not being pushovers, nor did they think the 
locals were 100% right.  He started very early on asking why our soldiers were getting blown up 
in such proximity to Iraqi Security Force checkpoints.  Ultimately, he realized that the ISF had 
been infested by Jayesh al-Madi under Muqtada al-Sadr and downshoots of the office of the 
Martyr Sadr.  His unit was able to do link-and-node analysis to draw a lot of this back to ISF 
leadership.  Then his unit could go in and say “J.R. Reiling, this is the information and proof I 
have on you.  You either knock this off or I’m going to take you to Camp Cropper.”  Sometimes 
they would comply, sometimes they would not.  If they did not, his unit would go knock on the 
door about 2 AM.  Their guards knew why the Americans were there, and they would generally 
come peacefully because his unit would tell them “You’re coming with us or you are going to 
die here tonight.  We know what you have done, and you will probably go to jail, but you will be 
tried, and you will not be able to do this any longer.”  As soon as they started pulling the corrupt 
Sunni and Shia leadership out of the area of operation, word travelled extremely fast and he 
recalled that they got a lot of access to the people that wanted to help.540   
Arming the tribesmen was a tricky initiative.  An ambassador working in Iraq during the 
Surge emphasized that Embassy funds did not go into the Sons of Iraq initiative.  They were 
involved in the meeting discussions, but the money that paid for Sons of Iraq was not 
reconstruction money.  He said that he talked to Lieutenant General Lamb regarding the Sons of 
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Iraq movement, and that he was very interested in input from the Embassies’ PRT people on the 
ground.541  An Information Operations Task Force leader felt that the critical aspect of the Surge 
was the political movement.  Once there was the separation (of Sunnis and Shia), the city 
elements needed to be brought into the government.542   
The Coalition was fortunate that once the warring factions were separated, it was actually 
a fairly positive time.  An ambassador working economics during the Surge felt that his timing 
was lucky.  Even though there was still violence, he thought it was actually a golden period of 
time for U.S.-Iraqi relations.  The U.S. had made a big commitment to help Iraq and the 
Awakening had reduced violence in the Sunni areas.  There was good Sunni-Shia 
communication.  Not perfect, but he pointed out that it got a lot worse later, so in retrospect it 
looks pretty good.  On the economic side the numbers were getting better.  There were less 
blackouts on the electricity grid.  He felt he was fortunate to be there at that time.543 
Growing trust among the Sunnis was an important sign of change.  A provincial PRT 
leader recalled that in 2007 the head sheikh of the province was abducted by insurgent elements 
on his return from the Hajj.  When he was in Mecca, he had given an interview for Aljazeera and 
stated that Iran was not the enemy, the enemy was the al-Qaeda/ISIS terrorists.  He was abducted 
by them and killed.  Many younger tribe members were agitating for action.  They felt that the 
U.S. had brought the violence into their province.  The Deputy Governor General Abdullah 
(brother of the sheikh) and the Governor came, and she met with them.  The deputy in particular 
was personally saddened by the tragedy.   He said he was fighting very hard in the tribe to get 
them to cooperate with the U.S. and get them to not take up arms or go over to the insurgents.  
She believed his intervention was critical to keeping them from doing that.544   
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It was important to get the Iraqi government on board with the change in Sunni attitudes.  
An ambassador working on economic issues said that after violence had declined dramatically in 
Anbar by midyear 2007, it was apparent that the provincial government needed additional 
funding for development priorities.  The violence of the preceding two years meant that it had 
not been able to program its development budget allocations, which had expired.  Ambassador 
Crocker and General Petraeus appealed to Prime Minister Maliki to allocate a budget 
supplemental for Anbar to use that fall to demonstrate the value of violence cessation.  Maliki 
approved a supplemental allocation of $50 million for urgent projects.  To him, this was 
significant because the Shia-led government was recognizing that Sunni-led Anbar had suffered 
intensely.545  It also demonstrates the value of the American presence in forcing the Iraqi 
government to reduce its sectarian tendencies. 
 A Chief of Staff at the Embassy also recalled working with Maliki’s representatives and 
others to help plan the rebuilding of markets, conducting reconstruction, promoting rule of law, 
providing benefits proportionately between Sunni and Shia, and thereby synchronizing the 
kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of the Baghdad Security Plan.  To him, once the Coalition got 
into Anbar and got the tribal chiefs to turn, Al-Qaeda could not adapt.546  This adaptability was 
one of the elements of successful counterinsurgency advocated by Gompert.547 
 Payoff came in the form of better intelligence and independent tribal activity.  A 
Psychological Operations leader recalled that what they started to realize when they began 
engaging with local tribal leaders was that they were receiving information that was very 
effective instead of using the “shotgun approach,” which was just throw a lot of information out 
there and see what stuck.  He said that even though the U.S. took credit for some actions, the 





 Academic literature on counterinsurgency varies regarding the importance of rebuilding 
the local economy.  Writers such as Paul, Pirnie and O’Connell, and Plakoudas were writers who 
looked at economic development as part of a smart-power approach to counterinsurgency.  Metz 
and others were more skeptical or placed a higher priority on political progress.549   Friis even 
describes some of the unintended consequences of reconstruction efforts in a foreign country 
such as loss of relative wealth or influence.550  Most interviewees saw economic development as 
an important part of the mission in Iraq during the Surge. 
 The job of reconstruction was aided by the continued standup of PRTs around the country 
as well as improving their abilities.  This was made possible by the improvement in security.  A 
Special Operations commander stated that particularly when you look at the 2007 period the 
PRTs could not survive without the military because of the nature of the security environment.551  
A stability operations commander in Baghdad recalled the importance of creating conditions of 
stability, going after the causes of instability: sectarian violence, education, sewage water, trash, 
all the things that contribute to instability.  He felt that they needed quick wins so the people can 
see that something can be done to address the Iraqi complaints of “Where is the electricity?”  
Those were the short-term gains to create a more stable environment so that the long-term 
mechanisms like USAID or the Department of Commerce could be put in place.552  Similarly, a 
Marine MTT leader knew that when IED statistics and ISF casualties began dropping 
dramatically, everybody who just helped get rid of al-Qaeda would be asking, “We just helped 
get rid of these guys.  Where’s my fence and water and power and all those other things I should 
be benefitting from now that those guys are no longer killing us?”553   
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PRT development was still a work in progress.  A Civil Affairs officer detailed to work in 
the PRTs differentiated between the types of PRTs: 
The provincial PRTs were out developing capacity.  The e-PRTs, located in the Baghdad 
belt, were project building teams.  The brigade commander would have “X” dollars and 
they would use that to go around making the sheikhs happy to encourage their support in 
the military fight.  They gave the sheiks what they wanted, a chicken house, a dam, roads.  
The role of the CA teams was to spend the money.  The e-PRT teams didn’t have the 
governance, rule of law, engineering, and agricultural experts on staff.  The provincial 
PRTs had Dept of Justice advisors, Dept of Agriculture advisors, engineers, and they 
were really successful in expanding capability in a higher-level CA mission.  That was 
not the focus on the Baghdad e-PRTs.  They were smaller and embedded with the BCTs.  
They didn’t have a separate location.  I helped to staff and train the e-PRTs in my third 
year, but they were not PRTs: it would be a mistake to call them that.  They were Surge 
CA units.  They operated with varying levels of success.554 
 
However, he recalled that due to the newness of the PRT concept with State Department: 
 
When we rolled into Tikrit there was no instruction on how to operate a PRT.  People 
from State who showed up to talk about our mission did not know any more about 
operating a PRT than we did.   State pulled me out and sent me to Karbala as a senior 
advisor and we were starting up whole new PRTs through the south and I again had carte 
blanche on designing our capacity building efforts for our Karbala team.  If you acted 
confident and walked in like you knew what you were doing, everybody said go for it.555 
 
The advantage of the PRTs is they would give the Coalition greater ability to impact 
reconstruction at provincial levels and below.  An ambassador leading economic planning at the 
Embassy felt the small projects were the right way to go.   He preferred seeing less “Bechtel-
design megaprojects” and more projects selected with local input if not control.  While the 
projects may not be perfect from a technical standpoint, from a political one such an approach to 
him was much better.556  A Civil Affairs brigade officer similarly felt that the smaller projects 
that had better oversight were much more effective than the larger projects.  The larger ones 
were more prone to corruption, graft and outright theft.  He said that when the PRT was running 
projects with U.S. civilian government oversight and talking to the tribal leaders and politicians, 
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town mayors, etc., there was more of a sense of what they needed than sitting behind the Green 
Zone walls saying, “I think they need this or that.”557   
They also served to unify Coalition efforts.  An Embassy Chief of Staff felt that 
previously they had too disjointed of a strategy, too many competing players, limited 
conditionality, etc. To him it was a free for all and he believed they could have accomplished 
much more by spending much less.558   A provincial Civil Affairs officer agreed that as the PRTs 
were developed in the rest of the country, their mission involved mentoring the Iraqis into 
developing their own capabilities to operate their own departments of agriculture, their own 
provincial councils, governors and courts, all of which he thought were very effective.559  An 
ambassador working on economic development at the Embassy said that USAID  used NGOs for 
immediate post-kinetic activities very actively to meet immediate needs such as contracts to pick 
up trash which would also provide jobs.560  A senior USAID official in Iraq during the Surge 
described working with the NGOs: 
They were integrated into Surge planning at the provincial level.  It depended on the 
work they were doing and whether there was a downside to them being seen with the 
military, U.S., British, Iraqi or whatever.  That planning would take place at the level of 
the head of the organization or the main person in charge of that area, but not to the 
extent that it linked directly to the counterinsurgency effort.  There were places where it 
had to be linked because active fighting was going on.  We coordinated a lot with 
commanders on the ground.  When they had issues why a certain program was not 
working better and they wanted to see more, they would come to me with those issues.  
We would try to set up discussion between the military and the people actually managing 
the development activities on the ground to try to find the right sweet spot.  How would 
people who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of soft power view an active support 
role with the military.  There is a downside to that.  Most of the commanders were 
sensitive to that and understood where we were going.  It helped them understand the 
area better if they did have these inroads.  The PRTs became “the place it happened.”  It 
was a formal structure that related to the provincial governments.  It was also a place that 
USAID implementing organizations could be involved.  Coordination did improve; it was 
not perfect everywhere.  In some places the situation was very difficult and challenging.  
On the other hand, some of the best coordinating happened in Anbar, the toughest of all 
places.  For some reason there was a common view of stabilization.  When there was that 
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kind of common view of what stabilization meant and what the civilian piece of it could 
be and how it would function, it was easier to work together.561 
 
Civilian-staffed PRTs tended to be more effective at bringing non-government 
organizations (NGO) into the effort.  An economics planner at the Embassy said that they 
contracted with the NGOs and used them to carry out assistance projects.  The IRI (International 
Republican Institute) and the NDI (National Democratic Institute) did voter and political 
training.  There were NGOs offering microfinance with U.S. funding.  There was a program for 
training bureaucrats in making the ministries work better which recruited a lot of Iraqi 
Americans from places like Detroit and had them teach from a provincial compound.  He felt 
that the NGOs had more on-the-ground insight, were in touch with the Iraqis around the country, 
and were doing good things.562  A JSPA planner saw the contractors working through USAID as 
their link to maintaining visibility on reconstruction.563  All of these benefits would have been 
much tougher to achieve working from Baghdad. 
There were large funds available to finance the activities of NGOs throughout the 
country.  As part of the PRTs, there were NGO experts to support those initiatives and national 
level programs to strengthen NGO development.  There were also 5 regional NGO centers to 
target those local initiatives.  Another Embassy economics planner emphasized that this effort 
began pre-Surge but flowered during the Surge.564 
A senior USAID official pointed out that one advantage of working in Iraq was how 
advanced it was.  She had never worked in a “middle-class” country with things like well-paved 
roads, recalling that Iraq had very good roads.  USAID does not normally work in countries that 
modern.565  This was an ironic benefit, as an Embassy Chief of Staff pointed out that there was 
usually no long-term funding for project maintenance such as roads.566  What the USAID official 
did say was a disadvantage was the precarious security environment.  During the Surge it was 
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important to consider what was possible for the NGOs and civilian contractors to do and not do.  
The range of risk-taking varied tremendously across organizations.  Never in her career had she 
worked with such a large budget with so few organizations implementing the projects.  Many of 
the most well-known USAID contractors had simply decided they could not work there any 
longer.  A normal USAID contract for a $150M bid would have any number of bidders.  By that 
time in Iraq, she might have 2-3 bidders: many NGOs were simply not willing to take on that 
level of risk.567   
The military side was still heavily dependent on embedded PRTs or e-PRTs, although 
they improved their process of incorporating them into the overall strategy.  A brigade 
commander in Baghdad turned the soft power/Civil Affairs activities into enabling operations 
that were synchronized via operations orders and FRAGOs (Fragmentary Orders).  To him, in 
the past it seems like they had all been done indiscriminate of each other.  His intent was to link 
the essential services effort formally to the security apparatus, and in so doing best ensure the 
success of those essential service activities by 1) auditing them to make sure that what they were 
doing was within the scope of the contract they had been awarded and 2) to ensure that whatever 
efforts were ongoing were not disrupted by people who did not want those contracts to be 
completed.568 
 Another brigade commander emphasized “What’s the story?” with his unit, the story they 
were trying to make sure was emphasized on patrol.  The soldiers knew that the Coalition was 
working to improve sewage, electricity and trash.  But these things cannot be done if there is not 
security in the area.  They would emphasize that the U.S, had money that can help with opening 
markets, area beautification and general improvements.  But they could not do those things if 
they had to fight; they could do both, but not in the same area.  He believed his unit could be 
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fixing things in one area while fighting in another: they were that “bipolar.”  But they could not 
fix and fight in the same place.  Security was always the first element of his campaigns.  Once 
security was established, cooperation was established and rules were understood, then they could 
go in and start distributing money for business, helping with power and sewer and water, etc.569 
 High value targeting of insurgents continued to utilize Civil Affairs to provide short-term 
tactical support.  A Special Operations commander said that they often used soft power, 
particularly small impact products, as a way to generate good will with leadership that then 
turned into an ability to better understand that piece of geography.  Whoever he is, tribal sheikh 
or mayor, if they brought some sort of beneficial economic development project to his region, 
and he was more likely to want to keep that relationship going, and more likely to provide 
information on enemy activity and social dynamics in his area.  It was a quid pro quo; attractive 
power was a way of delivering something seen as beneficial by the local leaders and they would 
then respond with things his unit needed to successfully conduct coercive activities as needed.570 
 The differences in civilian and military approaches to reconstruction could create conflict 
between DoD and DoS.  An Embassy Chief of Staff recalled that the military’s CERP funding 
could be disruptive if not properly coordinated.571  A JSPA team leader agreed, saying that 
CERP funds could be like “crack.” He specified that a new division commander rotated in and 
wanted to spend a lot of money.  The Iraqis were not cleaning up the streets, so the commander 
wanted to go outside the Iraqi government to hire and get the streets cleaned.  The Embassy felt 
that at that point in the war the Iraqis needed to be doing things like that so instead they would 
bring it up at the Friday meeting, and Prime Minister Maliki would yell at the responsible 
minister.572   
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 The greatest cooperative value was achieved when the Coalition worked together with the 
Iraqis.  A brigade commander in Baghdad recalled that there was a contract for $120,000 the 
U.S. was paying an organization to clean up the streets of Shula.  However, if you ever drove 
through Shula, rarely would you find anybody cleaning up the streets of Shula.  Once he found 
out who the contractors were by tying the process to the security apparatus, his unit could link up 
at the combat outposts strategically placed throughout the city and say, “Hey contractor, here is 
Mr. Company Commander, and you are going to leave tomorrow morning from this location, 
and you will be cleaning blocks A, B and C in accordance with your contract, and you will be 
working starting at 0630.”573   
 He was also able to employ attractive power to enable coercive power.  He recalled that if 
they could demonstrate that secular female business owners had opened women’s dress shops in 
Yarmuk for the first time in 5 years, were thriving, and the Coalition could protect it from people 
that wanted to shut it down, that information moved furiously, to the point that people in say 
Qadra would come to his forces and say, “How can we open up a shop?”  His unit would respond 
that information on insurgents in their area was necessary.  He believed that they could not have 
had that relationship if they had not been living in the cities and fighting alongside the ISF and 
their volunteers.  A permanent presence was required for casual conversations to unfold 
naturally.  No meeting ever starts off with business, as he remembered it had to start with “the 
cups of tea and casual conversation.”574 
 According to a stability operations commander in Baghdad, the continued presence 
associated with build efforts was the U.S.-led structure of military soft power.  PRTs would 
deploy to those areas as the U.S. got some degree of security in them.  The number of PRTs 
multiplied exponentially during 2007-2008 for that reason.  As they were gaining control, they 
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needed more continuous presence and commitment of other US government agencies beyond 
DoD.  The partnership with USAID and the Iraqi government began to kick in, even in areas 
where the Iraqis were in charge.  He remembered one example of the road heading out to the 
west toward Ramadi that was primarily cleared by ISF.  Alongside of it was the famous Gulf 
War “baby milk factory.”  The Coalition wanted to get that factory back to producing actual 
baby milk.  He was part of reconstructing it, getting new equipment and getting the baby milk 
factory started inside an ISF-controlled area.575   
Local challenges could hinder the process.  A Marine Corps MTT leader in the west told 
a story about a glass factory that needed a spool of copper wire to restart production in Iraq.  It 
was a big deal for a long time.  The last thing they needed was copper wire of a thick enough 
gauge to run from the main power line to the power plant.  The Civil Affairs (CA) guys had 
rolled it to a fence to keep it in a safe area.  The fence line they rolled it to was adjacent to the 
compound of the 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army division.  They got bolt cutters, unspooled the entire 
wire, cut it into segments, melted it into ingots, and got it out of there before anyone knew 
anything.  That lesson learned early on about how pilferable supplies were put the CA teams on 
alert and forced them to develop a robust tracking and reception methodology.  He said that it 
ruined nearly a whole year’s worth of work when that copper wire was stolen.576   
 One of the most controversial reconstruction organizations was the Task Force for 
Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) described in Chapter Four.  It was a DoD 
organization with a large budget that did not have to operate under many of the restrictions that 
handicapped the Embassy.  A Marine Corps economics planner at MNC-I recalled the push by 
the TFBSO, also known as the Brinkley Group after its leader Paul Brinkley, to revive the state-
owned enterprises and make that the source of employment.  He thought it failed because there is 
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a difference between the effect of a private or public sector job on willingness to join the 
insurgency.  If you are working in the private sector it builds a limited kind of loyalty.  He was 
surprised that during the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad employees came to defend their 
employer’s light machine or retail shop because they realized that if the shop was closed or 
burned out, they would be out of a job.  However, if you work for a state-owned enterprise or a 
ministry, you know that even if the ministry is burned out or the factory is destroyed, you are still 
going to get a paycheck.  Second, he believed that in the public sector your loyalty is not to Iraq, 
but it is to whomever got you that job: uncle, religious or tribal leader, perhaps even a member of 
the insurgency.  Interrogations indicated that a significant number of the insurgents were 
receiving a government paycheck.  They were working for SoEs (state-owned enterprises) or the 
ministries Monday through Friday and planting IEDs on the weekend, or there were ghost 
workers who showed up once a month to get paid and give half to whomever got them the job.577 
 On the other hand, TFBSO efforts did reopen many businesses in Iraq.  To a senior 
member of the TFBSO, they were coming in and opening factories, giving people back their 
jobs.  The local media would “go nuts,” because it was a big story.  “They’re reopening the Beiji 
fertilizer factory finally!”  They tried very much to let the local Iraqi leadership like the Deputy 
Governor be “the face.”578  A stability operations commander in Baghdad remembered going 
with Mr. Brinkley and some U.S. Congressmen on a trip to reactivate a rug-weaving factory.  It 
was using old-fashioned hand-weaving making beautiful, brilliant rugs in the ancient Sumerian 
tradition of rugmaking.  The factory was intact and in perfect condition, but they did not feel 
secure enough and lacked the monetary resources to get started.  What he saw was the Iraqi 
system begin to come back to life as, along with the Brinkley Group, the military helped to 
reactivate supply chains, internal and external.579   
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 One of the leaders of the Brinkley Group gave his opinion on the situation in Iraq: 
It was an irony because we were all actual people who had worked in capitalism.  We 
were not communists.  We had people who had never worked in the private sector in their 
lives attacking us like we were some sort of Stalinist reinforcement of the Ba’athist 
socialist regime.  It was so absurd.  Our whole point was that these factories employed 
thousands of people.  They want their jobs back.  They wanted to privatize these things.  
The way to privatize any industry is to have it up and running and efficient and operating, 
and then you bring people in who will buy it.  No one buys an empty factory full of dust-
covered equipment that has been sitting idle for three years.  We made that clear every 
step of the way when we were opening these operations.  At the end of the day, we did 
not care about selling. Our top priority was counterinsurgency.  We needed to get local 
communities back to normal.  Store is secured, I am going back to work.  Kids are going 
back to school.  Life is back to normal.  Three years out of work, we had to get people 
back to a normal life and show them that America has not come to make their lives a 
living hell because that was what they thought.  We were clear that our strategy was to 
transition these operations and privatize them over time.  We did that.  A lot of the most 
compelling ones such as cement operations and some metal processing plants were 
privatized and are still in operation.  The process was underway and accelerating when 
we were shut down in 2011.  A lot of these operations we were able to privatize early 
were in safe areas, not high risk.  Companies like Lafarge (now LafargeHolcim) bought 
two of the big cement plants.  There was a big phosphate plant that was purchased.  We 
helped propel the tenders out publicly for that.580  
 
 He felt that the TFBSO worked well with USAID.  What he thought devastated them was 
moving USAID from being a separate agency to being under the State Department, right in the 
middle of the Surge.  Over time State put them into the DSS model for security and they were 
moved inside the Embassy compound and that compound they built was abandoned.  When that 
happened, he felt the USAID mission collapsed.  NGO engagements collapsed with it because all 
of that was through USAID.  He thought that the TFBSO relationship with USAID was OK for a 
year and then new USAID people came in and joined the chorus of those saying, “Who are these 
assholes from DoD out there doing this?”581   
 An MNF-I planner felt that a particularly valuable TFBSO contribution was bringing in a 
consulting firm.  The firm would ask where the experts were and were told in the ministries.  
When they went to the ministries, they found that they were primarily junior officials because 
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most of the senior ones took their pensions and left so they would not become a target.  Grant-
Thornton employed them as consultants.  They understood the Iraqi system of governance under 
the still-existing ministries and became worth their weight in gold.  It was a $14M contract.  An 
issue in 2007-2008 was getting a ministry in the Iraqi government that had $20B to spend to pick 
up the $14M contract because it was proving to be worthwhile.  That was “in competition” with 
the typical State Department and USAID processes.  But they learned to make use of it.   He said 
that the Buy Iraqi First program of the TFBSO cost in the single-digit billions, which to him was 
a bargain compared to the cost of 200,000 Americans and contractors that were supported in 
Iraq.582 
As the security situation in Iraq improved, more progress toward returning society to 
routine functioning could be made.  Improvement would not be linear: there were fits and starts 
as opportunities to engage in non-insurgent crime and other issues became available.  
Nonetheless many interviewees felt a change in the local environment for the better. 
Signs of progress began to be seen.  A stabilization operations commander in Baghdad 
said that the build phase had to begin when the clearing is beginning, or even before, so that the 
humans that live there can feel that change is coming and happening right now.  They can now 
come out and talk about the few insurgents remaining in the neighborhood.  The walls come up, 
their kids can come back out.  The sounds of children playing inside those areas again was to 
him the sound of progress, as well as the sound of construction material and equipment being put 
into place.  All those things were the sound of progress, that is what it would look like to him.  
The build would begin early and be sustained throughout.583   
A JSPA team leader talked about chlorine delivery which had slowed down in late 2006 
but was required for clean water.  Street cleaning and opening markets were seen as a big deal.  
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It was stressful all along, but he remembered feeling a sense of progress.  Things such as street 
openings, whether the T-walls would come down and if it was safe to do that.  Cooking oil 
deliveries and foodstuffs were important in early 2008.584  An MNF-I planner recalled that Iraqi 
oil production was ticking up.  He said that the number of satellite antennas on rooftops in what 
had been a police state a year before was stunning.  By 2007-2008 he remembered seeing a 
shopping bazaar in Erbil where there were so many satellite dishes on the roof it made him worry 
for the roof.585 
 Little things mattered.  A stability operations commander said that in some places they 
were buying paint, which would seem like a very minor element of rebuilding.  Someone had 
once said to him, “Never underestimate the power of paint.”  He thought it was a funny tongue-
in-cheek point until they began to deliberately plan for where they wanted painting to occur.586  
Routine improvements were found to help restore a sense of normalcy to the population. 
A Marine Corps MTT leader talked about the “palpable” differences between pre and 
post-Awakening Ramadi and on the east side of the city.  It had been largely walled off before 
then with long lines at the checkpoints so people could get to the smallest markets to do any 
trading, but now it was a much more open city.  They could not bulldoze their way through the 
streets anymore: they had to be attentive to traffic and politely find their way through.  Markets 
were open, shops were reopening.  On patrol with their Iraqi counterparts they could dismount, 
change dollars to dinars and have lunch at the local bazaar.  That was the presence that was there, 
almost the kind of community policing he had hoped for in the end.  By the time he left, the team 





LEVEL OF INFLUENCE 
 
 Metz talked about the U.S. problem of assuming that the normal state of affairs is for a 
country to control all of its territory.588  This construct hurt the U.S. during the early stages of 
Iraq because it tried to implement centralized control over Iraq, sparking the Sunni insurgency 
and setting off the sectarian conflict whose spike in violence led the U.S. to initiate the Surge.  
Along with Metz, writers such as Marston, Plakoudas, Branch and Wood, and Paul advocate the 
importance of conducting counterinsurgency at the lowest levels of the population possible. 
An important smart power element of the Surge was trying to wean Iraq off of the 
centralized leadership that had dominated it since its inception.  Chapter Seven will explore the 
paradox that Afghanistan had the opposite problem, not enough central government control.  The 
key asset for this was the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).  Ambassador Crocker talked 
about some of the nuances of the PRTs: 
Some PRTs had excellent relations with the governor’s office and used those 
relationships to bring Iraqis into the process.  I would have to say that when you make 
that kind of civilian Surge with PRTs in a lot of different places around the case, often 
staffed with folks who didn’t really know much about Iraq, it is essentially a foreign 
element.  It is not organically part of an Iraqi process.  Think small and think modest.  
Try to figure out where you can make a lasting difference, and that means doing a lot 
more listening than talking to figure out where we might have a sustainable, positive 
effect for the long term.589 
 
 An ambassador leading economic devleopment during the Surge agreed.  To him, it 
really was not about the reconstruction programs they did, but about how they picked them: 
which bridge to rebuild, which road to pave, which buildings in a community to fix.  Was it the 
district bigwig saying “I want my mayor’s office fixed” or was it a community-based 
organization that came together to develop a solution.590  An advisor to the stability program at 
the Embassy and a PRT leader in the north both described the $500 million local governance 
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program to help provincial leaders do planning, budgeting and execution of programs supporting 
the delivery of essential services at the local level to prepare them for the eventuality of 
provincial budgets drawn from Iraq’s oil revenues, which took place soon after, and coordinate 
with the capital budgets of the national ministries.591  
An MNF-I planner described the PRTs as helpful to lower levels of governance in 
helping them understand how to hold a council, how to nominate projects, how to make sure they 
were not too corrupt, that the money gets paid on time, etc.592  A commander in the north agreed, 
saying they used the district advisory council to provide them with the list of potential projects.  
Microgrant applicants were sent to the district council building to request and collect the money.  
The idea was to get the locals to believe that their local government was working for them, train 
the officials on how to do their jobs, and hopefully provide some economic benefit.  Corruption 
was still an issue: he heard that some district council members received kickbacks for guiding 
the U.S. to their favored projects.593   
Similarly, a Treasury official working in Diyalah Province believed that the military 
people working with the government did not understand enough of how the banking system and 
finance worked to know if they were being honestly dealt with.  There had been a big battle in 
Baqubah, and the issue was timing.  The local bank had received the cash for payment to farmers 
and for social services.  This had happened right before the battle, so the bank could not get to 
the money, even though the money was secure.  They wanted another batch of cash to make their 
payments, and the central bank said no.  When she went there, she recalled that the bank was 
pretty torn up, including a pile of rubble in front of the safe that kept them from opening it.  
Eventually they got the additional money with the help of the civilian experts.594   
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Some local areas adapted faster than others.  The PRT leader in Salah al-Din Province 
told people Salah al-Din was a special place because it had a strong insurgent contingent because 
most of the former regime leadership was from Salah al-Din as well as al-Qaeda/ISIS.  Salah al-
Din was more violent than Anbar or Baghdad, according to her roughly half the attacks with only 
a fifth of the population.  But once stability was reestablished, they had a wealth of expertise 
available to put to work because Salah al-Din was where most of the Saddam-era national level 
government officials had been drawn from.595  Another bridging piece provided by the PRTs was 
bringing the provincial governors, particularly from the Sunni provinces, to Baghdad to meet 
with the Iraqi leadership and U.S. government officials.  The local PRT leader would accompany 
the governor down to Baghdad and go through the meetings with him.  That created a connection 
between the province and central government that he believed had never really existed before.596 
Better military cooperation enabled better PRT efforts.  A brigade Civil Affairs officer in 
the north recalled that the local U.S. commander pushed a lot more soft power, in-person 
partnering with the PRT and his element, meeting with the governor and local leaders in the 
province to talk.  To him, they were very supportive of the projects that were going on.597  At the 
same time, one brigade commander felt that the tribal leadership was not as influential as he 
hoped as  a positive enabler to our operations.  An example he gave was when one of the Special 
Operations raids killed a woman and her daughter and maimed a young boy when a flash-bang 
was thrown into the room.  The post-event interaction between the commander and the tribal 
leaders was able to defuse the situation.  The Coalition did the condolence payments and the 
tragic event never surfaced again.  The tribal leaders were effective in that sense.  As far as 
denouncing violence and getting toward a theme of nationalism, he believed that that was more 
difficult with the tribal leaders.598 
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A stability operations commander in Baghdad remembered that all of the districts had 
councils and he would meet with them.  The Coalition would provide them with paint and 
brushes, and they would begin to beautify key streets.  One that was perhaps most significant to 
him was Haifa Street in central Baghdad, which had seen tremendous fighting.  The fighting had 
been stabilized by Coalition and ISF and they were now doing the “hold and build” parts of the 
counterinsurgency strategy of “clear, hold and build.”  He believed that “build” must begin while 
“clear” is ongoing and sustained through “hold” and then becomes the primary effort if stability 
is achieved.  They needed a combat force that was equipped and organized to help the locals 
begin to do things like paint Haifa Street, put plants back into the street, put up playgrounds 
again, let children play, and reopen markets.599 
A PRT team leader in the north described her experience: 
I was very close to the deputy governor and governor and worked with them all the time.  
The very first meeting I had with the Iraqis was with the deputy governor.  I tell people it 
was like they picked him out of central casting: former brigadier general, devout Muslim, 
Ba’athist.  Here I am, former Peace Corps, I am not touching any weapons, I am a 
pacifist.  At that first meeting he was very direct and said, ‘You are military occupiers, 
we want you out of our country.’  I said, ‘we want to go too, so let’s work together so we 
can get out of here faster.’  He and I became very close, and I worked with him all the 
time. 
 
 A financial advisor working with the TFBSO said that you can do the grand gestures, 
building bridges or giving every woman in the village a goat, but teaching people how to do their 
jobs better was what made the Surge effective, and was a lot of what it was about.600   
 Big projects attract big headlines.  They also attract mismanagement, corruption and 
insurgent attacks.  Robinson and de Tray both believed that smaller level projects and assistance 




One true success was the work done by the TFBSO in cooperation with the Treasury 
Department to modernize the Iraqi financial system.  A contractor with extensive experience as a 
banking supervisor working with the Brinkley Group was there working on payment systems.  
U.S. Treasury wanted an electronic payment system with a company that would not come into 
the country, so she ended up being the person intervening between them and the central bank and 
facilitated their bringing their equipment.602  She found both Christian and Muslim females 
working at the bank.  They had 500 women in their employ who did nothing but count money.  
They had some of the machines that could count 100 bills, but these were inadequate for the task.  
On the positive side, it was a way for women to be employed safely and could provide for their 
families because most of their husbands, fathers or brothers were dead.  The Central Bank was 
interesting to her because 80-85% of the employees were female.  Men could not sit in the room 
with the women alone, but she could sit anywhere she wanted to.603   
The system in question was known as an RTGS (Real-Time Gross Settlements) system.  
The Brinkley Group in coordination with the Treasury Department, which was paying for it, 
sourced the Iraqi who put the system in.  It was put in while she was there, and according to her 
it ran great.  RTGS usually works with high-dollar items, not settlements.  The ultimate object 
was to reduce the amount of cash payment and dollarization in the economy. She believes it is 
still in place.604 
With her work she saw a lot of people being able to conduct commerce and do the things 
they needed to do, making that part of the Surge a positive to her.  Many of the women she 
worked with at the Central Bank had been deeply affected by the war.  As things economically 
improved, that effect was reduced.  She stated that Iraq is a rich country and if the Central Bank 
were still operating in the same place they would be doing better, but it burned down three times.  
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Part of the problem was a distribution issue.  There might be “tons” of money sitting in the 
Central Bank but if you can’t get it out, it is no good.  Being able to support financial mediation 
was good.  She recalled them as a very conservative central bank in comparison to some of the 
central banks she had worked with.  It was all new leadership because anyone who had had 
leadership in the old bank was Ba’athist.  When she went into the Central Bank in 2004 the 
women did not know how to use Excel.  She was amazed that she was being paid a lot of money 
to teach people how to use Excel to their advantage.  You cannot sell treasury bills without 
Excel, you cannot manage a reserve requirement without Excel, you cannot do any of that.  
However, they all had high school educations, and some had college.605 
Similar systems upgrading occurred in other areas as well.  A PRT leader in the north 
recalled that there were people working on the budget that were still using hand-written ledgers.  
Her team put in a simple Excel spreadsheet that revolutionized the process of tracking where the 
money went and how projects were distributed by type (such as education, water, health, etc) and 




 As discussed earlier, Schifrin felt that the Surge itself increased Iraqi belief that the 
Americans were serious about stabilizing Iraq and willing to commit resources to make that 
happen.  Bringing Iraqis at all levels back into the process had to happen for long-term Coalition 
goals to be achievable.  Plakoudas believed that neither insurgents nor counterinsurgents can 
succeed without local support.607  Olson Lounsbery and Pearson went into extensive detail about 
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the need for agreements acceptable to all parties in the conflict in order to achieve success in 
“peacebuilding.”608 
Multiple interviewees stated that creating a stable security environment was a means to 
the end of putting the Iraqis back in charge of their country and enabling normalization of the 
political, economic, and cultural functions the country possessed.  As will be discussed in 
Chapter Nine, Iraq was different from Afghanistan which had little national governance 
structure.  Iraq had infrastructure and people trained in employing it.  The challenge was putting 
them back to work and getting them to perform their jobs in an efficient, non-sectarian manner.  
An MNF-I planner bluntly said that in the end it is their country: they “do not get to leave after a 
year.”609 
 A PRT team leader described the situation in more detail: 
I went to Iraq in September 2003 for a long weekend as an effort by State Department to 
assist the Iraqis.  I took a group of current and former foreign ministers and ministers of 
finance from the former Soviet Union.  People like the Serbian Finance Minister, the 
former Russian Foreign Minister.  I took them to Iraq for a three-day conference to meet 
with Iraqi officials.  At the time we thought the biggest problem was going to be 
transitioning Iraq to a market economy.  It was fascinating what the conversations were 
about.  Two things stood out.  An Iraqi gentleman who had been head of the Customs 
Union before the sanctions said that their customs union procedures were the envy of the 
region.  They had been destroyed partly by Saddam Hussein and partly by the sanctions.  
Another participant said that Iraq and Italy had the same GDP in 1971.  He said that 
people will say, ‘That is terrible, what happened?’  Instead, they should be saying, ‘They 
were the same in 1971: they were capable of achieving that and could have done much 
more.610 
 
 A brigade Civil Affairs officer had learned that counterinsurgency or not, when the U.S. 
is the occupying country, it needed to treat people as humans.611 At the same time, a PRT leader 
felt that Foreign Service training in the U.S. tends to mistake politeness with respect.  The leader 
felt that although interactions must be polite and civil, you can still respectfully disagree with 
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people.612  A planner at MNC-I said it was hard to tie everything together because it had to be an 
Iraqi plan, but it was easier to do it through the U.S. chain of authority.613   
 The Surge helped foster the conditions needed to rebuild Iraq.  Interviewees talked about 
the psychological impact the Surge had on the Iraqis, changing their strategic calculus as they 
began to truly believe that the U.S. wanted to put them first and let them “take the lead.” As a 
result they became more willing to engage with the U.S. and pursue mutual objectives.  It was as 
much as anything the evolution of a relationship.614   
 Many senior members of the Coalition regularly interacted with the Iraqi leadership.  An 
MNF-I planner was part of the group including General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker who 
met weekly with Prime Minister Maliki, the Iraqi National Security Advisor and other senior 
officials. He recalled that they would talk about both hard and soft power issues.615  Similarly, an 
Ambassador who was a senior economic planner met 2-3 times per week with Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister for Economics, as well as the Finance Minister and other ministers.  His role and 
seniority allowed him to talk about budget execution, ideas to propose or people from 
Washington to introduce.616 A senior USAID official met with her primary liaisons 2-3 times a 
week as well as leaders from many ministries, sometimes accompanied by the Ambassador if the 
Ambassador had an issue with a minister.617   
A JSAT planner recalled meeting several times a week with the Ministry of Defense and 
Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi National Security Council, some with the Ministry of Oil or the 
Ministry of Education.  There were two objectives.  One was trying to find out what the Iraqis 
wanted to do and were doing.  The other was to attempt some persuasion to get them to do what 
the U.S. wanted them to do. That was a continuous problem throughout the effort.  The key issue 
was to build capacity, but to him it was never well-defined if capacity was what they wanted to 
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do or what the U.S. wanted them to do.618  An MNF-I planner recalled that the Deputy Prime 
Minister in the Maliki government was Barham Salih, who later became the President of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government.  He was a U.K. citizen with a PhD in economics from a U.K. 
university.  He became the “go-to guy” for the Coalition because he did not have the Sunni 
Arab/Shia concerns.619   
 A Civil Affairs officer working in a PRT described his growing relationship with the 
brother of a key advisor to Grand Ayatollah Sistani.  He recalled that they even invited him to 
visit the mosques, but there was a formal agreement that the U.S. would not go anywhere near 
the mosques.  He had to go to the Embassy to get the Ambassador’s permission, who agreed that 
he could go.  The biggest concern was that he would be taken hostage.  He joked that the rule 
was that if he died that was OK, but they did not want to have an American hostage.620  A JSAT 
planner for the Embassy remembered that he learned a few words of Arabic and benefited.  He 
recalled meeting with the Deputy Commander of the Badr Corps.  He said he used his “3 or 4” 
words of Arabic, and the commander said, “Oh it’s so good that you know Arabic.”  At the 
meeting, was a diplomat with a PhD from an Arabic University, he is a 5/5 speaker,621 and “no 
one cares.”  The fact that he was even trying gets more credit than someone who is accomplished 
at it.  He said that like the three cups of tea in Afghanistan, he had to take a more circuitous route 
to get to his point and get cooperation.622 
 Surprising insights sometimes came from closer cooperation.  A PRT leader recalled an 
interesting interaction with the principal sheikh for Saddam Hussein’s tribe.  Their meeting ran 
into prayer time.  The PRT leader told him there was a prayer room in the back if he wanted to 
go pray.  The “sheikh” said no but asked if he had a whisky.  Even though he was wearing the 
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traditional clothing of a religious leader, the PRT leader learned that it was about listening and 
figuring out where the Iraqis were coming from.623  
 Coalition members also gained greater fidelity in their areas of interest.  A stability 
operations commander remembered that as they began to listen to the tribal and district councils 
and became much more precise in the help they were providing they were able to use intelligence 
to know if we were going into an area where the council was influenced by militias or Sunni 
extremist tribes versus someone who was really trying to get the situation stabilized.624  To an 
Embassy Chief of Staff,  soft power included getting Iraqis to spend funds in a non-sectarian 
manner.625 
 Several interviewees worked with the surprising challenge of getting the Iraqis to spend 
their money.  An ambassador working economics at the Embassy said that the whole budget 
execution effort was about helping the Iraqis spend their own money, which was why he went so 
often to see the Finance Minister.  Part of the budget execution problem was the shortcomings of 
the Iraqi bureaucracy.  The U.S. wanted them to spend $2B a year on infrastructure projects but 
they had no capacity to move that much money that quickly.  He remembered a colleague saying 
that the war was really a series of three-month wars in which the U.S. was always looking to turn 
things around in the next quarter.626  Another ambassador at the Embassy agreed, saying that 
many times the problem was not lack of resources, it was getting the Iraqis to execute.  Their 
experience under an authoritarian regime meant that it was hard to get people to make decisions 
below the top.  Officials less than a minister did not want to sign any piece of paper, which he 
said does not work when the goal is a functioning structure of government.627  An MNF-I 
planner said that the 2003 Iraqi reconstruction fund was appropriated a total $18.3 billion, and 
there were economic support funds managed through State Department and CERP totaling about 
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$22 billion.  Most of this had already been spent by the time of the Surge.  By 2007 the oil 
money the Iraqis had to spend was around $20 billion per year and growing.628  Iraqi income at 
that point far outstripped U.S. contributions.   
Trying to ensure proper funding allocation was also an education issue in Iraq.  A 
Treasury representative working at the Embassy described trying to get the Iraqi budget passed 
on time, a Treasury Department policy priority.  A member of the Multi-National Security 
Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) told her that she  needed to stop the budget.  She sent 
him away.  The next day someone else from that office showed up from that office and repeated 
the request: she told him to get out of her office.  Then a third, even more senior person showed 
up, so she figured this was important to them and asked what they wanted to do.  MNSTC-I 
wanted to take money out of the non-security side of the budget and add it to the defense budget 
to create a housing program and a make work program to discourage young men from joining the 
bad guys.  She asked if this was buying security.  He said yes.  She told him it had to come out of 
their budget because it did not meet any of Treasury’s policy priorities: further, they had not 
asked the other ministries if they wanted to give this much money up.  Later the Treasury 
Attaché showed her a letter from MNSTC-I he received informing the Embassy and Treasury 
office that Generals Dempsey and Petraeus had met with the Prime Minister and they had 
changed the Defense Ministry budget to fund their items.  She did not feel it met the security 
objective, but they were able to get the budget passed on time.629 
Various forms of Iraqi mismanagement remained an issue.  A PRT leader talked about 
the TFBSO providing a mechanism for bringing important business representatives of the U.S. to 
Iraq, but absent the Iraqis themselves making the reforms that draw investment, and absent Iraq 
efforts to stem corruption, he was skeptical that it had the desired effect, which he felt was 
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ultimately to blame on the Iraqis.630   An MNF-I planner would be asked why this province had 
18 hours of power per day and Baghdad only had 12?  He recalled that when he flew over the 
country at night in helicopters there was no lack of electricity because they were leaving their 
outside lights on.  He said that it wasn’t until about 2008-2009 before they got better at asking 
questions of the Iraqi people rather than asking the ministry about the hours of power in Basra.  
They learned to ask how much electricity they had and where they got it?  Were they getting it 
from the grid, or a neighborhood generator, or a personal one?  There were thousands of small 
generators in Iraq: what they needed was diesel.  These were different questions from asking if 
they were satisfied with the free electricity they were supposed to be getting: the answer of 
course was no. As another example, a CERP project would give a factory a generator which they 
said would get them to work.  The Coalition bought one for them, then the factory still wasn’t 
working.  He would ask why, and the owner would say that the ministry was not providing them 
the raw materials they needed.  It really was not the generator, although he knew it was being 
used.  He took pictures of Iraqi wiring in the streets running from local generators to nearby 
houses.  It was the same with gasoline.  SOMO was the state oil marketing organization, whose 
job was to sell the oil Iraq was to produce, and they were the marketing arm.  Gas was a penny a 
gallon.  By 2004-2005 the Coalition was still reporting there was no gasoline, but since liberation 
a million cars had been imported.  With an artificial price comes a black market.  He said that 
600-700 trucks pulled up every day at the Beiji refinery.  The SOMO stations were not getting 
oil, but the black-market price for gas in Iraq was the same as it was in Turkey and Kuwait.  
Thus the trucks were selling the gas behind a building somewhere.  He humorously recalled that 
in 2006 the people who had drawing rights to the fuel all had the same first name, Sheikh.631   
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Sometimes the Americans simply had to adjust to the Iraqi way of doing things.  An 
ambassador leading economic planning recalled that about 2-3 weeks after the “Charge of the 
Knights,” Prime Minister Maliki and many of the ministers were still in Basra.  The ambassador 
was sent down along with a military counterpart to ask the Prime Minister if they needed the 
Coalition to do any re-tasking of our assistance projects in Basra as a result of events.  There 
were a large number of sheikhs also in the palace at the time.  Maliki talked to them first.  As he 
was being escorted to see the PM, he saw that every one of the Sheikhs was carrying a brand-
new briefcase on the way out that they did not seem to have had on the way in.  That was how 
the Iraqi government did tribal engagement.  It was a benefit to the sheikhs for having met with 
the Prime Minister.632 
Some of the Iraqis appreciated the value of the American presence in their country and 
anticipated it would be ephemeral.  A Civil Affairs officer working in a PRT described the 
following scene: 
I was in Tikrit in the governance building and I had an awesome translator.  He says, 
‘come with me.’  We went to the big theater in the government center and its packed with 
sheikhs.  It looks like an Indiana Jones movie: the room was full of them.  I stepped in 
being the only American and dressed in BDUs (Battle Dress Uniform) and armed.  The 
deputy prime minister is at the front of the room.  My guy is translating for me.  The 
deputy prime minister is giving them hell.  His lecture was awesome.  He was saying, 
‘You better recognize that the Americans are not your enemy.  They aren’t staying: they 
are going to leave.  You need to take advantage of their presence to get the best deal we 
can before they’re gone because they’re your best friends.’  He said that he knows that 
the sheiks were thinking that these infidels, we don’t need them.  ‘Let me tell you about 
Islamic piety.’  He reached in his pocket and pulled out a piece of paper and said, ‘Do 
you know what this is?  There was the Islamic Conference (somewhere in the Near East) 
last month.  We paid the whole bill for the Iraqis in attendance, including this one.  You 
know what this one is?  This is a liquor bill! Don’t tell me about Muslim piety.  You’re 
just the same as them: you love your booze; you just won’t show it.  You better carry the 




A stability operations commander in Baghdad recalled the change from American to Iraqi 
leadership.  At one of the last reconstruction meetings he chaired there had been a new Deputy 
Minister for Reconstruction position created.  With it several members of provinces with whom 
the U.S. worked now had a presence at the table.  It had gone from being a purely military 
meeting with a couple of Iraqis in the room to primarily Iraqi with the Americans off to the sides 
He thought this was a phenomenal morphing in only several months.  There was now a deputy 
minister who was essentially his counterpart and sat right beside him.  The last thing he did was 




 Interviewees saw security as a prerequisite for the attractive power activities needed to 
put Iraq back on a track toward growth.  They could actually travel about the country and work 
more closely with Iraqi leadership to explain to the citizens what was being done and why.  
Growth was important as stability was restored, because Iraqis being convinced to cease 
sectarian militia activities needed to have an alternative way to make a living.  Jobs and a 
political voice were seen as an important part of that alternative. 
 PRTs played a major role in weaning Iraq off the centralized decision-making style that 
had characterized the Saddam regime.  Decision-making was pushed down to more local levels 
and gave Iraqis a greater voice in determining the direction they wanted their province or city to 
take.  This enabled reconstruction projects that better reflected what the Iraqis wanted rather than 
what the Americans thought they needed.  Increased oil revenues helped make more funds 
available, to the point that the challenge was occasionally getting the Iraqis to spend it.  Overall 
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the trend moved toward increased employment and growth throughout the economic sector of 










 Interviewees were asked several retrospective questions regarding the Surge, providing 
them an open-ended opportunity to reflect upon their experiences and the potential learning 
value.  Some of the interviewees answered one or more of the questions in great detail, often 
relating them to personal experiences after the Surge.  Both military and civilian interviewees 
had a number of interesting insights they had learned, with many shared opinions regarding their 
experiences. 
 Interviewees were asked if they believed the Surge produced long-term benefits, and why 
or why not.  Almost all felt it produced benefits for the Iraqis, although some felt the benefits 
were short-term in nature.  Many of the short-term responses felt that the benefits of the Surge 
had the potential to be long term but offered several reasons why this did not turn out to be the 
case.  For some, regardless of how subsequent events in Iraq played out the world is still a better 
place for having done the Surge.  Interestingly, Iraq Surge participants who went to Afghanistan 
for the subsequent surge there were far more likely to consider the Iraqi Surge successful than 
those who did not go to Afghanistan. 
 Interviewees were asked what soft power lessons they learned from the Surge.  The most 
common answer would fall into the category of the need to do smart power.  Both military and 
civilians by and large agreed that reconstruction and political progress were impossible to 
achieve in an unsettled security environment.  They also emphasized the importance of working 
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with and listening to the local population.  They talked about the importance of personalities and 
working to overcome structural shortcomings which remained even after the change to a more 
cooperative posture. 
 Interviewees were asked if the lessons of the Surge were applicable to other or future 
conflicts.  Most said yes, many caveated it with the good schoolhouse answer “it depends.”  
Many believed small wars are going to be more prevalent in the future than large ones.  
Afghanistan provided an instant opportunity for many Surge veterans from both Defense and 





 In-progress review (IPR) is a military term for regularly analyzing how events unfold 
during the course of an operation and making necessary changes to future operations.  It allows 
leadership to adjust original planning and expectations to achieve desired objectives.   
 In July of 2008 MNF-I published a document titled “Multi-National Force-Iraq 
Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.”635  The three-page non-classified document is 
signed by General Petraeus.  It serves as an interesting opportunity to see how MNF-I evaluated 
its actions and made appropriate adjustments.   
In some ways it is a condensed version of FM 3-24.  It contains many of the ideas 
captured in the field manual.  Coercive power is important.  It talks about utilizing all assets to 
defeat the insurgency to provide security and protect the population.  Unity of effort and 
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cooperation are important, along with spending and reconstruction.  Initiative and adaptability 
are emphasized.  All these are similar to ideas addressed in FM 3-24. 
One interesting difference is that Sons of Iraq are mentioned three different times in the 
MNF-I guidance.  As has been seen, Sons of Iraq was an initiative developed by the Coalition to 
put Sunni militias on the counterinsurgency payroll to fight against al-Qaeda and other extremist 
insurgent elements.  It was not welcomed by the Maliki government and often bypassed them 
with payment going directly to the militia elements being led by local Sunni sheikhs.  This was a 
source of friction between the Coalition and the Shia-dominated Iraqi government that 
delegitimized the government.   
FM 3-24 devotes a full chapter to developing host nation security forces.  It does 
recognize the possible existence of sectarian divisions within the security forces, and correctly 
observes that most host nation governments will resist recruiting disaffected ethnic groups into 
their security forces.    It even cautions that ethnic discrimination by security forces can occur 
against the population.  However, it does not advocate for recruiting and maintaining security 
utilizing host nation elements not under governmental control.  It lists security elements as 
including military, police, corrections personnel and border guards, not militias.  Thus, it would 
not be expected to incorporate Shia or Sunni militias in Iraq into the government security effort. 
A theme continually emphasized throughout FM 3-24 is the need for operations to 
enhance host nation government legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.  It says that success 
requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of “that uncommitted middle.”  It 
says that the counterinsurgency forces must work with host nation ministries responsible for 
national and internal security.  It advocates for establishing “Home Guard” units but defines 
them as local security forces under host nation governmental control.   
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Sons of Iraq was considered so critical to success in Iraq that it is mentioned no less than 
three times in the MNF-I guidance, even though it goes against the grain of FM 3-24’s advice 
regarding host nation control of the use of force and fostering their legitimacy.  Why the major 
change? 
FM 3-24 acknowledges that a country may suffer from sectarian differences so severe 
that it can impact efforts to establish stability.  However, it still seems to carry a degree of 
assumption that the host nation government will make some effort toward cooperation with 
opposing religious or ethnic groups.  After it states that host nation governments will probably 
resist recruiting disaffected minorities into the security forces, it then holds out the hope that 
even moderate efforts to do so will provide enormous payoffs.  There seems to be an element of 
wishful thinking that perseverance will produce success, a failure to recognize that there are 
some governments that are simply not amenable to cooperation with minority groups they may 
have battled with for decades or even centuries.   
This had become a substantial problem by 2007.  The Maliki government continually 
dragged its feet on bringing Sunnis into the armed forces.  Interviewees have talked about the 
proclivity for the Iraqi government to replace competent Sunni leaders with Shia loyalists, 
further alienating the Sunnis.  There was little effort to create a sense of unity among Iraqi 
security forces.  At that point there was no realistic expectation that they could stabilize the 
country other than through severe repression in Sunni-held areas.  Because the Kurds had an 
established and capable security force in the peshmerga, they were more insulated from Shia 
efforts to marginalize non-Shia Iraqis.   
On the other hand one can say that MNF-I was following the guidance of FM 3-24.  It 
does say that successful counterinsurgents need to be adaptable.  General Petraeus saw the 
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success of the Anbar Awakening in western Iraq and believed it could be replicated in and 
around Baghdad.  He needed to separate the warring factions and give the Sunnis some form of 
security.  Since the Iraqi government refused to provide it to the Sunnis, he likely felt he had 
little choice but to circumvent official channels and work directly with the Sunnis to meet their 
security needs. 
Ironically, the end result closely resembled the warning of FM 3-24 that a desired end 
state for security forces is that they be sustainable by the host nation after U.S. and multinational 
forces depart.  Although the capability to do so existed, the willingness of the Maliki government 
to do so did not.  This caused a break between the Sunnis and the central government that 
contributed to the rise of ISIS in western Iraq and Syria after 2011 when U.S. ground forces 
departed Iraq by agreement with the Iraqi government. 
 
DID THE SURGE PRODUCE BENEFITS? 
 
General Petraeus was asked how much of a breathing space he had hoped to accomplish 
during the Surge, to which he responded: 
We hoped to accomplish at least a few years and I think that we did.  If you say that the 
Surge ended in the summer of 2008, then it was not until mid-December 2011, after our 
last combat forces and the four-star general departed, that Prime Minister Maliki 
launched the actions to target, for legal reasons, the Iraqi Vice-President, the senior Sunni 
Arabs in government, the Iraqi Minister of Finance who is not a Sunni Arab, and then a 
senior parliamentarian for Anbar Province.  Peaceful demonstrations were put down 
fairly violently.  Leaders that we had insisted be fired during the Surge were restored to 
command positions in the police and the army.  A variety of other actions were taken that 
ultimately, once again alienated the Sunni Arabs from Iraqi society and tore it apart 
again, something that we had worked hard to bring back together.  We really had a good 
3 ½ years during which time the security situation and various other situations improved 
and did improve further beyond the Surge, but beyond which the underlying struggle for 
power and resources was never completely resolved, nor was the progress cemented by 
the implementation of laws that were passed by the Parliament by the Prime Minister.  
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The reality is that he undid a fair amount of what we did together and that was what 
alienated the Sunni population and allowed the al-Qaeda in Iraq remnants to reconstitute 
as the Islamic State and move into Syria, gather additional resources, and swing back into 
Iraq.  And because of the changes he made in leadership and the way that he had 
undermined the chain of command and then a variety of other actions, at a time that those 
forces needed to be most capable of counter-offensive operations they were incapable of 
doing that.636  
 
Most interviewees for this work were asked the following question: “Did you see the 
Surge as providing long-term solutions and how?”  Interestingly, this was the most likely 
question for interviewees to not directly answer.  Many chose to discuss short-term benefits of 
the Surge without providing a response to the question as asked.   
Five of the 36 respondees were uncertain. A Civil Affairs officer did say that he did not 
feel that the security environment was any less dangerous when he flew into Baghdad in 2006 
than when he left in 2008. The mortaring was still about the same, everything was about the 
same.  He did not remember having a sense of safety during the time he was there.637  Another 
officer felt that he could not tell from his “small-picture” perspective.638  A USAID official felt 
that outside of some pockets of assistance it would be more appropriate to err on the side of 
humility.639  Some of the “pockets” included the Ministry of Social Welfare and building the 
Iraqi defense capability, which she did feel are in a better place today than they were.  She 
compared the effort to other parts of the world where USAID worked until the U.S. left because 
they did not need assistance anymore, which took decades to achieve.640 
One respondee felt the Surge produced short term benefits that must be weighed against 
problems it also created.  An ambassador who worked economic issues during the Surge felt it 
demonstrated the limits of what the U.S. can do for a long-term occupation effort.  Short term 
success may have been achieved in terms of security and restarting the political process, but it 
was not realistic to think America could keep mobilizing Guardsmen every two or three years for 
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two decades.  He felt that the Surge also gave external agents such as Iran or al-Qaeda the 
opportunity to push their narrative of the U.S. occupation, and they “came back with a 
vengeance” after the Coalition departed.641 
Thirty-one of the 36 answered in the affirmative at some level.  However, many qualified 
their answers in several ways.   
Many of the interviewee answers coincided with the literature discussed earlier.  
Interviewees would agree with Buchanan and Gentile that the Anbar Awakening and Sons of 
Iraq were primary reasons for Surge success.  Similarly, the idea of Olson Lounsbery and 
Pearson that the Sunnis in particular were desperate enough that even partnering with the 
Americans seemed a preferable alternative to continuing to host al-Qaeda.  Pirnie and O’Connell 
and Schifrin showed the need for partnering with the indigenous security forces and making 
population protection the top mission priority.  Although Hammes talked about enabling local 
forces rather than directly engaging the enemy, interviewees indicated that the early part of the 
Surge in particular required more Coalition direct action against insurgents, and Special 
Operations maintained eliminating key figures from the battlefield throughout the Surge.  There 
was recognition like Fitzsimmons that ethnic and religious identities would be difficult to 
subsume in a “greater Iraq,” and political and resource constraints limiting Surge success as 
discussed by Friis.642 
 Responses can be placed into three broad categories: 
1) The Surge produced short term benefits. 
2) The Surge could have produced long term benefits, but circumstances intervened. 




Short Term Benefits 
 
 Almost all interviewees felt that the Surge at least provided some form of benefits.  A 
JSAT team leader had a unique view that the greatest benefit of the Surge was to the American 
military and people.  Rather than following the Iraq Study Group recommendation to leave, the 
U.S. intelligently applied American and military and civilian efforts in such a way that to him it 
made a difference.643  His opinion indirectly shows up in the pride many Surge participants felt 
for their role and perceived impact in Iraq.  A brigade commander during the Surge said that he 
was proud of what they did even though they lost a lot of soldiers.  They knew they were 
increasing risk when they left the FOB, but he saw that as the only pathway forward.  He felt that 
they had to be willing to show faith toward the common end with the Iraqis.644 
 Some interviewees felt it was the change in method that was effective.  An ambassador 
leading economic planning said that the Surge was not a solution in and of itself.  The Surge to 
him was a change in tactics resourcing.  He felt that it did demonstrate that you could put a 
whole-of-government approach together with resources and far-sighted management of them.645  
A Treasury Department official agreed that the Surge had people with subject matter expertise 
looking at making things work holistically.  She felt that because of the Surge there is an 
underlying foundation for government moving forward.646  A Psychological Operations officer 
felt that in some ways it was not anything different, just a shift in paradigm. For example, the 
Sunni Awakening was already taking place as early as September 2006.  To him the Surge was 
really capturing those events, putting them in an umbrella plan and then sprinkling in a few more 
actions.647 A Civil Affairs officer said that they could not have had the soft power without the 
hard power.  To him, everybody had their role.648 
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 Some emphasized positive short-term effects of the Surge.  A JSPA planner observed that 
from the point of view of population security metrics, the Surge was effective, but it could not be 
done forever.  Long-term there had to be a handover to reestablish a sovereign government of 
Iraq.649 A provincial brigade commander agreed, saying that the Iraqis did not really embrace 
and capitalize on their successes.  He saw them stealing copper out of generators and soldiers 
selling their weapons.  Battalion commanders had to pay for their positions to their brigade 
commanders.  Troops would get one meal a day, but the commander received enough money for 
three and pocketed the rest.  There was deep hatred due to the cultural and religious differences 
between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia.  He definitely saw short-term success, but to him it did not 
materialize into long term benefits.650  Along those lines, an ambassador working economics 
believed that the Surge gave the Iraqis a security pause, and time to build a political consensus.  
It gave them a security window of opportunity to forge a political consensus which in the end 
they did not do.651   
 A USAID contractor working with the banking system said the Surge provided medium-
term solutions.  To her, nothing works long-term if you are talking 20-25 years.  When she was 
in Iraq, they were working on short-term solutions except for the payment system.652  An 
Embassy planner felt that they laid an effective foundation, posturing the Iraqis for success as 
best we could.653 
 
Potentially Long Term 
 
 There were interviewees who felt that the gains of the Surge had the potential to be long 
term.  A brigade commander in Baghdad said that the Surge reduced the number of follow-on 
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battles because of the higher concentration of soldiers during the Surge. To him, asking whether 
the effects were long-term or transitory is a loaded question.  He said that the effects have a shelf 
life and that is where the question arises of how much presence you have left over to keep things 
under control.  He learned the hard way that you can’t give people a capability they can’t sustain 
themselves.  For example, they put in large generators (“Mother Of All Generators”) that needed 
the street cleared to pass.  He returned to Iraq many times since the Surge and the generators are 
all gone: he said they just don’t exist.654  A PRT leader agreed that the Surge bought time, but 
that progress is not linear and the time bought must be used effectively.655   
 A Special Forces commander criticized what he saw as a failure to work more broadly.  
He believed the Iraqi Special Operations Forces performed well after the U.S. departure, but 
other Iraqi military and police capabilities were not as well-developed by the Coalition.  He said 
that at the time he joked that the Coalition was creating a “plastic chair army.”  They were good 
enough to sit in a plastic chair and check IDs at a checkpoint and run population security 
measures across the country.  What was not created was an army that could withstand a little 
contact with the enemy.   When ISIS came across the north in the 2012 timeframe, he said that 
most of those conventional forces threw down their equipment and ran.656   
 A stability operations commander in Baghdad went into detail about the issue of 
sustainable effectiveness: 
The benefits produced had the potential to be long term.  Long term also means they are 
attended to over the long term.  In other words, the gains are consolidated and not lost: 
they must be attended to.  This is why you see something like Japan or Germany or South 
Korea looking very different than Iraq.  The cultures are different, but so are they among 
those three countries.  What is very different is the presence.  There was a large, 
continuous presence that had generational effects on professionalism and the conduct of 
government.  A very senior counterpart who could put direct pressure on the senior 
military officials and the president.  It was one more arm that did not have to be entirely 
diplomatic.  The Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, Commander of U.S. Army and 
Air Forces in Europe, we had very senior structures there that could put direct pressure on 
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German leadership.  General McArthur as he established conditions of occupation in 
Japan created a constitution and other sorts of things.  Is that military?  No, that’s 
governance.  He just happened to have the legitimate authority to do that.  We have 
gotten away from that since the 1950s, there is a belief that the military should not be 
involved in that.  But in places where the military has been involved in that and has led it, 
it has always worked well.  You can use Secretary Marshall with the Marshall Plan for 
the reconstruction of Germany, or the continuous presence of U.S. forces in the Republic 
of Korea that has led to everything from a highly professional military to a democracy 
that can undergo an impeachment without the military being involved.  All these things I 
have witnessed myself in just the last few years.  That came from us being present.  Our 
desire to reduce presence quickly in Iraq occurred before any of that had set in.  It would 
have been like withdrawing our U.S. force presence from Germany in 1950.  It was not 
ready: the systems of government weren’t ready.  The military stabilized the emergence 
of governance over the next three generations: we did not do that in Iraq.  There are many 
lessons to be drawn from this.  The potential is always long term.  The work that we did 
was indeed a long-term effect: the gains were not consolidated as a matter of policy.657   
 
 Several interviewees felt that the Surge achieved positive effects that proved transient.  
An Embassy planner said that it provided a solution for a couple of years, but a lot of those 
accomplishments were lost when the government became more blatantly sectarian.  In theory, it 
was going to provide political space to facilitate compromise between Shia and Sunni actors, but 
he did not see that happen.658  An Embassy Chief of Staff said the U.S. subsequently got away 
from its successes which to him needed one leader developing a comprehensive, persistent 
strategy with conditions.659 To an MNC-I planner, the benefits were transitory because the 
fundamental politics of Prime Minister Maliki had not changed.  He believed that the Coalition 
could have achieved more long-term success had it persevered or had Maliki evolved politically 
and been less under Iranian influence.  With the departure of the military, the U.S. did not have 





Long Term Benefits 
 
 Other interviewees were confident that the Surge had positive long-term ramifications.  
An IO Task Force leader said that the data on polling, violence and Iraqi confidence all show it.  
He said that these gains continued to reflect progress through 2011, years beyond the end of the 
Surge.661  An MNC-I planner said that it essentially stabilized Iraq so that from 2009-2011 ISF 
acting in a generally politically-neutral way could control the insurgency.662  A JSPA planner 
helped author a white paper in summer 2006 that said the U.S. was failing in all 5 lines of 
operation.  He believed that without the Surge Iraq was lost, so it was a positive long-term 
result.663 A Special Forces commander recalled that they dramatically dropped the level of 
violence and changed the dynamic.  When he was there in 2010, he recalled Iraq had relative 
peace, security, and the beginnings of economic stability, particularly as the oil market and 
infrastructure really started to come online, which to him was bought by the Surge in 2007.664 
 Similarly, an MNF-I planner focused on economics said that from a high of 3200-3300 
civilian deaths per month, by 2010 there were days when there were no reported war-caused 
deaths.  Markets were open and oil companies were coming in.665  A Marine Corps MTT leader 
said that the desired effect was achieved but said that the fact that it was coincidental/planned 
with the Anbar Awakening was the only way it would have been achieved.666 A Civil Affairs 
officer who believes the benefits were “strong and long term” points to the struggle Iraq is 
having in its relationship with Iran, desiring an Iraqi future independent of an Iranian theocracy.  
A lot of 18–19-year-old Iraqi lives were transformed by their relationships and interactions with 
Americans according to him.  There was a plaque on the wall at the U.S. Army National Training 





 Many of the interviewees were critical of the decision by the Obama Administration to 
pull combat forces out of Iraq entirely.  An IO Task Force leader did feel that invading Iraq was 
not necessary and “atrociously planned.”  He recalled sitting in the living room of a friend prior 
to the invasion when the friend got a call from Jay Garner saying, “Can you help me with a 
political-military plan?”  Apparently, they did not have a plan three months before they went in.  
To him, President Obama made a strategic choice in 2011 that was constrained by what President 
Bush had done, so the fact that President Obama made a decision that resulted in an undercutting 
of sustaining the effort after 2011 was not just Obama’s fault.668 
He also felt that State Department lacked conceptualization that they were going to be in 
charge of running a peace process and a continuing political-military struggle after 2011. He was 
astounded at the number of times he heard, “we need to be a normal embassy,” even in CPA 
days.  Another time he was walking through the Embassy talking with the Deputy Public Affairs 
Officer about the IOTF’s campaign to counterbalance Iranian interests.  The officer said, “Well, 
isn’t that really the Iraqis’ problem now?”  To him, overall State Department employees are not 
doers.  They worry that conducting a controversial messaging campaign might get them PNGd 
(Persona Non-Grata).669 
Other critics of policy included an ambassador who worked economics at the Embassy 
said that putting an end date on the U.S. military presence was a huge mistake.670  Another 
ambassador said that under President Obama the focus shifted to the Iraqis doing more for 
themselves, then oil prices crashed and Al-Qaeda in Iraq recovered.671  A staff officer at MNF-I 
thought that the change to the Obama Administration hurt badly because they were myopic.672  
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An Information Operations officer believed that the benefits were tied to political gains.  Then it 
tailed off, the U.S. pulled out, and he felt that everything that had been achieved was gone.673 An 
Embassy official working stabilization and transition felt that when the Obama Administration 
decided to pull the troops out, Iraqi leaders lost their insurance policy to take the difficult steps of 
transition that would inevitably be a threat to his own life and that of his ministers.674   
A Special Operations commander put a certain amount of responsibility on the Iraqis and 
the sectarian nature of how they moved leadership around.  He said that the inclination to act in a 
sectarian manner was always within the system and the thing that stopped it was the US military 
or the Embassy’s ability to go to the Iraqis and say “Uh-uh, why are you moving the 7th Infantry 
Division commander?  Major General Ali had done a phenomenal job: why are you changing 
him out?  This is not normal rotation, and the guy you’re putting in sucks, we know he sucks.  
He’s been here, here and here, we know he’s incompetent, corrupt, etc.”   When the Coalition 
left in 2011, he believed that the U.S. lost that leverage and ability to protect the Iraqis from their 
darker nature.675 
  An MNF-I planner similarly blamed the pullout for preventing the Surge effects from 
being long term. It allowed Prime Minister Maliki to renege on his pledge to bring the Sons of 
Iraq into the formal security structure.  It also allowed him to replace competent military 
leadership with ones loyal to him.  When Mosul fell to ISIS, the colonels got in helicopters and 
flew back to Baghdad.  The captains and lieutenants got into jeeps and hit the road.  He had 
expected that the Americans wanted about 10,000 to stay to provide the combined arms skills, 
secure communications, the honest broker, the things we can do very well.  He was surprised that 
the negotiated agreement was all the Americans out by December.  Without U.S. redundancy, 
Baghdad was back to its old ways of ignoring everything it did not want to hear from the field.676 
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 A TFBSO manager pointed out the international ramification of the U.S. pullout.  He felt 
that leaving about 5,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq would not have been for them to conduct combat 
operations.  He saw their role as the presence of a senior commander in Baghdad.  When Kassam 
Soleimani (Iranian Quds Force Commander) would try to strong-arm Prime Minister Maliki into 
doing things against the interest of the Iraqi people, the U.S. soldiers would give Maliki the 
ability to say, “Of course I would do this for you, but I have the Americans here, what do you 
want me to do?”  He believed that presence would even have forestalled the emergence of ISIS 




 Table 8 summarizes interviewee responses to the benefits question and subdivides them 
by various categories: 
 





Army 4 5 3 3 
USMC 1 1 * * 
DoS 4 5 4 2 
USG 2 * 1 * 
Foreign 1 * * * 
Career 6 10 4 3 
Temporary 6 1 4 2 
Soft Power Spec 12 9 6 5 
Hard Power Spe * 2 2 * 
Prior Iraq Exp 10 7 6 5 
296 
 





No Prior Iraq Ex 2 4 2 * 
Leader 4 5 2 4 
Staffer 8 6 6 1 
BN- 1 * * 1 
BDE+ 11 12 8 4 
Conventional 11 11 8 4 
Spec Ops 1 * * 1 
Baghdad 9 9 7 3 
Iraq Other 3 2 1 2 
Left the Base 9 8 4 4 
Did not Leave 3 3 4 1 
Met with Iraqis 11 10 7 5 
Did not MWI 1 1 1 * 
Detainee Work 4 3 2 1 
No Detaine Wrk 9 8 6 2 
AFG Surge 9 2 2 1 
Not AFG Surge 2 6 6 3 
Soft power app 11 11 6 3 
SP N/A * 1 4 1 
Table 8:  Interviewee Responses to Surge Benefits Question by Categories 
 
 Note that not all subgroups will add up to 36.  Responses are displayed roughly in a best 
to worst manner from left to right in terms of positive impact.  No interviewee said the Surge had 
a negative effect, hence “uncertain” is designated as the right end of the scale.  In some cases, 
subgroupings are too small to draw theoretical conclusions.  Subgroupings of note are 
highlighted in yellow and are discussed below. 
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Afghanistan “Surge” Participants   
 
By far the most interesting category was Iraq Surge participants who subsequently 
participated in the 2009 Surge in Afghanistan, which was not even an initial interview question.  
14 Surge participants or 38.8% of those surveyed were in Afghanistan in 2009.  This is a high 
percentage when viewed as conducting consecutive year combat tours.  Normally a 
servicemember or civilian who is deployed into a combat zone is expected to have recovery time 
before being sent back into combat, particularly in another country.  It demonstrates the ability of 
General Petraeus to exercise his ability to get the people he wanted into key positions.  
Ambassador Crocker would become Ambassador to Afghanistan, but not until 2011 or after the 
Afghanistan Surge had ended. 
  Of the 14 Surge participants who went to Afghanistan in 2009, nine can be categorized 
as saying the Iraq Surge produced long-term benefits or 64.2%.  Of the 36 total interviewees for 
this work, 12 indicated that the Iraq Surge produced long-term benefits or 33.3%.  75% of those 
responses came from the 38.8% of respondees who went to Afghanistan.  By comparison, only 
two of the 17 respondees who did not go to Afghanistan in 2009 felt that the Iraq Surge produced 
lasting results, or 11.8% (one long term benefit respondee did not indicate service in Afghanistan 
either way).  Interviewees who went to Afghanistan in 2009 were over five times as likely to say 
the Surge in Iraq produced lasting benefits as those who did not.   
 The nine respondees who went to Afghanistan and said the Iraq Surge produced long 
term benefits can be further delineated as follows: 
 3 Army, 1 USMC, 2 DoS, 2 US Government, 1 foreign 
6 career, 3 temporary 
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All 9 were soft power specialists 
7 had prior experience in Iraq 
4 were leaders, 5 were staffers 
8 served at brigade level or higher 
1 was special operations 
7 worked in Baghdad, 2 were in outer provinces 
7 traveled outside the wire 
8 met with Iraqis 
3 worked with detainees 
7 felt the lessons of the Iraq Surge were applicable to other/future conflicts 
None of these subcategories were significantly different from their percentages relative to 
all interviewees.  Only three were Army, so the response is not simply being made by close 
confidants of General Petraeus.  Interviewees who went to Afghanistan and believed the Iraq 
Surge produced long term benefits were statistically representative cross-sections of all other 
sub-categories developed for this study.  In other words, it was not responses of military 
members or careerists or staff members that truly explains the disparity.  Interviewees who 
subsequently went to Afghanistan were far more likely to view the Iraq Surge as successful 
independent of who they worked for, what they did or where they did it in Iraq. 
 It is beyond the author’s knowledge of cognitive psychology to explore in-depth the 
reasons why people who were in Afghanistan in 2009 were more than five times as likely to say 
the Iraq Surge was successful as those who did not go to Afghanistan.  Theories regarding 
cognitive relativism can provide potential insight.  Cognitive relativism has a number of 
competing definitions in the field of psychological study, but does make two primary claims: 
299 
 
1) The truth-value of any statement is always relative to some particular standpoint; 
2) No standpoint is metaphysically privileged over all others.678 
 Immanuel Kant said that the concept of objective reality is not valid if taken independent 
of human experience because it is only because of human experience that thought and 
classification becomes possible.679  Modern relativist philosophers such as Richard Rorty and 
Kuhn argue that differing experiences can result in differing paradigms or viewpoints of events 
and thus different “truths,” although they dismiss the idea that each viewpoint is necessarily of 
equal worth.680  Another possible explanation is the self-affirmation theory of Claude Steele 
which postulates that individuals will attempt to protect their self-integrity when confronted with 
information that contradicts their sense of self, in this case seeking a positive Iraq Surge outcome 
as reaffirming their sense of self-value. 
 The Afghanistan Surge was ordered by President Obama in response to what was seen as 
a deteriorating security situation there, combined with his campaign opinion that more U.S. focus 
should be placed there rather than Iraq.  It consisted of 17,000 U.S. troops supplementing 68,000 
NATO forces already in Afghanistan.681  Both numbers are about half of the comparable figures 
for Iraq in 2007.  About half of the PRTs in Afghanistan were staffed by non-U.S. participants, 
so there was also less of a civilian “surge.”  Consequently, it was sardonically referred to as the 
“mini-Surge” or “half-Surge.”  It did not receive the media publicity of the effort in Iraq, nor did 
it produce results approximating the dramatic change seen in Iraq.   
 It is reasonable to suppose that a person who experienced two different events may be 
more favorably inclined to pick one as the better of the two and even overestimate its success.  
Everyone wants to see their life’s work as successful.  Having participated in both Surges begins 
to accumulate a substantial portion of one’s working life.  No one wants to say they wasted a 
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substantial portion of their life, so having two different experiences gives them an opportunity to 
believe that at least one worked.  This would contrast with Vietnam, which was the primary U.S. 
effort of its time so that even a person who worked multiple tours of duty “at the front” did them 
all in Vietnam and would lack the opportunity to create a perception of  “good” and “bad” wars.     
 This viewpoint shift should not be dismissed as entirely imaginary.  Even “short term” 
results can be expected to produce gains.  A year or two without violence in a stretch of many 
years is certainly better than none at all.  Less expenditure of lives and treasure will resonate 
through the subsequent years.  Modernization and infrastructure improvements will remain.  
Interaction with Coalition members changes the perspective of the Iraqis toward Westerners.  
Many interviewees both military and civilian gave examples of Iraqis emulating their good 
habits and continuing to see these changes on subsequent trips to Iraq.  Nations contemplating 
future partnering with the U.S. would probably be less inclined to do so had it pulled out of a 
failing Iraq in 2007 versus a stable Iraq in 2011.  Possibly, viewing Iraq from the paradigm of 
Afghanistan experience changes the focus of its group members and permits them to develop a 
more nuanced or pragmatic viewpoint of the outcome in Iraq. 
 Conversely, people who did not go to Afghanistan may have a greater degree of idealism 
and judge the effort in Iraq by a more stringent standard compared to those who were members 
of a different effort that did not produce a noticeable change, even in the short run.  To the Iraq-
only interviewees there may be more of a perception that since Iraq is not currently a stable, 
prosperous nation where all sects and cultures are equally represented and thriving, the U.S. 
intervention there and the Surge in particular were not a success.  The ambitious Coalition goals 
laid out at the beginning of the effort in Iraq were not fully achieved.  This does not mean that 
good things did not happen, although whether they were worth the price paid is a normative 
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judgement.  An Iraq Surge participant who did not see the level of change they hoped for but had 





Six of the 15 leaders provided low end responses of benefits being short-term or 
uncertain, for a rate of 40%.  By comparison, seven of 21 staffers provided low end responses, or 
33%.  It could be a statistical anomaly: one less low-end response by the leaders would equate 
their answer rate with the staffer’s low-end rate. 
 The lower enthusiasm rate of the leaders for the Surge outcome could be explained by a 
keener awareness of the costs of the Surge.  These were the people who had to write condolence 
letters home to grieving American families.  This could potentially incline them to view Surge 
success through a darker lens, injecting a degree of normative opinion beyond that of staff and 
support personnel. 
 
First-Time Iraq Participants  
 
All of the interviewees who did their first tour of duty in Iraq during the Surge indicated 
some level of positive value to the Surge.  None were among the five “uncertain” responses, 
which all came from people with prior Iraq experience at a rate of 17.9%.  A single “uncertain” 
response would have increased the eight first-time Iraq participants “uncertain” response rate to 
12.5%, still interestingly below the rate of people with prior experience in Iraq. 
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 This outcome is the most difficult to explain since it would seem to run counter to the 
logic of the Afghanistan participants previously described for whom more counterinsurgency 
experience correlated with a more generous view of the Iraq Surge’s success.  Perhaps the first-
timer’s lack of prior experience in Iraq during times when the situation did not seem as dire 
would incline them to think of the high level of violence as more typical than someone who had 
been in Iraq during more stable times, thus leaving them even more impressed by the post-Surge 
stabilization of Iraq. 
 
Participants Who Did Not Travel Outside The Wire   
 
Five of the 11 interviewees who did not regularly travel outside the wire rated the Surge 
results as low end, or 45.5%.  By comparison, only 8 of the 25 interviewees who did regularly 
leave the compound, or 32%, rated the Surge results as low end.  In this case, changing a single 
response for the interviewees who did not travel outside the wire brings them to 36.4%, still 
interestingly above the rate of interviewees who did leave the compound. 
 A case can be made that going outside the wire and seeing Iraq could alter a person’s 
perception of the effort there.  Seeing markets reopening, projects completed and getting first-
hand feedback from the Iraqi general population could leave participants with a more positive 
feeling regarding Surge results than someone who only learned about these changes on briefing 
slides or cables written for higher headquarters. Someone who never left the compound might 
miss that firsthand opportunity to see change, possibly made worse since the bases were all 




Proportions Difference Testing 
 
 The following table depicts proportions testing of data points of interest among 
interviewees to the question of whether the Surge produced benefits: 
 
Subgroup 1 Proportion in 
Group 1 




who thought the Iraq 
Surge was successful 
.642 Non-AFG participants who 
thought the Iraq Surge was 
successful 
.118 3.49* 
Leaders who thought 
Surge benefits were 
short term or were 
uncertain 
.40 Staffers who thought Surge 





thought the Surge 
benefits to be short 
term or were 
uncertain 
0.0 Returning Iraq participants 
who thought the Surge 
benefits were short term or 
were uncertain 
.179 2.76 
Did not travel outside 
the wire and thought 
Iraq Surge benefits 
were short term or 
uncertain 
.46 Traveled outside the wire and 
thought Iraq Surge benefits 
were short term or uncertain 
.32 .76 
* p<0.05 
Table 9:  Significance Testing 
 
The category of significance, as described previously, proved to be Iraq Surge 
participants who subsequently went to Afghanistan.  Hypotheses were as follows: 
A1:  Iraq Surge participants who subsequently went to Afghanistan were significantly 
more likely to consider the Iraq Surge a success than Iraq Surge participants who did not 
subsequently go to Afghanistan. 
Proportions testing demonstrated a t-statistic for the difference of 3.49, a result well 
beyond a 95% confidence level and disproving the null hypothesis. 
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The other categories tested did not demonstrate a sufficient deviation from the null 
hypothesis to prove significance.   
L1:  Leaders were more likely than support personnel to consider the Surge to have had 
only short term or uncertain benefits. 
Proportions testing demonstrated a difference of 1.48, a response rate that does not 
disprove the null hypothesis. 
F1:  First time personnel deployed to Iraq were less likely to consider the Surge a success 
than personnel who had previously deployed to Iraq. 
Proportions testing demonstrated a t-statistic for the difference of 2.76, however given the 
small number of responses, this is insufficient to disprove the null hypothesis at the p<0.05 level 
– we cannot be confident that there is a difference between the groups. 
T1:  Personnel who travelled outside the wire were more likely to consider the Surge a 
success than those who did not travel outside the wire. 
Proportions testing demonstrated a t-statistic for the difference of .76, a   value that does 
not disprove the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups. 
 
SURGE LESSONS LEARNED 
  
Interviewees were asked what soft power lessons they had learned from Iraq.  As an 
open-ended question, there were a range of answers given covering a number of important 
topics.  There was no discrete categorization of answers lending themselves to statistical analysis 
akin to that provided by the query of whether the Surge produced benefits.   
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This work focuses on the important ones that consistently came up.  Many talked about 
systemic problems that in some cases still persist, feeding into a concern about internalizing the 
lessons learned.  Working together was deemed important, both in terms of interagency 
cooperation and individual personalities.  The importance of empowering host nation leadership 




A short-term hire working economics for the Embassy found that the U.S. was still trying to 
overcome organizational and structural issues.  He said that when he went back to the Embassy 
in Baghdad six months later, he did not know a single person there.  Leaders like Petraeus and 
Crocker bring with them core staffers that had worked with them before, so they did not have to 
worry about whether the team would work.  He felt that these teams were an important part of 
what made the Surge successful.682 An ambassador who worked at the Embassy early in the 
Surge returned to Washington and responsibility for managing the manning effort in Iraq.  He 
gives credit to Secretary of State Rice for implementing some level of reform to the system to get 
the best and brightest into Iraq.  He said that diplomatic service is not about going to war zones.  
The military is an organization designed and trained for that, and if you want your military career 
to succeed you need to go there from the beginning.683   
Many interviewees talked about the importance of a concerted effort.  Several officers said 
there need to be multiple integrated things happening at length: there is no silver bullet.684  An 
MNC-I planner said that coordination between the senior decision-makers within the government 
are needed so it can be implemented.  The spectrum between hard and soft power is not a switch: 
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to him it is a continuum.685 An Embassy Chief of Staff said that unity of effort does not have to 
be a Surge, but rather a coordinated versus ad hoc effort that takes a whole of government 
approach.686  An ambassador who worked on economic issues said he was a big fan of close 
integration of military and civilian efforts, particularly the PRTs.  Joint campaign planning and 
integration to him will be very important if the U.S. is ever in a similar situation.687  
 A Civil Affairs team chief described the sometimes-discordant nature of the U.S. effort in 
Iraq as “everyone and their mother was trying to execute ‘soft power.’”688  Similarly, an 
Embassy planner said that the civilian and military sides do not understand how to work 
together, and they do not fit together very well.  He feels they will not be successful unless they 
come up with a common planning schema to understand what their differences are and how to fit 
together.689  An MNC-I planner said that the integration has to start early.  Joint exercises to 
practice soft power would be effective to him.690  A PRT team leader felt that soft power was not 
resourced in Iraq.  Even with the Surge he saw it as still the military in the lead and taking on 
soft power activities by pushing themselves out to the grassroots rather than integrating soft 
power experts into what the military was doing at the lower levels.691 
 An MNF-I planner went into some detail on some of the limits facing the Executive 
Branch.  He said that people may talk about increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers 
from 6,000 to 9,000, but what are the extra people going to do?  To him, State Department is 
great at being able to deliver a message.  But when they were thrown into a conflict environment 
and had to create the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, they discovered that they did not 
have the right kind of people.  They had leaders to do engagement and people to do messaging 
and public diplomacy: what they did not have were farmers who knew how to increase crop 
yields or raise better chickens.  Even USAID is composed of more managers than front-line 
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workers, so the U.S. ends up hiring expertise from the outside on short-term contracts.  His 
concern was that it can become a grant-distributing agency handing out money and hoping the 
results obtain.    The original concept behind the PRTs was that the mission would provide 
security.  But that became the enormous Blackwater or Triple Canopy operations instead of 




 Multiple interviewees commented on the human element of success.  A Civil Affairs 
officer said that there were many things that were personality driven.   To him it is not a 
particular technique that was effective, it was how those skills were integrated, and the 
leadership has to do that.693  A provincial brigade commander recalled two basic types of State 
Department officers.  The first PRT commander he worked with wanted to make a difference and 
gain experience in Iraq even though disagreeing with the U.S. policy to be there.  He believed 
that others saw deployment as a way to have a last adventure before retirement whether they 
agreed with the U.S. policy to be there or not.  He found it more difficult to cooperate with the 
latter even if they had a lot of experience and the potential to be very effective.694  An advisor at 
MNC-I summed it up as “Honesty. Relationships. Trust.”695  A Treasury official felt it important 
to approach the task with some level of humility, not to go in and say you have the answers to all 
their problems.  To her it is not a bad thing to take a couple of days before you start “spouting 
off.”696  Similarly, a USAID manager said, “Never promise what you can’t deliver.”  She 






 Interviewees talked about the importance of interacting with Iraqis below the national 
level.  An ambassador leading economic planning felt that local engagement is important.  He 
thought it was important to have a few things they did really well and pay attention to what was 
happening at the local level.698 Another ambassador agreed, saying that empowerment must 
occur down to the local level: otherwise, you end up with no loyalty, and corruption.699  A 
stability operations commander in Baghdad said that soft power has to happen from the bottom 
up and be resourced from the top down.700  Even a detention facility commander felt that part of 
his success came from building relationships with local leaders, tribal leaders and sheikhs.701 
 Interviewees discussed standards as well.  A brigade commander in Baghdad said that 
when improving things like electricity, and sewage, it had to be to their standards, not yours.  
Painting the curbs, having flowers in the islands, giving them money to open the stores, may be 
satisfying, but can they sustain it?  Is it important to them?  Otherwise, it is just good for us.702  A 
JSAT planner at the Embassy expressed a similar viewpoint on progress. Do you pick up the 
trash yourself or do you get the Iraqis to pick up the trash?703   
 Related to this, an economics officer at the Embassy felt that the most important lesson 
was making the host government as accountable as possible.  He felt that there must be better 
synchronization to ensure that the host nation actually implements the reforms that they 
promised to execute that are the basis for so much international support, both economic and 
security.704  An IO Task Force leader believed that the only truly national interest the U.S. has is 
the production of a functional social order: everything else is subordinate to that.705  A planner at 
the Embassy believed that here is only so much you can do for someone.  If they do not want it 
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themselves then it does not matter how much soft power you put into an area, it is not going to 
be effective.706 A PRT leader said that sometimes it felt like trying to teach a high school council 
how to run a meeting.  He said they did not have minute or rules of order, things that Americans 
take for granted as the way you run a transparent process.707 
To a stability operations commander in Baghdad, security and prosperity are twin sisters.  
Long term presence mattered to him, including military presence so there is a handmaiden to the 
diplomatic arm that if necessary, can create conditions by force to consolidate gains.  He was 
disappointed to see the Maliki government institute secular oppression that was the reverse of 
Saddam’s: marginalizing the Sunni elements by failing to give them roles in government and 
withholding oil revenues.  He felt that the growth of ISIS was a function of the limit of military 
power to create the conditions of government.  Even with the world’s largest U.S. embassy, that 
was not enough.  He thought it must be coupled with the true soft power which is diplomacy and 




There were also lessons learned about messaging.  A Psychological Operations officer 
emphasized that words have to be perceived from the receiver’s point of view, not the senders.  
Also, to be proactive, not reacting to adversaries.  He felt that USIA should be pulled from under 
State Department and restored to a more independent status.709  A brigade commander 
emphasized that soft power is critical in all operations and must be integrated.  Sometimes soft 
power is in the lead, sometimes in support, but they must be integrated.710  An Information 
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Operations planner believed that there had to be effective actions to message.  To him, if there is 




 Interviewees had concerns of whether the lessons of Iraq would remain “learned.”  A 
Special Operations commander believes there is a reason that nations have insurgencies: social, 
political, economic, there are root causes, and those root causes have to be addressed by the host 
nation.  However, the U.S. entered Iraq with a leadership that had been educated to fight 
“Krasnovians,” a.k.a. Soviets, in their training and education base, even long after the 
Krasnovian, aka Soviet, threat had faded from the woodwork.712  He recalled that even in 1994-
95 all the tactical problems were still being conducted against a Soviet-based threat, long after 
the Soviet Union had collapsed.  He felt that the U.S. paid the price in the early years in Iraq.713  
A deputy brigade commander was concerned about conclusions that soft power efforts such as 
CERP worked.  He said that studies reaching that conclusion received their input from the Iraq 
Reconstruction Management System which by its own admission was at least 15% inaccurate: he 
thinks it may be twice that.  If projects were being done in an area and it was quiet, it would be 
treated as a “good” area even if it was a staging area for attacks into other areas.  His concern is 
that the U.S. did not have a strategic AAR (After Action Report) of what worked during the 
Surge.714   
 A TFBSO manager saw one of the greatest benefits of the Surge as the increased 
interaction with Iraqis itself.  To him, the victory is in the micro, not the macro.  A million 
different Americans walked the streets of Iraq from 2003-2012.  The vast majority of their 
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interactions with Iraqis were positive and helpful and created a better situation at the most local 
level.   He believes that those things endured and have value.  For example, the TFSBO created a 
lot of jobs.  Maybe because an Iraqi got his job back, his kids got to go to school, he got to feed 
his family, and perhaps his son did not join the insurgency.  He said that since you do not know 
what the downstream effects are, let the macro go and have faith.715 A Civil Affairs Reserve 
officer fell back on his experience as a customer service representative at several U.S. stores 
including Home Depot, learning to not immediately say no to the Iraqis when they made a 
request.  If the answer would be no, he would explain why.  For him it worked so well that when 
comparing his experiences there with irate Home Depot customers (the ones the manager always 
has to deal with), he said that “That was madder than anyone in Iraq got at me.”716   
 One respondent who worked banking issues said she did not learn any lessons during the 
Surge.  For her, what worked during the Surge were the same things that had worked for her in 
other countries: sitting down with people, showing them how to collect the data and money they 
needed.717  A JSPA planner believed that soft power was useful but not decisive in Iraq.  To him 
it was about which sect or sub-sect was going to control Iraq’s future and wealth.  He said that 
the military assumed causation for providing jobs and decreasing violence.  To him that was 
exactly backwards.  When the violence went down, people could go to jobs. There was strong 
correlation between violence and jobs, but to him the causation was almost certainly the other 
way round.718   
A PRT leader saw the military learning a lot of soft power and trying to adjust but 
believes there is still no substitution for having a USAID or other expert there.719  Another PRT 
leader talked about the difference in how the military and civilian sides reintegrated people 
returning from Iraq: 
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For a lot of us when we came back, the Department of State was doing nothing for us.  It 
was like, “Oh you’re back, there’s your desk: get back to work.” It was a big issue for the 
State Department because there was a concern that if you go to talk to someone about 
depression or whatever it may be this will have an effect on your security clearance.  I 
went to someone in the department and told him that we needed to do something because 
people were suffering.  If the issue was the security clearance, let’s do what the military 
does and make a mandatory session for everyone that comes back because then it does 
not impact your clearance and think of the resources we have.  Unfortunately, the State 
Department medical team was not up to dealing with it.  The first mandatory session the 
State Department medical people were not addressing the real suffering of colleagues 
who had been in the field but asking us to help them develop a list of things people 
should pack.  Crazy stuff like that.  I finally said that we could help with that, but we 
were all here because we were broken and needed to be fixed.  We had none of the 
resources that the regular military had.  We were more like the Reserves in that our 
experiences were not universal: of course now about 25% of the department has served in 
Iraq or Afghanistan.  If you were in the military and went to Iraq or Afghanistan that was 
your job and you were given credit for doing your duty.  That was not the perception in 
the State Department at the time.  The policy was anathema to most people in State 
Department.  I had only gone because I thought that it was the biggest screwup we had 
ever done and I wanted to go help fix it.  For the Department it was very difficult: people 





 The final question of most interviews was whether the interviewee felt that the soft power 
lessons of Iraq were applicable to other or future conflicts. In response, many interviewees 
echoed sentiments from the literature regarding the future.  They reflected the ideas of Malkasian 
and Plakoudas that a sound counterinsurgency strategy must conform to the local social and 
political environment utilizing a range of policies employed in different combinations as the 
situation dictates.  Many remarks echoed Olson Lounsbery and Pearson that analysis of a conflict 
should examine a gradation of causes from background to proximate.721  Because of the 
limitations of the U.S. Executive Branch, there was less consensus with Dixon that the 
politicians should be in charge.722 
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 Almost all interviewees responded with some level of positivity to the question.  A Civil 
Affairs officer felt it is a difficult question to answer, knowing that many people contributed in 
Iraq.723  A USAID contractor said that what she did in Afghanistan was not different from what 
she had done in the past.  Delivering technical assistance is a process: what worked before for 
her still worked.724  Otherwise interviewees believed that the lessons of Iraq would be applicable 




An Embassy Chief of Staff was concerned that some mis learned lessons were brought to 
Afghanistan, like increasing CERP funding versus utilizing Department of State and local 
government managed funding.725   An ambassador working economic issues at the Embassy 
feared that the lesson most people will take from Iraq is not to do nation-building. He believes 
their issue is not that the lesson should be how to do it better, but that this is not a very profitable 
activity for a government.726  An IO Task Force leader had concerns for what he called “the big 
gap” between the military and civilian sides, which he blamed on the Army for calling 
counterinsurgency “not our real job.”  To him, change needs to be framed based on resistors 
saying, “We aren’t going to do anything that stupid” even though they will.727  An Embassy 
Chief of Staff agreed there are lessons to be learned from Iraq: the question is did we learn 
them?728  Another Embassy executive pointed out that 95% of U.S. deployments the last several 
decades have not been for major combat operations, so it needs to figure out how to take soft-
power, civilian types and integrate them.  He does not believe we are doing very well at that.729  
An MNC-I planner believes that the simple fact is the U.S. is going to face this again and again. 
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He said that using military force to establish stability “seems a lot like war,” but it sounds a lot 




Two different PRT leaders drew similar lessons learned.  One believed abstract lessons 
such as trust-building are certainly there, but that each situation is unique because of ethnic 
makeup, history of centralized governance, and external influences (e.g. in Iraq from Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Syria).731  The other believed that soft and hard power elements must be at the 
table equally from the beginning.  She described an occasion where she was a participant in a 
war games exercise the military was running.  The premise was that the U.S. military goes in for 
two years to prop up an unpopular leader.  She said that that does not make sense: why go in to 
prop up an unpopular leader?  What if it is going to take 5 years, or 10?  The 2-star participating 
in the exercise was very frustrated when she was asking these questions, because they had all 
these plans about what they were going to do.  He finally looked at her and said, “Ma’am, there’s 
going to be a war: don’t stop us.”   While she understood the comment in the context of an 
exercise in process, it pointed to the crux of the matter – inadequate analysis of objectives and 
methods, coupled with a belief that ‘hard power’ was the solution to all problems. 732   
A common response was similar to an ambassador who said that it depends on the 
conflict.  To him, that determines what soft power elements you want to look at most strongly 
and back most vigorously.733  An Embassy planner pointed out the “problem” of fighting the last 
war.  Each area is going to be different, with its own dynamics, so he said that you can take a few 
lessons and apply them, but it must be tempered with understanding the new landscape. He 
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worked in Afghanistan and said it was remarkable how little they could apply the lessons of Iraq 




 In the process of doing the interviews, the author discovered that many of the 
interviewees had participated in the 2009 Surge in Afghanistan.  In many cases the same person 
was working the same type of jobs within a year of each other, only changing the country.  This 
provided a ready-made compare-and-contrast opportunity to explore how well the lessons of Iraq 
carried over into Afghanistan.  It has already been demonstrated that these individuals were far 
more likely to see the Iraqi Surge as successful than people who did not subsequently go to 
Afghanistan.  Their responses to this question below corroborate with their view of Iraq as the 
more successful Surge. 
 A JSPA planner believed that trying to apply the Iraq template in Afghanistan was not 
successful, although there were certainly lessons to be learned.735  An ambassador who worked 
in both places said that the big difference was elite Afghans do not think elections are the way to 
pick their leadership, so they cheat.  He said they were particularly weak on the developmental 
aspects of generating support for a national effort to govern, and to show results to the 
population that would create the kind of loyalty the U.S. hoped to see happen.736  An MNC-I 
planner who subsequently went to Afghanistan saw that Iraq had a lot more capability, national 
connectivity, and unity than Afghanistan which tended to be tribal and regional. In Afghanistan 
there was less reliance on the local to provincial to national connections because they were not as 
significant as they were in Iraq.737  
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An IO Task Force leader who was in Afghanistan in 2010-2011 said that one of the issues 
was U.S. people already in Afghanistan showing some resistance, with an air of “Oh, you are the 
Iraq people coming in telling us how to do it.”  They were also hamstrung with resourcing.  
According to him in Afghanistan the bid was for “lowest cost, technically acceptable” as 
opposed to “technically superior” in Iraq.”738 A PRT leader felt that “we” (the US military and 
the US population in general) have by-and-large already forgotten the lessons of Iraq and will 
have to re-learn them again (and again and again) during every future conflict.739 
A stabilization advisor at the State Department who participated in a USAID contract to 
build up the provincial governments in Afghanistan said the effort failed due to the massive level 
of corruption.740  An ambassador leading economic development in Baghdad thought bringing 
the PRT concept from Afghanistan to Iraq was helpful but cautions about trying to push too 
many lessons between Iran and Afghanistan.  Afghanistan has a completely different level of 
development in terms of education of the population, structure of the country, history and so 
forth.  He believes that when President Obama came into power and said we were going to get 
out of Iraq and focus on Afghanistan, there was a broad feeling that Afghanistan has not been 
tamed in 200 years although there are a lot of others who have tried.741   
Transformation is not fast.  A USAID manager learned that when you spend a lot of 
money planning for something you should not cut it short after one year, a mistake she felt they 
repeated in Afghanistan.  She pointed out that Afghanistan is at the bottom of the list of every 
economic and social indicator.  Planners there expected to have at least 5-6 years to carry out 
their plans.  She felt that in Afghanistan you really needed that time to work on development: 
Getting more people in schools, getting them healthier.  She saw an almost toxic mix of local and 
U.S. elections and saw how that could impact the U.S. willingness to impact an effort like that.742    
317 
 
An Embassy Chief of Staff saw similar shortfalls in Afghanistan in terms of lack of capability 
and financial resources.  He also believed that the tribal issues were more complex than Iraqi 
sectarianism.  U.S. efforts were still ad hoc, and too much aid was being given out without 
conditions.  He thinks a coordinated strategy would probably have been as effective spending 15-
20% of what was spent on financial aid in both Iraq and Afghanistan.743 A JSAT team leader at 
the Embassy said that it is almost as if Iraq and AFG should have switched constitutions because 
Afghanistan is a decentralized country with a centralized constitution and vice versa.744 
A Marine Corps MTT leader who had served in Anbar Province said that Afghanistan 
demonstrated utilization of the ink spot theory developed by David Galula.  They realized that 
ink spots were not forming in Afghanistan because the enclaves were too isolated.  When they 
did start to see that the locals were putting pressure on the Taliban not to bomb finished roads 
because that is how they kept their commerce alive, the Marines initiated some gravel-improved 
road building.  They watched prices in the bazaars drop 50-75% because the cost of 
transportation and bribe networks had ceased to exist.  He said that they turned the engineers into 
the main effort force.  That logic worked, and the effect was tangible once the roads were 
completed.745 
An Embassy JSAT planner saw some of the same security issues again in Afghanistan.  
There was a situation where they had a first-time bidder who did not know what they were doing 
and were skimping on the contract.  Then the State Dept put a 25-year-old in charge of the 
project in DC.  When she came out, the State Department did not like the project and said it was 
not secure enough to visit.  He was amazed: State Department personnel could not even visit 
their own project.  He was a “3161” hire who found that many of the best people he worked with 
in Iraq applied with the Trump Administration in 2016, but the woman in charge of hiring for 
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State Department had no idea what the 3161 program was.  He believes the modern skill set 
needs more of the imperial diplomat similar to the British civil service in the Raj system.  He 
wonders why there is not a “Civilian Readiness Corps” roster.746 
A senior TFBSO manager saw positives and negatives in Afghanistan: 
In some cases life did get better there because to him their needs were so basic.  It wasn’t 
an industrial society.  Clean water, life expectancy, a lot of the humanitarian problems 
that USAID did really well with.  He believes that where it started to break down was 
things they saw.  The Soviets were much better at this.  There are factories in Afghanistan 
in the north and west that the Soviets built that are still in operation.  He does not recall a 
single industrial thing that has been built since the U.S. has been there.  Not a food 
processing plant, even the most innocuous things.  You had a bit of the shut down the 
state-owned stuff.  Flour mills from southern AFG that were state-owned had been 
closed.  So you’re brow-beating the local farmers not to grow poppy, but there is no place 
to sell wheat.  They don’t have a supply chain to sell to.  There’s no place to sell wheat, 
but we’ll give them a massive amount of free seed so they can create a massive glut of 
wheat at harvest season that no one will pay for and you can’t export because there is so 
much on the market that the price collapses.  There was a lack of business thinking for 
creating an end-value chain for those early -stage economic commodities such as crops 
and minerals.  There was a need, but mostly just to show a vision for Afghanistan that 
was positive and advancing as opposed to a horrifically corrupt government structure. 
The AFG government structure cannot work.  It would be like the President appointing 
every governor in the U.S., every city mayor.  Imagine how corrupt that would be: that’s 
the Afghan government.  That is how it works.  It makes it horrifically corrupt with a 
structural brokenness.  Had we been able to stay on we were beginning to hit our stride.  
Things like socially responsible mineral asset development, which completely went off 
the rails when we were shut down.  It is heartbreaking because minerals are being 






 Many of the interviewees would have agreed with Byman that aid cannot create a healthy 
economy where preconditions of rule of law and social stability do not exist.748  Adaptability and 
opportunism as discussed by Gompert come through in most interviews.  Similar to De Tray, 
interviewees emphasized working with locals to strengthen ties with the government structure.  
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The effort remained one of cooperation, which Kilcullen said was more important than formal 
unity of effort.  Many would dispute Metz and his belief that the causal linkage between 
economic growth and lowering the need to join an insurgency is overestimated.749 
Other interviewees were more assertive in the applicability of the lessons of the Surge.  A 
brigade commander in Baghdad believed that soft power is here to stay. It is the way to get your 
message across, it is the way to win hearts and minds. He believes that using CA, PSYOP and IO 
to win, change or fool hearts and minds is invaluable in all environments and can help people 
without having to fight.750  A Civil Affairs officer believes that any environment you look at 
globally has that civil/soft power dynamic.  There are very few pure kinetic types to be had.  To 
him, learning from the Surge in Iraq is not just the tactics and techniques, but the visualization of 
every entity being at the ready to handle a variety of problems that has to be ready to go.751  A 
detention facility commander agreed, saying that progress cannot be achieved solely by using 
bullets and guns. For him, it takes the pen and the scroll, it takes mentoring, it takes vision, it 
takes training, it takes communication.752   A Psychological Operations officer believes the 
response to ISIS was a perfect example of that.  Instead of using ground forces to fight them, the 
U.S. does everything we can to get a force that fights them and let them do the fighting.  The 
U.S. should just enable them as best it can, otherwise according to him it creates too many 
problems with the local population.753  A staffer at MNF-I believes we will see far fewer 
conflicts of state-vs-state, and they will be much more insurgency-based, Syria and ISIS and AQ 
types of threats.754  A brigade commander recognized that soft power is one of the tools a 
commander has to use to effectively accomplish the mission.  Important to him is making sure 
that in train up and pre-deployment training there is an opportunity to practice not only with role 
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players, but ideally to work with the individuals that will be performing soft power during the 
fight.755   
An economics planner understood the importance of reform from within.  The 
international community can come in and help stabilize and transition countries, but he feels that 
the countries have to make the difficult reforms in order to get their economies going.  Aid is not 
a substitute for economic growth: good policies are.  Stopping corruption, delivering resources, 
and instituting and implementing the real legal reforms are what he says will attract 
investment.756   
A stability operations commander believes that there was a belief that the use of the 
military instrument is a last resort, that the U.S. should use diplomacy until there is no 
alternative, then sequentially moving into the use of the military.  It cannot be sequential to him: 
that does not work.  Another wrong lesson the U.S. drew from Panama was trying to militarize 
the entire process.  He said that this is a difficult policy question: what is the end point of an 
extensive military commitment?  Who is going to stand up as an elected official and say “I’m 
signing up for 50 years?”  How do you stabilize a region that has gone into such chaos that it has 
called your interests into play?757 
A Special Operations commander answered the question of the applicability of Iraq’s 
lessons to the future as follows: 
You think?  Look at the two global power-level adversaries we have today, the Chinese 
and the Russians.  Great power competition is all about soft power.  With maybe a little 
kinetics thrown in here and there which both sides try to avoid.  We don’t want to go to 
war with the Russians, and more importantly the Russians don’t want to go to war with 
us.  But they still want to achieve their objectives.  It is a concept we try to put out from 
USASOC and SOCOM of the idea of the gray zone – the area of competition between 
“peace” and “war.”.  We have a US government structure that’s binary: we’re either at 
peace or we’re at war.  If its peacetime, the State Department is in charge.  If it is a war, 
it’s a military-led effort until we establish peace, then we go back to the State 
Department.  We’re all soft power or hard power.  But the reality is, and the whole Cold 
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War was that way as well, the competition most of time is this gray zone: it isn’t peace, 
but it isn’t war either.  We aren’t fielding tank-on-tank in Eastern Europe right now, and 
we’re not fighting fleet-against-fleet in the South China Sea.  All of these various soft-
power tools are what we have as levers to compete with against China or against Russia.  
They know at this point in time that they don’t want to fight us in a conventional war.  
The Russians know they’ll lose, and the Chinese know they’re not ready.  So they are 
trying build that conventional capability, but between now and that point they’re still 
trying to achieve their objectives and set conditions.  And how are they doing it?  They’re 
doing it through a variety of soft-power tools. The Chinese philosophy of the “three 
warfares” (public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare) is all about how to wield 
soft power at the strategic level.  Our challenge as a nation is that our structure isn’t 
unified until you get to the President, and our interagency process for wielding soft 
power in a holistic, synergized way is really hard.  Nobody owns information, although 
State Department will tell you they do.  They don’t really: despite various attempts such 
as the Global Engagement Center (GEC) to synchronize messaging, we have not 
achieved that.  You still hear people talking about getting back to the US Information 
Agency days, at least we would be a little bit more coherent.  But the reality is no one 
owns messaging, everybody does it.  All the different tools that we wield are in different 
Executive departments, and the interagency process to do that coherently is pretty hard 
in our democracy.  The answer is to say we’re in a cognitive fight with adversaries that 
want to compete with us for real stakes in a world environment of players who are 
choosing sides or will eventually have to choose sides, and we better figure out how to 
get our act together and compete in that space with soft power at the tactical level.  I 
think we have good, integrated soft power at the tactical level.  We haven’t integrated at 
the operational and strategic level with real success against an adversary that is a bit 
more advanced than a bunch of guys with AK-47s, cell phones and computers. 
 
When the threat reemerged, the Iraqi army that existed at that point wasn’t necessarily at 
the level of capability than it had been in the past.  We always talked about bringing the 
enemy’s capability down and bringing the friendly capability up, and when you get to 
that crossover point where the Iraqi capability is more than the insurgents, you can 
leave.  But they didn’t account for what I as a good Special Forces guy call “FID 
(Foreign Internal Defense) entropy.”  You could just as easily call it Security Force 
Entropy.  Like thermodynamics, systems tend to randomness without energy coming in to 
keep the system organized.  The other part of the crossover is that you can’t just get the 
host nation forces better, you have to get them to the point that their energy into the 
system prevents entropy from taking place.  For many years we were the energy that kept 
the Iraqi capability high enough, but we didn’t get to that crossover point where Iraqi 
energy kept their forces ready and capable, having their own processes to train and 
evaluate themselves.  We did that with the ISOF (Iraqi Special Operations Forces).  They 
were more advanced.  When we left in 2011, they had sufficient internal process to 
maintain readiness, and by the way we kept two ODAs (Operational Detachment) with 
them assigned to the Embassy manning structure, so we still had contact with the ISOF 
all the way up until ISIS returned, and then we came back with additional advisors and 
trainers.  They had better internal energy, but the reality was we never left them.  The 
rest of the Iraqi army didn’t have that.  They were left to their own means and they hadn’t 
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reached that crossover point between US energy to maintain capability to Iraqi energy to 
maintain capability.758 
 
A State Department manager at the Embassy during the Surge believed that if you set the 
right scenarios and structure and most importantly get the right people it will work better, which 
he feels is the responsibility of senior decision-makers in Washington knowing who their best 
people are and sending them.  His concern is that history has shown that Congress will stop 
funding programs or renege on commitments just as it did in Vietnam.  He does not want to get 
in a situation where the U.S. gets people to trust it and the only way to help them is getting them 
back to the States.759  An economics manager at the Embassy said that a lot of what the Surge 
incorporated was based on action at the Embassy.  To him, DoS sent the “A” team.  At one point 
there were 5 or 6 ambassadors in Iraq.  He saw it as a testament to what America can do when it 
brings all elements of national power.760 
A brigade Civil Affairs officer believed that his most important less to apply in the future 
was that counterinsurgency or not, especially when the U.S. is the occupying country, it needs to 
treat people as humans.  Sitting down man-to-man (there were only a couple of women he talked 
to in a year), treat them as another human being and things go better.  He feels that you will 




 Interviewees provided a number of thoughtful reflections regarding the ramifications of 
the Surge in Iraq.  Common themes emerged around coordination, personalities, smart power and 
the importance of close cooperation with the Iraqis. 
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 Almost all interviewees believed that the Surge produced benefits, although many 
considered them to be short term or truncated by the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq in 
2011.  Many considered the local-level benefits to be the longest-lasting, with national changes 
proving more ephemeral.  Improvements in security, economics and politics around the country 
were highlighted by participants as being made possible by the Surge.  Both military and 
civilians saw the Surge as creating the “breathing space” hoped for by the political leadership in 
Washington.  People who subsequently went to Afghanistan were much more likely to view the 
Surge as successful than those who did not whether military or civilian, careerists versus short-
term hires or working in Baghdad or an outer province. 
 A wide variety of lessons were learned by the Surge participants.  Variations of the use of 
smart power were prevalent throughout the interviews.  They found that combinations of 
coercive and attractive power produced the best results.  Because of the nature of their respective 
sizes, the military ended up with an outsized portion of the attractive power mission as well as 
their traditional coercive power role. 
 Interviewees saw the value of their lessons for other conflicts as well.  In some cases, 
they would immediately get an opportunity to apply them, particularly in Afghanistan during the 
Surge there ordered by President Obama.  They found that general principles tended to carry 
over better than specific techniques, particularly in Afghanistan.  Others talked more expansively 













 In the end, the Surge worked.  The U.S. was willing to give General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker the opportunity and resources to try a new strategy in Iraq.  They would 
take a smarter power approach utilizing closer cooperation and integration of their military and 
civilian assets to better mix coercive and attractive power to stabilize Iraq. 
The gamble by the Bush administration paid off in the form of a dramatic drop in 
violence in Iraq to levels not seen since the CPA days.  Fortuitous circumstances meant that the 
Surge coincided with the Anbar Awakening by the Sunni tribes and a rise in oil prices.  The 
synergy of these events resulted in a stable environment that allowed a restart of stalled political 
and economic development which continued years after U.S. troop levels were drawn back down 
at the end of the Surge in 2008. 
 This work utilized the database provided by interviewees to develop a chronological 
retelling of the Surge and the role of smart power in Iraq. Chapter Two served as a literature 
review on power, counterinsurgency and the Surge.   Chapter Three describes the decision to 
utilize grounded theory and referral sampling of interviews to develop a data base of perspectives 
on the Surge across a variety of executive agencies and other personal experience and mission 
criteria. 
Chapter Four laid out some of the problems that had plagued previous Coalition 
operations starting with poor cooperation between the various Federal agencies.  It went into 
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detail about domestic support for the effort dropping as well as international backing for U.S. 
efforts in Iraq.  Interviewees described problems with trying to unite the competing ethnic and 
sectarian factions in Iraq even while trying to develop an adequate security force and proceed 
with unsecured and unviewed reconstruction projects.   
 Chapter Five began by analyzing U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, developed at Fort 
Leavenworth in 2006 under General Petraeus’ personal oversight.  It signaled a change in 
strategy as well as in support from the U.S. senior leadership.  Interviewees talked about how 
they and their counterparts would work to change their method of operation to get closer in line 
with smart counterinsurgency doctrine, utilizing coercive and attractive power to stabilize and 
rebuild Iraq. 
 Chapter Six demonstrated how General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were able to 
implement their strategy change and the effect it had in stabilizing Iraq.  The military moved off 
its large compounds and established Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts shared with its 
Iraqi counterparts.  Oversight of Iraqi appointment of military leadership was maintained to 
prevent capable commanders from being replaced by political flunkies.  The civilian effort was 
strengthened thanks in large part to the expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept 
throughout Iraq.  It provided the first real opportunity for the State Department to work below 
the national level and build capacity that had been stymied under the top-down rule of Saddam 
Hussein. 
 Chapter Seven detailed the interviewees perspectives regarding the Surge.  It presented 
several interesting findings regarding interviewee opinions of the effectiveness of the Surge.  It 
provided the opportunities for interviewees to detail lessons they personally learned about soft 
power during the Surge.  It also examined opinions on how well the lessons of the Surge 
326 
 
translate to potential future conflicts.  This final chapter is focused on a series of lessons learned, 
grouped into three categories: lessons reinforcing the previous literature on counterinsurgency 
and the Surge, lessons different from or even at odds with the literature, and new lessons.   
 




Smart power was an important element of the Iraq Surge, effectively marshalling and 
combining attractive and coercive power resources to achieve success. Surge lessons can be 
utilized in current or future counterinsurgency environments concerning strategies for effectively 
marshalling soft and hard, attractive and coercive, power resources to achieve a 
counterinsurgency goal. Almost all of the key lessons and take-aways from this project involve 
how to combine these sources of power to address the challenges of a counterinsurgency 
environment. This is no matter of mere ratio-setting (e.g. 52 percent hard, 48 percent soft) but a 
matter of intelligently combining sources of power to achieve intended results and minimize 
unintended results. 
This section sums up a number of lessons in counterinsurgency that were drawn from the 
interviews and grouped into three categories in terms of whether they reinforce, differ from, or 
are new relative to the existing literature on counterinsurgency and the Iraq Surge.  Lessons are 





Lessons Reinforcing the Literature 
 
In many cases the interviewees shared lessons that are reflected in the literature on 
counterinsurgency.  Naturally, these are not new lessons.  Prior counterinsurgents had 
understood and documented them in the course of their own campaigns.   This section discusses 
the following items: 
1) Broad counterinsurgency lessons do not change, but have to be relearned 
2) Counterinsurgency environments are complex 
3) Cultural and religious differences are difficult to reconcile 
4) The government is often the cause of the insurgency, otherwise there would be no insurgency 
5) Domestic issues complicate foreign counterinsurgency, particularly in democracies 
6) Isolating a counterinsurgency environment is difficult 
7) Modern transportation/communications make counter insurgency difficult 
8) Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed 
9) Smart power is normative 
10) Coercive or attractive power are rarely effective singly 
11) Adaptability is critical 
12) Working with the host nation is harder, but in the long run more successful 
 
Broad counterinsurgency lessons do not change, but have to be relearned 
 
      Counterinsurgency is hard.  Many of its lessons require effort, which may cause them 
to be “unlearned” in the interregnum between conflicts.  Interviewees talked about the need for 
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getting off the large compounds, letting the Iraqis take the lead in reconstruction efforts while 
maintaining oversight, and improving cooperation between the military and civilian efforts.  All 
these things can be found in successful counterinsurgency summaries and lessons learned 
published by U.S. and other military forces after their experience in prior conflicts.  But they are 
hard to do.  They are also usually seen as moving a nation’s military away from its “core 
mission” of fighting conventional warfare and are typically resisted by the senior military 
leadership. 
It is easier and safer (in the short run) to stay on big bases, do things one’s own way, and assume 
contracted work is getting done.  But it is less effective and eventually counterinsurgents become 
forced by circumstances to adapt or fail in their counterinsurgency effort.  Hoffman saw FM 3-24 
as a first step that required a continual effort to revive and update the old lessons to apply to 
modern counterinsurgency.762 
 
Counterinsurgency environments are complex 
 
 An insurgency is normally going to be the result of irreconcilable differences between 
parties of interest within a country.  Ethnicity, religion, economics and political repression (or 
belief of same) reach a point where one or more groups no longer feels that they formal process 
meets their needs and rebels.  External actors can be expected to further complicate matters in 
pursuit of their own interests.  Writers such as Olson Lounsbery and Pearson and Metz described 
a number of these issues in their work. 
Interviewees in different parts of Iraq and performing different mission recounted a 
variety of issues which complicated the U.S. goal of taming the insurgency under a unified, 
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representative Iraqi government.  They described problems with equitable wealth distribution, 
political representation and appointing military leadership with the intent of fairly representing 
all ethnic and sectarian groups.   
 
Cultural and religious differences are difficult to reconcile 
 
 Antagonisms between differing cultures and religious sects have typically built up over 
centuries and seen varying levels of dislike, repression and even outright warfare and massacre.  
Most academicians understood even before the 2003 invasion that reconciling Sunnis, Shia and 
Kurds would be a difficult task even if the U.S. would be willing to consciously collaborate with 
the differing ethnic and sectarian groups.  Ahmed and Allawi captured many of the ethnic and 
sectarian problems that plagued Iraq, and Fitzsimmons described the difficulties of reconciling 
these at a national level.763 
 The U.S. principle of separation of church and state tends to carry over into its 
international relations.  Most American government officials are reluctant to get directly 
involved with the religious aspects of foreign countries.  Almost every interviewee was asked 
whether they or their unit interacted with religious figures.  Some said yes, but only one went 
into detail.  General Petraeus said there was a plan for engagement with religious figures and that 
he and Ambassador Crocker met regularly with them but did not expand further on his answer.764  
It seemed to be a case where the “right” answer is to say yes so interviewees said yes, but the 
reality was there was little systematic effort by the Coalition as a whole. 
 This may have been a missed opportunity for the U.S. in Iraq.  The imams are an 
important and influential part of the leadership in the Middle East.  They have large weekly 
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audiences and people listen to them.  Some also share influential leadership positions within the 
tribal structure.  The U.S. Constitution does not say government officials cannot interact with 
foreign religious leaders.  The reluctance to partner with foreign religious elements likely 
reduces the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East where Islam 
plays a critical role. 
 
The government is often the cause of the insurgency, otherwise there would be no insurgency 
 
 Shia control of the Iraqi government created an opportunity for them to avenge 
themselves against the Sunnis who had ruled them for decades and they promptly took advantage 
of it.  Sunnis were excluded from political participation, although Sunni electoral boycotting 
made some of the damage self-inflicted.  Dixon and Gentile described these problems and how 
they specifically applied to Iraq. 
Interviewees talked about how oil revenue streams flowed the slowest toward the Sunni 
provinces.  Competent Sunni military commanders were replaced with government loyalists.  
Shia death squads operated wearing Iraqi military and police uniforms.  U.S. planners had failed 
to envision that cutting the Sunnis out of the political process beginning with CPA orders for de-
Ba’athification and eliminating the Iraqi Army would lead to a Shia takeover to a degree the 
Sunnis would perceive as unfair and lead to a sectarian insurrection.  Insurgency literature 
commonly understands that dissatisfaction with the government is normally responsible to some 




Domestic issues complicate foreign counterinsurgency, particularly in democracies 
 
 Iraq demonstrated the difficulties that emerge as a counterinsurgency effort becomes less 
popular with the citizens of the occupying country over time.  General Petraeus and his key 
leaders understood that they were not just buying time in Iraq, but in the U.S. as well.  Kaplan 
described his invitation to academicians and other outside experts to the initial conference laying 
out the groundwork for publication of FM 3-24.765  He and Ambassador Crocker also spent a 
great amount of time preparing for their Congressional testimony per Mansoor and made a 
conscious effort to be available to U.S. media.   
 The inclusive nature of General Petraeus’ domestic strategy maintained the spirit of the 
concordance theory of Schiff.  He identified his key target audiences in the U.S. and made sure 
that he influenced their perception of the Surge.  He also worked to create and maintain allies in 
both the Legislative and Executive branches and get their agreement to his new strategy. 
 
Isolating a counterinsurgency environment is difficult 
 
 The literature is familiar with the idea that international organizations both governmental 
and non-governmental are going to have interests in a country experiencing insurgency.  It is 
only to be expected that other groups such as neighboring countries or coreligionists will be even 
more concerned about the outcome in a country than the foreign counterinsurgent.  Ricks talked 




 Interviewees talked about turning the Sunnis in Iraq away from al-Qaeda as being a key 
element of the success of the Surge and its timing.  They talked about efforts by neighboring 
states such as Iran to exercise their own influence in Iraq, but even nominal U.S. partners such as 
Saudi Arabia were often perceived as attempting to push events in Iraq in directions inimical to 
U.S. goals, particularly their efforts to subvert Iraqi unity and spread Wahabi jurisprudence and 
practice. 
 
Modern transportation/communications make counter insurgency difficult 
 
 In line with the above, it is easier for insurgent elements to maintain contact with each 
other and with the outside world.  In colonial days occupying powers could conduct brutal 
suppression campaigns with few details leaking out.  Even if they did, there was no United 
Nations to act as a focal point for criticism of their activities to center on.  The Internet in 
particular makes it difficult for governments to isolate insurgent areas and activities from the 
attention of the outside world.  Kilcullen described the challenges of trying to isolate an 
insurgent environment.767  
 However, the gate swings both ways.  When reviewing the lessons learned for this work, 
one interviewee pointed out that in this case, “When we took full and creative advantage of 
advances in transport and communication, we were able to leverage them effectively.”768  He is 
absolutely correct: the trick of course is being able and willing to leverage these capabilities 





Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed 
 
 History demonstrates that as counterinsurgents conduct operations at smaller and smaller 
levels they become more effective.  U.S. cordon-and-search operations in Vietnam proved to be 
of limited value, whereas working to establish regional and provincial Vietnamese defense forces 
inflicted 40% of all casualties on the insurgent forces despite receiving less than 2% of the 
military funding.  The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in 1979 with a military doctrine that did 
not call for employment of artillery below divisional level: within a few years they were 
operating smaller detachments coordinating with fire control officers at company or even platoon 
level.769 
 One of the key Surge elements in urban areas was getting Coalition forces off their big 
bases and establishing Joint Security Stations or Combat Outposts coinhabited by Iraqi security 
forces.  Additionally, approval authority for Psychological Operations messaging was delegated 
to lower-level units to allow for quicker approval and publication of messages that would better 
resonate with the local target audience.  PRTs were also stood up to increase interaction with the 
provincial governments in Iraq.  Interviewees talked about how these initiatives at local levels 
increased trust and decreased the ability of insurgents to isolate and control portions of Iraq. 
 
Smart power is normative 
 
 This work and others have demonstrated that hard and soft power can be quantified to an 
extent.  Smart power is a normative term: there is no single correct admixture of coercive and 
attractive power guaranteed to produce the desired end state in an insurgency.  Keohane, Nye 
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and other writers have understood that smart power is a moving target, a concept rather than a 
destination.  Interviewees for this work continually emphasized the need to use coercive and 
attractive power in differing combinations. 
 Brigade commanders interviewed for this work particularly described the granularity of 
their operations.  In one sector they might be fighting while in another sector they were 
rebuilding.  Or they might find themselves fighting today in a sector they were rebuilding 
yesterday.  They might even find themselves fighting off attacks in a sector while trying to 
rebuild it.  They had to constantly adjust their power distribution to match the fluid nature of the 
environment. 
 The Civil Affairs teams were usually provided with security elements, demonstrating the 
binary nature of the operational environment.  In a similar manner, the State Department and 
other civilian workers found that establishing stability an providing security for attractive power 
personnel was necessary to carry out the mission.  Many interviewee statements demonstrated 
that progress was not linear and constant adjustments to the security and development inputs had 
to be made.  Proper use of smart power was very dependent on the decision-maker on the ground 
who best understood the situation in their area of operations. 
 
Coercive or attractive power are rarely effective singly 
 
 Multiple interviewees talked along the lines of “You can’t kill your way out of an 
insurgency, but you can’t buy your way out of one either.”  The smart power concept is certainly 
necessary to be successful in any counterinsurgency environment, even if the subcomponents 
vary.  Elements of coercive and attractive power must be present.  Friis wrote about the Western 
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tendency to focus on attractive power activities without coordinating with a strong security 
component,770 while Plakoudas talked about the importance of coordinating a wide range or 
response policies.771 
 Interviewees talked about the situation prior to the Surge as the U.S. was drawing back to 
the large bases.  Not only was the soft power failing to eliminate insurgent elements, but it also 
became less effective as there was no security for State Department to safely get out and conduct 
its projects.  The leadership wanted to turn the country over to the Iraqis, but they were clearly 
unable to effectively take over.  Soft power by itself was not going to be the solution no matter 
how much the U.S. wanted it to be. 
 
Adaptability is critical 
 
 FM 3-24 paved the way for the Surge effort to give commanders more flexibility and 
freedom to seize opportunities presented to them by circumstances in their area of operations.  It 
drew on historical examples of counterinsurgency campaigns that were willing to change their 
procedures to better match what needed to be done.  FM 3-24 was doctrine, but it was not 
doctrinaire.  This contrasted with Gompert and his criticism that the typical U.S. response to 
problems is to create more bureaucracy.772 
Russell (2013) described the beginning of the U.S. interaction with Sunni tribes in 
western Iraq.  Interviewees talked in particular about the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq 
as developments previous Coalition leadership had avoided but General Petraeus eagerly 
integrated into his stabilization plan with great success.   Cooperation between DoD and DoS 
moved down to provincial and local levels with interviewees talking about the great success they 
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had when they began working together at all levels.  Messaging worked faster to exploit 
Coalition successes and insurgent failures. 
 
Working with the host nation is harder, but in the long run more successful 
 
 The U.S. likes to go it alone.  Even the “Coalition of the Willing” put together for Iraq 
was overwhelmingly U.S. in makeup.  Most countries would prefer to do things themselves if 
possible.  As discussed previously, then they can do what they think is best, not have to reconcile 
planning with a partner who probably does not share the same goals.  This includes the host 
nation.  It is quicker not to bring in local leaders to shape the planning process and who will not 
want to do things the way the Americans do.  West described problems the U.S. had by not 
partnering with the Iraqis and attempting to moderate their behavior prior to the Surge, while 
Pirnie and O’Connell previously described the importance of preparing U.S. military forces to 
partner with indigenous security. 
 As multiple interviewee statements attest, the problem with cutting out the host nation is 
that resources and activities expended in the host nation are less likely to be effective.  Multiple 
stories indicated that if the locals do not care about a project, they are not going to care if 
corruption, incompetence or theft keep the project from being completed.  During the Surge, 
more effort was made to involve the Iraqis in the decision process and continue oversight to 






Lessons Different Than the Literature 
 
A number of interesting commonalities came from the interviews that share a perspective 
different than what is commonly found in the literature on counterinsurgency.  In some cases the 
literature does not seem to fully recognize the importance of the item under consideration.  In 
some cases the interviews follow a different tack than that found in the literature.   This section 
discusses the following items: 
1) Foreign counterinsurgency becomes less popular with the local population with time 
2) Counterinsurgency falls into a gray area neither DoD nor DoS are enthusiastic about entering 
3) There are many ways to incorrectly apply power 
4) The importance of FM 3-24 was in its existence as much as what was in it 
5) Coercive and attractive power can be differentiated 
6) Power elements are both more and less fungible than commonly understoodIraq has little 
concept of a national will 
7) Someone will be unhappy about any change made 
8) Adaptability can apply to higher level guidance 
9) Part of the fight occurs in detention facilities 
 
Foreign counterinsurgency becomes less popular with the local population with time 
 
Couch observed that when we invade a foreign land, the clock starts ticking.773  
Regardless of the circumstances under which we arrived or how we carry out the occupation, our 
presence will be resented.  The literature in general understands this concept but does not seem 
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to appreciate how fast and hard the resentment builds up.  People barely tolerate their own 
nation’s leaders telling them what to do, let alone those of another country. 
Americans in Iraq had a difficult time understanding why they were never as popular as 
they expected.  After all, the Coalition had gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his family!  
Americans understood that that gratitude would fade over time.  The problem was that the 
Americans and Iraqis viewed two different starting points for their relationship.  To the 
Americans in Iraq and to an extent the decision-makers in Washington it began in March 2003 
when American invaded Iraq.  To them, overthrowing Saddam should have immediately given 
them a large boost into positive perception and the slide down would commence from there. 
Iraqis saw the relationship differently.  They would date the U.S.-Iraqi relationship from 
1990.  Not because of being evicted from Kuwait, but from the post-conflict sanctions imposed 
on them by the U.S. via the United Nations.  The sanctions built up a great deal of resentment 
among many Iraqis for more than a decade before the 2003 invasion.  Even for Iraqis glad 
Saddam was gone his removal only brought them back to a neutral feeling about the Americans, 
not a positive one, thus they were soon back to a negative perception of the Americans.  The 
Americans might be proud of themselves for repairing a power generator, but the reason it was 
not working was often because the sanctions had prevented the Iraqis from being able to obtain 
parts for it or it had been bombed during the invasion.  There was a continual disconnect between 
Americans who expected more appreciation from Iraqis for what they did and Iraqis who did not 
see why the Americans should be proud of fixing something that was not working because of 





Counterinsurgency falls into a gray area neither DOD nor DOS are enthusiastic about entering 
 
In a world with infinite resources, it would be easy to allocate the right force to 
counterinsurgency.  After the Army’s 1st Corps conquered an area, it would be replaced by the 1st 
Reconstruction Corps.  This organization would report to the President, not DoS or DoD.  It 
would have a security division, a reconstruction division, a civic development division and other 
elements intended to stabilize a recovering nation.  It would not need much artillery, but neither 
would it incorporate Peace Corps volunteers.  At some point the Reconstruction Corps would be 
able to depart leaving the U.S. Embassy as the senior national authority in a “normal” country. 
We do not live in a world with infinite resources.  The cost of maintaining a Reconstruction 
Corps would be closer to DoD costs than DoS costs.  Even if the bulk of the members were in a 
callup role as opposed to being full-time government employees, they would still get pulled from 
their normal jobs for a crisis.  Every time Guard or Reserve members get activated, that is time 
they are not spending making their fellow Americans healthier, wealthier, or wiser.   
For the foreseeable future there is little choice but to continue leaving the military in a 
foreign country longer than they want and bringing in civilians earlier than they want.  
Consequently, getting the right resources in place and determining who is in charge will persist 
as problems the U.S. deals with in a counterinsurgency environment.  Both DoD and DoS will 
say the right things about participating in a counterinsurgency environment, but in reality, both 






There are many ways to incorrectly apply power 
 
The literature talking about smart power will usually talk about developing the right “ratio” 
of hard and soft power.  Nye goes into this in detail and acknowledges that it is not simply “Soft 
Power 2.0.”  What does not seem to be deeply explored is that you can get the ratio right but still 
not get the result you want if you apply the wrong type of hard or soft power.  This issue was 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three and highlighted by Table 3.1.   
The operationalized concepts of coercive and attractive power help understand the nuances.  
Shutting the Sunni tribes in western Iraq out of the political process was a coercive action that 
drove them closer to al-Qaeda.  It was not until the U.S. began working with those tribes after the 
Anbar Awakening and through the Sons of Iraq that the right coercive power was being applied 
against the threat in Anbar Province. Likewise, messages to the Iraqi people to support the local 
government lacked the attractive power that combining those messages with efforts to make the 
government more accountable to Iraqis produced. 
Just because soft power is being applied in a situation calling for attractive power does not 
mean it is being effective.  The “Lion Fountain” story detailed in Chapter Four perfectly 
illustrates this point.  The Americans spent a considerable amount of money with the best of 
intentions to try to do something nice for the local populace.  Because they had not bothered to 
ask the locals what they wanted, it ended up being money largely wasted and thus was an 
ineffective initiative.  It demonstrates the difference between soft power and this work’s 
definition of attractive power.  The project was soft, but since the Iraqis probably would not want 
it repeated (mostly because they did not care), it was not attractive.  Spending the money on a 
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project the Iraqis wanted done would have had a better chance of achieving the desired attractive 
power effect. 
 
The importance of FM 3-24 was in its existence as much as what was in it 
 
Field Manual 3-24 provided a number of tactics, techniques and procedures for more 
effectively waging counterinsurgency in Iraq.  It revitalized a number of ideas that had proven 
successful in past conflicts and integrated them into a more pragmatic approach to combatting 
violence in Iraq.  Kagan described it as not just about non-kinetics, but the synergy between 
kinetics and non-kinetics.774  Writers such as Hoffman focus on the content of FM 3-24 and its 
applicability to conflict.775 
The ideas in FM 3-24 were important.  Just as important, if not more so, was the 
publication of the field manual itself.  It signaled higher level support for the new style of 
counterinsurgency warfare.  It meant that General Petraeus and his subordinates in Iraq were able 
to carry out their strategy without having to look over their shoulders or justify their new tactics 
to higher headquarters.  Doctrine does not just tell soldiers how to do things: it gives them 
permission to do it. 
 
Coercive and attractive power can be differentiated 
 
Some theorists postulate that power is power and can all be put into a category of altering 
behavior, getting people to do something they were not going to do or refrain from doing 
something they were going to do.  For example, Boulding and his “smaller” concept of power as 
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discussed previously.  By this standard there is no difference between types of power as they will 
all induce changes that would not have happened without the application of power. 
 This work set out operational definitions for coercive and attractive power and provided 
examples of each one.  Even if both have a goal of behavior change, they each approach it 
differently.  This was seen as potentially impacting the length and depth of their impact.  
Interviewees talked at length about the mix of power during the Surge in Iraq and that each had a 
role.   
 
Power elements are both more and less fungible than commonly understood 
 
People are fungible.  This work has demonstrated that military people found themselves 
thrust into roles better suited for civilians such as manning the State Department’s Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT).  Interviewees talked about doing jobs different than what they 
anticipated or trained for prior to arrival in Iraq.  Nevertheless, they were largely able to adapt to 
circumstance and be a suitable, even if not always ideal, substitute. 
 The tools available to counterinsurgents have varying degrees of fungibility.  Cash is 
probably the most fungible.  A bulldozer can be utilized to dig an entrenchment for a defensive 
military force or clear a field for agricultural use: it can even be used to create a road that serves 
both military and civilian purposes.  An artillery piece or guided missile has little application 






Iraq has little concept of a national will 
 
Strategic level U.S. planners placed a lot of faith in the idea of forging a single identity 
amongst large blocs of Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, in addition to other smaller but distinct groups 
such as Christians or Marsh Arabs.  Attempts were made to generate a sense of common purpose 
through political participation and development of a fair system of government spending, 
particularly from oil revenues.  There were some elements of common purpose: for example, 
Americans probably failed to appreciate and emphasize the unifying nature of the Iran-Iraq War, 
where all Iraqis were proud of the role they played in preventing an Iranian takeover of their 
territory.   
 However, theorists from Marx forward have shown a desire to assume unity where it 
probably does not exist.  The idea of thousands or millions of people sharing common opinions 
on a range of political, economic and social issues is probably unrealistic even if they share an 
ethnic identity or language.  In a country such as Iraq pretensions of a broad sense of common 
identity simply led to efforts unlikely to produce the desired results. 
Interviewees continually stressed the fragmented nature of the Iraqi body politic.  There were 
a few instances of Iraqis such as military commanders trying to forge a truly national unit.  
However most Iraqi military and civilian leaders the interviewees saw were more concerned with 
maintaining or furthering ethnic, sectarian, tribal or family power and influence.  Many were in 
fact using the levers of government in a manner coldly calculated to further the cause of their 





Someone will be unhappy about any change made 
 
Political theory seems to assume that intervening nations will be bringing “good” changes.  
What it may fail to appreciate is that there will always be someone who benefits from the current 
system.  Lifting the pre-invasion sanctions may be seen as an unalloyed good, but that viewpoint 
was not shared by the tribes who had been making a good living smuggling into Iraq.  
Particularly in Anbar Province, it was a factor that led them to support Al-Qaeda infiltration 
efforts and serve as their supply and fighter conduit. 
Likewise, the requirement placed in the Iraqi Constitution that 25% of the representation in 
the 329-member Parliament had to be women.  Laudable in its intent, nonetheless it must be 
viewed in terms of opportunity cost that 83 men who would have been part of the Parliament are 
now shut out of the power structure.  This does not say that Iraq would be better off with those 
men in the Parliament, simply that they are going to be unhappy with the new system and serve 
as a potential source for other malcontents to rally around.   
 
Adaptability can apply to higher level guidance 
 
Napoleon reportedly said that commanders have the right to disobey an order not given to 
them by a superior standing next to them.  A friend of the author always used to emphasize the 
need to provide “Scooby Snacks” to our bosses.  They expect certain things to be done, and we 
have to meet those needs to keep them happy.  After that we could use our remaining time to do 
the things we knew needed to be done.  Writers may assume that subordinates in executive 
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branch agencies are conscientiously attempting to carry out the letter of higher headquarters 
directives as well as their spirit. 
Several interviewees talked about modifying or disregarding higher level requirements 
they believed did not meet the situation in Iraq or their part of Iraq.  Messaging in particular was 
often designed for the chimeric national audience rather than local populations commanders 
lived and worked with.  Their concerns were recognized by the continual effort to push message 
approval authority to lower levels.  Cooperation with the Anbar Awakening began as a series of 
lower-level initiatives by subordinate commanders acting without formal authority or guidance, 
although the change in strategy brought higher headquarters around to supporting these 
initiatives.   
 
Part of the fight occurs in detention facilities 
 
Detention facilities should be thought of as the holding area for people most likely to 
become future insurgents upon release.  The ability to decrease the recidivism rate of prisoners 
can directly and immediately reduce the effectiveness of the insurgent effort.  The positive image 
that can accrue from released prisoners telling friends and loved ones that they were treated with 
respect is a valuable component of counterinsurgency legitimacy. 
Press reporting on prison facilities focuses on scandals such as Abu Ghraib and rarely 
seems to cover day-to-day details of detention and rehabilitation.  Academic writing on the topic 
is also sparse.  Perhaps it is simply an uncomfortable subject people do not care to explore and 
discuss in detail.  Or it could be that to researchers there is a mental shift that seals those people 





Interviewee themes emerged that are covered in sparse detail in academic literature or are 
not understood.  Interesting findings include: 
1) Capabilities are not inherently hard or soft 
2) The importance of personalities is often underestimated 
3) Surge participants thought their effort made a difference in Iraq 
4) Surge participants thought the lessons learned are applicable to other conflicts 
 
Capabilities are not inherently hard or soft 
 
 Academic writing on power generally inclines to placing national capabilities into 
categories of either hard or soft.   
 Interviewees bore out the idea that State Department was capable of conducting coercive 
power just as the military could conduct attractive power.  Part of the role of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) was keeping their Iraqi contacts exercising power and spending 
their budgets responsibly.  The implied threat was the loss of future funding or support if they 
failed to do so.  They were also willing to hire security teams, although this was intended to 
provide security for attractive power operations. 
 The military was also put into a number of attractive roles because they had the bulk of 
the assets available in Iraq.  Most or in some cases all of the PRT manning consisted of military 
personnel.  Interviewees ended up being part of the attractive power mission of the Surge, if not 
by choice then by availability.  A military person conducting attractive power was considered 
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better than no attractive power at all being conducted.  They were also largely responsible for 
training the Iraqi Security Forces.  As a salaried position, there was never a shortage of recruits.  
The training was intended to instill pride and professionalism in the Iraqis, making them want to 
emulate the U.S. forces through their personal example.   
 Counterinsurgents who are willing to employ assets in nontraditional roles find that they 
have more options available to them than those who do not.  Even an imperfect solution helps 
advance national security objectives and takes better advantage of the resources available.  
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker both demonstrated the ability to employ the resources 
available to them innovatively. 
 
The importance of personalities is often underestimated 
 
Numerous psychological studies exist regarding the role personalities play in 
relationships.  Literature discussing the importance of personalities abounds when discussing 
private enterprise.  Interviewees for this work who came from a business background 
consistently spoke about establishing and maintaining good relationships as being key to 
effectively doing their jobs in the private sector as well as Iraq.  Careerists as well agreed that in 
many cases replacing one person could have a dramatic effect on cooperation and accomplishing 
U.S. goals in Iraq. 
The issue has been discussed earlier in this work.  It is certainly easier to assume that 
replacing one colonel or foreign service officer with another person of the same grade will not 
alter performance of the mission.  Compiling data and analyzing it is less afflicted with 
subjective valuations that can make statistical calculations much more problematic.   
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Counterinsurgency literature reviewed for this work talks about changes brought about by 
changing personnel but did not seem to reflect the contention of interviewees that such changes 
could be the difference between success and failure in performing one’s job.  It does not seem 
that experience or competence mattered as much as simply having someone in the position who 
genuinely tried to work with their counterparts from other organizations.  In many cases a willing 
if inexpert leader can be supported by their own experienced subordinates who understand that 
the organization is expected to act in a cooperative manner by the example set by the leader.  As 
organizations get to know each other they develop trust which will further deepen coordination 
and cooperation. 
 
Surge participants thought their effort made a difference in Iraq 
  
 As detailed in the previous chapter, 31 of 36 interviewees felt that the Surge produced 
some form of positive benefit.  Positive responses were spread across all subgroups interviewed: 
military and civilian, staff and leaders, those who worked in Baghdad versus outer provinces, etc.   
To most the benefits were long-term or had the potential to be so.  They pointed to the 
decrease in violence as the primary indicator of success.  The Shia militias reduced their level of 
violence and the Sunni tribes turned against al-Qaeda.  This return of a secure environment 
allowed the Iraqis to restart the political process and begin to rebuild the economy and return to a 
sense of normalcy. 
 The coercive effort was a combination of the increase in size and posture of U.S, military 
forces in combination with improvements in Iraqi Security Force capabilities.  Partnering 
together at Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts, they brought the levels of violence 
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down to the point that one interviewee recalled that there were days with no war-related deaths in 
Iraq.   
The attractive effort was aided by the expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to 
allow the Americans to have capabilities to practice attractive power below the national level of 
government during the Surge.  Interviewees felt that the efforts they made working with regional 
governors and mayors were part of trying to change the top-down leadership of Saddam Hussein 
and the Ba’athists. 
 
Surge participants thought the lessons learned are applicable to other conflicts 
 
 Surge participants almost all felt that what they learned in Iraq during the Surge was 
applicable to other and/or future conflicts.  There was concern that the lesson would not be 
learned or even mislearned.  They believed that better cooperation among the various agencies 
produced a more effective counterinsurgency effort.  They also appreciated the importance of 
soft power and saw it as part of an integrated strategy. 
As has been discussed, many of the interviewees subsequently participated in the surge in 
Afghanistan.  They believed that some of the Iraq lessons did not transfer over to Afghanistan, 
but many did, particularly the need for adequate security and the necessity of cooperation among 








This work has multiple possibilities for further research.  Obviously more of the same 
types of interviews could further solidify data sets and bring in other job specialties or regions of 
the country.  Other potential research avenues include further study of the perceptions of people 





 The finding regarding Iraq participants who subsequently went to Afghanistan would be 
interesting to explore in more detail.  Because this work focused on Iraq, perceptions on 
Afghanistan were not explored.  Interviewees were not asked if they thought the Afghanistan 
Surge produced results.  Such a question would require a control group of people who 
participated in the Afghan Surge but not the Iraq Surge.     
Another research option might be other instances of being able to compare and contrast 
viewpoints of people who participated in counterinsurgent efforts in different countries.  Some 
historical examples might include: 
1) France 40s-60s: Vietnam and Algeria (possibly WWII as an insurgent) 
2) U.S.: 1900s-30s: China, Philippines, Central America 
3) British 1890s-1910s: S Africa, AFG, Zulu, Egypt 
4) British 1940s-1960s: Palestine, Malaysia 
5) Russia: 50s-90s: Baltics, Czech, Hungary, AFG, Chechnya 
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6) Israel 60s-present: West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon 
7) China 50s-present: Tibet, Uyghurs 
Some would have to rely on records as the individuals involved have passed.  Interesting 
differences could be explored.  Some cases might not have an effort that was distinctly more 
successful.  Some may not have occurred in close chronographic proximity like the Iraq and 
Afghan Surges, which might impact the subject’s perception (insurgency might look different 
when one is a colonel rather than a lieutenant).   
 Attempting to find insurgents who participated in multiple efforts would be more difficult 
but not impossible.  Most insurgents will tend to operate in their own country until they gain 
control of it.  People like Che Guevara who participated in the successful Cuban insurgency but 
subsequently went to a different insurgent effort, in his case Bolivia, are unusual.  Vietnamese 
who fought against the French and subsequently the U.S. could also be considered.  Islamists 
who fought in multiple insurgencies would also provide a wealth of experience, if difficult to 




In the course of this study two particular gaps were of note.  One was dealing with access 
to material which is in many cases still classified and not likely to be released in the next few 
years.  The other was shortfalls in the pool of interviewees gathered for this study.  Although a 
credible number of U.S. military and civilian personnel participated, there are other groups 






 During research the author contacted the Historian’s Office of Central Command (the 
major command responsible for Iraq)  and was told that they were still in the mid-1990s for 
document declassification and release.  Much of the information regarding messages is 
classified.  Although the document itself becomes unclassified upon release, the staff work of 
selecting target audiences and intended effects are classified.  The same problem exists with 
reconstruction and development projects.  Future access to these types of information will help 




Studying the effects of soft power during the Surge would benefit from including the 
following categories of people in Iraq during the Surge: 
Iraqis – Snowballing proved difficult.  Some of the interviewees had maintained contact 
with Iraqis they worked with during the Surge but were reluctant to pass along their contact 
information.  This was usually due to concerns that it could open the Iraqis to retribution, 
particularly the ones still living in Iraq.  Broader perspective on the effects of soft power in Iraq 
would be obtained by soliciting information from the intended target audiences and Iraqi 
decision-makers. 
Coalition Partners – Many of the Coalition of the Willing partner states had reduced their 
role in Afghanistan by 2007.  In the case of NATO members, some had shifted their focus of 
effort to Afghanistan which they saw as the greater national security threat due to the increase in 
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heroin importation.  Attempts to contact individuals proved largely unsuccessful.  Information 
from Coalition partners might have demonstrated different approaches and goals to soft power 
efforts during the Surge. 
Junior Participants – Snowballing tended to roll sideways and up.  Interviewees were 
more likely to recommend a peer or supervisor as a follow-on interview rather than a 
subordinate.  The 13 Department of State interviewees included 5 ambassadors.  Non-
commissioned officers, junior officers and younger foreign service officers might have a 
different perspective than that of colonels, generals, and chiefs of mission.  In the interest of 
brevity, such research could encompass an ordinally-scaled questionnaire versus the more open-




What do I believe were the important elements brought out by the interviews?  Certainly, 
none are unimportant.  Whether already commonly understood or brought out in a new light in 
this work, all play a role in successful counterinsurgency.  As this work has tried to show, there 
is no single magic element.  The best strategies integrate a complex and adaptable series of 
capabilities working together.  Nonetheless, three areas stood out as reminiscent of my own 









 When everyone cooperates, it is amazing what can be done.  When they do not cooperate, 
it is amazing what cannot be done.   I served as an installation Protocol Officer in Saudi Arabia 
in 1998.  As such I was responsible for the tents where we quartered our Distinguished Visitors 
(DV).  The nearest bathroom facilities were located about 100 feet from their tents.  The 
installation had poor outdoor lighting, creating a hazard for any personnel making head calls in 
the middle of the night.  I asked the installation supply officer if we could get some flashlights 
for the tents.  She told me to put in a requisition request and they would consider it at the next 
budget meeting.  I asked if I could sign some out temporarily, that we had appointed service and 
defense secretaries tripping over tent ropes at 2 AM.  She refused.  She was not being mean or 
vindictive, she just could not see the issue as a problem that needed prompt attention. 
 She rotated out before I had to make it a general officer issue or just go to the PX and buy 
$10 worth of flashlights myself.  After her successor arrived, I brought up the issue with him: an 
hour later the DV tents had flashlights in them.  Steve continued to be a “can do” officer for the 
remainder of the time we served together.  To me, the frustrating part of that experience (and a 
thousand like it in my military career) was that the time I was spending on a trivial issue like half 
a dozen flashlights was time I was not spending tackling bigger problems.  All it took was a 




 This ties together two concepts brought out by the interviewees: 
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1) Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed 
2) Iraq has little concept of a national will 
I was a staff officer at the Defense Language Institute at the time that smoking was in the 
process of being driven out of the military workplace.  There was a point where the installation 
smoking policy changed three times in two days.  It was a frantic two days for us at headquarters.  
We were drafting revisions, running them through the necessary staff at breakneck speed, then 
burning out the copier trying to get the most current version down to the different schools and 
service units.  After all, we cannot have our servicemembers comporting themselves based on a 
superseded policy, right? 
 Several months after this I was reassigned to one of the schools for language training.  As 
I was lounging around the school’s main office looking at their bulletin board, I saw that the 
version of the installation smoking policy posted there was one older than the three we had 
promulgated.  I would bet that half the people stationed there did not even know there was an 
installation smoking policy.  All the effort we had put in at headquarters was invisible outside 
our building. 
 The farther up the chain policy is trying to be made, the less likely it is to connect with 
individuals.  Particularly with messaging, the idea of developing a message of any depth that will 
appeal to all of Iraq is unrealistic.  A boss of mine once said that when a new contingency 
operation comes up, you have to get the first PSYOP product right because it is going to the front 
page of the New York Times.  After that you can develop products that will resonate better with 
the locals.  The Coalition learned that the best way to do this was pushing message approval 
down to the lowest levels. 
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 Along the same lines, the large-scale reconstruction projects in Iraq tended to not do well.  
Smaller ones were more successful.  Getting the local factory up and running, fixing the roads, 
and expanding the ISF brought local leadership and desires into play and ensured there was not a 
magnet for corruption and theft being created.  PRTs played a big role in making this happen and 
were a great smart power concept. 





 If we do not learn the lessons of the past, we are doomed to repeat them (although a wag 
has observed that those who do learn from history are doomed to make the opposite mistakes).  
Most of the basic principles properly applied during the Surge were not new.  Technology may 
change, political systems may change, economies may change, but people and their core beliefs 
and behaviors do not. 
 It can be frustrating to go through a relearning process.  Among the duties of my first 
assignment was serving as the unit Awards and Decorations Monitor, tracking and processing 
award submissions for the unit.  I was given the current tracking log that had about two dozen 
status columns in it.  I decided this was too many and developed a new tracking log that just told 
when notification of award eligibility went to the subordinate unit and when we sent the 
completed package up the chain for approval.   
 I immediately began having problems with packages not getting done, not getting 
corrections done in a timely manner, or just getting lost and I did not know where they were.  As 
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each stage of failure reared its ugly head, I modified my tracking log to prevent it from 
happening again.  Things eventually calmed down.  After about a year I happened to come across 
the previous tracking log.  To my chagrin it looked almost identical to what I had built after 12 
months of mistakes I could have avoided by simply following the recipe my predecessor had left 
for me.  After that I avoided making major changes to the job for the first 30 days after I 
assumed a new role. 
 Listening to experienced individuals is a good idea: there is a reason they are 
experienced.  I used to tell my IO classes that if experience was the sum of my mistakes that 
were not quite bad enough to get me fired or killed, then I had a ton of experience to share with 
them.  Once the U.S. was willing to acknowledge there was an insurgency in Iraq and started 
paying attention to experienced people past and present on how to deal with one, the situation 
began to change.  But it is hard.  How many times did I hear “This time is different” when it is 
really just old wine in new bottles?  The coercive lessons of counterinsurgency are particularly 




During a progress review for this work one of the committee members asked me what I 
hoped this study would contribute.  My response was that my hope is that if the U.S. or any 
nation finds itself in a similar situation in the future, this work might reduce the number of deaths 
and level of destruction before the counterinsurgents become smarter in their application of 
power.   
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The challenge with grounded theory work is it does not readily lend itself to statistical 
analysis.  We cannot take ten lab rats, inject them with CERP money, and study the results.  
Isolating an independent variable in a counterinsurgency filled with a mosaic of actors each 
operating with their own set of goals is an enormous task.   Every one of their stories is unique.  
Every project each interviewee pursued was unique.  Every day of pursuing the same project was 
unique.  The interview questions were deliberately designed to be as open-ended as possible to 
allow the interviewee to take the answer in a direction they felt was of interest.  It can be risky to 
take a datum and try to draw a larger conclusion from it: it may be an outlier. 
This does not mean that their words should be dismissed.  The value of these interviews is 
that they are real-world experience.  There are no artificial laboratory conditions.  They are not 
the outcome of a computer simulation.  They are not training exercises.  In fact, multiple 
interviewees talked about training they did prior to deploying, in some cases training developed 
by Iraq veterans and designed specifically for their upcoming mission.  They commented that it 
was better than no training, but usually they found a different situation on the ground and had to 
quickly adapt.  In many cases I would be hard-pressed to debate their insight based on a 
statistical print-out. 
Fortunately, many of their experiences had shared commonalities.  Many of these 
commonalities were close enough to be grouped together.  Some permitted broader conclusions 
to be drawn tying together the situations addressed by the interviewees.  The goal of this work 
was to sift through these interviewees and search for those commonalities with the objective of 
developing a set of lessons to be learned from their experiences.  Open-ended questions meant 
not all the commonalities are equally sized.  Some lumps are bigger and richer than others. 
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 The Iraq war was a difficult time for everyone involved.  The Iraqis had their country torn 
apart with conflict and economic dislocation raging for years.  Coalition members found 
themselves conducting lengthy tours apart from their families.  If you came into the office early 
you often had to listen to one of your coworkers in an argument with their spouse back home.  
Both were probably nothing more than good people in a difficult situation.  Not all my friends 
made it home.  Not all of the ones who did were able to comfortably readjust to their old lives.  
Physical and mental illness are an expected byproduct of living in a stressful environment.   
 The cost to America was immense and the bill continues to mount with each disability 
pension or too-early funeral service.  Perhaps a “smarter” strategy implemented sooner with 
high-level support could have reduced the costs to everyone.  Perhaps a stable Iraq could have 
been achieved earlier, with all the U.S., Iraqi and international ramifications that would have 
entailed.  Perhaps less violence would have resulted in less bitterness among the warring factions 
and more willingness to work together.   
 It is my sincerest wish that U.S. forces never become in involved in another 
counterinsurgency effort.  However, if or when the next such conflict arises, it is my great wish 
that the lessons of the past can be a guide to the future. 
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